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The title of this collection of recent narratological work, Postclassical Narra-
tology: Approaches and Analyses, openly alludes to David Herman’s seminal 
bimillennial volume Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analy-
sis (1999b), in which he introduced the term postclassical narratology1 and 
defined it as follows:
Postclassical narratology (which should not be conflated with poststruc-
turalist theories of narrative) contains classical narratology as one of 
its “moments” but is marked by a profusion of new methodologies and 
research hypotheses: the result is a host of new perspectives on the forms 
and functions of narrative itself. Further, in its postclassical phase, research 
on narrative does not just expose the limits but also exploits the possibilities 
of the older, structuralist models. In much the same way, postclassical phys-
ics does not simply discard classical Newtonian models, but rather rethinks 
their conceptual underpinnings and reassesses their scope of applicability. 
(1999a: 2–3)
As Herman here indicates, recent postclassical narratology has to be con-
trasted with what he calls classical narratology. What is subsumed under 
classical narratology primarily embraces the work of the French structural-
 1. David Herman originally coined the term “postclassical narratology” in an essay 
called “Scripts, Sequences, and Stories: Elements of a Postclassical Narratology” (1997). 
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ists (Roland Barthes, Claude Bremond, Tzvetan Todorov, A. J. Greimas, and 
Gérard Genette), but also the German tradition in narrative theory (Eberhard 
Lämmert and Franz Karl Stanzel). Herman, in turn, refers back to Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan’s classic study Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics 
(1983) (Herman 1999a: 1), which—together with Seymour Chatman’s Story 
and Discourse (1978) and Gerald Prince’s work (e.g., 1982, 1987)—most 
clearly shaped the image of what narratology is for a wide readership of stu-
dents and academics. Other influential spokespersons at first seen to fit the 
same groove were Meir Sternberg (1978), Thomas Pavel (1986), and Susan 
Lanser (1981).2 Yet, one could argue that these representatives of classical 
narratology already started to drift away from the structuralist model, if ever 
so slightly and imperceptibly. Where Rimmon-Kenan felt she had to cling to 
the “geometric imaginary” of narratology (Gibson 1996) in order to ward off 
deconstruction (Herman 1999a: 1), Lanser began to incorporate questions 
of gender and ideology (see her debate with Diengott—Lanser 1986, 1988; 
Diengott 1988), Sternberg went beyond mere chronology to focus on the 
dynamics of narrative design, Thomas Pavel founded possible-worlds theory, 
and Seymour Chatman started to analyze film narrative.
 Herman uses the term narratology “quite broadly, in a way that makes it 
more or less interchangeable with narrative studies” (1999a: 27, n1; original 
emphasis). In fact, it is more or less synonymous with the phrase “narra-
tive analysis” in his subtitle and in the final sentence of the “Introduction,” 
which provides an outlook for “narrative analysis at the threshold of the 
millennium” (27).3 In order to understand how Herman conceives of the 
originary quality of classical narratology, it is therefore useful to contrast it 
with its postclassical progeny. As Herman sketches the distinction in the pas-
sage cited above, postclassical narratology introduces elaborations of classi-
cal narratology that both consolidate and diversify the basic theoretical core 
of narratology. Such work is exemplified by the essays in the first section 
of the volume. Moreover, postclassical narratology proposes extensions of 
the classical model that open the fairly focused and restricted realm of nar-
ratology to methodological, thematic, and contextual influences from out-
side. These reorientations reflect the impact of literary theory on academia in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Herman in this second area notes three major lines of 
 2. All of these scholars have groundings in Russian Formalism and linguistics-based nar-
rative semiotics. The term narratology was coined by Todorov in Grammaire du Décameron 
(1969), where he writes: “Cet ouvrage relève d’une science qui n’existe pas encore, disons la 
NARRATOLOGIE, la science du récit” (1969: 10).
 3. For a critique of this broad usage see Nünning (2003: 257–62) and Meister’s more 
radical suggestions concerning a narratological fundamentalism (2003).
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development which reflect sections two to four of the collection: the rise of 
“new technologies and emergent methodologies”; the move “beyond literary 
narrative”; and the extension of narratology into new media and “narrative 
logics.” (Compare the table of contents and 1999a: 14–26 in the “Introduc-
tion.”)
 With some historical hindsight one could now perhaps regroup these 
developments slightly differently and focus on four types of interactions. The 
first category is roughly equivalent to Herman’s revisions of classical prob-
lems. It includes work that extends the classical paradigm intradisciplinarily 
by focusing on theoretical blind spots, gaps, or indeterminacies within the 
standard paradigm. Methodological extensions of the classical model, sec-
ondly, absorb theoretical and/or methodological insights and import them, 
producing, for instance, narratological speech act theory (Pratt 1977), psy-
choanalytic approaches to narrative (Brooks 1984, Chambers 1984, 1991), 
or deconstructive narratology (O’Neill 1994, Gibson 1996, Currie 1998). 
The third orientation integrates thematic and therefore variable emphases 
into the classical model, whose core had consisted of invariable, i.e., uni-
versal, categories. Examples are feminist, queer, ethnic or minority-related, 
and postcolonial approaches to narrative (see Nünning’s diagram listing the 
many new versions of narratology [2003: 249–51]). Contextual versions of 
postclassical narratology, constituting the fourth trend, extend narratological 
analysis to literature outside the novel. Narratology now includes a consid-
eration of various media (films, cartoons, etc.), the performative arts as well 
as non-literary narratives. Conversely, the narrative turn (Kreiswirth 2005, 
Phelan 2008b)4 in the (social) sciences and humanities has resulted in an 
awareness of the centrality of narrative in many areas of culture, from auto-
biography and history to psychology, the natural sciences, banking or even 
sports (Nash 1990).5
 Thus, while some scholars continue to work within the classical paradigm 
by adding analytical categories to the original base of structuralist concepts, 
others attempt to instantiate a more or less radical break with the tradition 
by transcending the assumptions and categorical axioms of the classical para-
digm. The motives for such a reconceptualization of the theoretical models 
and even the discipline of narratology often relate to the consequences of the 
narrative turn. Put differently, it is because narrative theory can now service 
 4. See also, for current relevance, the ESRC seminar “The Narrative Turn: Revisioning 
Theory” at the Centre for Narrative and Auto/Biographical Studies at the University of Edin-
burgh (2007–2008). www. sps.ed.uk/NABS/AbstractsSem1.htm.
 5. For extensive surveys see Fludernik (2000), Nünning (2000), Nünning/Nünning 
(2002), Ryan (2004), and Phelan/Rabinowitz (2005).
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many different sciences (or serve quite diverse masters) that an adaptation 
of its theoretical bases becomes necessary. In this way new light tends to be 
shed on hitherto unquestioned axioms which had been developed in relation 
to literary narrative, most often the novel, and which are therefore not ideally 
suited to their new contexts of application.
 The present volume abides by Herman’s dual focus on what one could call 
a critical but frame-abiding and a more radical frame-transcending or frame-
shattering handling of the classical paradigm. The first part of this book deals 
with extensions of classical narratology that take the achievements of struc-
turalism as a starting point for close scrutiny and then suggest revisions of 
the traditional paradigm. Here the emphasis is on adding new distinctions, 
questioning unacknowledged presuppositions, and on radically revising the 
standard concepts and typologies, redesigning the conceptual underpinnings 
of structuralist approaches. The second part, on the other hand, focuses on 
narrative analyses that move beyond the classical framework by extending 
their focus to a variety of medial and thematic contexts, from the visual realm 
to the generic (e.g., autobiography), the queer, and the non-literary (e.g., 
medical interviews). Some contributions also arrive at radical revisions of the 
classical model because the intermedial or thematic applications they have in 
hand require such trimming or redesigning.
 The essays in this volume moreover address potential overlaps between 
the various postclassical approaches. For instance, they link ethnic concerns 
with those of gender, visual narration with reader response, the autobio-
graphical mode and psychoanalysis with issues of gender and sexual orienta-
tion, formal concerns with sociological analysis, or the rhetorical approach 
with the unnatural. More generally, this collection presents new perspectives 
on the question of what narratives are and of how they function in their dif-
ferent media. We also wish to suggest that, as the first decade of the third 
millennium draws to a close, we are now perhaps beginning to see a second 
phase of postclassical narratology. David Herman’s volume Narratologies 
could be argued to represent the first adult phase in a Bildungsroman-like 
story of narratology. In this reading, Shklovsky and the Russian Formalists 
figure as narratology’s infancy and the structuralist models of the 1960s and 
1970s as its adolescence. This
[ . . . ] adolescence of narratology was followed by a reorientation and diver-
sification of narrative theories, producing a series of subdisciplines that arose 
in reaction to post-structuralism and the paradigm shift to cultural studies. 
[ . . . ] Out of the diversity of approaches and their exogamous unions with 
critical theory have now emerged several budding narratologies which beto-
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ken that the discipline is in the process of a major revival. (Fludernik 2005: 
37)
Herman’s narratologies would therefore correspond to a phase of diversi-
fication. In postclassical narratology’s second phase, which is one of both 
consolidation and continued diversification, one now has to address the ques-
tion of how these various narratologies overlap and interrelate (see also Her-
man/Biwu, 2009). Narratology, to continue our metaphor, in settling down, 
will now have to align with one another the numerous centrifugal models 
that arose in the first phase of postclassicism; it will now have to determine 
how these thematic and contextual inflections of narratology can be linked 
to the structuralist core in methodologically sound ways. This is not a call 
for a prescriptive unity of methods and models but an attempt to align the 
many disparate ways of doing postclassical narratology (phase one) and to 
check out their moments of overlap as well as the extent of their incompat-
ibilities. Newer developments also focus on the no doubt fuzzy boundary 
line between a general literary study of narratives and more specifically nar-
ratological analysis of the same texts. No one overarching model is envisaged 
here, but in our opinion considerable consolidation despite continuing diver-
sity is called for at this moment. By taking phase-one developments seriously, 
postclassical narratology will moreover subject its structuralist core to severe 
critical scrutiny, lopping, modifying, revising, or redesigning the foundations 
of the discipline. In what follows, we will first discuss the diversity of current 
narratological research and then turn to developments that suggest a more 
centripetal tendency in the process of establishment.
PostClassiCal NarratologY: PHase oNe
Multiplicities, interdisciplinarities, transmedialities
As Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck put it, the differences between the classi-
cal structuralist paradigm and the new postclassical research program can be 
characterized as follows: “Whereas structuralism was intent on coming up 
with a general theory of narrative, postclassical narratology prefers to con-
sider the circumstances that make every act of reading different. [ . . . ] From 
cognition to ethics to ideology: all aspects related to reading assume pride of 
place in the research on narrative” (2005: 450).
 Ansgar Nünning has captured the extent and variety of new approaches 
in a useful diagram (2003: 243–44) that provides a visual map for what he 
considers to be the most important distinctions between classical and post-
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classical narratologies.6 He contrasts (1) classical text-centeredness with post-
classical context orientation and (2) the treatment of narrative as a langue 
with the pragmatic focus on the parole of individual (use of) narratives in 
postclassical approaches.7 As in the syntax vs. pragmatics dichotomy, Nün-
ning also (3) sees classical narratology as a closed system and postclassi-
cal narratologies as emphasizing the dynamics of narration. He moreover 
(4) subsumes the shift from the functional analysis of features to a reader-
oriented focus on strategies and applications in the dichotomy and (5) con-
trasts classical bottom-up analysis with postclassical top-down inferencing. 
Nünning’s table next opposes (6) “(reductive) binarism” with a “preference 
for holistic cultural interpretation” and (7) structuralist taxonomy with the-
matically and ideologically directed analysis. As a consequence, (8) where 
classical narratology remained shy of moral grounding, postclassical nar-
ratologies open themselves to moral issues, analogously causing (10) a shift 
from descriptive to interpretative and evaluative paradigms. Thus, (9) classi-
cal narratology’s aim to provide a “poetics of fiction” (in alignment with the 
semiological thrust of narratology) is superseded by “putting the analytical 
toolbox to interpretative use.” Nünning also sees the rise of diachronic or 
historical narratology as a postclassical phenomenon (11). His summary in 
the diagram of the dichotomy classical vs. postclassical consists in the con-
trasts of (12) universalism vs. particularism (which is equivalent to contex-
tualism), and (13) the opposition between a relatively unified discipline vs. 
“an interdisciplinary project consisting of heterogeneous approaches” (all 
243–4). Paradoxically, Nünning’s rhetorical strategy of establishing open, 
non-taxonomic postclassical narratologies actually involves the dualism of a 
before and after and therefore relies on a structural binarism of the very kind 
that it is trying to transcend.
 Generally speaking, then, postclassical narratologies along the lines 
sketched by Nünning seem to move toward a grand contextual, historical, 
pragmatic and reader-oriented effort. Such integration and synthesis allows 
researchers to recontextualize the classical paradigm and to enrich narrative 
theory with ideas developed after its structuralist phase. While classical nar-
ratology was a relatively unified discipline or field, postclassical narratologies 
are part of a large transdisciplinary project that consists of various heteroge-
neous approaches (see also Herman 2007).
 6. The numbering in what follows corresponds to Nünning’s order in the diagram. 
 7. To put this slightly differently, the chief concern of structuralist narratologists was 
“with transtextual semiotic principles according to which basic structural units (characters, 
states, events, etc.) are combined, permuted, and transformed to yield specific narrative texts” 
(D. Herman 2005: 19–20).
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 Feminist narratology can serve as a good example of the types of strate-
gies and extensions of the classical model that are being practiced in postclas-
sical narratologies. Feminst narratologists such as Robyn Warhol or Susan 
Lanser have highlighted the fact that narratives are always determined “by 
complex and changing conventions that are themselves produced in and by 
the relations of power that implicate writer, reader, and text” (Lanser 1992: 
5). Much feminist narratology studies elements of story and/or discourse 
against the foil of gender differences. Such a deployment of narratological 
models places narratives in their historical and cultural contexts, highlighting 
the central significance of gender stereotypes. As a consequence, some femi-
nist narratologists like Susan Lanser (1986, 1988) and Ruth Page (2006) have 
proposed that one take the gender of authors, authorial audiences, actual 
readers, narrators, narratees, and characters into consideration, thus initiat-
ing a rewriting of classical models. The question of a narrator’s properties 
needs to incorporate their sex and gender; the explicit naming of narrator 
figures, their external appearances, and actions often yield information on the 
basis of implied genderization by means of dress codes, behavioral patterns, 
and cultural presuppositions. Feminist narratologists moreover supplement 
classical theories about actants by sociocultural roles. Under the heading of 
“the engaging narrator,” Robyn Warhol has postulated the existence of dif-
ferent types of narratorial discourse in texts by nineteenth-century male and 
female authors (1989), adding a consideration of popular literature to this 
field of inquiry (2003). Kathy Mezei (1996) and Ruth Page (2003), on the 
other hand, look at “male” and “female” plot structures (e.g., one climax vs. 
several climaxes or no climax at all).
 It is also worth noting that Judith Roof (1996) and Lanser (1995, 1999, 
this volume) have extended feminist narratology into queer studies. For 
example, in Come As You Are, Judith Roof looks at the reciprocal relation 
between narrative and sexuality. Queer narratology should disclose the traces 
of heterosexuality in narratives, pointing out “the production of sexual cat-
egories whose existence and constitution depend upon a specific reproduc-
tive narrative heteroideology” (1996: xxvii). Thus, narrative analysis should 
uncover “the preservation of literal and metaphorical heterosexuality as (re)
productive (and hence valuable).” At the same time, Roof pleads for a “con-
stitution of narrative that includes both heterosexuality and homosexual-
ity as categories necessary to its dynamic” (xxvii). This raises the following 
narratological problem: In what way do feminist and queer approaches go 
beyond the thematic highlighting of male (patriarchal and heteronormative) 
dominance in literature and beyond an analysis of counterhegemonic and 
subversive discourse in general? One way of answering this question is to 
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describe feminist/queer (or postcolonial) strategies by resorting to narrato-
logical categories. Thus, the use of second-person fiction in Edmund White’s 
Nocturnes for the King of Naples (1978) allows the author to inveigle the 
heteronormative reader into sympathizing with a love relationship, which 
only later emerges as homosexual (cp. Fludernik 1994b: 471).
 Analogously, postcolonial narratologists centrally address the question 
of how the narrative text is imbued with colonial or neocolonial discourse 
that correlates with the oppression of native populations and how the dis-
course simultaneously manages to undermine this very ideology (Pratt 1992, 
Spurr 1993, Doyle 1994, Aldama 2003). Brian Richardson (2001a, 2006, 
2007b), for instance, has suggested that we-narration occurs strategically in 
postcolonial fiction, reflecting the anti-individual conception of traditional 
cultures.8 While these two examples focused on the use of a prominent exper-
imental form of narrative for the purposes of conveying non-normative or 
counterhegemonic messages, other narratologists have tried to argue that the 
categories of narratology need to be modified or extended in order to accom-
modate the concerns of race, power, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. 
In a recent MLA panel on “Race and Narrative Theory,” Dorothy M. Hale 
proposed that narratology could not adequately deal with postcolonial writ-
ing since its categories were imbued with colonial logocentrism (Hale 2008). 
Though we do not share this viewpoint, we do agree that colonial, sexist, or 
racist literature often uses narrative devices and strategies that through their 
use in these ideologically loaded texts may seem to acquire phallogocentric 
and discriminatory overtones. Yet postcolonial, queer or antihegemonic nar-
ratives may be using the same writing strategies for quite subversive ends. 
Such a technique of “double-voicing” can be fruitfully compared with Henry 
Louis Gates’s category of “signifying” (Gates 1988) and of course with 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s characterizations of heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981). Narra-
tive devices by themselves do not carry any ideological freight; often they are 
neutral modes of focusing attention that only acquire normative or critical 
meanings in their various contexts of use.
 Another important feature of postclassical narratologies already noted in 
Herman (1999a) is their emphasis on new media. While traditional narra-
tologists such as Stanzel and Genette primarily focused on the eighteenth-cen-
tury to early twentieth-century novel, transmedial approaches seek to rebuild 
narratology so that it can handle new genres and storytelling practices across 
a wide spectrum of media. An interesting issue in this context is the question 
of how narrative practices are shaped by the capacities of the medium in 
which the story is presented. In their attempts to determine the different lan-
 8.  For work in the area of cultural narratology see also Nünning (1997 and 2000).
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guages of storytelling, proponents of transmedial narratology look at plays, 
films, narrative poems, conversational storytelling, hyperfictions, cartoons, 
ballets, video clips, paintings, statues, advertisements, historiography, news 
stories, narrative representations in medical or legal contexts, and so forth.9 
For instance, much attention has recently been paid to the analysis of drama 
(Richardson 1987, 1988, 2001b, 2007a, Fludernik 2008, Nünning/Sommer 
2008) as a narrative genre. Thus, the question of whether it makes sense to 
posit a dramatic narrator (Jahn 2001)10 or whether one will need to introduce 
a level of performance into narratology (Fludernik 2008) has been raised. 
Work on drama as narrative has highlighted the numerous narrator figures in 
plays (Richardson 1988, 2001b; Nünning/Sommer 2008). Analogously, film 
studies have underlined narrator-like elements in film such as voice-over nar-
ration (Bordwell 1985, Kozloff 1988, Branigan 1992). The concept of a dra-
matic narrator as the instance that tells the story of the play similarly echoes 
discussions about the existence of a “cinematic narrator” in film; both resort 
to the narrator category from novels or short stories (Chatman 1990: 127).11
 Other transmediality narratologists such as Marie-Laure Ryan, Jörg 
Helbig, and Werner Wolf have studied the potential narrativity of hyperfic-
tions (Ryan 1999, 2001; Helbig 2001, 2003). They also focus on possible 
narratives in paintings, poetry, and even musical pieces (Wolf 1999, 2002, 
2003; Ryan 2004). Transgeneric extensions of narratology (see especially 
Ryan 2008), in addition to the analysis of drama and poetry (Müller-Zettel-
mann 2002, in progress), target autobiography, historiography, legal narra-
tive, documentaries, and conversational storytelling (see also Nünning and 
Nünning 2002).
 Besides the theoretical and medial extensions just outlined, some forms of 
postclassical narratology ground themselves in a rhetorical framework. For 
both Genette and Booth, rhetoric served as a mastertrope for their textual 
analyses. Rhetorical narratology moreover integrates findings from reader-
response theory. Rhetorical theorists such as Wayne C. Booth, James Phelan, 
and Peter Rabinowitz are particularly interested in the contexts of narra-
 9. For instance, Jarmila Mildorf’s essay in this collection addresses the potential useful-
ness of narratology in the social sciences, while Martin Löschnigg looks at autobiographies 
from the perspective of cognitive narratology.
 10. Manfred Jahn argues that “all narrative genres are structurally mediated by a first-
degree narrative agency which, in a performance, may either take the totally unmetaphorical 
shape of a vocally and bodily present narrator figure (a scenario that is unavailable in written 
epic narrative), or be a disembodied ‘voice’ in a printed text, or remain an anonymous and 
impersonal narrative function in charge of selection, arrangement, and focalization” (2001: 
674).
 11. For a detailed discussion of the concept of the cinematic narrator see Jan Alber’s essay 
in this volume.
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tive production and reception. More specifically, they see narrative as an act 
of communication between the real author and the flesh-and-blood reader, 
but also between the implied author and the authorial audience (or implied 
reader), and, finally, between the narrator and the narrative audience (or nar-
ratee). In short, the rhetorical approach attempts to ascertain the purpose of 
stories and storytelling.
 Thus, Wayne C. Booth, in the context of the neo-Aristotelianism of the 
Chicago School, introduced the term implied author as a heuristic tool. The 
“implied author” denotes the real author’s “second self,” and as such satis-
fies “the reader’s need to know where, in the world of values, he stands, that 
is, to know where the author wants him to stand” (1983: 73). Booth argues 
that analyses along the lines of the implied author enable us “to come as 
close as possible to sitting in the author’s chair and making this text, becom-
ing able to remake it, employing the author’s ‘reason-of-art’” (1982: 21). 
Similarly, James Phelan defines the implied author as “a streamlined version 
of the real author,” and this version is “responsible for the choices that cre-
ate the narrative text as ‘these words in this order’ and that imbue the text 
with his or her values” (2005: 45; 216).12 The ultimate goal of narrative criti-
cism is to asymptotically approximate the condition of “the authorial audi-
ence,” i.e., the ideal audience for whom the author constructs the text and 
who understands it perfectly (Rabinowitz 1977: 121–41; see also Rabinowitz 
1998; Phelan 1996: 135–53). According to Phelan, “the rhetorical model 
assumes that the flesh and blood reader seeks to enter the authorial audi-
ence in order to understand the invitations for engagement that the narrative 
offers” (Phelan 2007b: 210).
 Furthermore, rhetorical theorists argue that narrative texts permanently 
invite us to make ethical judgments—about characters, narrators, and implied 
authors (Phelan 2007a: 6). Phelan thus discriminates between four ethical 
positions. The first involves (1) the ethics of the told (character-character rela-
tions); the second and third concern the ethics of the telling, namely (2) the 
narrator’s relation to the characters, the task of narrating, and the audience, 
and (3) the implied author’s relation to these things. The fourth ethical posi-
tion relates to (4) the flesh-and-blood audience’s responses to the first three 
positions (Phelan 2005; 2007a: 11).
 12. For discussions of the implied author see Kindt and Müller (2006) and the contribu-
tions by Jan Alber and Henrik Skov Nielsen in this collection. In The Rhetoric of Fictional-
ity, Richard Walsh reintroduces the actual author. More specifically, he suggests eradicating 
extra- and heterodiegetic narrators in narrative fiction: “Extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrators 
(that is, ‘impersonal’ and ‘authorial’ narrators), who cannot be represented without thereby 
being rendered homodiegetic or intradiegetic, are in no way distinguishable from authors.” 
He therefore concludes that “the narrator is always either a character who narrates, or the 
author” (2007: 84; 78).
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 Finally, it is worth noting that a narrative’s development from beginning 
to end is governed by a textual and a readerly dynamics (along the pattern 
of instability—complication—resolution) (Phelan 2007a: 15–22), and under-
standing their interaction provides a good means for recognizing the purpose 
of the narrative. Recent rhetorical narratology can therefore be seen as a con-
tinuation and deepening of the rhetorical framework of Boothian theory and 
as an underlining of discourse narratology’s rhetorical foundations. At the 
same time, it can be regarded as an important contextualizing venture that 
opens the text to the real-world interaction of author and reader, and hence 
provides a perfect model for discussing the ethics of reading and the treat-
ment of ethical problems in narrative fiction.
 So far, we have listed several extensions of narratology that tried to take 
into account theoretical developments in academia since the 1970s—reader 
response theory, feminism, gender and queer studies, postcolonialism, the 
ethical turn. We would now like to turn to developments in narratology that 
are not linked to external stimuli but have arisen from inside the discipline 
and in reaction to extensive analysis of the theoretical models, their gaps, 
inconsistencies, even contradictions. However, it should be noted that this 
distinction is not a watertight binary opposition but rather a convenient way 
of highlighting intrinsic and extrinsic developments that are both affecting 
postclassical narratologies, sometimes in combination with each other. Gen-
erally speaking, we feel that this contest between different positions is healthy 
for narratology because it generates different kinds of valuable knowledge 
about narratives.
 Besides accommodating many diverse intellectual currents, postclassical 
narratology also seeks to address and potentially remedy some of the short-
comings of traditional narratology. For example, structuralist narratology 
did not pay much attention to the referential or world-creating dimension 
of narratives (perhaps because structuralism’s precursor, the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure, excluded the referent from his theory of the sign 
and instead favored the dichotomy signifier vs. signified) (see also Herman/
Biwu, forthcoming). Cognitive narratologists, like Monika Fludernik (1996, 
2003b), David Herman (2002, 2003), Manfred Jahn (1997, 1999b, 2003), 
and Ralf Schneider (2000), on the other hand, show that the recipient uses 
his or her world knowledge to project fictional worlds, and this knowledge 
is stored in cognitive schemata called frames and scripts.13 The basic assump-
tion of cognitive narratology is that readers evoke fictional worlds (or story- 
 13. “Frames basically deal with situations such as seeing a room or making a promise 
while scripts cover standard action sequences such as playing a game of football, going to a 
birthday party, or eating in a restaurant” (Jahn 2005: 69).
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worlds) on the basis of their real-world knowledge; cognitive narratology 
seeks to describe the range of cognitive processes that are involved. Alan 
Palmer (2004) and Lisa Zunshine (2006), for instance, argue that the way in 
which we attempt to make sense of fictional narratives is similar to the way in 
which we try to make sense of other people. They argue that we understand 
narratives by understanding the minds of the characters and narrators, that 
is, their intentions and motivations. Most importantly, cognitive approaches 
are based on a constructivist theory of reading, arguing that what we read 
into texts is not necessarily “there” as a pre-given fact. This emphasis ties in 
with non-essentialist, pluralist, and generally pragmatic concerns and pre-
occupations, thereby establishing connections with recent developments in 
linguistics, where the direction of research has also moved from syntax to 
pragmatics and on to cognitive approaches. Cognitive narratology can thus 
be argued to affect the status of categories of narratological analysis; it shifts 
the emphasis from an essentialist, universal, and static understanding of nar-
ratological concepts to seeing them as fluid, context-determined, prototypi-
cal, and recipient-constituted.
 Possible-worlds theory is an area of narratological study which links 
with postclassical narratology in interesting ways. The basic assumption of 
possible-worlds theory is that reality is a universe composed of a plurality 
of distinct elements. The actual world (AW) is the central element, and it is 
surrounded by various alternative possible worlds (APWs), such as dreams, 
fantasies, hallucinations, and the worlds of literary fiction. For a world to be 
possible it must be linked to the center by “accessibility relations.” Important 
possible-worlds theorists are Lubomír Doležel (1998), Marie-Laure Ryan 
(1991, 1999, 2001, 2005, and 2006), and Ruth Ronen (1994). It could be 
argued that Marie-Laure Ryan’s more recent research (1999, 2001, and 2004) 
constitutes an interesting postclassical development over Doležel’s and her 
own earlier work (Ryan 1991). Her forays into media studies highlight the 
way in which the underlying cognitivist and transmedial aspects of her 1991 
model have been extended and explicated in the last fifteen years. Further-
more, Ryan has recently shown that postmodern narratives have found in the 
concepts of possible-worlds theory “a productive plaything for [their] games 
of subversion and self-reflexivity” (2005: 449). She also looks at potential 
analogies between parallel universes in physics on the one hand and possible 
worlds in narrative fiction on the other (esp. Ryan 2006). Ryan’s concept of 
immersion (Ryan 2001), moreover, builds a bridge to cognitive studies of nar-
ration.
 We just referred to the pragmatic revolution in linguistics with the devel-
opment of context-oriented models in text linguistics, speech act theory, 
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sociolinguistics, and conversation analysis. For narratology, the analyses of 
conversational narrative by William Labov (1972), Deborah Tannen (1984), 
and Wallace Chafe (1994) have been seminal. Discourse analysis has had 
a major impact on the postclassical narratological work of David Herman 
(1997, 1999c, 2002) and Monika Fludernik (1991, 1993, 1996). In the wake 
of linguistic pragmatics, narrative analysis has started to include nonfictional 
narrative in its analyses. Conversation analysis in narratology has largely fed 
into cognitive strands of narratology. In Fludernik’s work (1996, 2003a) it 
has moreover impacted diachronic narratology. This trend is complemented 
by extensive interest in narratology on the part of conversation analysts. Lin-
guists and psychologists like Michael Bamberg (2007; Bamberg et al. 2007), 
Brigitte Boothe (2004), Anna de Fina (2003), Mark Freeman (1999), Alexan-
dra Georgakopoulou (1997) and others are doing research on narrative iden-
tity, performance and empathy. A true interdisciplinary field has here been 
emerging.
 A fourth development that rewrites the classic design of narratology con-
cerns the discovery of narrative’s evolution over time. This comes in two 
forms, as a study of how narrative changes through the centuries and, in con-
junction with this descriptive focus, a revision of narratological categories as 
a response to the different aspects and textual features that one finds in earlier 
texts. Thus, Fludernik’s diachronic study of narrative structure (1996, 2003a) 
provides a functional re-analysis of patterns from earlier narrative at later 
stages of literary storytelling besides discussing the move from oral to written 
forms of narrative. Another diachronically focused study is Werner Wolf’s 
analysis of anti-illusionism (1993). Nünning’s volume Unreliable Narration 
(1998) not only produces a new extensively outlined model of the signals of 
unreliability in the introduction but also includes a series of essays illustrating 
the historical development of this narrative strategy (see also Zerweck 2001). 
David Herman’s volume The Emergence of Mind (2011) is probably the most 
perfect example of the diachronic approach. It includes essays on the repre-
sentation of consciousness which systematically cover all periods of English 
literature from the Middle Ages to the present time.
 In recent years, a number of radical critiques and suggestions for rewriting 
the classical model have been proposed. Besides suggesting specific extensions 
or supplements to the classical paradigm, this type of research has addition-
ally aimed at restructuring the basic setup of Genettean typology. The catego-
ries that have so far come in for most critical attention include focalization, 
voice, person, the status of the narrator and the implied author, and the 
story-discourse distinction. Thus, focalization figures in the already classical 
rewrite of Genette by Mieke Bal (1983, 1985/1997), but has been the focus 
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of further revision by, among others, Chatman (1990), Edmiston (1991) and 
Jahn (1996, 1999a). Voice has been targeted in Aczel (1998, 2001), Fludernik 
(2001), and in Walsh (2007, this volume). Walsh (2007) moreover queries 
the story-discourse distinction (see also Fludernik 1994b, this volume) and 
the existence of a heterodiegetic extradiegetic narrator (see also this volume), 
in continuation of Ann Banfield’s theses in Unspeakable Sentences (1982; 
see also Fludernik 1993). Massive attention has recently been given to the 
implied author and the issue of unreliability, and even a return of the author 
into narrative studies is being promoted in clear violation of what has almost 
become a taboo in literary studies.14 The list could be extended to include 
many more issues and critics and a large variety of supplementary proposals 
and critical restructurings.
 A final postclassical area of research is the study of unnatural narratives, 
that is, anti-mimetic narratives that challenge and move beyond real-world 
understandings of identity, time, and space by representing scenarios and 
events that would be impossible in the actual world.15 Brian Richardson 
(1987, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2006) is the most important representative of this 
type of postclassical narratology that looks at anti-mimeticism, but recently 
a number of younger scholars such as Jan Alber (2002, 2009a, 2009b, in 
progress), Henrik Skov Nielsen (2004), and Rüdiger Heinze (2008) have also 
begun to look at the ways in which some (primarily postmodernist) narra-
tives challenge our real-world parameters.16 Even before the invention of 
the term “unnatural,” Brian McHale (1987, 1992) and Werner Wolf (1993) 
devoted themselves to the range of specific techniques employed in post-
modern or anti-illusionist narrative texts. McHale lists a substantial num-
ber of metafictional strategies, all of which are designed to foreground the 
inventedness of the narrative discourse. Wolf’s study attempts an exhaustive 
description of anti-illusionistic techniques which are meant to cover all anti-
illusionistic writing, not just the specific kind of anti-illusionism practiced in 
postmodernist texts. Unnatural narratology, in a sense, is a combination of 
postmodernist narratology and cognitive narratology. It could also be argued 
to constitute an answer to poststructuralist critiques of narratology as guilty 
 14. On the implied author debate see Nünning (1998, 2005, and 2008) as well as Phelan/
Martin (1999), Phelan (2008a), and Kindt/Müller (2006); on unreliability see also Yacobi 
(1981).
 15. Alber argues that unnatural narratives confront us with physically or logically impos-
sible scenarios or events (2009a; 2009b; in progress; Alber/Heinze in progress; see also Tammi 
2008: 43–47 and Alber/Iversen/Nielsen/Richardson 2010). Alber’s Habilitation (in progress) 
also contains a historical analysis of the development of unnaturalness in English literary his-
tory.
 16. See also the essays by Jan Alber and Henrik Skov Nielsen in this volume. 
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of logocentrism and displaying a “geometrical imaginary” (Gibson 1996; see 
also Currie 1998). However, rather than deconstructing narratology’s con-
stitutive binaries, unnatural narratology (as a development from Fludernik’s 
“natural” narratology and cognitive narratology in general) tries to set up a 
narratological model for experimental texts that complements classical nar-
ratology and also connects with it by means of a cognitive framework.
PHase two: CoNsolidatioN aNd 
CoNtiNued diversiFiCatioN
essays in this volume
The essays collected here typically combine the resources of various disciplin-
ary traditions of postclassical narratology. They also reach back to concerns 
and theories already current in the heyday of classical narratology, though 
not usually discussed as “narratological,” like the work of Girard, Bakhtin, 
and David Lodge.17 All Anglo-American work on narrative moreover takes 
its reference point in the seminal thought of Henry James and E. M. Forster, 
which proved to be of continuing relevance even during the heyday of struc-
turalist narratology. In our summary of the essays, we will foreground their 
potential as indices of where narratology may be heading at the moment. In 
our view, the research that follows seems to suggest that we have reached 
a new stage at which one has to ponder the overlaps and potential areas of 
cross-fertilization between the numerous flourishing narratologies.
 The volume divides into two parts. A shorter first part deals with a num-
ber of extensions and criticisms of classical narratology. It includes creative 
additions to the standard model by Werner Wolf and Alan Palmer and a 
radical critique of the category of voice (as well as other cherished staples of 
narratology) by Richard Walsh, and an analytical essay on mediacy versus 
mediation by Monika Fludernik. Part II, called “Transdisciplinarities,” docu-
ments a number of innovative blendings of narratological issues with generic, 
medial, gender-related, psycho-analytic, and nonfictional contexts.
 Richard Walsh opens the volume by radically questioning key axioms of 
narratology. His point de repère is the question of voice. In development of 
his 2007 book The Rhetoric of Fictionality, Walsh here proceeds to link his 
questioning of the category voice with his reservations about the communi-
cative model of narratology, i.e. the assumption that every text must have a 
narrator figure. He conceptualizes narrative representation as rhetorical in 
 17. We owe this point to James Phelan (personal communication).
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mode, and as semiotic (rather than narrowly linguistic) in scope. The rhetori-
cal orientation of his argument appropriates Plato’s emphasis upon the act of 
narrative representation as diegesis or mimesis. Walsh draws out the recur-
siveness implicit in that formulation, and discriminates between its legitimate 
scope as a model of agency and the rather different issue of rhetorical effect. 
The semiotic nature of narrative representation is asserted through the meta-
phorical nature of the concept of voice, and through Walsh’s efforts to take 
the full measure of that fact with respect to other narrative media (principally 
film, but also the cognitive medium of mental representation).
 Werner Wolf’s is the first of two essays that attempt to close gaps in the 
traditional narratological model. Noting that the concept of mise en abyme 
has no conceptual counterpart relating to its frame, he proposes the con-
cept of mise en cadre for this lacuna. Wolf outlines how the addition of this 
concept can help to describe a number of textual features and how it can 
also be applied to medial contexts. Wolf’s contribution aims at bridging the 
gulf between classical and postclassical narratology by proposing a “neo-
classical” variant. He suggests that the concepts devised by classical narratol-
ogy have not lost their relevance. On the contrary, they are open to a fruitful 
development and supplementation and can be adapted to recent approaches.
 Alan Palmer contributes to the extension of narratological categories by 
proposing a theory of intermental thought. Such thinking is joint, shared, or 
collective and community-based, as opposed to intramental, individual, or 
private thought. It can also be described as socially distributed, situated, or 
extended cognition, or as intersubjectivity. Intermental thought is a crucially 
important component of fictional narrative because much of the mental func-
tioning depicted in novels occurs in large organizations, small groups, work 
colleagues, friends, families, couples and other intermental units. It could 
plausibly be argued that a large amount of the subject matter of novels is 
the formation, development and breakdown of these intermental systems. 
So far this aspect of narrative has been neglected by traditional theoretical 
approaches and fails to be considered in discussions of focalization, char-
acterization, story analysis, and the representation of speech and thought. 
Palmer therefore crucially contributes to closing this gap in the traditional 
narratological paradigm.
 Monika Fludernik in her contribution returns to a both historical and 
critical analysis of the relationship between the terms mediacy, mediation, 
and focalization. Following on from earlier work on drama as narrative, 
Fludernik considers the status of mediality for narrativity and contrasts Stan-
zel’s and Genette’s complex negotiations with the story-discourse dichotomy, 
the status of the narrator as mediator, and with the placing of focalization 
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or perspective in relation to the story-discourse binary. The essay revisits 
the exchange between Chatman and Barbara Hernstein Smith on the notion 
of narrative transmission. It also engages extensively with Richard Walsh’s 
no-mediation thesis (Walsh 2007) and places the mediacy and (re)mediation 
debate within the framework of her own narratological model. Like Walsh’s 
paper in this volume, this essay queries some long-held beliefs or basic axi-
oms of narratology.
 David Herman opens Part II of the volume by looking at William Blake’s 
poem “A Poison Tree” (1794), a text which operates across various com-
municative media. Herman inquires into “(1) the structure and dynamics of 
storytelling practices; (2) the multiple semiotic systems in which those prac-
tices take shape, including but not limited to verbal language; and (3) mind-
relevant dimensions of the practices themselves—as they play out in a given 
medium for storytelling.” According to Herman, Blake’s poem articulates 
and enacts a model according to which a more effective engagement with the 
world is premised on the ability to take up the perspectives of others. And, 
according to Herman, this is one of the most important features of narra-
tive in general: narrative is centrally concerned with qualia, i.e., the sense of 
“what it is like” for someone or something to have a particular experience, 
and hence narrative is uniquely suited to capturing what the world is like 
from the situated perspective of an experiencing mind. Herman’s contribu-
tion merges cognitive and transmedial narratology; he sees his essay as a first 
step toward an investigation of the potential overlaps between different post-
classical approaches. His contribution also has an openly ethical slant, thus 
linking to the paper of Amit Marcus.
 Jan Alber’s essay can be situated at the crossroads of transmedial narra-
tology, the rhetorical approach to narrative, and unnatural narratology. He 
reconsiders the process of cinematic narration from the perspective of hypo-
thetical intentionalism, a cognitive approach in which “a narrative’s meaning 
is established by hypothesizing intentions authors might have had, given the 
context of creation, rather than relying on, or trying to seek out, the author’s 
subjective intentions” (Gibbs 2005: 248). Alber argues that when we make 
sense of a film, we always speculate about the potential intentions and moti-
vations behind the movie, without ever knowing whether our speculations 
are correct. In a second step, Alber shows that there is a convergence between 
the functions of the cinematic narrator, that is, “the organizational and send-
ing agency” (Chatman 1990: 127) behind the film, and those of the implied 
filmmaker, who mediates the film as a whole and guides us through it (Gaut 
2004: 248). Replacing the filmic narrator and the implied filmmaker (analo-
gous to the “implied author” [Booth 1982: 21; Phelan 2005: 45]) with the 
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“hypothetical filmmaker,” Alber integrates the viewers’ speculations about 
the conscious or unconscious motivations of the professionals responsible for 
the making of the film into the analysis. He thus combines the views on inten-
tionality provided in Herman (2008) with a cognitive and reader-response 
oriented model. Alber applies this new theoretical framework to an experi-
mental narrative, namely David Lynch’s film Lost Highway (1996).
 Susan Lanser sketches the ways in which a particular topos, namely les-
bian desire, may be linked with historically variable narrative parameters, 
thus combining feminist/queer narratology with a diachronic outlook on nar-
rative. More specifically, Lanser explores what she calls the “sapphic dia-
logic,” a form of narrative intersubjectivity in which erotic content is filtered 
through the relationship between a (typically intradiegetic) female pairing 
of narrator and narratee. Reaching back to the sixteenth century, Lanser 
uncovers the history of a typical scenario in which female narrators tell other 
women about heterosexual congress in a context in which the telling becomes 
yet another erotic experience. Hence, Lanser identifies sapphic form as an 
underpinning of the eighteenth-century novel’s domestic agenda. Linking 
these analyses to the rise of the novel, Lanser is able to demonstrate that the 
eighteenth-century novel female protagonist is not only swept up in the con-
solidation of the heterosexual subject; but further, the novel preserves within 
its heterosexual frame the secret of domesticity’s dependence on the structural 
deployment of lesbian desire. Lanser’s contribution therefore uses the com-
municative scenario of text-internal dialogue and storytelling to figure an 
underlying sexual subtext. The paper combines a gender approach with a 
framework of reader response and the concerns (if not the model) of rhetori-
cal narratology.
 Our next contributor, Amit Marcus, merges narratology with psycho-
analysis by looking at René Girard’s notion of mimetic (or triangular) desire 
(Girard 1965) and setting this in correlation with the story-discourse distinc-
tion. For Girard, the subject does not desire the object in and for itself. Rather, 
the desire is mediated through another subject, who possesses or pursues the 
object. This third figure (the mediator or rival) is admired by the subject but 
also despised as an obstacle in achieving the object. In his contribution, Mar-
cus looks at narratives in which the narrator is both one of the main char-
acters in the story and the desiring subject. He shows that the narratives he 
analyzes present several ways in which narration can be linked with mimetic 
desire. While in two of the narratives he analyzes (Grass’s Cat and Mouse 
and Genet’s The Thief’s Journal) mimetic desire only motivates the narration 
and the narrator’s appeal to a narratee, without there existing a story on that 
level, in Camus’s The Fall the story at the level of narration is woven into the 
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story of the past life of the narrator. In sum, Marcus argues that if mimetic 
desire is the basis of the relation between the narrator and the narratee, then 
narratorial authority seems to be motivated by the anxiety that the loss of the 
narratee will cause unbearable pain to the narrator, whose mediator and rival 
will no longer provide him with the (fragile) existential security that he needs. 
The essay illustrates how the narrator-narratee relationship interacts with the 
story-discourse level of narrative in ways which, incidentally, are also notable 
in second-person narratives (Fludernik 1993, 1994a).
 In her contribution, Jarmila Mildorf follows David Herman’s suggestions 
concerning the development of a “socionarratology” (1999b) and shows that 
narratology, if suitably adapted to social science requirements, can add fur-
ther insights into the particularly “narrative” features of oral stories. More 
specifically, she analyzes two oral narratives from the database of personal 
experience of health and illness (DIPEx) with a view to identifying possible 
points of convergence between narratology and the social sciences. Mil dorf 
uses narratological terms such as the “experiencing I,” the “narrating I,” 
“focalization,” “slant,” “filter,” and “double deixis” in you-narratives and 
illustrates that frequently-evoked concepts in the social science literature such 
as “social positioning,” “identity,” and the marking of “in-group” and “out-
group” relations can be further illuminated if reconsidered through a nar-
ratological lens. Her contribution is therefore a test case for narratology’s 
ability to connect with work on storytelling outside the humanities. In par-
ticular, it provides a useful model for cooperation between narratologists and 
sociologists or psychologists who have so far been using different models and 
terminology. By showing that these models may be compatible with the nar-
ratological paradigms, Mildorf sketches an optimistic horizon for narratol-
ogy’s involvement with its neighbor disciplines in the social sciences.
 Martin Löschnigg discusses models and categories of cognitive narratol-
ogy that may be relevant for a narratologically grounded analysis of autobio-
graphical discourse. More specifically, he merges cognitive and transmedial 
narratology and, using Fludernik’s model of “natural” narratology, deals with 
the discursive representation of experientiality in autobiography. He focuses 
on the role of narrative in the formation of identity; the role of frames and 
scripts in the textual representation of memory; and finally, on the question 
of the fictionality of autobiography. Löschnigg argues that the new frame-
oriented models of cognitive narratology provide criteria for describing one’s 
life as (re)lived, allowing one to emphasize the continuity of narration and 
experience. This puts the binary narrator-experiencer model of classical nar-
ratology on a different and more flexible basis. He suggests that narrativity 
is a determinant of autobiography; “narrativized” understandings of identity 
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are based on lived experience and on the capacity of narrative to impose 
order and coherence on what is otherwise a jumble of disconnected fragments 
of experiences and memories. Löschnigg also demonstrates that the frames, 
scripts, and schemata of cognitive narratology can help us grasp autobiog-
raphy’s temporal complexity by identifying processes of segmentation and of 
creating coherence, which are especially important in memory-based narra-
tives. The essay closes with a consideration of the question of fictionality in 
autobiography, which can now be approached in a more differentiated man-
ner. If narratology cannot provide criteria to distinguish between “fact” and 
“fiction” in autobiographical writing, provided such a distinction is possible 
at all, it can at least, according to Löschnigg, provide the theoretical basis 
for describing the fictional as an integral element of life-writing. Löschnigg’s 
paper is therefore located at the borderline of fictionality and in this way 
reaches out from classical literary narratology to the wider area of real-life 
storytelling practices.
 Finally, Henrik Skov Nielsen discusses hybrid narrative texts which can-
not easily be categorized as either fiction or non-fiction. More specifically, 
he looks at two types of texts. On the one hand, he considers what he calls 
“underdetermined texts,” such as James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces (2003), 
i.e., texts that present themselves as neither fiction nor non-fiction. On the 
other hand, he analyzes “overdetermined texts,” such as Bret Easton Ellis’s 
Lunar Park (2005), that present themselves as both fiction and non-fiction. 
Frey’s book was published as non-fiction but turned out to represent the expe-
riences of James Frey in an exaggerated and partly inaccurate way; Ellis’s was 
published as fiction but is in many (though definitely not all) respects a factu-
ally accurate rendering of Bret Easton Ellis’s life. Nielsen notes that, interest-
ingly, both kinds of texts use techniques of fictionalization. He moves beyond 
the fiction/non-fiction boundary by arguing that invention is a resource of 
fictionality available as a rhetorical strategy in the real-world discourse of 
the author. Nielsen therefore combines a rhetorical slant on narrative with 
a reconsideration of the fiction/non-fiction divide and with a focus on the 
curious status of autobiography. He also proposes some radical revisions of 
the classical paradigm of narratology, thereby linking back to Part I of the 
volume.
As this summary illustrates, one can observe many synergetic effects between 
the diverse essays collected in this volume. Some of these connections arise 
from a common focus on a specific genre (autobiography in the essays by 
Löschnigg and Nielsen); the history of narratology (Walsh, Fludernik); ques-
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tions of fictionality (in Walsh and Löschnigg); the central role of cognition in 
narrative (in Palmer, Herman, and Alber); questions of authorship, responsi-
bility or authority (in Walsh, Wolf, Alber, and Nielsen); as well as the issues 
of gender and queering (Lanser, Marcus).
 Theoretically speaking, what is even more interesting is the fact that 
these very different approaches document that the field of narratology has 
now reached a phase which is dominated by partial consolidation without 
any undue reaching after singularity. At the same time, the trends towards 
commonality are offset by the diversity of approaches, a multiplicity of co-
operations with partner disciplines, and the general theoretical “promiscuity” 
typical of postmodernity. All of the contributors to the volume are critical 
of traditional theories, but not one of them wants to eliminate the classic 
model as a whole. Rewriting the traditional paradigm in its various typo-
logical manifestations instead takes the form of querying one particular ele-
ment (voice, mediacy, the narrator) or of adding one more distinction to the 
paradigm (Wolf, Palmer, Lanser), extending the model to cover new generic 
applications (poetry, film) or linking it with new thematic foci (collectivities 
in Palmer, sexuality and queerness in Lanser and Marcus, ethics in Marcus 
and Nielsen). Some contributors also try to extend narratology theoretically 
by adopting research questions, concepts, or frameworks from outside struc-
turalism: cognitive studies (Fludernik, Herman, Alber, Löschnigg), painting 
(Wolf), Girard’s psychoanalysis (Marcus), and media studies (Walsh, Alber). 
One could summarize these tendencies by saying that there is a consensus on 
narratology as a transgeneric, transdisciplinary, and transmedial undertaking, 
to echo Nünning and Nünning’s 2002 title.
 Secondly, all contributors on the whole agree that narratology should 
cover more than the classical genre of the novel. Postclassical narratology, one 
could therefore argue, has a much wider conception of what counts as nar-
rative than just the traditional novel (Genette, Stanzel, Chatman, Rimmon-
Kenan). The debate on extending narratology to other genres has resulted in 
a general consensus of crediting film as a narrative genre and a wide accep-
tance of drama, cartoons, and much performance art, as well as some paint-
ing, under the description of narrative genres. The borderline is now located 
in the gray area made up of poetry, music, and science. One can therefore 
claim that narratology’s object of analysis has shifted since the 1980s—nar-
rative now includes a much wider spectrum of “texts.” This change requires 
a reworking of narratological concepts since the traditional model was based 
on a very restrictive corpus of (generically) rather uniform verbal narratives.
 Third, the extension of narrative into a variety of different media has been 
accompanied by a shift from text-internal close analysis to context-relative 
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cultural studies, particularly foregrounding the question of narrative’s func-
tion in social, historical, ideological, or psychological contexts. Rather than 
merely analyzing how texts work, and which of their elements are responsible 
for which meaning or design effects, the current emphasis lies on what these 
narratives achieve in communication, which ideological or identity-related 
messages they convey, what ‘cultural work’ (Tompkins 1986, Beck 2003) they 
perform, and what possible effects they may engender in the real world. One 
could, therefore, argue that all narratology nowadays is context-sensitive.
 Fourth, we would like to propose that the cognitive model, which is one 
of the many ongoing projects in the field,18 is slowly establishing itself as a 
new basis for ever-increasing areas of narratological research. The cognitive 
model provides a useful explanatory framework which offers a potentially 
empirical grounding for dealing with textual features. It has also introduced 
to narrative studies some new terminology and concepts which are perhaps 
apt to replace more traditional elements in the paradigm. Among such new 
concepts one can point first and foremost to the notion of the frame, which 
has now been generally absorbed into narratology much in the same way that 
linguistic terminology (e.g., of deixis and temporal modes) was in classical 
narratology. A second major adoption from cognitive science is prototype 
theory, which is becoming more widely accepted in narrative studies and is 
beginning to replace the former insistence on clear distinctions between nar-
ratological categories. Deconstructive treatments of the binary oppositions 
of classical narratology have helped to popularize a more relaxed attitude 
towards classification. One could also count experientiality, originally pro-
posed by Fludernik in 1991 (see also 1996), as a cognitively based concept 
that has meanwhile been adopted by a number of researchers such as Wolf 
(2002) and Löschnigg (2006). A reliance on cognitivist and constructivist 
principles is now common in postclassical narratology, for instance in recent 
work by Ansgar Nünning (1998), Ralf Schneider (2000), Alan Palmer (2004), 
Richard Walsh (2007), and Jochen Petzold (2008).19 This emphasis on cogni-
tive issues is linked to the medial extension of narratology since the classical 
model was unable to deal with many of the newer types of narrative, and the 
cognitive approach offers a model which can accommodate linguistic story-
telling besides a host of other forms of narrative.
 What we are arguing here is that, although there is no unified new meth-
odology in sight for postclassical narratology (nor do we plead for such a 
 18. So-called cognitive narratology is usually associated with Monika Fludernik, David 
Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Lisa Zunshine. 
 19. See also Fludernik (2001) as well as Alber (2002, 2009a, 2009b, and forthcoming) 
and Aldama (2003).
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development), there is sufficient justification for referring to current narrato-
logical work in the singular as postclassical narratology; one does not neces-
sarily have to foreground the existing diversity in a plural label—postclassical 
narratologies. Our reason for emphasizing an incipient move toward congru-
ence, compatibility, and consolidation is our perception of recurrent strate-
gies of patchwork and blending as illustrated in the essays in this volume. We 
are not saying that all future narratology will be based on cognitive theory, 
or that all research in narrative will necessarily be transmedial and function-
oriented. What we are noting is a confluence of the various approaches that 
David Herman so magisterially outlined in his 1999 volume. Almost none of 
the essays printed in this book abides by any one single approach. The papers 
all combine and creatively blend different approaches, cognitive or otherwise, 
to achieve a synthesis that looks different in every individual essay but is a 
synthesis nevertheless. We do not maintain that there is a unified postclas-
sical model on the horizon—nor would we want to invent one—but we are 
arguing that narratologists nowadays see the object of their research as more 
variegated than was the case twenty years ago; that they resort to very differ-
ent methods in combination when approaching a problem; and that they will 
tend to ground their analyses in a rich contextual framework. To this extent, 
and to this extent only, do we see postclassical narratology not as continuing 
to proliferate into numerous new directions, but as beginning to sediment 
and crystallize into a new modus vivendi.
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extensions and reconfigurations of 
Classical Narratology
 i

My purpose in this essay is to critique the concept of narrative voice from the 
vantage point of a rhetorical model of fictive representation. In its core sense, 
narrative voice is concerned with the narrating instance, the various manifes-
tations of which are usually categorized in terms of person and level. These 
distinctions provide for a typology of narrating instances which is conven-
tionally understood within a communicative model of narration—a model 
in which the narrating instance is situated within the structure of narrative 
representation, as a literal communicative act (that is, as a discursive event 
that forms part of a chain of narrative transmission). By adopting a rhetori-
cal approach to voice, I am proposing to invert the hierarchy of that rela-
tionship between structure and act. From a rhetorical standpoint, narrative 
representation is not conceived as a structure within which a communicative 
model of narrative acts is implied, but as an act itself, the performance of a 
real-world communicative gesture—which, in the case of fictional narrative, 
is offered as fictive rather than informative, and creates, rather than trans-
mits, all subordinate levels of narration. Such a perspective upon narrative 
representation exposes the fundamental incoherence of the standard commu-
nicative model, and establishes the need for some basic distinctions between 
different senses of voice in narrative theory.
 My argument, then, begins by demonstrating the incoherence of the rep-
resentational typology of narrative voice as embodied in the communicative 
model of the narrating instance. This demonstration focuses upon the ele-
mentary categories of person and level that articulate this typology; its claim 
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is that it is not possible to sustain the distinction between these two categories 
in representational terms, and their collision results in contradiction. I go on 
to show that a rhetorical model of instance, reverting to Plato’s distinction 
between diegesis and mimesis and the recursive principle it embodies, can 
accommodate the range of narrative possibilities more coherently and simply. 
By elaborating upon the principle of recursiveness in representation I dem-
onstrate the need for a distinction between narrative voice as instance and as 
idiom; closer attention to the function of voice in free indirect discourse and 
focalization establishes a further distinction between idiom and a third sense 
of voice I term interpellation; finally, a return to my overarching rhetorical 
frame of reference clarifies the distinction between this third sense and the 
sense of voice as instance with which I began.
 The key premises for the whole discussion, for which I have argued else-
where, are the conception of narrative representation as rhetorical in mode, 
and as semiotic (rather than narrowly linguistic) in scope.1 I comment further 
upon these issues in the discussion that follows, so here I will only indicate 
the forms in which they arise. The rhetorical orientation of my argument 
straightforwardly appropriates Plato’s emphasis upon the act of narrative 
representation as either diegesis or mimesis (the poet either speaking in his 
own voice, or imitating the voice of a character); I merely draw out the recur-
siveness implicit in that formulation, and discriminate between its legitimate 
scope as a model of agency and the rather different issue of rhetorical effect. 
The semiotic nature of narrative representation is asserted here in my insis-
tence upon the (generally acknowledged) metaphorical nature of the con-
cept of voice, and my efforts to take the full measure of that fact in respect 
of other narrative media (principally film, but also the cognitive medium of 
mental representation). These two premises share the common definitional 
assumption that stories, of whatever kind, do not merely appear, but are told.
 Stories do not emerge circumstantially out of phenomena: they exist as 
stories by virtue of being articulated (always admitting that this may be a 
private, internal act of representation as well as a public, social one). The 
immediate implication is that narration in its primary sense is never merely 
narrative transmission but narrative representation—that is, the semiotic use 
of its medium. Narrative transmission applies not to the telling of a story (as 
if it pre-existed as such), but to the merely reproductive mediation of a prior 
discourse. In fiction, transmission is an element of the rhetoric of represented 
telling—that is, representing an intra-fictional narrative discourse as if you 
were transmitting an extant discourse. Acts of narrative representation, in 
 1. See especially chapters 1 and 6 of The Rhetoric of Fictionality (Walsh 2007).
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other words, are themselves among the possible objects of narrative repre-
sentation: one of the things a story may be about is the telling of a story. The 
crucial point, however, is that this recursive possibility, however prominent 
in fiction, does not account for fictionality itself: the effect of narrative trans-
mission is a subordinate and contingent product of the rhetoric of narrative 
representation.
 The dominant narratological sense of voice, that which bears upon the 
narrating instance, is Gérard Genette’s. One of the main sources of confusion 
around the concept of voice is that Genette’s version of the metaphor does 
not draw upon the sense of voice as vocalization, but upon its grammati-
cal sense (active or passive voice): “‘the mode of action [ . . . ] of the verb 
considered for its relation to the subject’—the subject here being not only 
the person who carries out or submits to the action, but also the person (the 
same one or another) who reports it” (1980: 213). It is no less metaphorical 
for that—indeed, Genette acknowledges that his appropriation of linguistic 
terminology throughout Narrative Discourse shows most figurative strain 
at just this point (31–32). But the range of Genette’s metaphorical vehicle is 
quite distinct from that of the more general, or more intuitive, usage; a major 
consequence being that many of the concerns that fall naturally under voice 
for other theorists are addressed separately by Genette. So free indirect dis-
course, for many the key issue in discussions of voice, is treated under mood 
in Genette’s scheme. The chapter on mood is also where he presents the cru-
cial concept of focalization, which for theorists following Franz Karl Stanzel 
is inextricable from the broader notion of mediacy—that is to say voice in 
Genette’s own sense, as narrating instance. Given these terminological and 
taxonomical discrepancies, it is perhaps all the more striking that both theo-
rists explicitly privilege language as the paradigmatic, if not intrinsic, medium 
of narrative instanciation. Genette makes this axiomatic: he refers to media 
such as film and the comic strip as extranarrative, “if one defines narrative 
stricto sensu, as I do, as a verbal transmission” (1988: 16).
 I am suggesting instead that a narrating instance may be considered as 
any particular use of any medium for narrative purposes. Narration, on this 
view, is essentially a representational act, not just a verbal one. Voice in Gen-
ette’s sense, as instance, is a figure for agency in narration: I take that to be 
as inherently a part of film and drama as it is of the novel, and as crucial to 
understanding the rhetorical import of narratives in those media. Seen in this 
light the voice metaphor is in no way specific to language, and neither are the 
main concerns that Genette addresses under this heading: person and level. 
(Tense, Genette’s other concern under the heading of voice, is clearly spe-
cific to language unless taken more broadly as an index of the temporal rela-
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tion between represented narrations and the events they narrate; but see the 
following discussion of his comments upon the intrinsic “homodiegeticity” 
of present-tense narration.) Genette is himself quick to point out the strict 
irrelevance of the linguistic category of person in the traditional distinction 
between first- and third-person narration: the basis for his own distinction 
between homo- and heterodiegetic narration, as well as the distinction of 
level between extra- and intradiegetic narration, is the relation between the 
narration and the represented world of the story (I am leaving aside auto-
diegetic, which is just a subset of homodiegetic; and metadiegetic, which is 
just second-degree intradiegetic). I want to suggest, however, that even these 
distinctions, whilst undeniably useful, are not finally well founded in terms 
of their own theoretical premises.2 This points us towards a somewhat differ-
ent paradigm in which the salient fact is simply the recursive possibility that 
a narrating instance may represent another narrating instance; or in Plato’s 
terms, that narrative diegesis may give way to narrative mimesis.
 It is clear that any narration, whether first-person or third-person (as 
these terms are generally understood) may incorporate the event of another 
act of narration, at a second level. Conversely, any narration, at whatever 
level, may equally well be first-person narration or third-person narration. 
The categories of person and level appear to be clear and distinct; the clas-
sification of a narrative discourse in either respect is not determined by its 
classification in the other. Whence the possibility of such four-part typologies 
of narrators as Genette’s (Figure 1.1), in which the categories of level and 
person respectively define the horizontal and vertical axes (person, here, is 
“relationship,” since Genette rejects the traditional terminology). Genette’s 
more analytic terminology makes it clear that the category of person is not 
really about the choice of personal pronouns, but rather a matter of the status 
of the narrative act. The dominant issue for the “relationship” distinction 
seems to be an epistemological one: with what kind of authority does the nar-
rator speak? That of omniscient or impersonal detachment from the events 
related? Or that of an interested witness to those events? With regard to level, 
on the other hand, the dominant issue seems to be ontological: from which 
world does the narrator speak? Ours? Or the world of another narrative—the 
world of the Arabian Nights, or of the Odyssey? What Genette’s terminol-
 2. To clarify the scope and purpose of my argument here, it is worth noting that I do not 
want to suggest that Genette’s typology lacks analytical value, or to diminish its significance 
to narrative theory ever since the publication of Narrative Discourse. My claim is simply that 
it is logically incoherent, and therefore should not finally be taken as an account of the repre-
sentational logic of fictional narrative, but as a testament to the fictive rhetoric that produces 
and frames the appearance of such a logic.
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ogy also implies, however, is that the categories of person and level do share 
a common frame of reference, with respect to which all four of his terms are 
defined: that is, the notion of diégèse, or story world.
 Genette’s term diégèse does not relate to the Platonic term, diegesis, but to 
a distinction originating in film theory between the diegetic universe (domain 
of the signified) and the screen universe (domain of the signifier). So a diégèse 
is the universe of the events represented by a given narration. Despite this 
subordination of diégèse to narration, Genette’s classification of narrative 
levels assigns each narrating instance to the diegetic level that includes it, so 
that the first level of any narrative is necessarily extradiegetic.3 Well then, is 
the extradiegetic a diegetic level? Genette needs it to be such, because the 
primary narrating instance may be fictional, and so represented (as with Mar-
cel’s narration, or Pip’s, or Huck’s). At the same time he also needs it not to 
be diegetic, because the primary narrating instance is directly addressed, he 
says, to “you and me” (1980: 229).4 The equivocal status of the extradiegetic 
level serves to evade the infinite regress of diegetic levels that must result 
from the assumption, fundamental to the communicative model, that every 
narrating instance is literal with respect to the events represented—that it is 
ontologically continuous with the world on which it reports (this is simply a 
precondition for narrative transmission). Such an assumption dictates that 
if the events are fictional, the report is fictional, and therefore must itself be 
represented; but the representation of that fictional event must then also be 
fictional—and so we face the prospect of an endless series of implicit narra-
tors. This conception of narrative mediacy as literal (irrespective of whether 
 3. Note that extradiegetic narration is defined in relation to the most inclusive, or first-
level, diégèse, not in relation to the main action of the narrative. So Marlow relates the main 
action of Heart of Darkness, but his narration is intradiegetic, represented as taking place 
during a long night on the sea-reach of the Thames, waiting for the tide to turn. The point is 
that Genette’s taxonomy of narration is a structural one, rather than a rhetorical one.
 4. Richardson mentions a number of canonical modern texts for which it is unhelpful to 
take this literalistic view of the extradiegetic narrative situation (2001b: 700–1); many more 
examples could be added.
Figure 1.1. from Narrative Discourse 248 (simplified)
level:
relaTiOnShiP:
Extradiegetic Intradiegetic
Heterodiegetic homer Scheherazade
Homodiegetic marcel Ulysses
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or not the narrative is fictive) means that each act of narration, and the dié-
gèse to which it belongs, must be part of one continuous line of narrative 
transmission through which that narration is channeled. If narrative mediacy 
is always transmission, the communicative model of narrative levels allows 
for no point of ontological discontinuity.5
 The category of person, as re-articulated in Genette’s distinction between 
homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narration, also has a problematic relation to 
diégèse. In Narrative Discourse Revisited, Genette notes two circumstances in 
which the apparently heterodiegetic status of a narration can be compromised 
by a degree of “homodiegeticity” (1988: 80). The effect occurs in present-
tense narration and the narration of historical fiction. Present-tense narra-
tion, by foregrounding the narration’s contemporaneity to diegetic events, 
pulls towards a sense of the narratorial perspective as that of a witness, who 
would therefore be part of the diégèse (Genette cites the last chapter of Tom 
Jones among his examples). The narration of a historical novel, on the other 
hand, by virtue of its claims to historicity, undermines our sense of the narra-
tive’s discrete diegetic universe and consequently the narrator comes to figure 
as a quasi-homodiegetic “subsequent witness,” in Genette’s phrase (1988: 
80). As these examples make clear, in the communicative model diégèse is 
not conceived of merely as an effect of signification, but as an ontological 
notion; and the category of person comes down to a relation of identity or 
non-identity between the narrator and some member of the story universe, 
the complete set of states of affairs posited by the narrative. Accordingly, the 
category of person has no place except within the ontology of fiction: non-
fictional heterodiegetic narration becomes meaningless. That is to say, the 
distinction of narrative person depends upon ontological discontinuity (cp. 
Genette 1993: 54–84; Cohn 1999: 109–31).
 5. Genette, of course, does not believe that fictions are true. He offers his own account 
of the ontological break between author and narrator required by his model, in an essay on 
John Searle’s pretended speech act account of fiction (Genette 1993: 30–53). The thrust of 
his argument is that the authorial act of pretending to assert is also an indirect speech act 
instituting a fictional world, the world within which those same pretended assertions are the 
true assertions of a narrator. Genette’s appeal to indirect speech acts is a good move, I think 
(because it is a move towards a rhetorical model); his retention of Searle’s pretence account is 
not. The essential feature of Searle’s account is that a pretended assertion has no illocutionary 
force (that is what, for Searle, renders the falsehood of fictions unproblematic). The occasion 
for an indirect authorial speech act, therefore, does not even arise; no speech act at all, direct 
or indirect, is seriously performed. Yet Genette requires the pretence formula, as a basis for 
the structural role of extradiegetic narration. Accordingly the only serious speech act available, 
and the only candidate for the indirect institution of a fictional world, is the narrator’s—which 
is within the world in question. This is the same logical paradox as I have been describing, 
recast in a different form. See Walsh (2007: 74–78).
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 So, within the communicative model, the concept of level disallows onto-
logical discontinuity, because it is understood as a chain of literally trans-
mitted narratives; but the concept of person depends upon ontological 
discontinuity, because otherwise there can only be homodiegetic narration. 
The crunch comes when these contradictory implications of person and level 
meet in the extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrator. Genette’s example in Figure 
1.1 is Homer, which is rather evasive; elsewhere he also offers the narrator 
of Père Goriot. This narrator, he says, unlike Balzac himself, “knows” (with 
scare quotes) the events of the narrative as fact (1980: 214). If we take the 
claim literally, it aligns with the logic of narrative levels and the principle 
of ontological continuity, but contradicts the designation of this narrator as 
heterodiegetic. If we do not take it literally, Genette forfeits his rationale for 
distinguishing between this narrator and Balzac; and in terms of the com-
municative model such a heterodiegetic narrator would have to mediate the 
narration of a further narrator who does indeed know the events of the nar-
rative as fact—and so we founder upon an infinite regress of narrative levels. 
The collision between person and level, as I have articulated it here, follows 
from the communicative model’s ontological notion of diégèse as story world 
and its literal model of narrative transmission. And it should be clear that the 
problem of ontological discontinuity is simply the problem, in this model’s 
terms, of fictionality itself. The problem arises in the first place, then, because 
of the logical priority the communicative model grants to the products of fic-
tive representation.
 This is a mistake avoided by the most venerable alternative to the com-
municative account of person and level, Plato’s distinction between diegesis 
(the poet speaking in his own voice) and mimesis (the poet imitating the 
voice of a character). Such a distinction characterizes the act of fictive rep-
resentation, and taken as a typology of narration it identifies a single salient 
feature: the recursive possibility that a narration may represent another nar-
ration. It makes the cut, in other words, between Genette’s extradiegetic het-
erodiegetic category (diegesis) and all the others (mimesis). A typology of 
narration based upon Plato’s distinction, then, recognizes two hierarchical 
modes of fictive representation, which may be a matter of information (dieg-
esis) or of imitation (mimesis). In fictive diegesis, the information is offered 
and/or interpreted under the real-world communicative regime of fictionality, 
in which an awareness of its fictive orientation is integral to its rhetoric. In 
mimesis the imitation is specifically of an act of narration, so accordingly the 
informative function of diegesis is performed at one remove. The rhetorical 
gesture of fictionality, however, remains attached to the act of imitation itself. 
Note that this act is an imitation of a discursive form of narration, not of a 
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specific, notionally prior narrative act—it is a representational rather than 
reproductive use of the medium. The non-fictional version of this recursive 
structure would indeed be the transmission of an extant narrative; that is 
quotation, not mimesis. The two features of this model of fictive narration 
that I want to emphasize, then, are first that the fictive rhetorical gesture is 
always present, and always attached to the actual communicative act; and 
second that the recursive capacity of the model is subordinate to this fictive 
rhetoric, but also defined in terms of communicative acts. The permutations 
of this relation between fictionality and narrative information can accommo-
date the range of narratorial possibilities identified by Genette’s typology in 
Figure 1.1, whether the diegesis mediates a mimesis of non-fictive narration 
(Ulysses), or of fictive narration (Scheherazade); or whether the mimesis is 
coextensive with the narrative itself (Marcel).
 In order to draw out the implications of this view of fictive communica-
tion and its capacity for recursiveness, I shall invoke Marie-Laure Ryan’s 
interesting alternative to the narrative-level model of recursiveness, which is 
the concept (borrowed from computer science) of the stack. The metaphor, 
she explains, refers to a stack of trays in a cafeteria: “The stack is supported 
by a spring, and the top tray is always level with the counter. When a cus-
tomer puts a tray on the top of the stack, the structure must be pushed down 
in order to make the top tray even with the counter; when a tray is removed, 
the structure pops up, and the next tray on the stack is lifted to counter level. 
Being on top of the stack and level with the counter makes a tray the ‘current 
tray’” (1990: 878). She illustrates the idea with an example representing the 
tales within tales of the Arabian Nights, as in Figure 1.2. 
 These are snapshots of the stack at two different points in the narrative—
the “Tale of Ali Baba” and the “Young Man’s Tale.” The diagram is offered 
as a representation of distinct ontological realms within the narrative, but it 
Figure 1.2. from “Stacks, Frames and boundaries,” 880 
(simplified)
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
Young  
Man’s Tale
Amina’s Tale
The Three  
Ladies of Baghdad
Arabian Nights
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works equally well as a representation of distinct narrative acts; and as a dia-
gram of recursive narration it is something we can work with. But first of all, 
as drawn it does not really capture the most suggestive feature of the stack 
metaphor as Ryan herself glosses it, which is the notion of the “current tray” 
at counter level. That would suggest the arrangement in Figure 1.3, in which 
anything below counter level is beneath our threshold of attention at a given 
point (I have added a snapshot of pure diegesis to clarify the idea).
 But now I want to revise the model, because although intermediate layers 
of narration may be occluded while we attend to the current narration, I have 
argued that the fictive rhetorical gesture of the diegesis is not. So we need to 
adjust the counter level, and represent the buoyancy of the stack as in Figure 
1.4.
 The actual communicative act here, The Arabian Nights, has a fictive ori-
entation that is necessarily apparent at all times, even when it is not the direct 
focus of our attention; whereas any narrative levels (or degrees of recursion) 
in between the diegesis and the current narration are virtually effaced. Not 
absolutely effaced, because it is open to us at any moment to wonder, for 
example, whether the current story is likely to interest King Shariah as much 
as Sheherazade needs it to (which refers us, even during the “Young Man’s 
Tale,” to the telling of “The Three Ladies of Baghdad”). So these levels are 
collapsed, latent contexts of the current narrative situation. This is as true of 
recursive narrative structures in which the intermediate levels of narration 
Figure 1.3. after ryan (first revision)
Figure 1.4. after ryan (second revision)
Young  
Man’s Tale
Arabian Nights
Arabian Nights
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
Arabian Nights
Young  
Man’s Tale
Amina’s Tale
The Three  
Ladies of Baghdad
Arabian Nights
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
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are all non-fictive with respect to each other. So, in Frankenstein, we attend 
to the monster’s narration in its own right, not as Walton’s written record of 
Victor’s oral relation of that narration. This is not at all to say that we do 
not cross-reference between the monster’s narration and information gleaned 
from our attention to these framing narrative acts when they are current; nor 
does it exclude our response to thematic connections between levels, which is 
provided for by our continual awareness of Mary Shelley’s fictive rhetoric.6
 The collapsed intermediate levels in this diagram are a mark of the 
insubstantiality of narrative transmission as conceived in the communica-
tive model. One of the merits of the most prominent alternative to Genette’s 
typology of narration, Stanzel’s typological circle, is that it registers this 
insubstantiality (Figure 1.5). The category of figural narrative treats the per-
spectival mode Genette called internal focalization as integral to narrative 
mediacy, which implies a salutary disregard for the communicative model’s 
commitment to a literal mode of transmission. Internal focalization is inher-
ently an imaginative alignment of the narration with a character perspec-
tive: its assimilation, under the heading of mediacy, within the same typology 
as diegesis (the authorial situation) and mimesis (the first-person situation) 
implies the equally imaginative status of the latter’s recursive structure. Both 
are contingent devices of the rhetoric of fictive narration, and neither entails a 
commitment to the literal logic of narrative transmission that leads the com-
municative model astray. On the other hand, the figural narrative situation 
cannot be homologous with Stanzel’s other two categories in the sense that 
they are with each other, precisely because the character perspective is not 
part of any communication. Unlike first-person narrative, figural narrative is 
not a recursive representational doubling of the narrative act that character-
izes authorial narrative. The same blurring of conceptual boundaries occurs 
within a different paradigm when Mieke Bal proposes to incorporate focal-
ization into the recursive hierarchy of embedded narration. She notes that, 
as a criterion of recursiveness, “the two units must belong to the same class” 
(43), but then defines the relevant class, too broadly, as “subject-object rela-
tions” (45), which effaces the key difference between narration and focaliza-
tion—that is, communication. So too with the figural narrative situation: its 
assimilation to the same class as diegesis and mimesis disregards the intrinsi-
cally communicative nature of narration. The figural narrative situation can-
not be reconciled with communication, not even self-communication, since it 
definitionally involves a disjunction between narration and character perspec-
 6. The concept of voice as idiom is also illuminated by this characteristic strategy, in the 
Gothic novel, of embedding multiple layers of narration—as we shall see below.
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tive. Monika Fludernik aptly describes the figural narrative situation as “non-
communicative narrative” (1994: 445), which captures its incompatibility 
with the literal logic of the communicative model. But from a more inclusive 
rhetorical point of view, non-communicative narrative is a contradiction in 
terms; and it is only from a rhetorical point of view that any parity between 
(represented) narrative transmission and character perception can be counte-
nanced in the first place. Figural narration, from this perspective, is simply a 
rhetorical option available to diegesis; one that exploits fiction’s imaginative 
freedom from the literalism of the communicative model just as some features 
of first-person narration do, but without the recursive structure of mimesis.
 The categories of person and level, as conceived in the communicative 
model, are logically incompatible with each other, then, and we can only 
make sense of fictive narratives (and narratives within narratives) in terms of 
a rhetorical paradigm more akin to Plato’s distinction between diegesis and 
mimesis and the recursive options it accommodates. This rhetorical paradigm 
involves awareness of fictionality at all times as an integral part of our inter-
pretation of fictions, so that recursive narratives do not at any point harden 
into discrete ontological facts with logical implications beyond the rhetorical 
focus of the particular case. Fictionality is a rhetorical gesture: as rhetoric it 
is necessarily communicative; as a gesture it is semiotic, but not intrinsically 
linguistic. This is important for two reasons. Firstly it accounts for a problem 
that exercises Genette in his discussion of La Chute, which (because of its 
Figure 1.5. from A Theory of Narrative xvi (simplified)
First-person 
situation
Authorial
situation
Figural  
situation
Reflector-
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resemblance to dramatic monologue) he is tempted to say has no extradi-
egetic level (1988: 89); as well as the analogous issue of the status of interior 
monologue, over which Stanzel and Dorrit Cohn disagree—Cohn sees it as 
direct discourse, Stanzel as pure reflector mode (Cohn 1981: 169–70). These 
problems arise because of an assumption that the fictive diegesis, to be dieg-
esis at all, must be a linguistic act—so that if there is no overt narration to the 
reader, there is no diegesis. But communication is the semiotic use of media: 
as long as the character discourse is understood as represented, not transmit-
ted, the fictive act of the diegesis is manifest. The second reason for insisting 
upon a semiotic frame of reference is already apparent from the way these 
two problem cases border upon drama: it is that a rhetorical model of fiction-
ality as a communicative gesture recognizes no categorical boundary between 
fictions in language and fictions in other media. So whereas the model of 
mediacy presented by Stanzel embodies a tradition in which mediacy is an 
indirect form of representation, and its antithesis is the direct, immediate pre-
sentation of drama, or film, I am claiming instead that mediacy is a property 
of media; and that the distinction between, for instance, fiction and drama 
is not a distinction between indirect and direct form, but between different 
semiotic means of representation: in one case symbolic (language), in the 
other iconic (mise en scène, performance, etc.).7
 There is an inherent possibility for any representational medium to repre-
sent an instance of its own use: for example, a film that represents the filming 
of a series of events (e.g. The Blair Witch Project, in which the whole film 
takes the form of documentary footage shot by the hapless characters; or The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, in which a relationship between two actors par-
allels that of their characters in the film they are making). Such recursive pos-
sibilities are rarely realized in the extradiegetic instance of a film, though the 
film-within-a-film is common enough. By contrast, the equivalent in linguistic 
fiction encompasses the whole range and history of homodiegetic narration, 
as well as intradiegetic narration (whether homo- or hetero-); that is to say, 
the whole order of narrative mimesis in Plato’s sense. The reason, presum-
ably, is that verbal narration is a native human faculty, whereas cinematic 
narration is a sophisticated technological extension of human narrative pow-
ers. On the other hand, the private, internal faculty of narrative articulation 
(that is, self-communication) may as readily be cognitively perceptual as lin-
 7. Note that the language within dramatic performance is itself represented, and sub-
ordinate to the iconic function of the medium. My position here takes up the possibility of a 
trans-media model of narrative raised by Manfred Jahn (2001: 675–76) and Brian Richardson 
(2001a: 691), though emphatically not by postulating the agency of a dramatic (or filmic) nar-
rator, for the reasons I first set out in “Who Is the Narrator?” (1997).
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guistic—as, for example, in dreams or memories. Techniques of literary nar-
ration that strive to represent this mental faculty (interior monologue, stream 
of consciousness) can be seen as straining at the limits of their medium, and 
depend upon the establishment of certain representational conventions; their 
filmic equivalents—representations of dream narratives, for example—are 
accommodated more straightforwardly by the medium (it is notable that 
dreams figure prominently in the early history of film).8 The prominence, in 
verbal fictions, of the mimetic paradigm (that is, of the narrating instance 
as a product of representation) may account for a non sequitur that seems 
to underlie the communicative model. Represented narrations are theorized 
(modeled) in terms of actual narrations—a perfectly appropriate interpre-
tative strategy (though theory often extends it well beyond its legitimately 
rhetorical scope by insisting upon a systematic logical equivalence that is by 
no means inherent in the analogy, and sometimes obfuscatory); then, by a 
kind of back-formation, actual narrations of fiction are themselves modeled 
as represented narrations—a move that requires some such hypothesis as a 
default narrator and a dummy representational frame. A trans-media sense 
of narrating instance can be a helpful corrective here if we reflect upon the 
redundancy of treating film in that way; as if there were any theoretical divi-
dend to be gained from regarding the discourse of every fiction film not as the 
film itself, but as something ontologically framed and mediated by the film 
(the discourse of a filmic narrator, communicating as fact the narrative of the 
film, through the medium of film, yet being only a formal inference from the 
fictionality of the film).9
 By viewing the narrating instance as a representational act, then, I am 
affirming two things. Firstly, that the most elementary and irreducible dis-
tinction among narrating instances is not symmetrical but hierarchical, cor-
responding to Plato’s distinction between diegesis and mimesis as, on the one 
 8. Richardson’s discussion of memory plays (2001a: 682–83) provides further support 
for this observation.
 9. This is essentially David Bordwell’s point in Narration in the Fiction Film (1985), 
where he argues for a view of filmic narration as the set of cues from which the viewer con-
structs the fabula, but denies that narration implies a narrator (1985: 62). His emphasis upon 
the viewer’s understanding of the representational product inevitably slights the communicative 
process, however, and arises from problems with the notion of fictionality that Bordwell does 
not explore, despite the prominence of “fiction” in his title. Edward Branigan does discuss 
communication in the context of fictionality, though preferring to “remain neutral” (1992: 
107) on the merits of communication models. He finds himself caught between, on the one 
hand, a sense of agency in narration—he himself speaks of “an implicit extra-fictional narra-
tion [ . . . ] the ‘voice’ of an ‘implied author’” (91)—and, on the other hand, the “anthropo-
morphic fiction” of a narrator (108–10). On this question, see also Jan Alber’s contribution in 
this volume.
48  Part I: Chapter 1
hand, a first-degree act of narrative representation (Genette’s extra-hetero-
diegetic narration), and on the other hand, a second-degree narrative repre-
sentation of a narrative representation (extra-homodiegetic narration, and 
all intradiegetic narration, homo- or hetero-). Second-degree narrative rep-
resentation is more prevalent in linguistic media than others, but in any case 
encompasses all circumstances in which the need arises for a second sense of 
voice, as represented idiom, in conjunction with the sense of voice as narrat-
ing instance, because such narrative mimesis encompasses all circumstances 
in which the instance is itself an object of representation. Secondly, I am 
affirming the importance of a distinction between narrative representation 
and narrative transmission. Properly speaking, media cease to function trans-
missively (i.e. as technological conduits for independently semiotic content) 
as soon as they themselves become semiotic—which is to say, here, represen-
tational. So it is possible in non-fiction for a narrating instance to be trans-
mitted within a framing instance (for example when a historian quotes an 
eye-witness account, or when a literary biography quotes from the work of its 
subject), but within fiction the appearance of such hierarchies of transmission 
is itself a product of representational rhetoric. The various transgressions of 
level that Genette classifies as metalepsis, whether foregrounded or inciden-
tal, are answerable only to that rhetoric: their significance is to be evaluated 
in relation to the discernible import of the representational discourse, rather 
than to the iron law of non-contradiction. Apart from the pragmatic, con-
textual circumstances of actual communication (including actual fictive com-
munication), the structure of narrative instanciation does not exist except as 
a product of representation, and the logic of represented narrative transmis-
sion has no priority over the rhetorical emphases of the representational act 
itself. Narrative theory and interpretation, then, must avoid the temptation 
to impose the coherence of a systematic logical structure upon the process 
of narrative representation, which is contingent and inherently protean in its 
rhetorical emphasis and focus, direction and misdirection. In reading through 
the represented structure of narrative transmission, narratologists should take 
care not to mistake interpretative strategies for theoretical paradigms.
 Where voice is used as a metaphor of idiom in narrative theory, it is a way 
of bringing to the fore the mimetic dimension of the narrative discourse; its 
capacity for representing the discourse of another. The represented discourse 
concerned may itself be a narrating instance, or it may be a discursive act 
of another kind; it may imply a particular discursive subject, or it may be 
a generic representation. The defining feature of voice in the sense of idiom 
is that it is always objectified, as the product of a representational rhetoric; 
and in this respect it is crucial to keep it distinct from voice as instance. The 
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temptation is to apply the sense of voice as idiom equally to represented dis-
courses and first-degree narrative discourse, or diegesis, because intuitively, 
narrative language does not only represent voices, but also exhibits voice. 
In rhetorical terms, however, the function of voice in these two discursive 
contexts—diegesis and mimesis—is quite different. It is true that we are likely 
to focus upon a similar range of phenomena whether we attend to qualities 
of voice in narrative diegesis or in a represented discourse; but the signifi-
cance of these phenomena for narrative interpretation is radically distinct in 
each case. When attending to voice in diegesis we are attending to rhetorical 
means (which may or may not be intentional, but are certainly authorial); 
whereas in attending to voice in represented discourses we are attending to 
rhetorical effects—even where these take the form of represented rhetorical 
means, as for example in the case of a represented narrating instance (Hum-
bert Humbert’s, say). So in diegesis, questions of voice bear upon the sig-
nificance we attribute to the represented events, the narrative object; whereas 
mimetic voice (which I am calling idiom) invites evaluation of the character 
whose discourse it represents—the discursive or narrative subject. It is easy to 
see why the notion of voice as idiom might seem applicable to all discourse, 
but it is also apparent, I think, that such usage strains the range of a single 
concept, given this disparity of rhetorical emphasis. In fact, the case in which 
both senses of voice are applicable (that of a represented narrating instance) 
does not obscure the difference between them, but highlights it. A narrative 
told by a character, considered as idiom, contributes to the job of charac-
terization; considered as instance, it contributes to the job of narration. In 
Moby-Dick, Ishmael’s narration considered as idiom tells us about Ishmael; 
as instance it tells us about Ahab and the white whale. Most of the time there 
is no incompatibility between these two functions, though the emphasis var-
ies widely from case to case; but fictions can include embedded narratives for 
reasons that have nothing to do with characterization, and in fact the latter 
may be an undesirable distraction. In such cases idiom defers to instance: this 
is commonplace in film, where a character’s narration typically progresses in 
quick succession from diegetic verbal discourse to voice-over, to impersonal 
filmic narration (Citizen Kane, for example, provides several variations on 
this technique); but consider also the Gothic novel, where the function of 
elaborate narrative embedding often has much less to do with the narrat-
ing characters than with a generic strategy for bridging the gap between the 
reader’s quotidian norms and the novel’s extreme, imaginatively remote sub-
ject matter (a similar strategy, in fact, to the “friend of a friend” framework 
typical of urban legend). Perhaps the most extreme example is Melmoth the 
Wanderer, the story of which is in part relayed via a Shropshire clergyman, 
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Melmoth the Wanderer himself, the ancient Jew Adonijah and the Spaniard 
Monçada to the student John Melmoth. Furthermore, these various narrating 
instances span about 150 years; yet there is little attempt to distinguish the 
idiom of any of them.
 Even within narratives in linguistic media, voice is used in senses ranging 
from the almost literal, for representations of oral discourse, to metaphorical 
applications so far abstracted from orality that the term becomes virtually 
interchangeable with vision: but throughout this spectrum the notion of voice 
enshrines an assumption that the distinctive features of a discourse afford 
an insight into an enunciating subject—that voice is expression. Indeed this 
assumption provides the whole rhetorical basis for the representational evo-
cation of voice that I am categorizing as idiom: the point of representing a 
character’s idiom is very much to invite inference about that character’s sub-
jectivity. Inference of this kind, however, is a much more hazardous and less 
obviously relevant undertaking when the notional voice is not objectified, as 
in narrative diegesis. In this case, many of the discursive features commonly 
embraced by voice are equally, and perhaps better, understood as style: by 
style I mean discourse features understood in their relation to meaning, as 
conceived within the field of stylistics, rather than as the expression of sub-
jectivity. This substitution makes it easier to recognize that there is no inher-
ent expression of authorial subjecthood—no authentic self-presence—in such 
discursive features; nor indeed is there inherently a singular authorial subject, 
either in linguistic media or (more self-evidently) in non-linguistic media. Of 
course stylistic analysis also relates discourse to ideological import, and this 
intimates another sense of voice that remains usefully applicable to narrative 
diegesis, but which relates narrative rhetoric to the constitution of a subject 
position, rather than to an originary subject as such. I shall return to this dis-
tinction later.
 For all forms of represented discourse, then, voice as idiom is a particular 
(idiosyncratic or typical) discursive evocation of character. It is worth insist-
ing upon the correspondence between such rhetorical strategies in different 
media, in order to grasp the phenomenon at a representational level rather 
than a specifically linguistic level. The recursive model of represented voice 
that I have invoked suggests that the place to look for analogies would not 
be representations of verbal discourse in non-verbal media, but rather those 
cases where a medium is used to represent an instance of its own use. I have 
already suggested that the range of represented narrating instances in film 
might be taken to extend from fairly literal representations of the use of filmic 
apparatus to representations of the use of the medium’s semiotic channels, as 
mimetic of cognitive narrative processes. On this basis represented narrating 
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instances, which occupy one part of the territory covered by the concept of 
voice as idiom, would include dream or fantasy sequences, as in the films of 
Billy Liar and The Secret Life of Walter Mitty, both of which include filmic 
representation of their protagonists’ day-dreams; but the same principle can 
be extended to other represented discursive and cognitive acts, including any 
point-of-view shot that represents the character’s own distinct cognitive-per-
ceptual subjectivity. A good example would be the recurrent shot, in Once 
upon a Time in the West, of a blurred figure approaching, which turns out 
to represent the memory of “Harmonica” (Charles Bronson): it is the per-
spective of his exhausted younger self (he has been struggling to support the 
weight of his brother, who has a noose around his neck) as Frank (Henry 
Fonda) approaches to torment him further by pushing a harmonica into his 
mouth as he is on the point of collapse.
 The most inclusive applications of the term voice in narrative—those that 
are interchangeable with terms like vision—suggest the equal applicability of 
linguistic and perceptual metaphors for the concept, which is a helpful sup-
port for the proposal that the issue of voice should be placed in the context of 
representational rhetoric across all narrative media. The analogy with vision 
also relates directly to another prominent metaphor in narrative theory, 
which is focalization.10 But there is a crucial distinction between focalization 
and the discursive features that fall under idiom. Voice as idiom always con-
structs a distinct subject (even if generic), by virtue of its objectification—that 
is, its difference from the narrative diegesis (or a framing narrative mimesis) 
within which it is represented. Focalization, on the other hand, constructs a 
subject position only, which may or may not be aligned with a represented 
character (external focalization is precisely not character centred). When 
focalization is aligned with a character, its rhetorical means may very well 
be a representation of idiom. Consider the relation between free indirect dis-
course (FID) and internal focalization. FID is one of the privileged topics in 
discussions of narrative voice, and as represented discourse it falls within the 
scope of voice as idiom. It also necessarily implies internal focalization (how-
ever momentary), though the reverse is not true: internal focalization does 
not always involve FID, or any other representation of idiom. FID is a form of 
discursive mimesis, whereas focalization is a feature of narrative diegesis (not, 
I hasten to add, of narrative transmission: it is a product of representational 
rhetoric, not an information conduit). Where FID and internal focalization 
 10. Fludernik, discussing the relation between voice and focalization, argues for the theo-
retical redundancy of the latter (2001: 633–35). I find it helpful to retain it, however, as an 
aid to discriminating between the different senses of voice, which are often in play at the same 
time.
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coincide, these are two sides of the same coin: the one oriented towards the 
represented discourse, the other towards the subject position constructed by 
that representation. The sense in which FID involves some kind of doubling 
of voice was encapsulated in the title of Roy Pascal’s classic study, The Dual 
Voice, as well as in Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of double-voiced discourse, of 
which it is a very specific instance (I shall return to Bakhtin below). FID is a 
representation of the idiom—the objectified voice—of another, in neutral or 
parodic style, with sympathetic or ironic inflection, but in any case with a 
certain distance inherent in the fact that the representing act itself remains in 
the fore. The indices of the representational act persist within the representa-
tion itself in the form of temporal and perspectival markers (past-tense verbs, 
third-person pronouns) that correlate with the subject position implied by the 
narrating instance rather than that implied by the idiomatic voice. That is to 
say, the narrating voice inhabits FID not as idiom, but as instance (overtly; it 
also involves interpellation, as we shall see): FID is double-voiced only in the 
sense that it is a synthetic product of distinct senses of voice.11
 Whilst certain forms of focalization go hand in hand with representa-
tions of voice as idiom, such as FID, this is not the sense in which voice may 
be understood as applicable to focalization in general. As idiom, voice is an 
object of representation: it is offered up to the evaluative scrutiny of the nar-
rative’s audience, and so held at arm’s length. There is a structurally intrin-
sic detachment, however sympathetic, to the rhetorical function of voice as 
idiom. Focalization in general, however, does not operate in this way: the 
perspectival logic of a representation is not manifested as an object, but as 
an implicit premise of the rhetorical focus of the representational act. That 
is to say, while voice as idiom serves to characterize a discursive subject as a 
more or less individuated object of representation, focalization as such func-
tions indirectly, to establish a subject position only; one that may or may 
not coincide with a specific character, but which in any case is not an object 
of representation but a tacit rhetorical effect of the discourse’s mode of rep-
resentation of another object. Where a specific character is involved, it is 
possible to describe represented idiom as an effect of sympathetic or ironic 
detachment, and focalization as an effect of empathetic subjective alignment 
(as long as the term empathy can be understood as without evaluative preju-
 11. The possibility of analogies for FID in other media raises interesting questions: con-
sider the way Hitchcock represents the experience of vertigo in the film of that name, in the 
famous tower shot combining a zoom out and track in to maintain a constant image size, or 
frame range, in a view down a (model) stairwell. The device is mimetic of James Stewart’s 
struggle to make sense of his perceptions, but as an overtly filmic technique—a simultaneous 
track and zoom—it is also part of the representational rhetoric of the diegetic narrative itself.
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dice). The more general, abstract concept that applies to the latter effect, 
however, is interpellation. This is the term I am using to define the third sense 
in which voice is used in narrative theory and criticism.
 Interpellation is the process by which an ideology or discourse “hails” and 
constitutes individuals as subjects (Althusser 1971: 162). Narration always 
involves perspectival choices, which necessarily carry with them some set of 
presuppositions, ranging from the physical (spatio-temporal), through the 
epistemological, to the ideological. This structure of presupposition may be 
aligned with a character, as in first-person narration and internal focalization, 
or it may not; but in every case the act of narrative comprehension requires 
an imaginative alignment between the reader (or viewer) and the implied sub-
ject position of the discourse. Such alignment may, to an extent, be conscious 
and qualified by reservations of several kinds; but to the extent that it is 
unconscious, it has the ideological effect of making the implied subject posi-
tion seem to constitute the authentic selfhood of the narrative recipient.12
 I have discussed the sense in which voice, as represented idiom, can be 
understood as a rhetorical means of characterizing the subject of represented 
discourse. It is a perfectly intelligible and modest figurative leap from there to 
a usage of voice that refers to the subject position implied by any discourse 
(represented or diegetic, aligned with a character or not). This is a distinct 
sense of voice not only because it need not be representationally embodied 
or owned by a character, or a narrating character, or indeed the author, but 
also because its scope extends well beyond the category of the discursive, or 
even the perspectival in any limited perceptual or cognitive sense (the domain 
of focalization), to become an organizing concept for ideology. Where the 
concept of voice is invoked in this sense, it seems to do quite various services 
for critical orientations ranging from Bakhtinian dialogics to identity politics. 
The figurative instability of the term itself is partly responsible, no doubt: it 
allows for uncertain fluctuation between a usage in which the ideological sub-
ject position is a discursive construct, and a usage in which it is an authentic 
manifestation of (subaltern) identity.13
 In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin identifies a range of double-
voiced phenomena in narrative discourse, the dialogic nature of which is 
only brought out by a theoretical approach he describes as “metalinguistic” 
 12. The mechanism of presupposition underlying the interpellation of subjects has been 
explored by John Frow in relation to genre and Vološinov’s concept of the literary enthymeme, 
or argument with an implied premise (Frow 1986: 77–78).
 13. Susan Lanser’s Fictions of Authority (1992) is a useful example of the politicization of 
voice from a feminist perspective. Lanser makes a clear distinction between voice in the sense 
I am calling idiom and a sense that equates with instance/interpellation, though she does not 
discriminate between the latter two senses.
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(181). This is because double-voiced discourse is only perceptible as a feature 
of concrete, situated language use, from which the discipline of linguistics 
(including formal stylistics) is necessarily abstracted. Double-voiced discourse 
emerges, then, when the manifest voice of an utterance can be contextually 
understood to be in dialogue with some other, implicit voice. Voice in this 
second sense cannot be assimilated to voice as idiom, since it is not rep-
resented; or to voice as instance, since it is not even explicit.14 Its implicit 
nature, and the fact that it is not necessarily attributable to a particular sub-
ject, or even any specific discursive form, marks this out as a sense of voice 
that falls within the scope of interpellation. But clearly, since the dialogic 
interaction that interests Bakhtin is ideological (ideology being the unify-
ing principle of the voice with which the discourse is engaged), the sense of 
voice that applies on the explicit side of the dialogue also finds its integrity 
in ideological terms, rather than as a set of formal discourse features, or the 
represented idiom of a particular subject. So Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky’s 
Notes from Underground as double voiced in that the Underground Man’s 
discourse throughout is not only oriented towards its objects, but also in 
dialogue with the anticipated response of another: “In each of his thoughts 
about [the world, nature, society] there is a battle of voices, evaluations, 
points of view. In everything he senses above all someone else’s will predeter-
mining him” (236). The ideological thrust of his own discourse is precisely 
to establish the autonomy and integrity of the subject position he claims for 
himself, yet the attempt itself involves him in an unresolvable dialogic vicious 
circle: “What he fears most of all is that . . . his self-affirmation is somehow in 
need of affirmation or recognition by another. And it is in this direction that 
he anticipates the other’s response. . . . He fears that the other might think 
he fears that other’s opinion. . . . With his refutation, he confirms precisely 
what he wishes to refute, and he knows it” (229). In other words, the Under-
ground Man’s discourse projects a subject position that is nevertheless unoc-
cupiable. In general, Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony necessarily dissociates 
voice from the individual subject; but without some other organizing prin-
ciple the polyphony would be too diffuse a phenomenon to be conceptually 
useful—and in fact the notion of monologism, which Bakhtin retains, would 
be unintelligible. The organizing principle at work in Bakhtin’s system is a 
concept of voice as the relative agglomeration of ideological significance, the 
 14. The need to discriminate between senses of voice is apparent in the conclusion to 
which Richard Aczel is led by a consideration of this specific Bakhtinian context: “Narrative 
voice, like any other voice, is a fundamentally composite entity, a specific configuration of 
voices” (1998: 483). If every voice is a configuration of voices, the term is being made to work 
too hard.
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integrity of which is not (even in the most monological instance) to be found 
in the discursive subject as such, but in the projection of virtual subject posi-
tions: that is, in the mechanism of interpellation. By distinguishing between 
voice as instance and as interpellation, I am contrasting a sense of the term in 
which it represents the narrating agency of a particular individual or collec-
tive, with one in which it discursively insinuates an ideological nexus, a sub-
ject position with the potential to constitute a particular subject (represented 
or otherwise). Such a distinction, I think, provides for a politicized sense of 
voice in which the contextual production of situated political identities is at 
stake (to be engaged critically, recognized or resisted), without hypostasizing 
the concept as the authentic expression of such identities.
 If my discrimination between the different senses of voice has any merit, 
it is the result of approaching the issue with two key assumptions in mind. 
First, an assumption that the senses of voice—instance, idiom and interpel-
lation—need to be conceived in terms of representational rhetoric, and in 
particular the rhetoric of fictionality; and second, an assumption that the 
issues covered by the term voice are not exclusively linguistic, but also semi-
otic, and relevant across the whole range of narrative media. It seems to me 
that these premises are crucial, not only to expose the inadequacies of the 
communicative model of narration, but also to take us beyond it. I have 
insisted upon the metaphoricity of the notion of voice as the precondition 
for its range of application both within and beyond linguistic media, and the 
terms I have used to discriminate between senses of voice can only cover that 
range themselves by virtue of a certain amount of extension and extrapola-
tion. So, I have used the term instance to refer to the sense of voice as an act 
of narrative representation, which is to say the sense in which the empha-
sis falls upon communicative agency in narration. I have suggested that the 
most fundamental distinction to be drawn within this category arises out of 
the inherent possibility of recursiveness in narration, whereby one narrating 
instance may represent another. I have shown how this distinction, which 
corresponds to the Platonic distinction between diegesis and mimesis, cuts 
across the fourfold typology of narrating instances Genette derives from his 
oppositions between homodiegetic and heterodiegetic, and intradiegetic and 
extradiegetic narration, and I have argued further for a rhetorical perspective 
upon narration that does not confuse representation with transmission. My 
use of the term idiom serves to group together senses of voice in which the 
emphasis falls upon the discursive subject as an object of representation—
that is, where voice serves purposes of characterization. This definition pro-
vides for analogies between literary representations of voice and examples 
of mimetic recursiveness in other media. It has also allowed me to make a 
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principled distinction between represented voice and focalization (the latter 
being a form of my third category of voice, interpellation), and to distin-
guish the different senses of voice that apply in the notably complex case of 
free indirect discourse. Finally, I have used the term interpellation to refer to 
those respects in which voice relates to a representational subject position 
rather than to a represented or actual subject as such. Focalization, I have 
suggested, is a special, restricted case of voice in this sense, in which the 
subject position is defined in perceptual and cognitive terms. In the general 
case, the sense of voice as interpellation embraces more abstract, ideological 
constructions of a subject position, and I have shown how such a concep-
tion of voice can account for its use in the context of Bakhtinian dialogics. If 
nothing else, this analysis of the metaphor of voice in narrative theory shows 
that it has already gone a long way beyond words, and indeed that it is per-
haps too richly suggestive for its own good. There is little to be gained from 
attempting to constrain the use of such a metaphor, but it is worth insisting 
upon the need for more nuanced distinctions; the terms I have suggested 
here—instance, idiom, and interpellation—offer one way of doing just that.
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PositioNiNg tHe disCussioN oF Mise en cadre  iN 
tHe Field oF (Post-)ClassiCal NarratologY
Part of the present “state of the art” of contemporary narratology seems to 
be a paradox, for rather than presenting a static profile, this “state” of the art 
is characterized by a highly dynamic situation. Indeed, narratology currently 
appears to be undergoing a major paradigm shift: most narratologists have 
recently announced the demise of classical, structuralist narratology and pro-
claimed the emergence of a “post-classical” era.1 The manifold alleged or 
genuinely new developments in this post-classical narratology fall into three 
categories. There is firstly, as the most radical and also most questionable 
development, the deconstruction of narratology as a logocentric enterprise, 
as epitomized by Andrew Gibson (1996). Secondly, there is a large group of 
“applied narratologists,” who are principally interested in new synchronic 
or diachronic reference fields. They use (and occasionally modify) the tools 
provided by classical narratology for often highly topical applications to 
contemporary or past reality and employ narratology for cultural-historical, 
 1. Cf. Herman (1997, 1999), Nünning/Nünning (2002), Fludernik (2003), Kindt/Müller 
(2003), Nünning (2004).
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post-colonial or feminist analyses, to mention a few examples.2 And there 
is, thirdly, a group of “systematic narratologists,” who complement classical 
narratology from a predominantly theoretical point of view by systematically 
refining and completing its toolbox or by broadening narratology’s focus so 
that it opens up towards other theoretical approaches such as possible-worlds 
theory, cognitive theory3 and/or towards the non-verbal media, which are 
increasingly being included in narratological studies.4 Not only the first but 
also both of the latter groups move away from classical structuralist narra-
tology with its all but exclusive focus on intratextual phenomena of literary 
works as static structures.
 In spite of all the current rhetoric of “making it new,” one should not 
forget that all of today’s narratology is based on the ground-breaking work of 
the classical narratologists and that without them there would be nothing to 
deconstruct, no new outlooks to engage with and no extensions of narratol-
ogy. In this spirit of acknowledging the achievements of the founders of the 
discipline such as Gérard Genette, who, among many other notions, intro-
duced a fruitful typology of diegetic levels into the description of narratives 
(1972: 238 f.), I would in this article like to add something to his findings, a 
complement to classical narratology that is also meant as a compliment. My 
contribution thus belongs to the third group of post-classical variants con-
centrating on systematic supplementation. It is inspired by both structuralist 
analysis—which for me still has its merits owing to its ideal of methodologi-
cal and logocentric rigor, its attempt at terminological clarity, and its unparal-
leled contribution to the understanding of the internal make-up of (literary) 
texts—and by a number of post-classical approaches, notably frame theory 
and an intermedial perspective. Owing to this combination of classical and 
post-classical elements, my approach could also be termed “neo-classical.”
 My neo-classical complement takes its departure from the well-known 
concept of mise en abyme as investigated by Dällenbach (1989), Hutcheon 
(1984: 53–6) and others, and consists in highlighting a reciprocal, hitherto 
neglected phenomenon, which I call mise en cadre. To be more precise, I pro-
pose to contribute to the study of what, with Jean Ricardou (using “text” in 
a broad sense) one may call “similitudes textuelles” (1978: 75), that is, simi-
 2. For a cultural-historical (re-)orientation of narratology see Erll/Roggendorf (2002), 
Fludernik (2003), and Nünning (2004); for a post-colonial orientation see Birk/Neumann 
(2002); and for a feminist or gender orientation see Allrath/Gymnich (2002) and Nünning/
Nünning (2004).
 3. See Surkamp (2002), Zerweck (2002), Herman (2002, 2003).
 4. See Cobley (2002), Wolf (2002b, 2004b), Herman (2004), Ryan (2004), and Abbott 
(2005).
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larities that occur within a text or artefact. Thus the following discussion of 
mise en cadre as a complement to mise en abyme is also a contribution to the 
wide field of textual self-referentiality.5
PostClassiCal iNterMedial aNd FraMe-tHeoretiCal 
aPProaCHes as FraMes to Mise en cadre
Before discussing the concept of mise en cadre, I would like to briefly outline 
the post-classical theoretical frameworks that will be shown to be relevant to 
this concept.
 My first framework is the theory of intermediality. I am referring to 
“intermediality” here in its broad sense, which designates all phenomena that 
involve more than one conventionally distinct medium of communication. 
For my present purpose a variant of intermediality is relevant which deals 
with phenomena that can be observed in more than one medium. In interme-
diality theory this variant has been called “transmediality.”6 Transmediality 
is relevant also to many phenomena that have originally been described in 
literary narratology, notably to the core concept of narratology, namely nar-
rativity.7 It is moreover important to “descriptivity,”8 meta-referentiality,9 to 
name a few more examples, and it also extends, as we will see, to mise en 
cadre. These are all phenomena that transcend, cross or go beyond the con-
fines of literary texts. The phenomenon of framing equally belongs to these 
transmedial phenomena, which leads me to the second theoretical framework 
requisite for the explanation of mise en cadre, namely frame theory.
 Frame theory, as conceived in linguistics, social psychology and cognitive 
theory (Bateson 1972, Goffman 1974), is actually the most important theo-
retical framework for my purposes. It takes its point of departure in the idea, 
by now generally acknowledged, that all mental activity is ruled by cogni-
tive frames, that is, by meta-concepts, which in turn govern individual con-
cepts and thus help us navigate through our experiential and communicative 
 5. I am hereby enlarging on a form of self-referentiality which I first outlined in Wolf 
(2001: 61–68); cf. also Wolf (2009: ch. 3.2.).
 6. For transmediality as one of several basic forms of intermediality (which also includes 
intermedial transposition, plurimediality and intermedial reference) see Wolf (2002a: 18 f.); 
Rajewsky (2002: 206) also discusses it in the context of intermediality.
 7. See for instance Ryan (2004), and Wolf (2002b).
 8. See Wolf/Bernhart (2007).
 9. See Hauthal et al. (2007) and Wolf (2009).
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universe. Such frames also apply to literature and other media.10 Literature 
in itself constitutes a macro-frame, and its production and reception are 
shaped by further cognitive frames, for example, genres. While the applica-
tion of some, in particular seemingly natural, frames goes without saying 
because they operate with implicit “default settings” and without “key-
ings” (Goffman’s term11), there are frames which require explicit keying or, 
as I shall call it, framing. The various media, including literature, must be 
counted among this latter group, since they form specialized modes of com-
munication based on “non-natural” frames that call for special “keyings” 
or framings. “Framing” in this cognitive sense refers to a concrete coding 
of abstract cognitive frames as mentally stored schemata, a coding that can 
occur in mental activities as well as in physical manifestations either within 
texts and artefacts or in their immediate contexts. In the temporal media, 
framings in initial position are especially important since in this position 
they are most efficient in contributing to, and controlling, reception process-
es.12 In what follows I will be concerned primarily, though not exclusively, 
with such initial framings.
 An important location of cognitive framings in literature are paratexts—
another element from Genette’s useful classical toolbox (1987). Additional 
framings can be found in the framing parts of frame narratives (for instance 
the “General Prologue” of Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales) and as we will 
see, picture frames. In literature as well as in the visual arts such framing 
parts are commonly called “frames,” which could create confusion with the 
frame-theoretical meaning of frame and framing as introduced above. How-
ever, neither the terminological closeness between “frame” as cognitive frame 
and as physical text segment or picture frame nor the vicinity between cogni-
tive “frame” and “framings” should cause too many difficulties as long as 
what is meant remains clear. From a cognitive perspective the terminological 
similarity of “framing” and “frame” in their cognitive as well as common 
 10. For a detailed application of frame theory to literature and other media see Wolf/
Bernhart (2006).
 11. See Goffman 1974: 40–82. According to Goffman the most important default setting 
is what he calls the “primary framework” (1974: 21 and passim), which refers to reality; thus 
it is only when a communicative exchange is not seriously meant as “real” that we need “key-
ing” as, for instance, in role playing. Goffman’s “keying,” which he defines as “[a] systematic 
transformation [ . . . ] across materials already meaningful in accordance with a schema of 
interpretation” (45) is more restricted than my notion of “framing,” since “keying,” for Goff-
man, only marks the shift from reality to play, whereas “framing” can mark any cognitive 
frame that guides mental activities.
 12. For more details on frames and (initial) framing in literature and other arts see Wolf/
Bernhart (2006), in particular the introduction to that volume (Wolf 2006).
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senses may be said to point to a deeper functional relation. It consists in the 
fact that the frames of frame narratives as well as picture frames are sites on 
which cognitive framing (the coding of cognitive frames) frequently occurs 
with particular density, even though such frames-as-text-segments—and this 
is also true of paratexts and picture frames—can also serve other functions, 
e.g. create suspense, give summaries of the following story, emphasize the 
value of the framed work, etc. As regards the following discussion I would 
like to note that I will primarily deal with framings in the cognitive sense 
(in particular as physical markers of cognitive frames). More precisely, I will 
concentrate on two basic forms of how framings can be realized (whether in 
paratexts, the frames of frame tales, or elsewhere).
 The physical codings of cognitive frames can occur either in the explicit 
mode of telling (that is, by simply naming the relevant cognitive frames) or in 
the implicit mode of showing (that is, by implying cognitive frames through 
illustrations). The mode of telling may be illustrated by Chaucer’s “General 
Prologue,” namely by the explicit mention of “myrthe” and the wish to “be 
myrie” as the motivation for the host to ask the pilgrims to tell stories on 
their way to Canterbury (Chaucer 1957: 773, 782). This triggers the cogni-
tive frame “entertainment” as one of the functions of the embedded tales. The 
mode of showing, on the other hand, occurs when the text evokes, describes 
or narrates something in a framing part which—usually proleptically, but 
in some cases also analeptically—sheds light on the framed part and thus 
triggers a relevant cognitive frame in the recipient’s mind that influences his 
or her interpretation. In the mode of showing the establishment of similari-
ties between the framing and the framed is a particularly important device, 
one that is also particularly apt for literature as an art that does not only 
name concepts but also typically illustrates them. The distinction between 
telling and showing can even be exemplified in the titles of literary works as 
important instances of paratexts. There are titles that contain framings in the 
mode of telling, for instance Defoe’s The Life and Strange Surprising Adven-
tures of Robinson Crusoe, of York, Mariner (1719), where the generic frame 
“adventure story” is explicitly mentioned. By contrast, in Oscar Wilde’s The 
Importance of Being Earnest (1895) the implicit mode of showing can (ret-
rospectively) be seen at work in the indirect invocation of the generic frame 
“comedy” through the use of typical devices of comic entertainment: the title 
establishes a similarity with humorous elements of the play by containing the 
pun earnest/Ernest and by hinting at the playful non-fulfilment of expecta-
tions (seriousness as an “important” theme of a comedy!) that so conspicu-
ously informs Wilde’s witty comedy as a whole.
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Mise en cadre as a CouNterPart to Mise en abyMe: 
the Concept and examples from Fiction and Painting13
The Concept of Mise en cadre as Opposed to Mise en abyme
The implicit mode of showing is particularly relevant to mise en cadre, nota-
bly when it employs similarities as a form of realizing framings in the cog-
nitive sense. One more—and more complex—example besides the title of 
Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest shall prepare the ground for the 
theoretical explanation of the concept in focus here: Joseph Conrad’s frame-
tale Heart of Darkness (1899), more precisely the relationship between parts 
of the opening framing section and aspects of the framed text.
 As is well known, the embedded story and main part of the text themati-
cally centers on the concept and in particular on the ambivalence of “dark-
ness” not only of colonized “Africa” as a fascinating and disturbingly wild 
continent, whose “heart” Marlow’s expedition attempts to reach in search 
of the missing Mr. Kurtz, but also of the white colonizers themselves, whose 
motivations are revealed to have a remarkably dark side. Ultimately, the 
“heart of darkness” of the novel’s title pessimistically refers to the human 
heart, which is full of gloomy “abominations” underneath a “bright” but 
deplorably thin varnish of “civilization,” consisting of moral and humanist 
ideals.
 This ambivalence, with an emphasis on the dark side of civilization, is 
already conspicuously present in the landscape description contained in the 
opening frame (Conrad 1986: 1814–18). This description serves as the cod-
ing of major elements of the text’s implied worldview and pessimistic view of 
man and is thus a marker of a complex cognitive frame. The framing scene is 
set on board a ship anchored in the river Thames. The river, which is made to 
resemble “an interminable waterway [ . . . ] leading to the uttermost ends of 
the earth” (1814–15),14 foreshadows—and parallels—the great African river 
on which Marlow sets out on his expedition into the heart of the African 
darkness. Even more revealing than the similarities in the spatial coordinates 
is the play of light and gloom which the temporal setting provides, for the 
framing scene takes place at sunset: “The day was ending in a serenity of 
 13. Parts of this chapter are a revised version of my interpretation of Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness in Wolf (2006: 201–3).
 14. Moreover, in Marlow’s preface to his tale, the Thames is linked to the ambivalence 
of the former Roman civilization, whose “[l]ight came out of this river” in the midst of the 
“darkness” and “wilderness” of early Britain (1817).
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still and exquisite brilliance”—yet it is a “brilliance” tarnished in the west 
by a “gloom, brooding motionless over the biggest, and the greatest, town 
on earth” (all 1815). This darkness enveloping London, “the monstrous 
town” (1816) at the center of the British Empire,15 is repeatedly mentioned 
and forms one of the most salient features of the framing description. It is a 
gloom which triggers ideas of decay and death: “[ . . . ] the sun sank low, and 
from glowing white changed to a dull red without rays and without heat, 
as if about to go out suddenly, stricken to death by the touch of that gloom 
brooding over a crowd of men” (1815). The fact that the crew on board the 
ship starts a game of dominoes referred to as “bones” (1815) chimes in well 
with this image of death and decadence. All of these diegetic elements—and 
there are more in this framing part—are remarkable anticipations of elements 
in the ensuing hypodiegetic story and show revealing similarities with it. The 
decadent ambivalence surrounding the Thames resembles the atmosphere 
surrounding the African river in the embedded tale with its gloomy depictions 
of the failing aspirations of colonialism and man in general. This ambivalence 
also anticipates the fate of Kurtz; this “splendid pillar” of Western civiliza-
tion has apparently had experiences that lead to his famous dying words 
“The horror! The horror!” (1873), an enigmatic but definitely rather gloomy 
summing up of his life, which contrasts with its apparent moral splendor.
 The entire framing landscape description is a fine specimen of a mise en 
cadre. Like mise en abyme, this device rests on two formal criteria: 1) the 
existence of a hierarchy of at least two different logical or narratological 
levels; and 2) a similarity or analogy between them (including, as a liminal 
case, also contrast, for contrast, in order to be discernible as such, always 
implies a basic common ground between the contrasting phenomena). How-
ever, mise en cadre differs from mise en abyme in the direction in which this 
similarity is made to operate. While mise en abyme is itself a distinct element 
located on a lower level that sheds light on an upper level through revelatory 
similarities in a “bottom up” process (Figure 2.1), mise en cadre is part of a 
framing and thus upper-level structure that illuminates a lower, framed text 
in a “top down” process (Figure 2.2). Narratology has failed to provide a 
distinct term for this reversal of, and counterpart to, mise en abyme. I have 
therefore proposed elsewhere to baptize it mise en cadre (Wolf 1999: 104, 
Wolf 2001: 63–64), maintaining in the French term the connection with mise 
en abyme. (Already in 1994 Guy Larroux had used the term but in a different 
sense, namely that of “putting a frame around a tale.”16) My definition of the 
 15. The British Empire here stands metonymically for all European colonial empires. This 
includes the Belgian Congo, where the African part of the embedded story is set.
 16. Larroux, in his contribution to a colloquium which was held at the Université 
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term is as follows: As opposed to mise en abyme, in which a discrete lower-
level element or structure “mirrors” an analogous element or structure on 
the framing higher level, mise en cadre consists of some discrete phenomenon 
on an upper, framing level that illustrates—frequently, but not necessarily, in 
an anticipatory way—some analogous phenomenon of the embedded level 
so that a discernible relationship of similarity is established between the two 
levels (compare Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below).
 In frame-theoretical terms, mise en cadre can be said to concern the fram-
ing parts of texts or artefacts in which meaning is transmitted by reference 
to an embedded phenomenon through some kind of similarity with it. The 
meaning transmitted by mise en cadre is often a “framing” in the cognitive 
sense. Technically, this is frequently an implicit kind of framing, since the elic-
iting of meaning here typically occurs in the mode of showing, not exclusively 
in the mode of explicit telling (or thematization)17—combinations of both 
modes being, of course, possible. Functionally, mise en cadre can be described 
as a device that often serves as a framing (coding) of cognitive frames (meta-
concepts) and thus contributes to the understanding of the framed (embed-
ded) part of a text or artefact. However, mise en cadre can also serve other 
purposes besides that of marking metaconcepts. Prologues—as in the case of 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet—may, for instance, include miniature narra-
tives summarizing the plot of the ensuing play. In Romeo and Juliet the con-
tent-related similarity through which the prologue foreshadows the dramatic 
plot triggers the generic frame “love tragedy,” but it also provides informa-
tion concerning the action and the identification of Verona as the spatial 
setting.
 Interestingly, the aforementioned function of mise en cadre to code cog-
nitive frames is also shared by mise en abyme. For example, the reflections 
of Philip Quarles, the novelist within Aldous Huxley’s novel Point Counter 
Point (1928), at one memorable moment include extended reflections on a 
Toulouse le Mirail in 1992 and which was published in 1994 (cf. Larroux 1994: 252), dis-
cusses different meanings of cadre and employs mise en cadre simply for denoting the fact of 
adding a framing text to another, more important text. He thus does not distinguish mise en 
cadre from “embedding” or mise en abyme and actually uses the term “enchâssement” as a 
synonym of mise en cadre (247).
 17. One could argue that a mere thematization, as in the mention of a generic frame in 
a title, can also produce a similarity, namely a similarity of reference (for instance, “Adven-
tures” in the title of Robinson Crusoe may be said to refer to the same genre as the novel 
itself, namely the novel of adventure); for practical purposes and in clarification of a perhaps 
misleading earlier formulation (in Wolf 2001: 63, where I mentioned “Texttitel” in a discus-
sion of mise en cadre) I would like to exclude such liminal cases of simple and exclusively 
referential “similarity” from the application of the term mise en cadre and reserve it for more 
salient cases in which there is at least some kind of similarity in the mode of showing.
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new, experimental kind of novel-writing whose aesthetic principle he explains 
as “the musicalization of fiction” (Huxley 1978: 302). As this term and the 
illustration of musicalization given in Quarles’s metafictional reflections obvi-
ously provide a crucial key to the aesthetics underlying the entire novel (and 
hence to a cognitive frame of the text), this mise en abyme can truly be said to 
contain a framing in the cognitive sense).
 This functional closeness of mise en abyme and mise en cadre is, of 
course, no coincidence but stems from the fact that similarities (and con-
trasts) in works of literature and art are generally among the most common 
devices of creating or enhancing meaning. It even happens that the coding of 
cognitive frames occurs in what may be classified as a combination of mise 
en abyme and mise en cadre. This is, for instance, the case in the prologue 
to Longus’s classical love romance Daphnis and Chloe (2nd to 3rd century 
a.d.). Here, the narrator or author tells the reader how he once, in a grove 
dedicated to the nymphs, came across a beautiful picture representing various 
aspects of love. He then goes on to describe this picture and uses this incident 
as a motivation for his telling of the story of Daphnis and Chloe in emulation 
of the painter. This charming episode unfolds a complex web of meaning and 
similarities. On the one hand, it is an ekphrasis and thus within the prologue 
a mise en abyme of representation. On the other hand, it intermedially antici-
pates the main theme of the main text, namely love. Owing to its multiple 
manifestations including parental love, love between animals and humans, 
heterosexual love, etc., as well as due to its generic value as pointing to the 
ensuing love romance, the reference to love here clearly provides a cogni-
tive frame in the sense of a metaconcept. As this foreshadowing occurs on 
the “upper level” of a paratext through a similarity with the main text, this 
ekphrasis is also a mise en cadre with reference to this text.
 The reciprocal relationships between mise en cadre and mise en abyme 
discussed above can be illustrated as follows in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The 
arrows in the figures indicate the direction in which the “mirroring” implied 
in both devices works in order to create or enhance meaning (this includes 
the reference of framings in the cognitive sense): mise en abyme “mirrors” or 
points to the “upper level,” thereby clarifying or shedding light on it bottom-
up, while mise en cadre does so with reference to the “lower level” and thus 
works top-down:
 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 actually illustrate particular cases of mise en abyme 
and mise en cadre which are especially suited to enhancing the meaning of a 
text or artefact by means of similarities. The particularity does not so much 
relate to the mention of diegetic and hypodiegetic levels, which points to nar-
rative, perhaps even literary texts: the reference to this medium (fiction) is 
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only incidental, and our example could in principle be taken from other, even 
non-narrative texts, artefacts or media as well. The same openness applies 
to the exemplification of levels through diegetic levels: other kinds of levels 
would serve the same purpose, e.g. the difference between paratext and main 
text in literature, or between frame and canvas in painting. Rather, the par-
ticularity in focus here refers to a special quantitative relationship between 
“center’” and “periphery” or, in other words, between the dominant and 
other, non-dominant parts of a text or artefact: in Figure 2.1 the “dominant” 
is clearly the upper level, in Figure 2.2 the lower one. Even if ultimately the 
relationship between “dominant” (in the sense of carrying the most impor-
tant text or constituent of the artefact) and other parts is not really a binary 
opposition but a scale allowing for many degrees in between two poles, one 
can immediately see that there are quite different possibilities of shaping 
this relationship. As for representational mises en abyme in the form of dra-
matic plays within plays, Richard Hornby (1986: 33–35) aptly differentiates 
between an “‘inset’ type” as opposed to a “‘framed’ type.” In the former case 
the inner play is secondary and the framing play most important and longest 
(as in Shakespeare’s Hamlet), while in the latter case it is the embedded play 
that forms the center or “dominant” as opposed to a short framing part (an 
instance of this latter case would thus be Shakespeare’s The Taming of the 
Shrew). It should be noted that both of these types, including the basic rela-
tionships between dominant and other parts, are transgenerically as well as 
transmedially applicable (e.g., in film), and this is not only the case in mises 
en abyme but also in mises en cadre. As for the coding of cognitive frames as 
an important function of both mises en abyme and mises en cadre, it can in 
principle also occur in dominant mises en abyme (in Hornby’s terminology 
in the “framed type”) as well as in dominant mises en cadre, yet this is not 
typically so. The reason for this is that framings are functionally subservient 
Upper (e.g. diegetic) level XyZ  
lower (e.g. hypodiegetic) level  xyz
Figure 2.1. mise en abyme (in bold type)
Upper (e.g. diegetic) level XYZ  (  )
lower (e.g. hypodiegetic) level  xyz
Figure 2.2. mise en cadre (in bold type)
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to the framed and therefore also tend to be quantitatively non-dominant. 
Therefore, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent the typical cases of cognitively func-
tionalized mises en abyme and mises en cadre, namely a mise en abyme that 
is non-dominant with reference to the upper level, and a mise en cadre that is 
non-dominant with reference to the lower level.
mise en reflet as an Additional Counterpart to mise en abyme
For the sake of completing the picture of the variants of creating meaning 
in discrete textual or artistic units that are related to other parts of the same 
text or artefact through similarities, one may mention that such similarities 
can basically also operate on the same level. In fact, as opposed to mise en 
abyme and mise en cadre, which both presuppose a difference of levels across 
which the similarity operates, there is, of course, the possibility of juxtapos-
ing, for instance, similar stories or text elements on the same hypodiegetic, 
diegetic or extra-diegetic level. As in the case of mise en cadre, literary theory 
has not provided a term for this phenomenon—in particular when referring 
to complex similarities (and not only to mere semantic isotopies or other 
recurrences of individual elements, as described by Jakobson [1960] in the 
context of his theory of the “poetic function”). I have therefore called this 
phenomenon mise en série or mise en reflet (Wolf 2001: 66), maintaining in 
the French wording again a link with mise en abyme. Mise en série refers to 
cases where there are more than two instances of similar entities on the same 
level; for only two instances of similar entities on the same level, the term 
used was mise en reflet. As in the case of mise en abyme and mise en cadre, 
the elements of such same-level parallels can be of variable quantity, but there 
is here, too, a tendency to find cognitive framings predominantly in non-dom-
inant, smaller or shorter elements (in the temporal media in preceding parts) 
which code cognitive frames that are relevant to a dominant (subsequent) ele-
ment—and this for the same reason as mentioned above. Therefore, mise en 
reflet (with one non-dominant element carrying framings that shed light on a 
dominant one) is typical here, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
 An example of this phenomenon would be the “thought-reading episode” 
in E. A. Poe’s inaugural detective fiction “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
(1841). After an initial essay-like framing regarding “the analytical power” 
(1908: 381) as the main prerequisite of a good detective (a framing located 
on the extradiegetic level), the text illustrates master-detective Dupin’s ana-
lytical abilities by a surprising instance of his seeming thought-reading when 
he analyses the mindset of his friend, the story’s Watson-like narrator, and 
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provides an ex post facto rational explanation. As opposed to mise en abyme 
and mise en cadre, this episode is located on the same (intra-)diegetic level as 
the crime story which follows. The murder mystery of this tale clearly forms 
the center of the text, but the structure and the constituents of its telling—ini-
tial mystery, the subsequent process of detection carried out by Dupin with 
his “analytical power,” and the surprising final solution—are illustrated and 
foreshadowed in the “thought-reading episode” in remarkable detail. Over 
and above this structural similarity, this episode also furnishes important keys 
to the understanding of the main story, in particular of the frame “rational 
solution of mysteries through observation and analysis,” and thus constitutes 
a graphic illustration of a mise en reflet with a framing function.
How to beCoMe aware oF iNitial Mises en cadre, 
aNd tHe CoMbiNatioN oF iNitial aNd 
terMiNal ForMs oF Mise en cadre
Mise en cadre has been defined as a “discrete phenomenon on an upper, fram-
ing level” which shows a “discernible relationship of similarity” with refer-
ence to the lower level. This definition raises two problems. The first refers 
to the “discernibility” of the similarity required for mise en cadre. As a solu-
tion one may point out that there are different degrees of similarity, which 
result in different degrees of saliency of mises en cadre—from liminal to clear 
cases.18 The second problem is that of how one can know in literary texts, 
in particular at a first reading, what discrete textual element forms a mise 
en cadre. This is indeed a pertinent problem, not least with reference to the 
aforementioned frequent function of mise en cadre as an implicit means of 
marking cognitive frames in the mode of showing (as opposed to the explicit 
marking in the mode of telling). Moreover, although mises en cadre by defini-
tion occur in upper level or framing parts of texts or artefacts, they need not 
be co-extensive with such framings.
 In the temporal media, mises en cadre—their occurrence as well as their 
extension—are particularly difficult to identify in the process of reception if 
they foreshadow something that has not yet been read or perceived. In this 
 18. Cf. above, note 17.
one and the same level xyz  XyZ
Figure 2.3. mise en reflet (in bold type)
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context it is helpful when such a mise en cadre, as is so frequently the case 
with other implicit devices, is supported by explicit devices. We can indeed 
note such explicit clarifying elements in the framing part of Heart of Dark-
ness. Shortly before Marlow starts with his tale, the narrator expressly warns 
the reader that in Marlow’s storytelling “the meaning [ . . . ] was not inside 
like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a 
glow brings out a haze [ . . . ]” (1817). This metatextual warning not only 
points to the extra attention that the reader should invest in the quest for a 
hidden meaning of the embedded tale, but, through the repeated use of the 
terms “haze” and “glow,” points back to the description of the increasingly 
obscure landscape, in which these terms also occur19 and which, as a part 
of the framing, literally “envelop[s]” Marlow’s “tale.” This explicit empha-
sis on “obscurity” foregrounds the framing description and marks it as rel-
evant for the ensuing story, thus signalling a mise en cadre. In addition, the 
general emphasis on the landscape description in Conrad’s framing is such 
that an experienced reader, who knows that descriptions are rarely merely 
“innocent” visualizations of a setting, arguably already expects some further 
relevance. This very expectation also provides a sort of “keying” for the read-
ing of Marlow’s story, a keying that later on becomes confirmed when the 
similarities on the embedded level become apparent and can be related back 
to the framing in a process of spatialized reading, where, to borrow from 
Joseph Frank’s seminal essay, “attention is fixed on the interplay of relation-
ships [ . . . ] independently of the progress of the narrative” (Frank 1945: 44). 
Of course, the confirmation of this expectation of later relevance can only be 
gained after having read the embedded tale, and thus, in a temporal medium 
such as the novel, initial mises en cadre are usually revealed as such only 
when one has the benefit of hindsight.
 This is, however, not to say that all mises en cadre occur exclusively in ini-
tial positions. Rather, they can also be observed in internal and terminal posi-
tions as well as employing a combination of these possibilities. An example 
of the combination of initial with terminal mises en cadre is Mary Shelley’s 
Gothic frame-tale Frankenstein (1818). The opening frame, letters of Captain 
Walton to his sister Margaret in England, already displays revealing simi-
larities with the ensuing story by Frankenstein in the mode of a traditional 
initial mise en cadre. Walton is about to transgress a boundary, though a 
relatively harmless geographical one, since he is engaged in a quest for a 
“passage near the pole” (Shelley 1968: 270). Walton’s enterprise foreshadows 
 19. See “A haze rested on the low shores [ . . . ]” (1814), and “the sun sank low, and from 
glowing white changed to a dull red [ . . . ]” (1815).
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Frankenstein’s fateful ethical and religious transgression of the limits imposed 
on man, rivalling God as a creator of animate beings. Moreover, Walton, 
like Frankenstein, acts contrary to his father’s wish,20 purports to act for the 
benefit of humankind21 while in reality being propelled by an overheated 
Romantic “imagination,” “enthusiasm,” and scientific “curiosity.”22 Many 
of these correspondences can even be traced to verbatim parallels on the level 
of discourse, to phrases and keywords in Frankenstein’s hypodiegetic tale 
that are anticipated by similar expressions in Walton’s diegetic story,23 while 
others remain on the story level, for instance the fatal consequences which 
both men risk, owing to their “ardent curiosity” (270). While Frankenstein’s 
quest for artificial life produces a monster that actually kills several people, 
Captain Walton is prepared to sacrifice human lives for his mission.24 Again, 
this initial mise en cadre may be said to be difficult to identify at first read-
ing, but—as in Heart of Darkness—in this case, too, the text contributes to 
the discernibility of the correspondence between Walton and Frankenstein by 
explicitly making Frankenstein thematize the parallel shortly before starting 
with his narrative: “Unhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have you 
drunk also of the intoxicating draught?” (284).
 At any rate, the mise-en-cadre correspondences between an initial frame 
and the embedded story which trigger the frame “guilty scientific curiosity” 
become clear retrospectively when reading Frankenstein’s story, and this will 
arguably sensitize the reader for possible further correspondences between 
this story and the terminal frame (which reverts to Walton’s diary-like letters). 
In fact, when reaching the framing part that concludes the novel the reader 
 20. Compare, in reference to Walton: “[ . . . ] my father’s dying injunction had forbidden 
my uncle to allow me to embark in a seafaring life” (270), and Frankenstein, whose father 
equally tried to keep him from what he nevertheless ventured into: “In my education my father 
had taken the greatest precautions that my mind should be impressed with no supernatural 
horrors. [ . . . ] I knew well therefore what would be my father’s feelings, but I could not tear 
my thoughts from my employment [ . . . ]” (311, 315).
 21. Walton dreams of “the inestimable benefit which [he] shall confer on all mankind to 
the last generation, by discovering a passage near the pole to those countries, to reach which 
at present so many months are requisite; or by ascertaining the secret of the magnet, which, 
if at all possible, can only be effected by an undertaking such as mine” (270). Frankenstein 
claims that: “Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, 
and pour a torrent of light into our dark world” (314).
 22. Thoughts of the pole kindle Walton’s “imagination,” “curiosity,” and “enthusiasm” 
(269 f.). This foreshadows Frankenstein’s “enthusiasm” (297), “curiosity” (295) and “imagina-
tion” (313) with reference to the “physical secrets of the world” (296).
 23. See the preceding note.
 24. He says: “[ . . . ] gladly I would sacrifice my fortune, my existence, my every hope, to 
the furtherance of my enterprize. One man’s life or death were but a small price to pay [ . . . ]” 
(283).
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is again confronted with correspondences. This time they are centered on the 
motif of failure and its evaluation. Walton must acknowledge that his quest 
for the north passage has failed and that he must return. This mirrors Fran-
kenstein’s previous double failure, as narrated in his hypodiegetic story: his 
failure as a God-like creator (he has created a monster instead of a being that 
is beneficial to humankind); and his failure as an avenger, for he dies before 
he is able to kill his murderous creature (which ultimately commits suicide). 
In combination with the cognitive frame “guilty scientific curiosity” marked 
by the initial mise en cadre this could be interpreted as the coding of the cog-
nitive frame “punishment” or “poetic justice,” and both together point to a 
worldview in which providential justice seems to play an important role.
 However, this terminal mise-en-cadre correspondence between Walton’s 
and Frankenstein’s failures, which rounds off the impact of the initial mises 
en cadre, is implicated, through the parallel reactions to these failures, in a 
remarkable relativization of such a providential (moral or religious) reading, 
and this not only of Frankenstein’s tale but of the entire novel. Frankenstein, 
in the initial frame, explicitly thematizes the similarity between Walton and 
himself, and he moreover prefaces his story by giving it a clear morally didac-
tic function. Frankenstein sees his own experience as a warning for Walton, 
who shares his curiosity:
I do not know that the relation of my disasters will be useful to you; yet, 
when I reflect that you are pursuing the same course, exposing yourself to 
the same dangers which have rendered me what I am, I imagine that you 
may deduce an apt moral from my tale; one that may direct you if you suc-
ceed in your undertaking and console you in case of failure. (285 f.)
However, when we read Walton’s letters at the end, he does not appear to 
have learnt anything from Frankenstein’s biography. He is aware that the 
lives of his crew “are endangered” through him, but his “courage and hopes 
do not desert” him (486). He even says, “I had rather die than return shame-
fully, my purpose unfulfilled” (488). When he is nevertheless finally forced 
to abandon his quest, he does not do so out of moral considerations, but 
merely yields to the force of circumstances in bitter disappointment: “I have 
consented to return if we are not destroyed. Thus are my hopes blasted by 
cowardice and indecision; I come back ignorant and disappointed [ . . . ]” 
(488–89). His frustration is most clearly discernible in the way in which he 
answers the dying Frankenstein’s question, “‘Do you, then, really return?,’” 
Walton responds with a revealing sigh: “‘Alas! Yes [ . . . ]’” (489). All of this 
renders the alleged moral effect of the embedded story highly questionable. 
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The failure of Frankenstein’s didactic intention with reference to Walton thus 
retrospectively sheds light on the hypodiegetic story itself, undermining its 
moral effect. Frankenstein himself, shortly before his death, acts in a curiously 
ambivalent way as recounted in the concluding frame. On the one hand, he 
continues to emphasize the moral function of his life’s story by a final admo-
nition: “Farewell Walton! Seek happiness in tranquillity and avoid ambition 
[ . . . ]” (491). On the other hand, his own moral sensibility turns out to be 
curiously blunt when he says, “I have been occupied in examining my past 
conduct; nor do I find it blameable” (490). He concludes by giving utterance 
to a frustration similar to Walton’s when he thinks about his “apparently 
innocent” ambition “of distinguishing [him]self in science and discoveries”: 
“I have myself been blasted in these hopes, yet another may succeed” (491). 
This final mise en cadre, not of a moral concern but of a re-affirmation of 
the very scientific curiosity which we witnessed at work in his hypodiegetic 
autobiography, again undermines the moral message of the embedded story. 
The monster’s terminal appearance in the concluding frame only partly re-
establishes the text’s moral message, since it centers on his own guilt and 
remorse as a “fallen angel” (494); Frankenstein’s sin, his Prometheus-like 
usurpation of God’s creative power ungraced with concomitant love and 
responsibility, is not mentioned. Thus it appears that the mise en cadre of 
the motif of failure is combined with a deeply disturbing ambivalence in the 
effect which Frankenstein as a whole arguably has on the reader. The power-
ful impact of this Gothic novel does not so much stem from its character as 
a moral tale but derives from something else, above all from its capacity to 
“awaken thrilling horror,” as announced in the “Author’s Introduction to the 
Standard Edition” (262). Frankenstein’s didactic failure to morally convince 
the fictitious recipient of his tale, Captain Walton, can thus be regarded as a 
mise en abyme of the dubious moral function of the entire novel Frankenstein 
for the real recipient/reader. For the novel, while succeeding as a horror story, 
may also very well fail to appeal to its readers if read only with an eye to the 
“moral tendencies” and the “exhibition of the amiableness of domestic affec-
tion, and the excellence of universal virtue,” which P. B. Shelley claimed for 
the text in his “Preface” (268).
tHe traNsMedial relevaNCe oF Mise en cadre, 
aNd aN eXaMPle FroM PaiNtiNg
As said before, mise en cadre in a terminal position, such as in the concluding 
frame of Frankenstein, is less frequent in literature than its initial, foreshad-
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owing variant and therefore often gives rise, in literature, to the aforemen-
tioned problems regarding the difficulty of recognizing the structural and 
thematic similarities at play. In contrast to literature—a temporal medium—
spatial media tend to facilitate the deciphering of mises en cadre since here 
the limitations of a first reading do not apply and similarities between fram-
ing and framed can be accessed more or less at first glance.
 As an example let us turn to Caspar David Friedrich’s Tetschen Altar 
(Illustration 2.1). As is well known in art history, this altar piece was revo-
lutionary (and controversial) in that it introduced the representation of land-
scape into the genre of religious painting to the extent that the picture could 
be mistaken for a “mere” landscape painting25—that is, if one disregards 
the gilt frame. This frame, which was produced by the sculptor Kühn (cf. 
Kemp 1995: 13) following the directions of the painter himself, contains clear 
clues—“framings” in the cognitive sense—which sufficiently clarify the reli-
gious content and thus the affiliation with religious painting, provided one is 
prepared to disregard narrow generic boundaries and admit possibilities of 
cross-fertilizations between genres. What renders these clues especially inter-
esting in our context is the fact that some of them operate on the basis of a 
mise en cadre, that is, through a significant similarity between framing and 
framed. Thus, the rays emanating from the triangular symbol of God’s eye in 
the lower part of the frame unmistakably echo the sun’s rays in the painting 
which appear behind a curiously triangular rock and touch the cross erected 
on top of it. By this framing sign of God’s eye the frame announces and sta-
bilizes the religious meaning of the framed landscape and indeed codes the 
canvas a “religious painting” (as opposed to a “mere” landscape painting). 
This coding occurs in a logical (albeit not topological) “top-down-process” 
(from frame to framed) and is based on the device of “showing” through 
meaningful similarities. It is therefore as much a mise en cadre as in the liter-
ary examples discussed above and in fact the clearest case of mise en cadre 
occurring in the Tetschen Altar.
 The other religious symbols on the frame (the puttos and the eucharistic 
signs of bread and wine) serve the same function of providing framing signals 
for the correct decoding of the framed picture. Their similarity with reference 
to the picture is, however, more indirect. It primarily operates on the level 
of belonging to the same paradigm of religious symbols as the framed repre-
sented as a part of the framed landscape, which amounts to a merely referen-
 25. For a detailed art-historical discussion of the Tetschen Altar with special reference to 
its frame see Kemp (1995: 13–15).
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tial similarity that is analogous to the mode of “telling” in verbal texts. Yet 
the shape of the ears of corn and the vine in addition mirrors the clouds in 
the picture and thus adds a note of formal similarity in the mode of showing. 
Owing to the fulfilment of the condition of a “top-down” similarity of dis-
crete higher level elements mirroring lower level ones, these religious symbols 
of the frame can thus also be classified as instances of a mise en cadre, albeit 
less obvious ones. As opposed to this, the caption “Tetschen Altar,” which 
accompanies the book illustration of the painting under discussion (Mendgen 
1995: 14), while equally coding the religious cognitive frame, should not be 
regarded as a mise en cadre, as it does not operate on the basis of similarity in 
the mode of showing but exclusively through a simple reference in the mode 
of (intermedial) telling.26
 As we have seen, mise en cadre, like mise en abyme, in spite of having 
originally been theorized in narratology, is actually a transmedial phenom-
enon that can be observed to occur beyond narrative and even beyond ver-
bal artefacts (the same applies to mise en reflet/série). It may, for instance, 
not only be found in picture frames but also in paratextual sections of films 
that already show relevant elements of the film proper or in opera overtures 
anticipating important themes of the ensuing opera.27 Mise en cadre arguably 
has this wider relevance as a transmedial phenomenon that occurs across 
many media, since, besides coding cognitive frames, it also contributes to one 
of the most essential features of human artefacts, namely the production of 
meaningful and beautiful similarities and recurrences. Adding this concept to 
the toolbox of scholarly description of media and artefacts of various kinds 
is thus not a trivial matter: it allows us to see what the concept of mise en 
abyme did not highlight, namely that in artefacts similarities can work not 
only “bottom-up” but also “top-down.” Becoming aware of this fact and 
being able to identify it by a specific term can form a substantial contribution 
to our understanding of narratives and other artefacts. It can also provide 
a description of how meaning is produced and how recipients are guided 
by self-referential structures of artefacts of various media, narrative and 
otherwise.
 26. For the classificatory problem involved here, see above, note 17.
 27. For further examples see in Wolf/Bernhart (2006): e.g. on film Roy Sommer’s contri-
bution (“Initial Framings in Film,” 383–406), including examples of framing metareferences 
foreshadowing highly metareferential films (401–3 on Adaptation and The Truman Show), and 
on opera Michael Walter’s essay “Framing and Deframing the Opera: The Overture” (429–48).
illustration 2.4. Caspar David Friedrich: Tetschen Altar (1807–8)
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Mise en cadre—
wHY Yet aNotHer NarratologiCal NeologisM? or 
why Post-Classical Narratology should Continue the Project of 
Classical Narratology
The “scientism” and terminological rage of classical narratology in particular 
has been the butt of much criticism over the past few decades.28 One must 
therefore also expect such antagonism in the present context: is it really nec-
essary to introduce yet another neologism (mise en cadre) into narratology, 
and a French one to boot? The answer ought to be emphatically yes! For, 
in comparison to the many hundreds if not thousands of neologisms and 
technical terms used in other disciplines (e.g. in medicine; even in rhetoric 
there is a remarkable amount of terminology), the fuss about a few dozen 
narratological terms appears exaggerated and ultimately negligible. Actually, 
the real issue should not be the number of neologisms nor their euphonic or 
cacophonic quality, but their heuristic value. Whether mise en cadre turns 
out to be a useful concept is for the reader to judge. At any rate, it designates 
a relatively frequent phenomenon, particularly regarding framing parts in 
literature and other media, for which so far no precise term has been coined. 
“Foreshadowing” is at once too narrow, since it is inapplicable to terminal 
mises an cadre, and too imprecise, since it denotes only a function without 
the device through which it is achieved. Moreover, mise en cadre (like mise en 
reflet/série) forms an obvious counterpart to a well-known structural device, 
namely mise en abyme, whose heuristic value is generally accepted. Generally 
speaking, there should be a consensus in the humanities similar to the natural 
sciences that the endeavor to classify and name phenomena is an indispens-
able prerequisite for any study meriting the name of scholarship. Moreover, 
it is a well-known cognitive fact that the existence of a term triggers recog-
nition: having a concept at one’s disposal often helps one to become aware 
of the corresponding phenomenon. Thus narratology should decidedly not 
abandon its search for general features and its classical “rage” to describe, 
classify and name them, if necessary by means of yet another neologism.
 Of course, this enterprise rests on the premise that narratology—and 
theory in general for that matter—are rational, logocentric projects. This 
includes, for instance, the acknowledgment of narrative levels in narrative 
texts on the lines of Rimmon-Kenan’s differentiation between diegetic levels 
(1983: 94 f.). Detractors of logocentrism such as Gibson may sneer at this, 
 28. For a particularly pungent attack on “[t]he language of literary criticism and theory” 
as “the ugliest private language in the world” see Currie (1998: 33) in a chapter aptly entitled 
“Terminologisation.”
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but without a really valid reason. Gibson, for instance, claims that in some 
texts levels are blurred, but this constitutes no argument at all against a hier-
archical text model. Rather, it is only against the background of such a model 
that transgressive devices such as metalepsis (yet another term provided by 
classical narratology, see Genette 1972: 243–51) can adequately be described 
with reference to narratives in the first place since most metalepses form a 
(really or seemingly) illogical transgression of boundaries between extra- and 
intradiegetic or intra- and hypodiegetic levels. As for the majority of cases 
in which such transgressions do not occur, a distinction of narrative levels 
on the theoretical plane nevertheless makes sense, all the more so as the fre-
quency of frame narratives in literature requires an appropriate descriptive 
terminology.
 To conclude: where classical narratology has left lacunae, it is perfectly 
legitimate to continue its project of systematically describing and naming 
general features in literary texts. Mise en cadre provides a good example of 
a useful extension of narratological terminology, all the more so as this text-
based, “structural” phenomenon can in fact be linked with post-classical 
issues. As the above examples from fiction and painting show, mise en cadre 
can be inscribed both into an intermedial context and into a frame-theoretical 
one.29 It is in the latter framework that I originally coined the term (Wolf 
1999: 104). In addition, the example from Conrad shows that mise en cadre 
could also be used for a reader-response (or, transmedially speaking, recipi-
ent-response) approach as well as for post-colonial or culturalist interpreta-
tions. Yet this relevance of the concept under discussion to currently debated 
specific contexts is not actually its most important point. For the core of 
narratology—as of any theory—ought to be the potentially general;30 though 
I hasten to add that the generalities involved in, or related to, narratives go 
beyond what was in focus in classical narratology, and include, for instance, 
cognitive processes elicited by narratives. It is indeed the general nature of a 
theoretical concept that permits its application to, or modification for, a plu-
rality of contexts, and this certainly applies to mise en cadre, whether occur-
ring in narrative or non-narrative contexts.
 As can be seen in the case of mise en cadre (or mise en reflet/série for that 
matter), the study of “textual” generalities is not yet exhausted nor com- 
 29. It may indeed be the lack of a cognitive and a frame-theoretical awareness of classical 
narratology that made it neglect mise en cadre as opposed to mise en abyme, for this latter 
phenomenon can be described from an exclusively text-centered perspective.
 30. I here agree with Gorman’s definition of narratology as “the study of narrative as a 
set of potential features of any work” rather than “studies of individual works” (2004: 395).
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pleted.31 I therefore would like to plead for the continuation of the narrato-
logical endeavor, not in the narrow frame of structuralist, exclusively text-cen-
tered classical narratology but in a neo-classical narratology which includes 
textual features but also opens up towards non-structuralist approaches, 
other media, and the various contexts in which texts are embedded—as long 
as the focus on the general is maintained. In fact, this focus on the general is 
what legitimates narratology as the theory of narrative artefacts in the first 
place. Therefore I doubt if it really makes sense to speak of narratologies in 
the plural as has become fashionable (Herman 1999), let alone of a “post-
colonial” or a “feminist narratology.”32 At best, these so-called “narratolo-
gies” are specific approaches to, and extensions of, classical narratology or 
deal with special kinds of artefacts that are characterized by certain contents 
and/or thematic concerns. Be that as it may, in view of phenomena such as 
mise en cadre, it should be acknowledged that even after half a century of 
systematic investigation of narratives something new or useful can be found 
from the perspective of a general narratology. Nor should this perspective be 
abandoned altogether in a (by now perhaps outmoded) postmodernist, cen-
trifugal spirit. For this perspective has revealed a rich trove of analytical tools 
in the past, tools which, as the above example from painting shows, can even 
be applied beyond the confines of literary narratives.33 There is every reason 
to be confident that such a generalist, neo-classical approach may continue to 
prove useful in the future, too.
 31. Thus, to name but a few examples, the entire field of self-reference and metareference 
in the media, narrative and otherwise, has only recently come into focus, and the same is true 
of what actually constitutes “narrativity” across media. As a consequence, there is as yet much 
to be done in these areas.
 32. See Lanser (1986), Birk/Neumann (2002), and Allrath/Gymnich (2002).
 33. For some possibilities but also the problems of exchanging terminology across disci-
plinary and medial boundaries see Wolf (2007).
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Intermental thought is joint, group, shared or collective thought, as opposed 
to intramental, or individual or private thought. It is also known as socially 
distributed, situated, or extended cognition, and also as intersubjectivity. 
Intermental thought is a crucially important component of fictional narra-
tive because much of the mental functioning that occurs in novels is done 
by large organizations, small groups, work colleagues, friends, families, cou-
ples and other intermental units. It could plausibly be argued that a large 
amount of the subject matter of novels is the formation, development and 
breakdown of these intermental systems.1 However, this aspect of narrative 
has been neglected by traditional theoretical approaches such as focaliza-
tion, characterization, story analysis and the representation of speech and 
thought. Intermental thought in the novel has been invisible to traditional 
narrative approaches and the many examples of intermental thought that fol-
low would not even count as examples of thought and consciousness within 
these approaches. Nevertheless, this type of thought becomes clearly evident 
within a cognitive approach to literature that is informed by findings in cog-
nitive, social and discursive psychology and the philosophy of mind. This 
philosophical and psychological background to the concept of intermental 
thought is contained in chapter five of my book Fictional Minds (2004) and 
so I will not repeat it here.
 1. For an excellent analysis of the small intermental unit of a marriage in a Virginia 
Woolf short story, see Semino (2006).
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 I have explored the issue of intermental functioning in George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch in two previous essays. In “The Lydgate Storyworld” (2005a) 
I discussed some small intermental units in the novel: chiefly the marriage of 
Lydgate and Rosamond and the friendship between Lydgate and Farebrother. 
In “Intermental Thought in the Novel: The Middlemarch Mind” (2005b), I 
argued that one of the most important characters in the novel is the town of 
Middlemarch itself. I called the intermental functioning of the inhabitants of 
the town “the Middlemarch mind.” I went much further than simply sug-
gesting that the town of Middlemarch provides a social context within which 
individual characters operate, maintaining instead that the town literally and 
not just metaphorically has a mind of its own. To illustrate, I discussed the 
construction of the Middlemarch mind in the opening few pages of the novel 
and attempted to show that the initial descriptions by the heterodiegetic nar-
rator of the three individual minds of Dorothea, Celia and Mr. Brooke were 
focalized through it.
 This essay is my third and final one on the subject of intermental thought 
in Middlemarch. Its purpose is to build on the work done previously and take 
the analysis a stage further. I wish now to try to convey the subtlety of the fine 
shades of intermental thought in the novel and the complexity of the relation-
ships between intermental and intramental thought in the novel. First, I dis-
cuss the various ways in which, over the course of the whole text, readers are 
able to identify a number of distinct, separate Middlemarch minds within the 
single intermental unit that is constructed at the beginning of the novel. After 
saying a little about the techniques used for the constructions of these various 
minds, I suggest that an analysis of the class structure of the town reveals the 
existence of separate and well-defined upper class, middle class and working 
class minds. I then refer to the complexity and fluidity of the myriad other 
intermental units that occur at various points in the text and introduce a 
tentative typology for the various forms of intermental focalization that are 
present in the novel. The essay then turns to the roles played by individuals: 
not only those inside the large intermental units who act as spokespeople or 
mouthpieces for their views, but also those who, like Lydgate, Dorothea and 
Ladislaw, find themselves outside these units and become the object of their 
intermental judgments. These various intramental/intermental relationships 
have a substantial impact on the plot of the novel.
 A close study of Middlemarch reveals that George Eliot was fascinated by 
the intermental process: its complexity, its causes and effects, its relationship 
with individuals and so on. Thought in general and intermental thought in 
particular are discussed frequently and explicitly. Group minds are capable 
of great sophistication and of a wide range of cognitive functioning and they 
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cannot be understood in purely social terms. A very wide range of cognitive 
terms are used to describe intermental activity in the novel: knowing, think-
ing, considering, believing, noticing, conjecturing, implying, suspecting, toler-
ating, hating, opposing, liking, wanting, and so on. These and the many other 
examples that are to be found in the rest of this essay are verbs of thought 
and of consciousness. The whole novel is saturated with clear evidence of a 
variety of this intermental thought. The selection of this evidence that is pre-
sented in this essay comprises only a very small proportion of the total; ruth-
less pruning was required in order to present my argument in a manageable 
form.
 In the longer, indented quotes that follow, I will put all references to large 
intermental units in italics. I do this for ease of reference, but also to empha-
size in visual form the sheer number of these phrases in the text. I sometimes 
refer to the Middlemarch mind when it is clear from the context that I am 
talking about the large intermental unit of the whole town; I will also refer 
to a Middlemarch mind when it is clear that a subgroup of the whole town 
mind is being discussed. This essay is about large intermental units and I will 
not therefore be considering small units such as marriages, friendships and 
families. It is no exaggeration to say that a short book could be written about 
all of the intermental units in Middlemarch, both large and small.
 Fictional minds form part of the storyworld or diegetic universe of the 
novel. Put another way, they occur within the story, as opposed to the dis-
course, level. As I explained in chapter three of Fictional Minds, in studying 
the mental functioning of characters that takes place in the storyworlds of 
novels, I go beyond the information provided directly to the reader within 
the categories of direct thought, free indirect thought, and thought report (or 
psychonarration) that are the basis of the study of thought representation. I 
go beyond them because I also take into account the information that is made 
available to the reader by, for example, presentations of characters’ speech 
and behavior.
tHe CoNstruCtioN oF iNterMeNtal MiNds
In my earlier essay on the Middlemarch mind (2005b), I identified four lin-
guistic techniques that are used in its construction. In order of degree of 
directness, they are: explicit reference to an actual group, reference to a hypo-
thetical group in order to make a particular rhetorical point, use of the pas-
sive voice, and presupposition. The following passage neatly illustrates all of 
these:
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(1) Doctor Sprague [a] was more than suspected of having no religion, 
but somehow [b] Middlemarch tolerated this deficiency in him . . . it was 
perhaps this negation in the doctor which made [c] his neighbours call him 
hard-headed and dry-witted. . . .  At all events, it is certain that if any medi-
cal man had come to Middlemarch with [d] the reputation of having very 
definite religious views . . . [e] there would have been a general presumption 
against his medical skill. (125; emphasis added)
The passage marked (a) is the passive voice: it is the Middlemarch mind that 
is doing the suspecting. The letters (b) and (c) indicate explicit references, and 
(d) presupposition: a Middlemarch mind is presupposed because it is that 
that would create Sprague’s reputation. Although (e) is also an example of 
presupposition (a group would do the presuming), it is there to make a spe-
cific rhetorical point about intermental views on medicine and religion.
 I will say a little more here about the first category: explicit references 
to the names of a variety of intermental groups in the town. The most obvi-
ous names relate to the town itself. There are a number of variations: “the 
Middlemarchers” (106) and (114), “good Middlemarch society” (108), 
“Middlemarch company” (463) and so on. Another group of terms refers 
to “the town” (112), “the respectable townsfolk” (105), etc. References to 
Middlemarch can also be more specific when related to a particular context. 
For example, during a discussion of the political situation, the text refers 
to “buyers of the Middlemarch newspapers” (246). During consideration 
of Bulstrode’s possible hypocrisy in example (18) below, there is an ironi-
cal reference to “the publicans and sinners in Middlemarch” (83). Finally, a 
description of Rosamond’s popularity refers to “all Middlemarch admirers” 
(114).
 The Middlemarch narrator, as I mentioned earlier, is fond of explicitly 
acknowledging the cognitive element in the book, particularly as it applies 
to intermental cognition. Some of the many examples include “civic mind” 
(65), “public mind” (99) and (246), “the unreformed provincial mind” (424) 
and “many crass minds in Middlemarch” (106). There are other sightings in 
the examples used below. At other times, very general terms are used such as: 
“that part of the world” (151), “midland-bred souls” (71), “mortals gener-
ally” (105), “the company” at a party (107), “vulgar people” (114), “all 
people young and old” (16), “public feeling required” (16), it was “sure to 
strike others” (17) and so on. Some of the general and vague descriptions of 
the workings of the Middlemarch mind involve oblique references to speech: 
“gossip” (344), “the air seemed to be filled with gossip” (344), “the conver-
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sation seemed to imply” (124), “general conversation in Middlemarch” (181) 
and “It’s openly said” (72). Sometimes the reporting of the speech is focal-
ized through an individual: Mr. Featherstone “had it from most undeniable 
authority, and not one, but many” (73), Lydgate “heard it discussed” (106) 
and (an example of what David Herman [1994] calls hypothetical focaliza-
tion) “If Will Ladislaw could have overheard some of the talk at Freshitt that 
morning . . . ” (433). Later, it is made clear what he would have heard being 
said:
(2) “Young Ladislaw the grandson of a thieving Jew pawnbroker” was a 
phrase which had entered emphatically into the dialogues about the Bul-
strode business at Lowick, Tipton and Freshitt. (533; emphasis added)
The three locations mentioned in example (2) deserve further attention. We 
can only follow what happens in a storyworld if we follow the mental func-
tioning of the people in that storyworld. However, it is also essential to have 
a certain amount of knowledge, however rudimentary, of the geographical or 
material aspects of storyworlds. In the case of Middlemarch, we have to have 
a rough idea in our heads of the fact that Middlemarch is a town surrounded 
by a number of large country houses with accompanying parishes or villages. 
These include Tipton (home of Mr. Brooke, and also Dorothea and Celia 
before they marry), Freshitt (the home of Sir James Chettam, and Celia after 
she marries), and Lowick (the home of Casaubon, and also of Dorothea after 
she marries him). However, as this list shows, knowledge of the geographical 
storyworld is closely linked with knowledge of the mental and social story-
world. Tipton, Freshitt and Lowick are important only because they are the 
homes of these particular members of the gentry or upper classes who are 
leading characters in the story. This is demonstrated by the fact that refer-
ences to the upper classes are couched in geographical terms, as in example 
(2), as well as in more obviously social terms. In other words, these place 
names function as metonymies for the upper classes or the gentry. Similarly, 
references to the town of Middlemarch itself sometimes act in the same way 
for the middle classes (as the Tankard pub does for the working classes).
 As this discussion shows, the three social classes are amongst the most 
prominent of the subgroups of the Middlemarch mind. The upper classes con-
sist primarily of the Brookes, the Chettams, the Cadwalladers and the other 
members of the local landed gentry. The middle classes comprise the profes-
sional classes and, in particular, the various medical men. The working classes 
are much less well represented and are confined mainly to Mrs. Dollop’s 
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pub, the Tankard. Sometimes the text refers to the upper classes as the “Mid-
dlemarch gentry” (186), the “county” (4) or “the county people who looked 
down on the Middlemarchers” (114). At other times, as in example (2), there 
are more specific references to the place names: “all Tipton and its neigh-
bourhood” (151), “no persons then living—certainly none in the neighbour-
hood of Tipton” (17), “the unfriendly mediums of Tipton and Freshitt” (24), 
“all the world around Tipton” (32) and “opinion in the neighbourhood of 
Freshitt and Tipton” (58). Very occasionally, it is made clear that these place 
names describe the middle or working classes who live in them, as in “both 
the farmers and labourers in the parishes of Freshitt and Tipton” (34).
 There are several passages that illustrate the class structure behind the 
intermental functioning in the town. Here is one example:
(3) The heads of this discussion at “Dollop’s” had been the common theme 
among all classes in the town, had been carried to Lowick Parsonage on one 
side and to Tipton Grange on the other, had come fully to the ears of the 
Vincy family, and had been discussed with sad reference to “poor Harriet” 
by all Mrs Bulstrode’s friends, before Lydgate knew distinctly why people 
were looking strangely at him, and before Bulstrode himself suspected the 
betrayal of his secrets. (500; emphasis added)
This single sentence contains references to the whole social spectrum. 
“All classes” can be subdivided into upper (Lowick Parsonage and Tipton 
Grange), middle (the Vincy family and Mrs. Bulstrode’s friends) and lower 
(Dollop’s pub).
 At several points in the discourse the views of the Middlemarch mind are 
arrived at through what Bronwen Thomas calls “multiparty talk” (2002) 
(that is, conversations between more than two people). A surprisingly large 
number of conversations, at least twenty I would say, feature three or more 
people. Scenes of this sort in which Middlemarch minds are clearly at work 
include the following:
A The dinner party at which Lydgate is introduced to Middlemarch society 
(60–63)
B The public meeting at which the vote on the chaplaincy takes place 
(126–29)
C Sir James Chettam, the Cadwalladers and Mr Brooke talk about politics 
(261–67)
D Hackbutt, Toller and Hawley discuss Lydgate (308–9)
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E The Chettams, the Cadwalladers, Dorothea and Celia have a discussion 
about widowhood (378–79)
F The Bulstrode scandal breaks and comes to a climax at the public meet-
ing (494–505)
G The Chettams, the Cadwalladers and Mr. Brooke exchange views on 
Dorothea’s second marriage (560–65)
There are two sorts of multiparty talk here. C, E and G are conversations 
between members of the gentry that establish a set of characteristically upper-
class views on Dorothea’s marriages and on politics. By contrast, B, D and F 
are the town or middle class views on Lydgate and Bulstrode (together with 
the working class view in F). A is, as the text explicitly states, an uneasy mix-
ture of the upper and middle classes. In most cases, but particularly in F, there 
is a mixture of direct speech in the form of dialogue and multiparty talk, and 
intermental thought report. The hypothetical book on intermental thought in 
Middlemarch that I referred to earlier would allow space for a detailed analy-
sis of the endlessly fascinating ways in which the intricately shifting dynamics 
of the various group minds are traced in these passages. Unfortunately, there 
is not enough space in this paper for such an analysis.
 In addition to these big set pieces there are many short passages, often 
only a paragraph in length, in which intermental views are presented. These 
paragraphs act as a kind of low-level, continuous intermental commentary on 
events in between the big set pieces. Several of these paragraphs are used for 
illustrative purposes during the rest of this essay. In addition, there are several 
dialogues that make it clear that intermental norms have been internalized to 
such an extent that they have a subtle and indirect, though still profound and 
pervasive, influence on intramental thought processes. This point is particu-
larly true of concerns about reputation or honor. To take just one example, 
there is an important discussion between Sir James Chettam and Mr. Brooke 
on the codicil to Casaubon’s will in which Mr. Brooke says:
(4) “As to gossip, you know, sending [Ladislaw] away won’t hinder gossip. 
People say what they like to say, not what they have chapter and verse for 
[ . . . . ] In fact, if it were possible to pack him off . . . it would look all the 
worse for Dorothea.” (336–37; emphasis added)
Every word spoken by Mr. Brooke is informed by concern for intermental 
approval. All their thoughts are dominated by these four, dreaded words: 
what will people think?
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subgrouPs aNd tHe disCursive rHYtHM
Although the most common of the intermental minds at work in the town 
are divided along class lines, such a distinction comes nowhere near reflect-
ing the complexity of intermental thought in the novel. A large number of 
other ephemeral, localized, contextually specific groups can be identified. In 
a number of the examples given in this essay, there is a bewilderingly com-
plex variety of perspectives, usually comprising the whole Middlemarch mind 
together with some of its subgroups. Sometimes the subgroups appear to be 
in agreement and therefore form the Middlemarch mind. They may be sepa-
rate from each other but have an overlap in membership; they may be distinct 
from and even opposed to each other; sometimes sub-subgroups of a particu-
lar subgroup are featured. With the exception of the social classes, it is rare 
for subgroups to be referred to more than once in different parts of the novel. 
In the discussions that follow, it will be apparent that many of these groups 
are mentioned in a particular context in order to provide a very specific per-
spective on a particular issue and then vanish. I was originally tempted to try 
to create a kind of taxonomy or map of intermental thought in the novel by 
listing all the groups mentioned and analyzing their relations with each other. 
However, it took only a quick look at the large amount of evidence of inter-
mental thought in Middlemarch to see that such a task would be impossible. 
The complexity would simply be overwhelming. In any event, little would be 
achieved because of the contextual nature of many of the references to sub-
groups.
 The narrator can sometimes be self-knowingly ironic about the impreci-
sion that is required when discussing these intermental units:
(5) At Middlemarch in those times a large sale was regarded as a kind of 
festival. . . . The second day, when the best furniture was to be sold, “every-
body” was there. . . . “Everybody” that day did not include Mr Bulstrode. 
(415; emphasis added)
The reader is alerted to the fact that locutions such as “everybody” and “all 
Middlemarch” must not be taken literally. It is difficult to be precise about 
the membership of large intermental units. Generalizations are required even 
thought they may not be strictly accurate. To pursue this line of thought, the 
narrator sometimes uses a particular example of intermental thought, as in 
the discussion on prejudice in (6), to muse on the nature of intermentality 
generally and the imprecision of descriptions of it in particular:
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(6) Prejudices about rank and status were easy enough to defy in the form of 
a tyrannical letter from Mr Casaubon; but prejudices, like odorous bodies, 
have a double existence both solid and subtle. (300; emphasis added)
The narrator repeatedly points out that intermental units have a double exis-
tence which is both solid and subtle. On the one hand, the Middlemarch 
minds are collections of very different individuals, all with slightly different 
perspectives on the social issues affecting the town: they are subtle. On the 
other hand, and at the same time, these large units come together with a col-
lective force, particularly as it appears to an individual, which is far greater 
than the sum of their parts: they become solid.
 It is obviously too simplistic to suggest that intermental units are so fixed 
and clearly bounded that individuals are either inside or outside of them. The 
situation is more complex than that. Some people occupy ill-defined positions 
with regard to any intermental consensus. The vicar, Farebrother, is one who 
is on the fringes of the consensus. He regrets the common view on the Bul-
strode/Lydgate affair because he likes Lydgate and, although he dislikes Bul-
strode, he does not like to see him hounded. His case is made explicit because 
he is a major character and his views of the matter add to the complexity of 
the whole situation. However, the reader will know that other characters will 
have their own, individual views even if the precise nature of these views is 
not articulated. It is an important part of the capacity of readers to compre-
hend fictional narrative that they appreciate that, when intermental thinking 
takes place, significant intramental variations will always occur within it.
 One example of this complex combination of intramental and intermen-
tal functioning takes place at a dinner party at the Vincey’s household. The 
various members of the middle classes that are present discuss the chaplaincy. 
Individual views are expressed and they are often in disagreement with each 
other. People are thinking intramentally. Then: “Lydgate’s remark, however, 
did not meet the sense of the company” (107). What happens here is that the 
individuals who were previously expressing conflicting views coalesce and 
close ranks in the presence of an outsider, as families tend to do. The presence 
of a “company” with a common view is explicitly acknowledged. The party 
is no longer a random collection of intramental perspectives; it becomes an 
intermental unit.
 The attention paid in the text of the novel to the bewildering variety of 
the intricately interlocking subgroups results in the presence of a character-
istic discursive rhythm. This highly distinctive rhythm is sometimes there in 
single sentences, sometimes in a group of two or three sentences, sometimes 
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in a whole paragraph. Once it has been noticed, it is difficult to understand 
how it could have been overlooked. The tone of this rhythm is often ironic 
and even playful. The narrator regularly seems to backtrack on earlier state-
ments and qualify generalizations. The language seems to meditate on the 
difficulty of pinning down precisely how these fluid and protean minds are 
initially and temporarily constituted, then dissolve, reform and dissolve again 
and so on. Example (1) gives a flavor of this rhythm. Other examples include 
(18), (19) and (20). Note the prose rhythms contained in the following two 
passages, and the careful balancing of different intermental perspectives, all 
trained on a single intramental mind:
(7) However, Lydgate was installed as medical attendant on the Vincys, and 
the event was a subject of general conversation in Middlemarch. Some said, 
that the Vincys had behaved scandalously. . . . Others were of the opinion 
that Mr Lydgate’s passing by was providential. . . . Many people believed 
that Lydgate’s coming to the town at all was really due to Bulstrode; and 
Mrs Taft . . . had got it into her head that Mr Lydgate was a natural son of 
Mr Bulstrode’s. . . . (181–82; emphasis added)
(8) Patients who had chronic diseases . . . had been at once inclined to try 
him; also, many who did not like paying their doctor’s bills, thought agree-
ably of opening an account with a new doctor . . . and all persons thus 
inclined to employ Lydgate held it likely that he was clever. Some consid-
ered that he might do more than others “where there was liver.” . . . But 
these were people of minor importance. Good Middlemarch families were 
of course not going to change their doctor without reason shown. (305–6; 
emphasis added)
In both (7) and (8), a view is attributed to a large group and then modi-
fied or expanded by subgroups in what might be called a “many people 
thought . . . some said . . . others considered . . . ” rhythm. Example (7) is 
particularly illustrative because it starts with the whole Middlemarch mind, 
“general conversation in Middlemarch,” and then refers to three subgroups: 
some, others, and many people. The relationship between these three groups 
is unclear. Are they mutually exclusive or is there an overlap in membership? 
We cannot be sure. Example (8) concerns an implicit subgroup, patients, 
instead of the whole Middlemarch mind, but is otherwise similar in shape. 
Again, it would be very difficult indeed to establish the precise relationship 
between the various sub-subgroups of patients: those willing to change to 
Lydgate for very different reasons and those who are not. Some readers of 
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this essay may be familiar with the mathematical tool of Venn diagrams, in 
which circles are used to express the relationships between classes of objects. 
Some of the examples in this essay could, I think, be expressed very usefully 
in this diagrammatic form, but in other cases insufficient evidence is available 
for their use.
 The illustrated rhythm is characteristic of descriptions of intermental 
thinking because it is an acknowledgment of the messiness or complexity of 
this kind of mental functioning. It is invariably inaccurate and uninteresting 
to claim that everybody in an intermental unit thinks in exactly the same way 
for exactly the same reasons. Within the Middlemarch minds, the strength of 
view on the Bulstrode/Lydgate case will vary. Some people will be convinced 
of their guilt; others will be less so; some will care very much; others will 
not; some will be pleased at the general view because they dislike Bulstrode 
and/or Lydgate or because a loss of their status will benefit them; others will 
regret it because they like one or both of them or have moral objections. The 
narrator is invariably scrupulous in reflecting these fine shades of opinion. 
The delicate balance between intramental and intermental thought is always 
maintained.
iNterMeNtal FoCaliZatioN
The points made in the previous section about the narrator reflecting fine 
shades of intermental opinion can be restated in terms of the concept of focal-
ization. In what follows, I wish to propose the following three binary distinc-
tions within the umbrella term focalization that, I think, go some way to 
reflecting the complexity of the passages quoted in this essay:
• intramental and intermental;
• single and multiple; and
• homogeneous and heterogeneous
The difference between intramental and intermental focalization refers to the 
distinction between mental activity by one (intramental) and by more than 
one (intermental) consciousness. Single focalization occurs when there is one 
focalizer. The term multiple focalization refers to the presence of two or more 
focalizers of the same object. These multiple focalizers may be intramental 
individuals or intermental groups or a combination of the two. However, a 
further distinction is required. In the case of homogeneous focalization, the 
two focalizers have the same perspective, views, beliefs and so on relating to 
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the object. By contrast, heterogeneous focalization reflects the fact that the 
focalizers’ views differ, and their perspectives conflict one with another.
 If focalization is single, then it can be either intramental (one individual) 
or intermental (one single group), but it will be homogeneous and not hetero-
geneous unless an individual or group has conflicting views on an issue. One 
example of single focalization is (1), where all of the italicized phrases look 
superficially as though they are references to different groups, but in fact are 
simply different means of naming the Middlemarch mind. Other examples 
are (5) and (14). However, two points should be made. First, the majority of 
the examples quoted in this essay show multiple points of view. Most display 
a balance of distinct and distinctive collective views and fine shades of subtly 
differing judgments. Second, a succession of single focalizations will become 
multiple in a Bakhtinian effect on the reader when aggregated over the course 
of a novel.
 If focalization is multiple, then it can involve different individuals, or dif-
ferent groups, or a combination of both; and, completely independently, it 
can be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Obviously, a fairly large number of 
possible combinations can be derived from these variables. I have not con-
ducted an exhaustive analysis of the Middlemarch text to find out, but my 
guess is that most combinations are contained in this novel. Of the various 
examples of multiple intermental focalizations used in this essay, some are 
homogeneous and some are heterogeneous. Multiple intermental heteroge-
neous focalization is featured in examples (7), (8), (11), (13) and (18). In all 
these cases, the various intermental units mentioned have different views on 
the object of their cognitive functioning. To be strictly accurate, examples (7) 
and (11) have an intramental element as well and so are, in fact, examples of 
multiple intermental and intramental heterogeneous focalization. Multiple 
intermental homogeneous focalization is present in examples (2), (3), (10), 
(12), (16), (19) and (22). Again, examples (12) and (22) also have an intra-
mental element.2
iNdividuals iNside iNterMeNtal uNits
This section and the following one focus on the relationships between groups 
and individuals. This one will say a little about how the leaders or spokes-
people of each of the three classes are used to present the results of the class-
based mental functioning. The next section will consider those individuals 
 2. For more on multiperspectivism, see Nünning (2000).
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who are outside the social groups in the sense that they are the objects of 
their intermental cognitive activity.
 Both Mrs. Cadwallader and Sir James Chettam act as powerful mouth-
pieces for the upper class mind. Here is a very dramatic illustration of this 
function:
(9) But Sir James was a power in a way unguessed by himself. Entering at 
that moment [as Ladislaw is saying goodbye to Dorothea], he was an incor-
poration of the strongest reasons through which Will’s pride became a repel-
lent force, keeping him asunder from Dorothea. (377)
Chettam embodies or represents—or, to use the word chosen in the passage, 
“incorporates”—the upper class Middlemarch mind. It is stressed that he, 
thinking of himself as an individual, is not aware of this power and this may 
make his role even more powerful. His mouthpiece role is also clearly evident 
in example (22). Mrs. Cadwallader has a similar role. Two whole pages are 
devoted to an explanation of it (39–40): “She was the diplomatist of Tipton 
and Freshitt, and for anything to happen in spite of her was an offensive 
irregularity” (40). When something does happen in spite of her (the refer-
ence is to Dorothea’s engagement to Casaubon instead of Chettam), “It fol-
lowed that Mrs Cadwallader must decide on another match for Sir James” 
(40). This is intramental thought and action in the sense that it relates to a 
single individual, but her power to take this action results from her ability to 
represent the intermental consensus. Her intentionality is much more clearly 
foregrounded than with the Sir James quote. “It followed” implies that it fol-
lowed for Mrs. Cadwallader in her capacity as a mouthpiece for the Middle-
march mind and, in addition, to her as an individual agent. Example (9) is 
different in that Sir James does not actually do, say or even think anything. 
He simply has a representative role in Ladislaw’s uneasy consciousness. At 
that moment, for Ladislaw, Sir James is less an individual and more the incor-
poration of the town’s collective view.
 The middle-class mind has several mouthpieces: they include at various 
times Sprague, Minchin, Toller, Chicheley, and Standish. It is made explicit 
that they regard “themselves as Middlemarch institutions” (126). The follow-
ing quote gives a useful insight into the dynamics or mechanics of the middle-
class Middlemarch mind:
(10) What they [Sprague and Minchin] disliked was [Lydgate’s] arrogance, 
which nobody felt to be altogether deniable. They implied that he was inso-
lent, pretentious, and given to that reckless innovation for the sake of noise 
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and show which was the essence of the charlatan. The word charlatan once 
thrown on the air could not be let drop. (313; emphasis added)
Here we have a balance between a small intermental unit (the pair formed 
by Sprague and Minchin) and the much larger middle class mind. The wider 
group acquiesces in the views of the pair. The final sentence makes use of the 
passive voice and presupposition to give a very accurate indication of how 
views spread. People seize on an idea or a word and hang onto it. It is in this 
way that the use of the term charlatan becomes attached to Lydgate. How-
ever, in keeping the intramental/intermental balance referred to above, it is 
important to look out for individual characteristics. Fred’s illness “had given 
to Mr Wrench’s enmity towards Lydgate more definite personal ground” 
(312). Despite the fact that Mr. Wrench is a mouthpiece for a large intermen-
tal unit, his thinking here has conscious intramental shading.
 Mrs. Dollop is the acknowledged leader of working class opinion. This 
is a group that is based in the Tankard pub. (The middle class pub is the 
Green Dragon.) As the passages describing the working classes are amongst 
the weakest in the book and, to be honest, make for quite painful reading, 
I will only briefly describe this topic here. Here are two passages that illus-
trate the workings of the working class mind and the leadership role of Mrs. 
Dollop:
(11) This was the tone of thought chiefly sanctioned by Mrs Dollop, the spir-
ited landlady of the Tankard in Slaughter Lane, who had often to resist the 
shallow pragmatism of customers disposed to think that their reports from 
the outer world were of equal force with what had “come up” in her mind. 
(498; emphasis added)
(12) If that was not reason, Mrs Dollop wishes to know what was; but there 
was a prevalent feeling in her audience that her opinion was a bulwark, and 
that if it were overthrown there would be no limits to the cutting-up of bod-
ies, as had well been seen in Burke and Hare with their pitch-plaisters—such 
a hanging business as that was not wanted in Middlemarch. (305; emphasis 
added)
The use of a representative voice and a supporting chorus is a notable char-
acteristic of both passages. Regarding (11), the term sanctioned is reveal-
ing of Mrs. Dollop’s power. The group-defining force of the phrase “outer 
world” is also worth noting. This “outer mind” stands in clear contrast to 
Middlemarch conceived as a homogeneous unit of familiarity and home-like 
Palmer, “Large Intermental Units in middlemarch”  97
interiority. Finally, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the occur-
rence towards the end of (12) of intermental free indirect discourse. It is clear 
from some of the phrases in this sentence (“Mrs Dollop wishes to know what 
was”; “as had well been seen in Burke and Hare with their pitch-plaisters”; 
and “such a hanging business as that was not wanted in Middlemarch”) that 
the narrator is making use of the distinctive speech and thought patterns 
that are characteristic of Mrs. Dollop and her customers. I have also found 
examples of this phenomenon in Evelyn Waugh’s Vile Bodies (Palmer 2004, 
208–9). It seems to me that this type of free indirect thought merits further 
attention.
 Having examined the role of the mouthpieces of the three class-based 
intermental units, I will now consider the ways in which the text presents the 
judgments of units such as these on individuals who are outside of them.
iNdividuals outside iNterMeNtal uNits
There are a number of different ways to describe the cognitive relationships 
that exist in the novel between intermental units and the individuals who 
are outside them. I will refer here briefly to four. The first two (focalization, 
and what I call cognitive narratives) are narratological terms; the other two 
(theory of mind and attribution theory) are cognitive theories.
Focalization
As I explained above, individuals are frequently focalized through an inter-
mental mind. For example, both Dorothea’s and also Lydgate’s character and 
behavior are, at various times, focalized through a variety of Middlemarch 
minds. The relentlessly judgmental quality of intermental thought in the 
novel remains fairly constant in relation to both of them. However, inter-
mental units can also be focalized through intramental cognitive functioning. 
For example, within Lydgate’s free indirect discourse, there are references to 
“Middlemarch gossip” (240) and to “the circles of Middlemarchers” (299). 
Dorothea is critical of the “society around her” (23). Sometimes the two 
directions are at work simultaneously. In a very good example of a reciprocal 
intermental/intramental relationship, Lydgate comments that “I have made 
up my mind to take Middlemarch as it comes, and shall be much obliged if 
the town will take me in the same way” (112). It is clear that Lydgate talks 
here of Middlemarch in the way that the narrator does in the final sentence of 
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(19), as a sentient being that is capable of mental thought. In (13), the presen-
tation of power relations in the town is focalized through Lydgate:
(13) The question whether Mr Tyke should be appointed as salaried chaplain 
to the hospital was an exciting topic to the Middlemarchers; and Lydgate 
heard it discussed in a way that threw much light on the power exercised 
in the town by Mr Bulstrode. The banker was evidently a ruler, but there 
was an opposition party, and even among his supporters, there were some 
who allowed it to be seen that their support was a compromise. . . . (106; 
emphasis added)
Lydgate is aware that, on this question, the whole intermental mind (“Mid-
dlemarchers”) is subdivided into support for Bulstrode and opposition to him 
(and perhaps those who have no strong opinion?). The support is then fur-
ther subdivided into strong and weak or “compromise” support.
Cognitive narratives
This term designates a character’s whole perceptual, cognitive, ethical and 
ideological viewpoint on the storyworld of the novel. It is intended to be an 
inclusive term that conveys the fact that each character’s mental functioning 
is a narrative that is embedded within the whole narrative of the novel. In 
“The Lydgate Storyworld” (note the title), I argued that Lydgate’s mind in 
action is the Middlemarch storyworld as seen from his viewpoint. Double 
cognitive narratives are versions of characters’ minds that exist in the minds 
of other characters. So, one way to describe this cognitive relationship is to 
say that Middlemarch minds regularly form double cognitive narratives of 
individuals. Equally, double cognitive narratives can be reversed. As Lydgate’s 
wish that the town take him as it finds him shows, some individuals form 
their own double cognitive narratives for the Middlemarch mind.
Theory of mind
This is the term used by philosophers and psychologists to describe our 
awareness of the existence of other minds, our knowledge of how to interpret 
other people’s thought processes, our mind-reading abilities in the real world. 
This mind reading involves readers in trying to follow characters’ attempts 
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to read other characters’ minds.3 Theory of mind is usually considered to 
work in the novel on the intramental level. For example, in Persuasion, when 
Wentworth is snubbed by Anne’s father and sister, Anne knows that he feels 
contempt and anger; Wentworth knows that Anne knows what he feels; Anne 
knows that Wentworth knows that she knows, and so on. There are other 
points in the novel at which Anne and Wentworth use their theory of mind 
on each other. However, it is part of the purpose of this essay to show that 
groups can also use their theory of mind and, in addition, be the subject of 
individuals’ theory of mind.
 For example, when Lydgate takes Bulstrode out of the public meeting in 
which he, Bulstrode, has been humiliated:
(14) It seemed to him [Lydgate] as if he were putting his sign-manual to that 
association of himself with Bulstrode, of which he now saw the full meaning 
as it must have presented itself to other minds. [And then, within Lydgate’s 
free indirect discourse:] The inferences were closely linked enough: the town 
knew of the loan, believed it to be a bribe, and believed that he took it as a 
bribe. (504; emphasis added)
In theory of mind terms, the passage can be decoded as follows:
A Lydgate believes
B that the Middlemarch mind believes
C that Bulstrode believed
D that Lydgate was bribable
E and that Bulstrode intended to bribe him
F and that Lydgate knew of Bulstrode’s intention
G and that Lydgate did accept Bulstrode’s bribe
Note that this cognitive chain involves intermental (item B) as well as intra-
mental reasoning.
Attribution theory
An alternative approach is to use the language of attribution theory and say 
that a wide range of different attributions are made by intermental minds 
 3. For more on theory of mind, see Palmer (2005b) and Zunshine (2006).
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regarding the supposed workings of intramental minds.4 Throughout the 
novel, Middlemarch minds are focused on the construction of their views 
on individuals in order to judge them and to place them. “Most of those 
who saw Fred . . . thought that young Vincey was pleasure-seeking as usual” 
(163). So Fred is constructed as a pleasure seeker. In example (1), Sprague is 
defined as “hard-headed and dry-witted.” Attributions by large intermental 
units also have a profound effect on smaller units such as marriages: “In 
Middlemarch a wife could not long remain ignorant that the town held a bad 
opinion of her husband” (511).
 All this inter- and intramental complexity is a vital element in the develop-
ment of the various plots in the novel. The two most important examples are 
the Lydgate and Bulstrode crisis and the Dorothea and Ladislaw relationship. 
Example (9) shows very clearly that intermental units play a very powerful 
teleological role in the plot of the novel. The point is made explicit there in 
the reference to the upper class mind keeping Dorothea and Ladislaw apart, 
mainly through their, and especially his, uneasy awareness of its workings. 
For example:
(15) Will was in a defiant mood, his consciousness being deeply stung with 
the thought that the people who looked at him probably knew a fact tanta-
mount to an accusation against him as a fellow with low designs which were 
to be frustrated by a disposal of property. (417; emphasis added)
This is an example of what Bakhtin calls the word with a sideways glance: 
the nervous and uneasy anticipation of the view of another. It was also appar-
ent in example (4). The end result for Dorothea and Ladislaw is that they are 
kept apart for some time:
(16) His position [in Middlemarch] was threatening to divide him from her 
with those barriers of habitual sentiment which are more fatal to the per-
sistence of mutual interest than all the distance between Rome and Britain. 
(300; emphasis added)
The focus of intermental units on intramental thinking raises important ques-
tions regarding the construction of identity:
(17) There was a general impression, however, that Lydgate was not alto-
gether a common country doctor, and in Middlemarch at that time such an 
 4. For more on attribution theory, see Palmer (2007).
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impression was significant of great things being expected from him. (96–97; 
emphasis added)
Lydgate is considered to be a gentleman doctor. That is the intramental iden-
tity that is constructed by the intermental consensus. It is clear that George 
Eliot was very interested in how these socially situated identities are con-
structed. For example, the narrator emphasizes in the following quote that 
intermental minds tend to pay a good deal of attention to the past lives of 
individuals. While a cognitive narrative is being constructed for these indi-
viduals, their origins are carefully examined for any clues relating to their 
identities. Here, Bulstrode’s lack of known social origins is held to be deeply 
suspicious:
(18) Hence Mr Bulstrode’s close attention was not agreeable to the publicans 
and sinners in Middlemarch; it was attributed by some to his being a Phari-
see, and by others to his being Evangelical. Less superficial reasoners among 
them wished to know who his father and grandfather were, observing that 
five-and-twenty years ago nobody had ever heard of a Bulstrode in Middle-
march. (83; emphasis added)
Obviously, talk of a single, stable, assured social identity is misleading. All of 
these groups (loud men; those persons who thought themselves worth hear-
ing; others; the publicans and sinners in Middlemarch; some; others; less 
superficial reasoners among them) have their own conflicting, colliding, con-
tradictory perspectives on poor Bulstrode.
 This interest in the past is even more explicit in the next example, which 
is very revealing about the ways in which intermental constructions of intra-
mental cognitive narratives require individuals’ pasts to be filled out:
(19) No one in Middlemarch was likely to have such a notion of Lydgate’s 
past as has here been faintly shadowed, and indeed the respectable towns-
folk there were not more given than mortals generally to any eager attempt 
at exactness in the representation to themselves of what did not come under 
their own senses. Not only young virgins of that town, but grey-bearded 
men also, were often in haste to conjecture how a new acquaintance might 
be wrought into their purposes, contented with very vague knowledge as to 
the way in which life has been shaping him for that instrumentality. Middle-
march, in fact, counted on swallowing Lydgate and assimilating him very 
comfortably. (105; emphasis added)
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The passage starts by saying, reasonably enough, that the Middlemarch mind 
is not going to know what had actually happened to Lydgate before he arrives 
in the town. But it then goes on to say that the hypothetical construction of 
his cognitive narrative (in the absence of real evidence) will owe more to the 
Middlemarch mind’s own needs (“wrought into their purposes”) than any 
disinterested pursuit of the truth of his history. The final sentence emphasizes 
the point. It will make use of Lydgate as it wishes. The need is to create a 
“Middlemarch Lydgate” who can be comfortably “swallowed” and easily 
assimilated. This “Lydgate” need only have a tenuous relationship with the 
“real” Lydgate (whatever and whoever that is).
 In example (19) above, and also in examples (20) and (22), there is a 
strong emphasis on the almost mythic power of especially intermental but 
also intramental minds to modify reality to their own requirements. This is 
especially true, as can be seen above, of the construction of Lydgate’s cogni-
tive narrative. The intricate and messy detail of a life as actually lived by a 
particular individual is smoothed and flattened out into a simple story, a nar-
rative that is molded according to the intermental desire for a simple moral 
to the tale. In (20) the narrator again uses the opportunity of some complex 
intermental views of an individual, this time Bulstrode, for some general mus-
ings on how intermental minds construct intramental embedded narratives:
(20) But this vague conviction of interminable guilt, which was enough to 
keep up much head-shaking and biting innuendo even among substantial 
professional seniors, had for the general mind all the superior power of 
mystery over fact. Everybody liked better to conjecture how the thing was, 
than simply to know it; for conjecture soon became more confident than 
knowledge, and had a more liberal allowance for the incompatible. Even 
the more definite scandal concerning Bulstrode’s earlier life was, for some 
minds, melted into the mass of mystery, as so much lively metal to be poured 
out in dialogue, and to take such fantastic shapes as heaven pleased. (498; 
emphasis added)
This is a general assessment by the narrator of a certain type of intermental 
thought. Although it is related to the workings of the Middlemarch mind, 
it appears to have a wider application. The narrator seems to be suggesting 
that this is how intermental systems generally work. It is heavily ironic and 
rather jaundiced. It makes the obvious point that the cognitive investigations 
of the Middlemarch mind are not aimed at a pure disinterested pursuit of 
the objective truth. Rather, in this case, the driving force is the enjoyment of 
Palmer, “Large Intermental Units in middlemarch”  103
mystery, as opposed to the discovery of fact. This is because fact might result 
in an uninteresting narrative being constructed for the two individuals, Bul-
strode and Lydgate. Also, the resulting narrative might not suit the purposes 
or interests of those people who are hostile to the two. Even the “more defi-
nite” facts are warped to fit into a more satisfying narrative. There is then a 
reference to “some minds” going further “even” than the majority in modify-
ing the known facts to construct a satisfying narrative. A cognitive narrative 
that fits the needs of the group is created.
 In fact, in a typically explicit passage, the narrator muses on the question 
of identity and warns the reader against the distortions in the construction of 
intramental identity inherent in the myth-making process:
(21) For surely all must admit that a man may be puffed and belauded, 
envied, ridiculed, counted upon as a tool and fallen in love with, or at least 
selected as a future husband, and yet remain virtually unknown—known 
merely as a cluster of signs for his neighbours’ false suppositions. (96; 
emphasis added)
The myth-making process continues even after death. The following passage 
occurs at the very end of the book:
(22) Sir James never ceased to regard Dorothea’s second marriage as a mis-
take; and indeed this remained the tradition concerning it in Middlemarch, 
where she was spoken of to a younger generation as a fine girl who married 
a sickly clergyman, old enough to be her father, and in little more than a 
year after his death gave up her estate to marry his cousin—young enough to 
have been his son, with no property, and not well-born. Those who had not 
seen anything of Dorothea usually observed that she could not have been “a 
nice woman,” else she would not have married either the one or the other. 
(577; emphasis added)
Dorothea is focalized though the Middlemarch mind for ever. Her life exists 
now only as a double cognitive narrative that is constructed by the Middle-
march mind. In its reductive simplicity and naivety, this narrative is com-
pletely different from the warm, sympathetic, complex one that is presented 
by the narrator over the course of the novel. It is a very long way indeed from 
the woman described in the final paragraph, the one whose “finely-touched 
spirit had still its fine issues,” “who lived faithfully a hidden life” and who 
rests in an unvisited tomb (578).
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CoNClusioN
I have tried in this essay to describe the various ways in which the narrator of 
Middlemarch organizes the mosaic of intermentality that makes up the text 
of the novel. I hope to have shown that the various intermental units are so 
integral to the plot of the novel that it would be difficult for a reader to fol-
low the plot without an understanding of them. Now that the existence of 
this fundamentally important aspect of the novel has been established, the 
resulting lines of inquiry could go in a number of different directions. One 
would be to consider in more detail the different purposes that are served 
by the depictions of these units, in particular the creation of various ironic 
effects. Another would be to find out how the representations of intermental 
units in this novel both differ from, and are similar to, the representations in 
texts written by other novelists of the same period, as well as those from dif-
ferent periods.
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The issue to be discussed in this essay concerns narratological terminology, 
but involves different conceptualizations of theoretical design as well. The 
essay will be concerned with the relationship between Stanzel’s fundamental 
defining feature of narrative, its mediacy, on the one hand, and the discus-
sions of narrative mediation or transmission (Chatman) on the other. While 
Stanzel’s mediacy focuses on the mediateness of narrative, on the fact that 
the story (histoire) is mediated through the narrative report (Erzählerbericht) 
of a narrator figure, Chatman’s transmission and what has recently come to 
be called mediation concern the process of (re)medialization of one histoire 
or one version of a story into different, especially multi-medial, discourses 
(e.g., film, ballet, drama, etc.). The contrasting of mediacy and mediation, as 
I will explain below, thematizes different definitions of narrativity and par-
tially incompatible notions of discourse. Both models do, however, rely on a 
distinction between a deep-structural histoire (story) and a surface-structural 
discourse conceived in a variety of ways.
 A second term of continuing prominence in narratological debates is that 
of focalization. In classical models such as Mieke Bal’s, focalization is posi-
tioned as a process applying between the story and discourse levels of nar-
rative (see Chatman 1986: 22; Bal 1985: 501). Especially in Bal, focalization 
does not entirely synchronize with mediation, though some media presum-
 1. Bal divides her levels into fabula (≈ Chatman’s story), plot (“restructured fabula”) 
and text (i.e. the words on the page). In her model, focalization mediates between the levels 
of fabula and plot.
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ably involve the application of necessary or standard types of focalization. 
While focalization and mediation can therefore be argued to have some over-
lap, focalization and mediacy seem to stand in a relationship of complemen-
tary distribution both practically and theoretically. Practically, focalization 
(qua point of view) in Stanzel’s model seems unrelated to mediacy since it 
does not have any direct impact on the mediating discourse of the narrator; 
story is not transformed into text by means of adding a point of view. Para-
doxically, since the mediating narrator does not “see,” this opens up a “who 
sees” (the reflector mode protagonist) versus “who speaks” (the narrator) 
dichotomy within Stanzel’s theory. Theoretically, focalization and mediacy 
clash in their role as representatives of Genette’s versus Stanzel’s models. As 
the reader will remember, focalization is a term invented by Genette, whereas 
Stanzel’s three narrative situations combine different types of storytelling or 
narration with different types of focalization (“perspective”), and he also dis-
tinguishes between perspective and mode, both of which have affinities with 
standard conceptions of point of view or focalization. Looking at the inter-
relations between focalization and mediacy in Stanzel’s model and contrast-
ing mediacy and mediation may help to bring out some underlying parallels 
between a number of processes that are said to operate between the story and 
discourse levels of narratives. Such an inquiry also poses the question of to 
what extent a reconstruction of story from the discourse can be parallelized 
with the medial transformation of stories, plots or already existing discourses 
(Babes in the Wood as material, as story/plot, as a fairy tale transposed into 
film, cartoon, novel, etc.).
revisitiNg storY aNd disCourse—
No Media/CY/tioN witHout diCHotoMiZatioN
Practically all models of narrative theory repose on the story/discourse 
dichotomy, and they usually approach this binary opposition as a before/after 
sequence: first there is the story and then one transforms it into a discourse 
by means of narration by a narrator or through a specific medium like film or 
theatrical performance or ballet. The origins of the dichotomy lie in Russian 
formalism and its distinction between fabula and syuzhet (Shklovsky 1965: 
57; Eichenbaum 1965: 121–22; Erlich 1965: 240–1), complemented (and 
muddied) by the story/plot opposition according to E. M. Forster (1990: 42; 
86–87). Forster, as one remembers, contrasts story as a sequence of actions 
with plot (sequence of actions plus motivation): on the one hand, The king 
died. Then the queen died; on the other, The king died. Then the queen died 
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of grief. By contrast, the Russian formalist distinction focuses on the rhetori-
cal rearrangement of story elements in the discourse, illustrated with panache 
by Shklovsky on the example text of Tristram Shandy (Shklovsky 1965). In 
the later development of narratology, Forster’s distinction has been relegated 
to the deep structure of narrative: plot and story are now often treated as one 
level that is anterior to the narrative discourse. In fact, the journey from the 
events themselves (Geschehen, cp. Schmid 2005: 241–72) to story or plot 
(Geschichte), and then on to discourse has been represented in a number of 
different ways as Korte (1985) and Fludernik (1993: 61–62) already out-
lined.2 In Seymour Chatman’s Story and Discourse (1978/1986), narrative 
transmission in verbal and visual narrative includes focalization (1986: 158–
61). The move from the story level (focusing on existants and actions) to the 
discourse level (words, images) includes not only a possible rearrangement 
in the order of plot events (Genette’s anachrony in the category of tense), 
but also the introduction of focalization and voice (“who sees” and “who 
speaks”), the latter inflected in a medium-specific manner (see Chatman’s cin-
ematic narrator—1990: 124–38). However, the assumed inclusion of focal-
ization in narrative transmission will have to be modified in a close reading 
of Story and Discourse and in consideration of Chatman’s newer distinctions 
(1990: 139–60) between filter and slant (see below in the section Mediation 
and Focalization).
 All of these models depart from the assumption that the story is a given 
and the discourse transforms it into the text as we have it before our eyes. 
Such a viewpoint is generative and production-oriented, assuming that the 
author creates a narrator, who then transforms the story (what happened) 
into the text/discourse we read. As has been pointed out, from the reader’s 
perspective the situation is entirely different since the reader reconstructs the 
story from the discourse, a process that may be quite laborious in some Mod-
ernist novels like James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), William Faulkner’s Absalom, 
Absalom! (1936), or even in newer fiction like Timothy Findley’s Famous 
Last Words (1981) or Rudy Wiebe’s The Temptations of Big Bear (1995). All 
of these narratives require heroic efforts on the part of their readers to work 
out what happened in what order. What I would like to suggest, though, is 
that the readerly perspective is not exclusively a reception-oriented view of 
the story/discourse dichotomy, but that it also applies to the generative per-
spective. The story is always a construction and an idealized chronological 
outline. On the other hand, it also needs to be noted that nonfictional narra-
 2. See also the very useful summary in Wenzel (2004: 16–17), who even distinguishes 
between two layers of discourse.
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tives and re-medializations clearly rely on a prior story (though not necessar-
ily referent) which they transform into discourse.
 As regards authors’ compositional practices, it is now widely established 
that these do not start with a story or plot and then literally choose between, 
say, an omniscient or first-person narrator, between a chronological or ana-
leptic presentation of events, or between types of focalization. On the con-
trary, pronouncements by various authors on how they came to write their 
stories often allow us to glimpse a character trait, a key scene, a moral prob-
lem, and so on as the germ of the later narrative, and it is from that significant 
detail that decisions about presentation are developed. Specifically, many plot 
details are not known to authors when they start to write, as Dickens’s out-
lines for his later novels demonstrate to perfection. Taking plot as the basic 
ground on which discourse builds is therefore not very convincing from a gen-
erative perspective. The situation is, however, very different if there already 
exists a prior textual source for the narrative, for instance another novel, a 
fairy tale, a history book, or if the core of the story is a historical sequence of 
events which has already been canonized. Under these circumstances, trans-
formations do indeed take place on a prior event sequence. Angela Carter’s 
rewritings of, respectively, “Beauty and the Beast” and “Bluebeard’s Cham-
ber” in her “The Courtship of Mr. Lyon” and “The Bloody Chamber” in The 
Bloody Chamber (1979) obviously rely on their model reader’s familiarity 
with these fairy tales; only then can he/she optimally appreciate Carter’s femi-
nist anti-patriarchal revisions of these sources. One should, however, note 
that such revisions also change the plot by reintroducing different settings 
and characters (the piano tuner in “The Bloody Chamber”) and therefore 
actually create a new plot (and a new discourse). Since the revision of the plot 
has ideological importance, it cannot be set aside as irrelevant to the creative 
process.3
 Historical writing is even more complicated. On the one hand, there is 
no historical plot to start with, as Paul Veyne notes in his classic analysis 
(1971: 13–20); on the other hand, once historians have created the “history 
of the Peloponnesian War” or the “history of the rise of the gentry,” certain 
key events have been selected as prominent causes and results in a sequence 
whose teleological argument provides a storyline. This configuration (Ricoeur 
1984–88) is then taken over by other historians, who add to the data, revise 
in accordance with new sources, and summarize “the story” in their own 
 3. For a superb discussion of such adaptations, as she calls them, see Hutcheon (2006). 
Hutcheon in particular discusses modifications of theme, character and plot as common foci 
of the adaptive process (7–8), thus indicating that adaptations often tend to rewrite the story 
level.
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words. Historiography thus originally creates a new story, but often rewrites 
it once it has been outlined; indeed, only when a completely new interpreta-
tion becomes necessary in the light of recently retrieved evidence (e.g. the 
discovery and decipherment of the Linear B tablets) is a new story created. 
At the same time, owing to its factual pretensions, historiography always 
claims to tell a story that is prior to its narration since history is “out there” 
and supposedly independent of the individual historian’s text. (Hence the 
controversial status of Hayden White among historians; he seems to say that 
there are no events outside the historians’ inventions of stories, though in 
actual fact he merely queries our representations of those occurrences in story 
form.)
 The story/discourse dichotomy, and especially the priority of the story, 
has recently been attacked by Richard Walsh (2001, reprinted in Walsh 
2007), who also refers to a debate between Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1980) 
and Seymour Chatman (1981) in Critical Inquiry. Smith’s article is a sarcastic 
review of Chatman’s 1978 classic, Story and Discourse, basically from her 
perspective of a speech act paradigm of speech and writing, which is Smith’s 
preferred mode of approaching literature in her On the Margins of Discourse 
(1978). Smith’s major point of attack is the “Platonic,” as she terms it (1980: 
213), nature of story in Chatman; in her view, story, like Plato’s ideas, does 
not exist in the real world. The only thing that exists is versions of stories 
(specifically discourses of Cinderella), including summaries, which are also 
discourses. Smith proposes that the reason that most people agree on a simi-
lar summary of a text is because they share a cultural background, have simi-
lar expectations of what a summary should look like, and deploy the same 
culturally transmitted genre conventions. Chatman’s reply to Smith focuses 
on the linguistic model and parallelizes story and discourse with the pho-
nological phoneme/phone dichotomy: “The phonemes are as real as their 
actualizations on people’s lips; they are not some fuzzy Platonic idea but a 
reality, a construct by linguists from actual utterances and attributable to the 
configuration of articulational and semantic features” (1981: 804–5). Chat-
man’s more basic model is, however, Chomsky’s transformational grammar, 
since the entire point of reconstructing the underlying story for Chatman is to 
determine in what way the discourse differs from it (by way of anachronies, 
focalization, etc.).
 It makes perfect sense to contrast the messy text that one has in hand with 
an idealized chronological story, which the reader needs to piece together 
in order to understand the narrative. One can also sympathize with narra-
tological tendencies to logically put the story first (though not in terms of 
actual production). The point of Smith’s criticism that Chatman responds 
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to only vaguely and insufficiently is the one about the impossibility of find-
ing a core version of Cinderella in its many manifestations from China to 
Peru. Chatman never really addresses this question. Smith, on the one hand, 
clearly confuses the chronology of a hypostatized story which belongs to any 
one discourse with the mythic kernel that supposedly lies beneath all Cinder-
ella retellings in three hundred and more versions of that fairy tale. Most of 
the difficulties that Smith outlines actually touch on the existants (the prince 
is not a prince but the captain of a ship; Cinderella is the oldest sister) or 
the setting (cp. Hutcheon 2006: 7–8). The transformation of a chronological 
into an anachronistic discourse, on the other hand, presupposes the posit-
ing of the same plot for both versions. Or, in other words, story/discourse 
transformations only make sense for one specific story version of Cinder-
ella that is transformed into one specific verbal narrative or film or ballet. 
Different discourse versions of Cinderella in different media, on the other 
hand, all have their individual stories. Narrative transmission does not in fact 
coincide with remedialization (the rewriting of a myth), i.e. the presumed 
Ur-Cinderella responsible for the three hundred or more Cinderella tales on 
this globe. Where Smith is quite correct, therefore, is in showing that a re-
medialization cannot take the original text (and its story) as a starting point 
for the same kind of transformation that occurs between story and discourse 
in one medium. A rewriting of fairy tales and myths such as Angela Carter’s 
“The Erl-King,” “Puss in Boots” or “Penetrating to the Heart of the Forest” 
produces a different discourse (and a different story).
 In his brilliant “Fabula and Fictionality in Narrative Theory” (2001; 
2007: 52–68), Walsh inverts the classic story before discourse dichotomy 
by not only emphasizing discourse’s priority over story but by additionally 
arguing that “sujet (discourse) is what we come to understand as a given (fic-
tional) narrative, and fabula (story) is how we come to understand it” (2007: 
68). Rather than focusing on how we deform story to yield a rearranged 
discourse, Walsh sees the construction of fabula as a means of explicating 
the rhetoric of fiction: “Fabula is not so much an event chain underlying the 
sujet as it is a by-product of the interpretative process by which we throw 
into relief and assimilate the sujet’s rhetorical control of narrative informa-
tion” (67); rather, fabula is “an interpretative exercise in establishing repre-
sentational coherence” in order to achieve “rhetorical perceptibility” (ibid.). 
The construction of fabula is needed for the interpretation of narrative (65). 
Walsh here seems to first cast out story (fabula) as the rock on which narra-
tology reposes, but then ends up entrenching the distinction, yet does so from 
a functionalist rather than temporal (chronology-related) or generic perspec-
tive.
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 To return to our problem of mediacy, mediation, and focalization. One 
needs to point out that in classic narratological models, all three concepts 
rely on the opposition between the two levels of story and discourse and that 
the notions of mediation and focalization presuppose the priority of the deep 
structural level. (I am using Chatman’s classic formulation here.) Particularly 
in the case of mediation, this poses the question of whether a remediation of 
one story into another in a different medium (from novel to film, from fairy 
tale to Walt Disney production) actually is a remediation, or whether film 
or cartoon versions do not in reality have different plots which relate to the 
plots of the source narratives in a framework of family resemblances. Does 
the process of selection, restructuring, and media-related refocalization create 
a new story through a new discourse, or is it still the same story?
 We will keep these conundra in mind. For the moment we have estab-
lished that the dichotomy between story and discourse is basic to all recent 
theorizing about mediacy, mediation, and focalization. We also saw that tra-
ditional narratology in practice (though not always in theory4) saw the story 
level as prior to the discourse level and conceived of the discourse as a trans-
formation of the story through the medium of narration (which then included 
medial and focalizational aspects). We additionally noted that a reception-
oriented perspective would tend to emphasize the construction of story from 
the discourse. A mediational focus, on the other hand, requires a stable plot 
on which mediation can build and therefore seems to argue for the priority of 
story. However, as I have suggested, remedialization and narrative transmis-
sion are perhaps two entirely different animals and should not be treated as 
equivalent.
MediaCY versus MediatioN
When Stanzel introduced the notion of mediacy in 1955, he defined it in the 
following manner:
Die vorliegende Untersuchung nimmt ihren Ausgang von dem zentralen 
Merkmal der Mittelbarkeit der Darstellung im Roman. Mittelbarkeit chara-
kterisiert auch die Darstellungsweise im Epos. [ . . . ] Im Roman bezeichnet 
 4. The de facto priority of discourse is noted by Genette when he sees the story as the 
signified of the discourse. For criticism of the story/discourse relation see also Fludernik (1993: 
61–63; 1994; 1996: 333–37). Wolf Schmid even has a diagram that visualizes the priority of 
discourse over story by arrows pointing from narration to discourse, from discourse to plot, 
and from plot to events (2005: 270).
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die Mittelbarkeit der Darstellung jenen Sachverhalt, der von den oben ange-
führten Theoretikern des Romans in der Anwesenheit eines persönlichen 
Erzählers gesehen wird. [ . . . ] [D]ie Auffassung, daß echte Darstellung im 
Roman nur durch die Vermittlung eines persönlichen Erzählers möglich 
wäre, ist in ihrem normativen Anspruch ebenso unhaltbar wie jene besonders 
von Spiegelhagen vertretene Ansicht, daß der Erzähler völlig unsichtbar zu 
bleiben habe. [ . . . ] In der Regel ist die Erzählung in einem Roman jeweils 
auf eine ganz bestimmte Art des Vermittlungsvorganges abgestimmt, die 
dann im ganzen Roman durchgehalten wird. Sie soll hier Erzählsituation 
genannt werden. Die Mittelbarkeit des Romans erhält in der Erzählsitua-
tion ihren konkreten Ausdruck: ein Autor erzählt, was er über eine Sache 
in Erfahrung gebracht hat, ein anderer tritt als Herausgeber einer Hand-
schrift auf, jemand schreibt Briefe oder erzählt seine eigenen Erlebnisse, um 
nur einige geläufige Einkleidungen der Erzählsituation zu nennen. Solche 
Einkleidungen haben alle zum Ziel, im Leser die Illusion zu stärken, daß das 
Erzählte ein Teil seiner eigenen Wirklichkeits erfahrung sei. (1969: 4–5)
The present investigation takes as its point of departure one central feature 
of the novel—its mediacy of presentation. Mediacy or indirectness also char-
acterizes the technique of presentation in the epic. [ . . . ] For these theoreti-
cians [Petsch, Hamburger, Friedemann] the novel’s mediacy of presentation 
consists in the presence of a personal narrator. [ . . . ] The view that authentic 
presentation in the novel is only possible through the mediation of a per-
sonal narrator is as untenable a normative criterion as the view, held notably 
by Friedrich Spielhagen, that the narrator ought to remain fully invisible. 
[ . . . ] As a rule, the narration in a given novel maintains a single fixed type 
of mediative process throughout the work. This mediative process will be 
called the narrative situation. The mediacy of the novel finds its concrete 
expression in the narrative situation: one author narrates the facts he has 
learned about a given subject; another appears as the editor of a manuscript; 
yet another writes letters or narrates his own experiences. These are only a 
few common guises of the narrative situation. Such guises all have the aim of 
strengthening the reader’s illusion that the narrated material is a part of his 
own experience of reality. (1971: 6–7)
In the first sentence of this passage Stanzel notes that mediation of the story 
by the narrator has generally been taken for granted and was thematized by 
Robert Petsch (1934), Käte Hamburger (1993), and Käte Friedemann (1965). 
His contribution to these antecedents is to show that Spielhagen’s ideal 
of objective, seemingly narrator-less type of narration (1883: 220) is also 
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mediated, and that mediation therefore manifests itself through a number of 
different narrative situations.
 In his 1979/1984 Theory of Narrative, the concept of mediacy is elabo-
rated differently, in relation to the opposition of narrative (epic) with drama, 
a contrast that Stanzel borrows from Pfister (1977/1991):
The three narrative situations distinguished below must be understood first 
and foremost as rough descriptions of basic possibilities of rendering the 
mediacy of narration. It is characteristic of the first-person narrative situa-
tion that the mediacy of narration belongs totally to the fictional realm of 
the characters of the novel: the mediator, that is, the first-person narrator, is 
a character of this world just as the other characters are. [ . . . ] It is char-
acteristic of the authorial narrative situation that the narrator is outside the 
world of the characters. [ . . . ] Here the process of transmission originates 
from an external perspective, as will be explained in the chapter on “per-
spective.” Finally, in the figural narrative situation, the mediating narrator 
is replaced by a reflector: a character in the novel who thinks, feels and 
perceives, but does not speak to the reader like a narrator. [ . . . ] (Stanzel 
1984: 4–5)
Stanzel then goes on to equate his concept of mediacy with Seymour Chat-
man’s narrative transmission (5). He proceeds to align foregrounded mediacy 
with the literariness of a narrative, citing Shklovsky’s Tristram Shandy essay 
as an analysis of foregrounded mediacy (6). Later in the introduction Stanzel 
reduces narrative transmission (mediacy) to the narratorial function. The nar-
rator is either openly active in the telling of the tale or hides behind it:
All those narrative elements and the system of their coordination which 
serve to transmit the story to the reader belong to the surface structure. The 
main representative of this transmission process is the narrator, who can 
either perform before the eyes of the reader and portray his own narrative 
act, or can withdraw so far behind the characters of the narrative that the 
reader is no longer aware of his presence. (16–17)
The main grounding of Stanzel’s mediacy thus lies in the verbal mediation 
of story by means of a narrator’s act of narration. Narrative is to be distin-
guished from drama by its mediacy. Whereas the story of drama is enacted 
on stage and therefore presented without mediation, im-mediately, nar-
ratives represent the events through the medium of verbal narration by a 
narrator figure. Stanzel’s model therefore relies on a definition of narrative 
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that excludes drama from it—a traditional German axiom that goes back 
to Goethe’s genre distinction between epic, poetry, and drama as the basic 
triad of available generic forms. Narrativity, in the sense of what constitutes 
a narrative,5 in Stanzel therefore includes a story versus discourse distinction 
and entails a mandatory narrational level figured in a narratorial persona 
(who/which may, however, be laid back, covert or even seemingly non- 
existent, as in reflector-mode narrative, i.e. in narratives of global internal 
focalization). Such a definition does not cover nonverbal narratives or drama; 
its presuppositions, especially that of the distinction between narrative, lyric, 
and dramatic modes, clearly proclaim that such an extension is not desired.
 Although the exclusiveness of Stanzel’s definition of mediacy, and implic-
itly of narrativity, seems restrictive today, one does well to remember that 
the necessary existence of a narrator, and the privileging of the verbal act of 
narration, can also be found in Gérard Genette, who has been drastically out-
spoken regarding his rejection of Banfield’s no-narrator theory:
Narrative without a narrator, the utterance without an uttering, seem to me 
pure illusion [ . . . ]. I can therefore set against its devotees only this regretful 
confession: “Your narrative without a narrator may perhaps exist, but for 
the forty-seven years during which I have been reading narratives, I have 
never met one.” Regretful is, moreover, a term of pure politeness, for if I 
were to meet such a narrative, I would flee as quickly as my legs could carry 
me: when I open a book, whether it is a narrative or not, I do so to have the 
author speak to me. And since I am not yet either deaf or dumb, sometimes I 
even happen to answer him. (Genette 1988: 101–2)
Parallelizing the reading process with narration, Genette humorously pres-
ents the activity of reading as a conversation with a person, the real author 
or narrator (in the case of a fictional narrative). Genette’s model goes beyond 
Stanzel’s in its focus on the level of narration, separating as it does the narra-
tor as extradiegetic communicative instance on the one hand, and the product 
of his/her act of narration, the narrative discourse, on the other. It is precisely 
this split in the mediacy-constituting narrational transmission between sender 
and textual message that opened up the way for Seymour Chatman to include 
first film and later other media under the banner of narrative transmission. 
Chatman’s model allows for the existence of different “texts”—purely verbal, 
filmic, dramatic. It therefore implies the hypostatizing of a narrating instance 
 5. In opposition to different definitions of narrativity as constructedness in Hayden White 
(1981) and in opposition to narrativehood in Gerald Prince (1982, 2008).
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in film, drama, and even in other visual media (see Chatman’s cinematic nar-
rator, 1990: 124–38).
 Although both Stanzel and Genette anchor a narrator telling the story in 
their theoretical models, for Stanzel the narrator splits into two types—on 
the one hand an explicit teller in most first-person narratives and in authorial 
narratives with a foregrounded narrator figure; and on the other a disguised 
narrator in reflector-mode narratives, where the narrator is in abeyance, 
covert, seemingly absent, and the story seems to be “told,” i.e. conveyed, by 
a reflector figure (often called “narrator” by Booth, e.g. 1983: 274) or James-
ian “center of consciousness” (James 1934: xvii–xviii; 322–25). By contrast, 
Genette takes the narrator as fundamental, but combines voice, mode, and 
tense as inflections of the relationships between story, discourse, and narra-
tion. Although every narrative has a narrator, there is actually no real media-
tion going on since the narrator produces a discourse (the discourse being the 
signified of the narration as signifier), and the discourse in turn is the signifier 
of the story, its signified. This means that in Genette the one necessary thing is 
a narrator, and the story emerges indirectly as the signified of the narrational 
acts’ signified—it is at second remove from the story. Rather than subscrib-
ing to a story–discourse model, then, Genette’s typology actually consists 
of a double dyad or triad: A. narration-B. récit [B1 discourse-B2 story]. In 
fact, this dichotomy, in which one term of the binary opposition splits into a 
further dichotomy, is a recurring structure in Genette’s model. His model of 
focalization also works in the same way: focalization versus no focalization 
(focalization zéro), with focalization divided into internal versus external. 
One cannot speak of mediacy or mediation proper in Genette, but only of 
signification.
 Stanzel, on the other hand, entirely focuses on mediation qua mediacy, 
but he exclusively means mediation through the narratorial discourse. The 
point of Stanzel’s model, however, is not so much to thematize mediation—
this he really takes for granted as the constitutive feature of narrative (epic) 
in contrast to drama in so far as both genres tell a story—but to propose 
two types of mediacy, namely explicit and implicit or overt and covert, and 
to demonstrate how the pretense of immediacy in figural narrative can be 
achieved. Since the reflector character does not narrate and all narrative is 
mediate, how is mediacy achieved in this type of fiction which seems to pro-
vide im-mediate access to the experience of the characters, to the story? If 
immediacy were actually possible, this would militate against the axiomatic 
distinction between drama and narrative, but such dramatic immediacy is 
possible only rarely in dialogue novels; in figural narrative, instead, medi-
acy is camouflaged by the narrator’s sly disappearance behind the scenes, 
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allowing the reflector character’s psyche to move to the foreground, supply-
ing a deictic center of orientation and evaluation. Stanzel therefore sees medi-
acy as a kind of mediation, but not in terms of different media (verbal telling 
versus visual, performative narrative), but of different types of verbal narra-
tive—by means of either overt telling (first-person or authorial narrative) or 
“reflecting” through the center of consciousness within a narrative discourse 
that, as to its source, remains disguised, occulted, camouflaged. From the per-
spective of later Balian, Chatmanesque or Wolfian models, Stanzel’s theory is 
therefore not a theory of mediation but of mediacy—in so far the translation 
of Mittelbarkeit, literally “mediability,” is correct. It is a theory of the fore-
grounding or backgrounding of mediacy by the narratorial discourse, which 
is the one and only medium of narrative.
 Stanzel, as the quotations cited above show, alternates between a dual and 
a triple manifestation of mediacy. On the one hand, the three narrative situa-
tions (first-person, authorial, and figural) are said to instantiate mediacy; on 
the other hand, the modal difference between telling and showing (reflecting) 
is constitutive of mediacy. This inconsistency could be related to the existence 
of two levels of mediacy. At some points, as in our first quotation (1969: 
4–5), Stanzel seems to focus on the generic forms of mediacy, including the 
diary, the editor’s report and other frames in the various manifestations of 
mediacy; at other times the emphasis is on the (missing) narrator persona and 
veiled act of narration or on the foregrounding/backgrounding of narrato-
rial mediation. From that latter perspective, the triad of narrative situations 
begins to slide into a dichotomy, since both first-person and authorial narra-
tives have a clear narrator persona, with the exception (in Stanzel’s model) of 
the autonomous interior monologue. Cohn’s suggestion to reduce the three 
axes in Stanzel’s Theory of Narrative therefore articulates the unease trig-
gered by the slide between a clear triadic and an equally obvious dual set-up 
within the model (Cohn 1981).
 My own model in Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology extends Stanzel’s the-
oretical edifice by revising two of his presuppositions. First, it became clear to 
me that reflector-mode narrative substitutes consciousness for narration; the 
medium of figural narrative is therefore less a covert narrator hiding behind 
the mind of a protagonist than a different mode of cognitive conceptualizing 
of characters’ experience—telling versus experiencing. This then led to my 
addition of two further such frames—based on conversational narrative for-
mats posited as prototypical and therefore of cognitive salience: viewing and 
reflecting (ideating) (see Fludernik 1996: 43–52). In my model there are thus 
four different ways in which forms of consciousness mediate narrative expe-
rience within frames. Later in the book I also integrated readers’ immersive 
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projections into that model when discussing Banfield’s empty center and Stan-
zel’s reflectorization technique (his Personalisierung) in contrast with what I 
called forms of figuralization (using Stanzel’s English term for his personale 
Erzählsituation, i.e. the figural narrative situation).6
 Because viewing and experiencing are not based on discourse or language, 
this model additionally opened the way to a broader understanding of nar-
rative and narrativity, which no longer remained limited to verbal narra-
tive. Note, however, that the mediation of experientiality through cognitive 
frames, i.e. mediacy, is not at all equivalent or even comparable to media-
related mediation per se—different cognitive frames may come into play in 
different media. The model therefore welcomes considerations of mediation, 
but without dropping the notion of mediacy as a separate category. For these 
reasons, it is important to continue to distinguish between the concepts of 
mediacy and mediation.
MediatioN aNd FoCaliZatioN
Whereas, as we have seen, Genette’s focalization can be added to any possible 
narrative, Stanzel’s internal perspective is central to figural narrative texts, 
combining with the reflector mode: grosso modo one can say that mediacy 
comes either in teller or in reflector mode, and if in the latter, one has internal 
focalization à la Genette. (It is not important for our argument here that Gen-
ette’s internal focalization, Stanzel’s internal perspective, Stanzel’s figural nar-
rative and his reflector mode do not all refer to precisely the same thing and 
have some very jagged edges.7) Since Stanzel excludes all nonverbal narratives 
 6. See Fludernik (1996: 178–221).
 7. Stanzel’s perspective “involves the control of the process of apperception which the 
reader performs in order to obtain a concrete perceptual image of the fictional reality” (1984: 
111); thus “[i]nternal perspective prevails when the point of view from which the narrated 
world is perceived or represented is located in the main character or in the centre of events” 
(ibid.). Reflector-mode narrative, which also covers first-person texts, is marked by “a close 
correspondence between internal perspective and the mode dominated by a reflector charac-
ter” (141), while the figural narrative situation contains a dominance of internal perspective 
with a prevailing reflector mode. But first-person reflector-mode narratives in Stanzel belong 
to the first-person narrative situation. As for Genette’s focalization, it is defined through a 
restriction of point of view within the narrative world (Genette 1972/1980: 185–6). This 
internal focalization seems to correspond almost precisely with Stanzel’s internal perspective, 
except that their opposites, external focalization and external perspective, differ radically. 
Internal focalization in Genette contrasts with external focalization—an external view of the 
fictional world which disallows insight into characters’ minds; whereas Stanzel’s external per-
spective characterizes the narrator’s all-encompassing vision on the fictional world including 
“his” omniscient ability to look into the protagonists’ minds. Thus, Fielding’s depiction of his 
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from consideration, the question of how to treat focalization in film does 
not pose itself within his theory. Nor is there a question of where to locate 
focalization. Since Stanzel only has one type of “focalization,” namely reflec-
tor mode narrative,8 which is one of two ways in which mediacy manifests 
itself, focalization therefore clearly “occurs” between the story level and the 
discourse level. Hence, it comes to rank with those transformations usually 
positioned in this space: the rearrangement of chronology (Genette’s category 
order) and the selection and compression process (Günther Müller’s Erzähl-
zeit versus erzählte Zeit [1948]).9
 Once one starts to consider narrative as existing in several media, how-
ever, a long list of theoretical imponderables emerges; these have given rise 
to a number of diverse solutions. The possible relations between focalization 
and mediation clearly depend on which of these solutions one has espoused.
 Let us start with Chatman since he is the prime exponent of the story 
and discourse definition of narrative, and the inventor, or at least popular-
izer, of the cinematic narrator concept. For Chatman, “point of view” (1986: 
151–61) comes in three forms: perceptual point of view, conceptual point of 
view and interest point of view (1978: 152). Perceptual point of view refers 
to what a character sees; conceptual point of view refers to cognition and 
attitude; and interest point of view to the “passive state” (152) of being con-
cerned, of practical interest, or life-orientation. Already in Story and Dis-
course, Chatman relates point of view to the story level: “point of view is the 
physical place or ideological situation or practical life-orientation to which 
narrative events stand in relation” (153; my emphasis). He clearly opposes 
point of view and voice: “Perception, conception, and interest points of view 
are quite independent of the manner in which they are expressed. [ . . . ] Thus 
point of view is in the story (which is the character’s), but voice is always out-
side, in the discourse” (154; Chatman’s emphasis). Rather than seeing point 
of view constitutively as part of a transformation process, Chatman actually 
locates character’s point of view in the story, and allows the narrator a sepa-
rate point of view which is separate from the action of telling, though still 
part of the transformation from story into discourse, I suppose.
 In Chatman’s Coming to Terms (1990), the narrator is no longer allowed 
any point of view, but may have a slant, whereas characters’ point of view 
characters’ consciousness would be global zero focalization (plus extradiegetic heterodiegetic 
narrative), possibly with minimal pockets of internal focalization, in Genette, but external 
perspective (and hence authorial narrative situation) in Stanzel.
 8. In heterodiegetic narrative internal perspective coincides with the reflector mode; in 
homodiegetic narrative, internal perspective is just part of the dynamics of the first-person 
narrative situation.
 9. In Genette, time of narration versus narrated time is subsumed under duration.
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becomes a filter through which they perceive the narrative world (1990: 
139–60). Chatman’s revised model foregrounds ideology,10 and it allows per-
ceptual point of view only on the level of the characters: “I propose slant to 
name the narrator’s attitudes and other mental nuances appropriate to the 
report function of discourse, and filter to name the much wider range of men-
tal activity experienced by characters in the story world—perceptions, cog-
nitions, attitudes, emotions, memories, fantasies, and the like” (1990: 143; 
Chatman’s emphasis). Note that in Coming to Terms the point of view on 
the narratorial level is now subsumed under the “function of discourse” and 
not a stance superimposed on the narrational act. Focalization, perceptual 
and cognitive or ideological, therefore only relates to characters—there is 
no external focalization as in Genette (Chatman 1990: 145)! It has nothing 
to do with the point from which events are perceived but in fact seems to 
be equivalent to Stanzel’s reflector-mode: characters’ point of view is a filter 
through which the characters “experience” themselves and the world around 
them. Filter, in fact, “captur[es]” the “mediating function of a character’s 
consciousness” (144). It therefore emerges that the model which was most 
crucially responsible for entrenching the story/discourse dichotomy actu-
ally does not integrate focalization into it. In Chatman (1990) focalization 
does not arise from transformations between story and discourse, despite the 
explicit statement in Story and Discourse that it does: “Narrative transmis-
sion concerns the relation of time of story to the recounting of time of story 
[ . . . ]: narrative voice, point of view, and the like” (1986: 22).
 Let us now turn to Genette. In Genette, decisions about focalization for 
a whole text (what one could call macrofocalization, to distinguish it from 
Mieke Bal’s microfocalization in individual sentences), like the choice of 
homo- versus heterodiegesis, most probably take their origin in the author. 
(Genette rejects the construct of the implied author—Genette [1988: 136–
45]—which/who would be held responsible for it by theorists like Rimmon-
Kenan [1983] or Nünning [1989], who replaces the implied author by what 
he calls level 3 of communication, N3). If focalization is rooted in authorial 
decisions, it has no business with the mediational process (i.e. the transmis-
sion of story into discourse) because it would be located already at the level of 
the plot. Note that this conclusion crucially depends on definitional choices. 
Thus, the discourse is here taken to be the product of the narratorial process 
of narration, the words on the page. As soon as one moves into a different 
medium such as cartoon or film, the existence of a narrator and the descrip-
 10. Interest, renamed “interest-focus” (148–9), is now linked to the audience’s attention, 
wishing a character “good luck” (148).
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tion of the “text” as the utterance by that narrator become less convincing 
propositions.
 Once the concept of mediation is extended to media contexts, the theo-
retical problems multiply exponentially. One of these problems is to what 
extent focalization happens in the mediational process (see above) or is super-
imposed by the medium. This is an important question in film. One can, for 
instance, argue that, since film is a predominantly visual medium, in which 
the camera serves as a focalizer, film narrative is inherently focalizing so that 
there exists no zero focalization in accordance with Genette’s model (1980: 
189–94; 1988: 121). Other theorists have argued that all films have external 
focalization since the default shot is one in which the scene is presented in 
an overview or bird’s-eye view which does not correspond to human vision. 
Subjective (internal focalization) shots are rare and require some manipula-
tion: close-up shots, shot-reverse shot, eye-level shots that unnaturally cut off 
objects one would usually see as part of the picture, e.g. a shot taken from 
the perspective of a seated person looking at people passing by that cuts off 
people’s heads, or low-angle shots for individuals who seem overpowered by 
what is bearing down on them, such as children’s low-angle perspectives on 
the adult world.11 For film, Mieke Bal’s focalization terminology is even more 
useful than Genette’s since her distinction between focalizer and focalized 
allows one to contrast those shots in which the camera serves as focalizer and 
those in which a character focalizes events (Bal 1985). The latter are subjec-
tive shots. The waters become muddied, however, when the camera presents 
us with a face distorted by fear. This is clearly meant to be a subjective shot 
(in Bal’s terms of an invisible focalized, i.e. a character’s emotions), yet in the 
filmic medium this shot has to be visible, and it may be both the camera’s pre-
sentation of a character’s mind frame and the rendering of another character’s 
impressions of the fearful person. The camera’s pan from the scene as a whole 
to a character’s internal focalization corresponds to a shift from authorial 
narration to free indirect discourse or interior monologue; the already subjec-
tive vision of a character focusing on the emotions depicted or reflected in 
another character’s face corresponds to narrated perception (the observer’s 
impression of his/her interlocutor), and this impression may be objective in 
the sense that the visual medium would tend to show us the face of the fearful 
person as he/she really looked, but it might also be subjective (unreliable) in 
portraying the deranged or biased vision of the observer character (I do not 
have an example for this; but then I am no film specialist). The zoom on the 
 11. See Chatman (1978: 158–61). Compare also his section on slant and filter in film 
(1990: 155–8).
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character’s fear-distended face would clearly mark a departure from neutral 
or objective camera shots, and it could be compared to an authorial or figural 
handling of the lens. Yet a close-up only becomes necessary in the framework 
of (authorial) wide-angle shots, since these do not allow the viewer to notice 
the expression on a character’s face (too small on the screen).
 It is still relatively easy to determine whether or to what extent one can 
find equivalents of Genette’s three types of focalization or of Bal’s in films 
or cartoons; when it comes to plays, the problems proliferate, as we will 
see below. Moreover, once one starts to include other types of focalization 
models, the theoretical issues multiply even further. For instance, when using 
Manfred Jahn’s distinction between strict, ambient, and weak focalization 
(Jahn 1999), all films would presumably lie somewhere between strict and 
ambient, and some perspective camera-eye high-angle shots might even be 
regarded as weak focalization.12 The problem with this is that it entirely casts 
out subjectivity, which was of course the leading motive behind the introduc-
tion of focalization as a term designed to improve on the concepts of point 
of view and perspective. Another question is: to what extent can linguistic 
or ideological perspective, or affect, be rendered in film, and how does one 
describe the combination of visual, aural, and verbal elements that might 
result in similar effects? (I am here thinking of suggestive music hinting at a 
protagonist’s anxiety, or at impending danger; or of voice-over for interior 
monologue, usually combined with a close-up of the protagonist’s face.)
 Drama poses problems of a different nature. In Stanzel’s paradigm (where 
there is no category of focalization), one simply has an immediate presenta-
tion of the story, with the admittedly unrealistic convention of the soliloquy 
or the aside. The audience apparently watches what is happening from their 
external perspective. (This description clearly leaves out questions of selection 
as well as the presence of metadramatic and narrative elements in drama.) If 
one tries to apply Genettean terminology to plays, drama would seem to have 
external focalization throughout (even more extensively than film), and again 
there is no good explanation for soliloquy (it could not easily be categorized 
as internal focalization). Drama therefore on the whole resembles early fic-
tion in which the conventions allow characters to soliloquize, i.e. utter their 
thoughts out loud (rather than the narrative depicting their interiority in free 
 12. Jahn defines these terms as follows: F1 refers to the “burning point of an eye’s lens” 
(87), F2 to the object of focalization. In strict focalization, “F2 is perceived from (or by) F1 
under conditions of precise and restricted spatio-temporal coordinates” (97). Ambient focaliza-
tion, on the other hand, depicts F2 “summarily, more from one side, possibly from all sides” 
and “allow[s] a mobile, summary, or communal point of view” (97). Weak focalization is weak 
because it dispenses with F1, and thus with “all spatio-temporal ties”; there is “only a focused 
object to F2” (97).
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indirect discourse or psycho-narration or interior monologue). Characters 
cannot focalize in drama, so, within Mieke Bal’s model, one has a consistent 
“narrator-focalizer” who focuses on the visible. I am not sure how she would 
deal with the soliloquies, though. Experiments in twentieth-century drama 
have tried to get around these genre conventions by means of a variety of 
techniques. Dreams and memories, in particular, are depicted on stage and 
externalize a subjective perspective of certain characters. Clues such as verbal 
repetition or a change of lighting, or simple inconsistency serve to alert the 
audience to a segment of memory or fantasy. (See, for instance, Tom Stop-
pard’s Travesties, Sebastian Barry’s The Steward of Christendom, and Chris-
tina Reid’s The Belle of the Belfast City.13) However, these tactics are mostly 
used to present the contrast of a character’s mind rather than their focalized 
perception.
 The relationship between mediation and focalization is therefore fraught 
with complications. The most crucial of these are the variety of models of 
focalization and the dissensus among narratologists regarding where exactly 
focalization “happens” (connected with the disagreement between different 
narratological models). Thus, if focalization is conceived of as vision of some-
thing (as in Bal), it can become part of the plot (a character focalizing another 
character); on the other hand, focalization conceived of as mind-reading (zero 
focalization) vs. internal focalization à la Genette locates the source of this 
technique with the author or narrator. Since the figure of a narrator does not 
necessarily exist in other media (again a point of dissensus), imponderables 
mushroom.
 One of the ways out of this dilemma is to concentrate on the discourse in 
one particular medium, and to discuss what strategies are employed to create 
spatial perspective and to transmit insights into characters’ minds, or from 
within characters’ minds on their surroundings. Such a pragmatic approach 
will list the function of close-ups, zooms, shot-reverse shots and so on in film 
to indicate interiority and subjective vision. It will also discuss dolly-shots 
and pans to track spatial orientations of a neutral or subjective kind. (For 
instance, a film in which we see a character enter a house and then get a shot 
of the lobby and a pan up the staircase obviously represents the character’s 
viewpoint on entering.) In drama, such an analysis will tend to focus on ges-
tures and soliloquy as indicators of characters’ interiority, and it will note 
that there exists no psycho-narration (looking into characters’ minds from a 
 13. All three plays are memory plays. Travesties (1974) focuses on Henry Carr’s memories 
of World War I in Zürich; The Steward of Christendom (1995) has its protagonist Thomas 
Dunne re-experiencing crucial moments of his life; and in The Belle of the Belfast City (1987), 
scenes from Dolly’s past help to explain attitudes and moods in the present.
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quasi-extradiegetic viewpoint) in drama. (Clearly, postmodernist experiments 
such as David Edgar’s Entertaining Strangers [1985], where the play sports 
a narrator who psychonarrates characters’ minds in tandem with them [cp. 
Fludernik 2008: 370–71], need to be taken as exceptions to this rule.) Drama 
is also singularly lacking in spatial focalizing since it traditionally presents 
one setting from one particular perspective. Yet, again, recent experiments in 
dramaturgy and staging have discovered ways and means to get around these 
restrictions. Thus, looking into more than one space at the same time (e.g. the 
kitchen and Biff’s bedroom in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman [1949]; 
or several rooms in Tennessee Williams’s Vieux Carré [1978]) can allow the 
audience an “omniscient” (spatially omnipresent) viewpoint; filmic montage 
on a screen, on the other hand, may suggest a character’s subjective view of a 
narrowing tunnel through which he is climbing. Nevertheless, in contrast to 
experiments in temporality, plot disjunction or the dissolution of the bound-
ary between the fictional world and fantasy, such spatial manipulations are 
not particularly prominent in the theater.
tHe No-Narrator aNd No-MediatioN tHesis
In his book The Rhetoric of Fictionality (2007) Richard Walsh has reiterated 
the controversial no-narrator thesis which had already been popularized by 
Ann Banfield (1982) and has recently been revived by Sylvie Patron (2005, 
2009). Walsh also proposes a no-mediation thesis, although he does not call 
it that; that is, he rejects the idea that there is one story which is then medi-
ated into different manifestations in novels, films, ballets, and so on. This the-
sis takes us right back to Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1980) and her remarks 
on the multiplicity of different versions of Cinderella.
 I do not want to engage with the no-narrator thesis here; Walsh is apply-
ing Occam’s razor even more aggressively than Genette did to rid himself 
of the implied author. Unlike radical no-narrator proponents, I myself have 
always held that there is a narrator persona when one has clear linguistic 
signs of a speaker’s (writer’s) “I” and “his”/“her” subjective deictic center 
(cp. Fludernik 1996: 169); authorial narrative of the Tom Jonesian kind with 
an intrusive narrator persona for me clearly has a narrator. Walsh’s phrasings 
are perhaps too hedged to indicate clearly whether or not he regards the nar-
rator in Tom Jones as legitimate qua narrator. (I rather think he does, despite 
impressions to the contrary.14) Like myself, Walsh clearly “repudiate[s] the 
 14. See, for instance, his remark that there may be a “local effect” narrator, who then does 
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narrator as a distinct narrative agent intrinsic to the structure of fiction 
[ . . . ]” (84), though perhaps for different reasons. Walsh intends to critique 
the notion that fictionality in fiction resides in the figure of an invented fic-
tional speaker, the narrator, whereas I reject the obligatory narrator proposi-
tion because I need to see linguistic evidence for a speaker in the text and do 
not want to hypostasize the existence of a narrator for texts in which there 
are no such evidential markers.
 Walsh’s no-mediation thesis proposes that, since in his model fabula is 
not prior to sujet, stories in different media do not transform a common plot 
(story) in different ways, but that each establishes their own fabula. He goes 
on to argue that sujets (discourses) in different media are medium-dependent 
(this in agreement with most narratologists) and that (in disagreement with 
the narratological community) plot (fabula) is likewise medium-dependent: 
“The idea of representation is not intelligible without a medium” (104–5). 
Walsh links this theoretical insight to the fact that stories abound both as 
objects of analysis and as tools of sense-making:
That is to say that, both across and within media, narrative representations 
are intelligible in terms of other narrative representations. Narrative sense-
making always rides piggyback upon prior acts of narrative sense-making, 
and at the bottom of this pile is not the solid ground of truth, but only the 
pragmatic efficacy of particular stories for particular purposes in particular 
contexts. (106)
The first example that Walsh adduces for his thesis is Neil Gaiman’s Sandman 
cartoon, in which the reader needs to figure out that the two characters sleep-
ing together in the central area of the cartoon page are dreaming the sequence 
of images on the bottom and top of the page: “The event is a product of 
narrative processing, an instance of cognitive chunking in which the mind 
negotiates with temporal phenomena” (111). Walsh’s second example comes 
from early film. He demonstrates convincingly that early film sequences are 
quite non-dramatic or plotless. His focus, however, is a film called The Coun-
tryman and the Cinematograph from R. W. Paul (1901), in which the naïve 
country person encounters a movie screen showing a train rushing towards 
the viewer. Since the country yokel cannot distinguish between the “space of 
representation” and the “space of exhibition” (125), he runs away—to the 
audience’s amusement. In this film, the frame, as Walsh claims, corresponds 
to the “concept of the frame”: “[ . . . ] the frame is not a representational 
not have to be presumed to exist for the rest of the text (2007: 81).
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feature of the narrative transmission, but a rhetorical feature of imaginative 
orientation” (126). I take it that what Walsh means to say is that what hap-
pens in that movie can only be explained in a media-related way—and hence 
the “plot” is actually a function of the medium.
 Personally, I do not find either of these examples convincing as support 
for Walsh’s thesis. Both rely on the conventions of the media in question, 
and both take the reader’s perspective to be central to the question of plot. 
One will of course agree that in some media it may be difficult to grasp what 
is the plot of the narrative and that certain conventions help one to do so 
(clearly, the convention of the flashback requires a learning process, too); it 
is also true that one will need to understand at some point that a represented 
object is not the real thing—“This is not a pipe” (René Magritte; see Fou-
cault 1968/1986). But such conventions of representation apply to all types 
of media (including non-narrative ones) and not to specific media in specific 
ways.
 Be that as it may, in the context of an essay on mediacy, mediation, and 
focalization, Walsh’s insights can stimulate some interesting conclusions 
regarding the conundra that we have been puzzling over. For one, the notion 
of mediacy does indeed appear to be equivalent to mediation if one sees it 
as a synonym for representation. The fictional world is represented, and it 
is most obviously represented in different medial forms: verbal (the novel or 
short story), performative (verbal or nonverbal, musical or non-musical—
theater, ballet, opera), visual and non-performative (pictures, cartoon, film). 
It is now generally accepted that mediation through a storyteller occurs not 
only in novels but also in plays or cartoons (see Richardson 1988, 2001; 
Fludernik 2008; Nünning/Sommer 2008 and Schüwer 2009). Such media-
tion through a represented narrator persona (who is a character) is in fact a 
frame, and this frame may be introduced in a medium different from that of 
the inset—a character in film may be shown to read or verbally tell a story, 
a novel may describe what story a picture tells to the viewer (cp. Ryan’s 
category 5 of her areas of remedialization—Ryan 2004: 33). This would 
suggest that narration as mediacy and narration as mediation overlap: one 
either has a definite character as a narrational agent (in language or perfor-
mance or pictures or operatic music or a combination of these); or medi-
acy is not personalized. Non-personalized mediacy can be conceived of as 
mediation through a medium. Representation would then appear as either 
person-related and subjective (there is a teller) or as impersonal and objective 
(medium-related).15
 15. On a transmedial perspective that looks at narrative aspects common to several media, 
though in medium-specific manifestation, see also Rajewsky (2002, 2007) and Mahne (2007).
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 On the other hand, if one returns to Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology 
and cognitive frames that serve as agents of mediacy, one can also regard 
mediacy as medium-independent. Besides telling—a frame that calls up a 
narrative agent and hence the figure of the narrator—Towards a ‘Natural’ 
Narratology also had the frames of viewing, experiencing, reflecting, and 
action. Each of these frames can be activated in various media, though not 
each one in each medium. Whereas mediacy in Stanzel or narrative transmis-
sion in Chatman is therefore constituted by mediation through a narrator 
(overt or covert, personalized or dissimulated), in Towards a ‘Natural’ Nar-
ratology mediacy can, but need not, rely on the presence of a narratorial 
agent whether explicit or implicit. Viewing is clearly the most basic frame for 
all the visual arts, but subjective camera shots and symbolic techniques can 
also invoke the experiencing frame, and some rare close-ups with voice-over 
not only instantiate telling but may even call up the reflecting frame. The 
fundamental viewing frame operates for the audience’s experience of wit-
nessing the fictional world on screen; however, it may also begin to overlap 
with the experiencing frame, since immersion into the filmic world occurs 
not only for characters’ consciousness but also for the audience’s spatial feel-
ing of being inside the fictional world. Action of course plays a crucial role as 
a subsidiary element or subset to viewing, as it does in drama, painting, and 
cartoon.
 No-narrator theories make perfect sense for painting and ballet; though 
even there one will be able to introduce the figure of a teller. The point is that 
a teller is an optional element in all media where the main protagonist does 
not function as the narrator. The no mediation thesis makes sense only to the 
extent that one treats the medium as primary so that there is no medial choice 
on the basis of a plot, resulting in a film, text, picture, etc. One must here 
be especially wary of introducing arguments from remedialization into the 
analysis. Remedialization can, however, point to characteristic advantages 
of one medium over another. It is certainly the case that, in the interest of a 
maximally effective narrative, the discourse in any medium is extremely selec-
tive in what it renders and how. This starts with length—a filming of a novel 
will always have to be shorter and therefore highly selective. The veracity of 
a film will focus not on reproducing the extensive dialogue from the novel 
in toto but on providing the “feel” of the novel, evoking the characters, the 
atmosphere, the mood of the text. It will introduce, say, sequences of land-
scape description and cloud formations in cheery or dark weather to call up 
the gaiety or bleakness of the characters’ lives, and it may also do so simply 
to add a visual aesthetic quality to the film which may or may not correspond 
to the style of the narrative in the written version. The point of a remedializa-
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tion is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between a plot element 
and a rendering of it in the original novel and the later film, but an indepen-
dent play with the material of the novel, whether that material belongs to the 
plot or to the discourse. A good film will make use of the specific potential of 
the filmic medium for a particular scene or a particular effect which is part 
of the artistic design of the film. As a result, the plot of a filmed version of a 
novel will inevitably turn out to differ in part from the plot of the novel itself, 
though for the film to be a reasonably reliable remedialization, these plot dif-
ferences need to be kept within bounds; after all, the film most often wants to 
be recognizable as a film version of the novel.
 What this suggests theoretically is that, for any narrative token in and by 
itself, no mediation need be assumed; there is no separate layer of additional 
effects or processes added on to a prior plot that would convert a story into 
a medialized version of discourse. Mediacy—how the medium presents the 
fictional world—may be conceived of as medium-independent, though it will 
of course be medium-inflected in its specific manifestations. When it comes to 
remedialization, however, there is a prior model that orients the new version 
of the story, but very rarely is the remedialized version a faithful translation 
of the original. Like all good translation, a filming of a novel or a dramati-
zation of a short story or a novelistic rewriting of a TV show need to con-
cern themselves with an individual perspective and design, taking from the 
original only what allows them to fulfill their vision. Hence, the no-mediation 
theory of narrative makes as much sense as does the no-narrator theory.
CoNClusioN
In this paper I have tried to find connections between the concepts of mediacy, 
mediation, and focalization in the classic narratological paradigms. What the 
comparison has underlined is, to begin with, the dependence of all of these 
terms on the story/discourse dichotomy. Both Stanzel’s concept of mediacy 
and the process of mediation in the sense of transforming deep-structural 
plot into a medium-related surface structure rely on the idea that im-mediate 
representation of story is impossible. In Stanzel’s case, this is the logical con-
sequence of his contrasting of drama and narrative; im-mediate representa-
tion supposedly exists in drama. The assumption that all narrative undergoes 
a transformation into medial manifestation clearly rules out im-mediacy from 
an axiomatic perspective. Yet again from Walsh’s representational perspec-
tive, all narrative is a representation of plot or of a fictional world and hence 
by definition medialized. Im-mediate telling does not exist.
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 A second important point that emerged from the discussion is the crucial 
question of narratorial transmission in relation to mediacy and mediation. 
Stanzel’s mediacy and Genette’s conception of discourse as the product of a 
narrational act both place the (verbal) narrator and the process of telling the 
story at the heart of their conception of narrative transmission (to use Chat-
man’s phrase). However, Stanzel allows for the illusion of im-mediacy and 
can be argued to imply the existence of a variety of mediational options (by 
means of telling, by means of reflecting; or by means of the three narrative 
situations; by means of generic molds such as the editor, the diarist, etc.). By 
contrast, Genette’s emphasis on the narrator (overt or covert—to use Chat-
man’s terminology) locates what in Stanzel’s model would be the illusion 
of im-mediacy in focalizational choices in conjunction with the category of 
voice (internal focalization roughly corresponding to reflector-mode narra-
tive; zero focalization to the authorial narrative situation; and the alterna-
tion of external and internal focalization typical of first-person narrative). In 
Genette, therefore, focalization is clearly distinct from mediacy or mediation. 
In privileging the act of narration, Genette’s narrative transmission remains a 
non-medialized mediacy.
 The problem of narratorial presence or absence plays an even more cru-
cial role in discussions of mediation. Film has been the prime example of a 
medial narrative for narratologists. Chatman’s cinematic narrator and the 
French term auteur in film studies have tended to dominate this discussion. 
However, as we have seen, the hypostasizing of an obligatory narratorial 
agent in film, drama, ballet or cartoons lacks any kind of logical or textual 
evidence, except perhaps in some kinds of plays, where the stage directions 
echo novelistic conventions of narratorial commentary (as they do in the 
work of George Bernard Shaw, for instance—see Fludernik 2008). A narra-
tor figure can, as I have shown, be introduced into narratives in almost any 
medium; but such instances of voice-over, stage managers or cartoon-drawers 
depicted in the margins between cartoons are rare and tend to emphasize the 
fact that in these media most often there are no such teller figures. This would 
suggest that narratorial transmission is a specific kind of mediacy, and—as 
I suggested—that the medialized renderings of a fictional world can be ana-
lyzed as deploying a variety of cognitive frames in combination, though with 
one cognitive frame dominant over the others, depending on which medium 
one is dealing with.
 In this essay I have also proposed that one distinguish between media-
tion and remedialization, since the two are often thrown together (as in the 
exchange between Herrnstein Smith and Chatman). The controversial ques-
tions all relate to mediation qua narrative transmission. Chatman’s answers 
Fludernik, “Mediacy, Mediation, and Focalization”  129
to Herrnstein Smith rely on the linguistic, in fact, Chomskyan, model and 
analogize the deep structure of transformational grammar with the story 
of narratives. However, this analogy is wrong. Chomsky’s deep structure is 
grounded cognitively as a prototype of syntax; the transformations that result 
in the surface structure of sentences explain departures from the ground figu-
ration. By contrast, where narrative is concerned, the transformational rules 
are not the point of the exercise at all; what narratologists are keen to exam-
ine is, for instance, what the chronology of a story is when the discourse turns 
out to be full of flashbacks and ellipses. No “rules” apply between the two 
levels—it is not the case that a particular chronology always gets rearranged 
in a specific manner; nor does it make sense to hypothesize the existence of 
a transformational rule to explain a flashback as A → B → C transformed 
into A → C → B since that very reversal of the reconstructed plot elements 
B and C is what the concept “flashback” already denotes. Compare the pas-
sive transformation, in which the syntactic reshuffling results in a semantic 
effect (active → passive). The theoretical existence of a deep structure and of 
transformational rules makes sense from a methodological perspective where 
syntax is concerned, but it does not clarify issues in the same way for narra-
tive or narratology. As in Genette’s category of voice, the deep and surface 
structure model in narrative uses a metaphor in order to talk about patent 
versus latent structure, for instance in relation to chronology or order.
 One can take these arguments a step further by exploding the notion of 
focalization as a process that occurs between the deep and surface structure. 
As I demonstrated in the section on Mediation and Focalization above, even 
Chatman himself vacillated on the issue and seems to have ended by adopting 
a theory that locates point of view independently on the narratorial and plot 
levels. While it makes sense to reconstruct a chronology in interpreting texts 
that deliberately disguise that order of events, one cannot convincingly argue 
that the plot inherently has no focalization. At best it could have zero or 
external focalization, which might then be shifted into internal focalization 
in some passages. The problem is that if one defines focalization as access to 
interiority, then the deep structure of the story would simply be the bare plot 
sequence without any stylistic elements and human details (The king died and 
then the queen died). By adding “of grief” we already add not just the cause 
of the queen’s dying but the experiential parameters of the story, and then the 
discourse can only be said to elaborate (rather than add) aspects like focaliza-
tion, description, dialogue, etc. If, on the other hand, focalization is defined 
as “who sees,” the plot must be a neutral version in which nobody sees and 
the discourse would add who is doing some seeing. This is of course how 
focalization and Stanzel’s mediacy have traditionally been understood. Yet 
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the point of this seeing is not whether (factually) a character was there to see 
and note an occurrence; the point is whether the narrative “sees through the 
mind” of a character or whether there is evaluative slant (Chatman) on the 
story world. The decision taken in narrative mimesis is therefore that from 
which perspective the telling or representation is to be modulated, which 
takes us right back to the question of mediacy, i.e. whether we are to be 
presented the fictional world through the voice of a narrator or character (in 
Walsh’s view, a narrator would be a character) or through the consciousness 
or filter of one (or several) characters (in succession). In this case, focalization 
and mediacy would collapse into one another, as they do in Stanzel.
 One final point on this issue. All of these discussions assume that one 
can indeed establish a chronology and a realistic, consistent fictional world 
“out there.” Although readers will expect to find such a world, experimental 
texts may deliberately foil their attempts to establish it. Nevertheless, techni-
cally innovative texts frequently do include, for instance, passages of internal 
focalization. Yet, since in these texts there is no determinable deep structure 
on which to apply focalizational transformations, the existence of such focal-
ized passages must then be laid at the door of the author (reader, note, this 
is tongue-in-cheek!), and an analysis in terms of mediation and transmission 
desisted from. We will take the foregoing argument as yet another piece of 
support of the Walshian no-mediation thesis.
 What we have been struggling with is the incompatibility of axiomatic 
narratological assumptions. The problems discussed in this paper are perhaps 
quite arcane; to raise them may—metaphorically speaking—reflect nothing 
but narratologists’ inevitable critical urge to read metaphors literally, which 
puts them in danger of drowning in the theoretical waves that they have 
provoked.
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transdisciplinarities
 ii

tools For triaNgulatioN
Writing in 1991, on the brink of what Alan Richardson and Francis Steen 
(2002) subsequently termed “the cognitive revolution” in literary research, 
Mark Turner presciently argued in his book Reading Minds that English 
studies needs to set itself new goals in the age of cognitive science. Specifi-
cally, Turner suggested that “[o]ur profession touches home base when it 
contributes to the systematic inquiry into [ . . . ] linguistic and literary acts as 
acts of the human mind” (18). To quote Turner more fully:
I propose that what the profession lacks is a concept of language and 
literature as acts of the everyday human mind. If we had such a concept, 
our grounding activity would be the study of language and of literature 
as expressions of our conceptual apparatus. We would focus on how the 
embodied human mind uses its ordinary conceptual capacities to perform 
those acts of language and literature. (6)
In this groundbreaking, agenda-setting contribution to the field, Turner 
draws on ideas from cognitive linguistics to triangulate literary scholarship 
with the study of language and of mind. Working against the grain of what 
he characterizes as default assumptions in the humanities in general and lit-
erary studies in particular, Turner suggests that practitioners should shift 
from producing ever more sophisticated readings of individual works, to 
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developing an account of the basic and general principles underlying the pro-
cess of reading itself. Cognitive linguistics, Turner argues, affords invaluable 
tools when it comes to this reprioritizing of reading over readings. At issue 
is a reassessment that places systematicity over nuance; common, everyday 
cognitive abilities over ostensibly unique or special capacities bound up with 
literary expression; and unconscious sense-making operations over what falls 
within the (narrow) domain of conscious awareness. Thus Turner draws 
on the work of theorists like George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) to 
describe poetic scenes and figures as a skillful exploitation of generic, cog-
nitively based linguistic abilities, rather than as a special, separate form of 
verbal creativity limited to literary writing. Likewise, Talmy’s (2000) account 
of force dynamics (409–70)—his theory of how the semantic structures of 
natural language encode a folk physics of force, movement, friction, etc.—
helps Turner build a cognitive-linguistic framework for understanding the 
rhetoric of argument. Ways of understanding arguments, Turner suggests, 
are grounded in embodied human experience; for example, arguments are 
defined in terms of positions and counter-positions that must be resisted and 
overcome, in parallel with how a swimmer must fight against the current or a 
runner is buffeted by countervailing winds.
 This essay revisits the project of triangulation envisioned in—and pro-
grammatically articulated by—Turner’s study more than fifteen years ago. In 
one respect, the scope of my discussion will be more restricted than Turner’s, 
since I am examining not literature in general but rather literary narrative in 
particular, as exemplified in William Blake’s short narrative poem “A Poison 
Tree.” My discussion, however, focuses on Blake’s text as a specific realiza-
tion of what might be called the narrative system. At issue is narrative viewed 
as a representational system that operates across various communicative 
media (Herman 2004, 2009, and 2010; Ryan 2004; Wolf 2003), including 
print texts, film, face-to-face discourse, graphic novels, and so on, and that 
enables people to use those media in particular ways to structure, express, 
and comprehend their experiences.1 Thus the focus of the research program 
 1. In other studies (Herman 2009, 2010), I propose a general framework for analyzing 
multimodal storytelling, or forms of narrative practice that exploit more than one semiotic 
channel to represent situations, objects, and events in narrated worlds or storyworlds (see be-
low for a fuller characterization of this term). These other studies suggest the relevance of the 
distinction that theorists like Kress and van Leeuwen (2001) draw between modes and media. 
For such researchers, modes are semiotic channels (better, environments) that can be viewed as 
a resource for designing representations within a particular type of discourse, which is in turn 
embedded in a specific kind of communicative interaction. By contrast, media can be viewed as 
means for disseminating or (re)producing what has been designed in a given mode. In this es-
say, though I will refer to narrative/storytelling media in my discussion of Blake’s combination 
of verbal and visual designs in “A Poison Tree,” this poem and Blake’s oeuvre more generally 
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from which the present essay derives is in another respect broader than the 
one outlined by Turner. My overall research goal—a goal that indicates the 
scope of cognitive narratology, broadly conceived—is to triangulate not just 
literary narratives, theories of language, and research on the mind, but more 
capaciously, to inquire into (1) the structure and dynamics of storytelling 
practices; (2) the multiple semiotic systems in which those practices take 
shape, including but not limited to verbal language; and (3) mind-relevant 
dimensions of the practices themselves—as they play out in a given medium 
for storytelling.
 In the account sketched here, cognitive narratology can be viewed as a 
subdomain of the broader enterprise of cognitive semiotics (cf. Brandt 2004; 
Fastrez 2003); cognitive linguistics also belongs to this broader domain.2 
Cognitive semiotics studies how the use and interpretation of sign-systems 
of all sorts are grounded in the structure, capacities, and dispositions of 
embodied minds. Cognitive narratology studies the design principles for nar-
ratively organized sign-systems in particular. Drawing on tools from a vari-
ety of fields, including (cognitive) linguistics, ethnography, the philosophy of 
mind, and social and cognitive psychology, cognitive narratology explores the 
interfaces among narrative structure, semiotic media, and humans’ cognitive 
dispositions and abilities. Hence my aim here is to suggest a range of strate-
gies for triangulating narrative, media, and minds—strategies not necessar-
ily anchored in the traditions for studying verbal language that factor most 
prominently in Turner’s pioneering book.
 In the pages that follow, I use as a case study Blake’s “A Poison Tree,” 
first published in 1794 as part of Songs of Innocence and Experience, to dis-
cuss several research foci that fall within the scope of cognitive narratology. 
These foci correspond to areas of intersection among the three key concerns 
of this essay, namely, storytelling practices, communicative media, and the 
mind:
• Research on the cognitive processes that support inferences about the 
structure and inhabitants of a narrated world, or storyworld; relatedly, 
the study of what constitutes (across media) distinctively narrative ways 
of worldmaking (Gerrig 1993; Goodman 1978; Herman 2009: 105–36).
• Studies of how narratives can stage discourse practices in storyworlds—
exemplify multimodal narration in the sense just indicated.
 2. Hence, in contrast with Turner’s (1991, 1996) general approach, in the approach 
developed here cognitive linguistics constitutes not the sole basis for triangulating narrative, 
media, and mind, but only one toolkit (or group of toolkits) among others.
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where discourse is defined as the rule-based manipulation of symbols 
(verbal, visual, or other) in multiparty contexts of talk. At issue is how 
stories reflexively model cognitive, interactional, and other dimensions 
of acts of narration along with other forms of communicative practice. 
Under this heading I subsume questions about how narratives like 
Blake’s present folk theories of discourse, how they mobilize emotion 
discourse in particular, and how their representation of acts of discourse 
positions characters and readers in various ways.
• Research on the nexus of narrative and consciousness. One pertinent 
question in this connection is how stories represent the felt, conscious 
awareness of narrators as well as characters—what philosophers of 
mind might refer to as the “what-it’s-like” dimension of conscious expe-
riences (Nagel 1974). A second key question is the extent to which nar-
rative might afford scaffolding for conscious experience itself (Herman 
2009: 137–60).
My next section provides further context for analyzing “A Poison Tree” as a 
case study, situating my approach in some of the commentary that has grown 
up around Blake’s work. Indeed, I have chosen Blake’s poem as a test case in 
part because Blake’s own poetic practices resonate with the later frameworks 
for inquiry explored here; texts like “A Poison Tree” suggest that Blake him-
self was deeply concerned with developing new ways of understanding the 
relationships among modes of narration, storytelling media, and the human 
mind. Then, in the remainder of my essay, I turn to the research foci just 
listed, putting them into dialogue with the poem to extend the project of tri-
angulation already anticipated in Blake’s work. I conclude with some reflec-
tions on what my analysis suggests about future directions—and outstanding 
challenges—for narrative inquiry today.
tHe Case studY
william blake’s “a Poison tree”
As Phillips (2000) notes, Blake invented in 1788 a method of creating and 
reproducing word-image combinations that he called “Illuminated Print-
ing,” and that subsequent commentators have termed “relief etching”: “It 
was composed of writing and drawing on a copper plate using an acid-resis-
tant varnish, etching the unprotected surfaces away leaving both text and 
design standing in relief, and then inking and printing the relief surfaces on 
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a printmaker’s rolling press” (15; see Essick 1985 and Viscomi 2003 for fur-
ther details about Blake’s techniques). This method, which Blake may have 
adopted in part because it entailed about one-fourth of the cost of engraving 
(Mitchell 1978: 42), was used to create the version of “A Poison Tree” whose 
image is reproduced above.3 I also provide a verbal transcription of Blake’s 
text.
 3. From Copy C of Songs of Innocence and Experience. Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, 
Library of Congress. Copyright (c) 2009 the William Blake Archive. Used with permission.
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I was angry with my friend;
I told my wrath, my wrath did end.
I was angry with my foe;
I told it not, my wrath did grow.
And I waterd it in fears, 5
Night & morning with my tears:
And I sunned it with smiles,
And with soft deceitful wiles.
And it grew both day and night,
Till it bore an apple bright. 10
And my foe beheld it shine,
And he knew that it was mine,
And into my garden stole,
When the night had veild the pole;
In the morning glad I see: 15
My foe outstretchd beneath the tree.
It is important to stress that the version of the poem reproduced here is just 
one realization of Blake’s original design. As Gleckner and Greenberg (1989) 
observe, “Blake printed and individually hand colored Songs of Innocence 
and Songs of Innocence and Experience from 1789 to 1818. Twenty-one cop-
ies of Innocence and twenty-eight of the combined work are known to exist. 
No two are alike, Blake having altered his coloring more often than not, his 
arrangement, and even certain aspects of the plates’ iconography from copy 
to copy” (xii; cf. Essick 1985: 883; Viscomi 2003).4
 4. For example, in the existing copies of the first issue of Songs of Experience, two dif-
ferent color schemes are used for “A Poison Tree” (Phillips 2000: 104), and in “the twenty-
eight extant copies of the combined volume, Blake offers nineteen different arrangements of 
the poems” (Gleckner and Greenberg 1989: xiv; xv). Though I will not comment further on 
the production methods used to create “A Poison Tree,” nor on the design considerations af-
fecting its placement among the other poems in Songs of Innocence and Experience, Blake’s 
manifest concern with these issues warrants equal care when it comes to examining the inter-
play between the verbal and visual elements of his work. As Mitchell puts it, “The free inter-
penetration of pictorial and typographic form so characteristic of Blake’s books is technically 
impossible in a medium which separates the work of the printer from that of the engraver 
[ . . . ] In one sense, then, there is almost something perverse about discussing the ‘relations’ 
between the constituent parts of an art form which is so obviously unified in both conception 
and execution” (1978: 15).
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 What interpretive traditions have grown up around this poem in par-
ticular and around Blake’s multimodal poetic practices more generally? And 
how can those traditions be used to underscore the relevance of “A Poison 
Tree” for the project of triangulating narrative, media, and mind? For his 
part, Gallagher (1977) considers whether “A Poison Tree” should be read as 
a parabolic poem, in which the specific scenario presented in the poem (the 
vehicle) is subordinated to the general theme or moral principle it is designed 
to instantiate (the tenor). As Gallagher puts it, “in a narrative whose tenor 
([the idea] that deliberate repression of anger is far more destructive than its 
spontaneous expression) is a deceptively obvious cliché, it is all too easy to 
dismiss the poetic vehicle (a poison tree) as merely a convenient parable con-
strued allegorically for the sake of articulating the moral which can be drawn 
from it” (237). For Gallagher, however, interpreting Blake’s text as merely 
a parable amounts to underreading the poem, and more specifically failing 
to come to terms with “the astonishing allegation that anger can become 
literally incarnate as a physical object (a poison tree can be made to material-
ize out of thin air)” (237).5 Gallagher instead construes the poem as a dark 
parody of the account of the fall stemming from the Book of Genesis, with a 
self-deifying narrator playing the role of an angry, punitive God in a sinister 
version of the creation myth (247–48).
 Furthermore, Gallagher draws attention to the final couplet of Blake’s 
poem (lines 15–16), with its shift to the present tense via the verb see (“In 
the morning glad I see: / My foe outstretchd beneath the tree”). Although, as 
I discuss below, see could be glossed as an instance of the historical present 
tense, designed to underscore the special significance of the narrator’s past act 
of looking vis-à-vis the other events recounted in the poem, for Gallagher the 
poet’s shift of tenses accentuates the ongoing impact of events on the narra-
tor’s mind:
Although the shift can be interpreted as necessitated by the demands of 
rhyme, Blake would hardly compromise sense merely for the sake of sound. 
The meaning of the poem’s concluding couplet is clear: a single past act 
(the murder of the narrator’s foe) brings about an effect which has decisive 
 5. Here Gallagher (cf. Welch 1995: 243–44) distinguishes Blake’s poison tree from the 
more properly allegorical representation of another tree in Songs of Experience, namely, the 
Tree of Mystery in “The Human Abstract” (“The Gods of the earth and sea/ Sought thro’ 
Nature to find this Tree;/ But their search was all in vain:/ There grows one in the Human 
Brain” [lines 21–24].) In contrast to this figurative usage, “Blake’s poison tree is no metaphor: 
it is rather the physical instrument by which the narrator allegedly effects his enemy’s death” 
(242).
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reverberations in the eternal present: in the morning—any morning, every 
morning—I see my foe now dead beneath the tree. This is precisely true of 
original sin, for in Adam’s mortal transgression all men have already died. 
(Gallagher 1977: 248)
This interpretation emphasizes the continuing legacy of the narrator’s world-
disrupting (or world-corrupting) actions—in this case, his act of choosing 
not to tell someone (who thereby became his foe) about his wrathful feelings 
toward that person or his reasons for having such feelings.6 The interpreta-
tion also highlights the world-configuring power of the narrator’s remember-
ing/perceiving mind. Visually re-mediating the narrator’s verbal report of his 
own act of seeing,7 the design of the text foregrounds this moment to suggest 
that the most destructive of the narrator’s acts are acts of mind—including 
the act of gladly seeing the death of someone whom the narrator has himself 
(through yet another act of mind) transformed into a foe.
 The poem thus supports Mitchell’s (1978) claim that in Blake’s images, 
“[p]ictorial space does not exist as a uniform, visually perceived container of 
forms, but rather as a kind of extension of the consciousness of the human 
figures it contains” (38; cf. Connolly 2002: 26). Reacting against Newton’s 
conception of space as a pre-existing container in which material bodies are 
impinged upon by physical forces (Ault 1986: 163–69; Hagstrum 1991: 76–77; 
Peterfreund 1998: 54), Blake instead emphasizes the active, form-giving opera-
tions of embodied minds as they configure spaces into scenes organized around 
particular, situated perspectives. Or, as Mitchell puts it, “[t]he essential unity 
of Blake’s composite art [ . . . ] lies in the convergence of each form [verbal as 
 6. Although Blake’s phrasing might be read as suggesting that the two persons mentioned 
in the first stanza of the poem were already the narrator’s friend and his foe before he ever 
discussed or refrained from discussing with them his wrathful feelings, and that these prior 
relationships are thus simply a premise of the narrative, I would resist this interpretation. In-
stead, I construe the poem as developing a genealogy of the very concept of “foe,” by tracing 
the destructive consequences of not engaging in open discourse with others when conflicts first 
arise. In accordance with this interpretation, I read the first stanza as an instance of the trope 
of hysteron proteron, in which later events are mentioned before earlier ones, and which in 
this case is motivated by the poem’s sparse verbal style and the constraint imposed by its use 
of end rhymes. On this reading, the narrator mentions the effects of his own past conduct—
namely, someone’s being categorized, or constituted, as a friend or a foe—before he mentions 
the conduct that caused these effects—namely, engaging or not engaging in open talk with 
others when a conflict arises.
 7. Mitchell (1978), however, argues that “in contrast to the general practice of eigh-
teenth-century illustrators,” Blake’s method “is to provide not a plausible visualization of a 
scene described in the text but rather a symbolic recreation of ideas embodied in that scene” 
(18). The relationship of the image track to the verbal track in Blake is thus one of transforma-
tion rather than translation (19).
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well as visual] upon the goal of affirming the centrality of the human form (as 
consciousness or imagination in the poetry, as body in the paintings) in the 
structure of reality” (1978: 38). In the case of “A Poison Tree” consciousness 
and body converge in precisely this way, with the verbal and visual informa-
tion tracks jointly foregrounding the destructiveness for self and other of a 
specific way of seeing. The poem’s visual design bears out Mitchell’s diagnosis 
of Blake’s pictorial style, which involves not the projection of “inner,” mental 
realities onto an “outer,” material world, in proto-expressivist fashion, but 
rather an emphasis on “the continuity and interplay between body and space, 
as a symbol of the dialectic between consciousness and its objects” (59). Note, 
for example, how the lower branches of the poison tree, i.e., the branches 
constituting the lower border of the verbal text, echo the curve of the supine 
figure’s ribcage and also have the same span as the dead foe’s outstretched 
arms. Here the observing consciousness, from whose vantage-point on the 
represented world the image can be assumed to emanate, construes the spatial 
layout of that world as conditioned by the human form’s situation within it—
even as that observing mind’s representation is shaped by its own, situated per-
spective, including its position in time and space vis-à-vis the scene portrayed.
 As these last remarks suggest, beyond figuring a dialectic between con-
sciousness and its objects, mind and world, Blake’s text suggests that story-
telling practices mediate between these two poles—and do so by projecting, 
through various semiotic channels (and combinations of channels), worlds 
inhabited by embodied minds. In what follows, I put Blake’s own narrative 
practice into dialogue with recent research that suggests strategies for trian-
gulating—modeling the relations among—stories, media, and the mind. This 
research can shed new light on Blake’s work; but more than this, considering 
how the research bears on “A Poison Tree” can help chart new directions for 
cognitive narratology as a theory-building enterprise.
Narrative waYs oF worldMakiNg
Tools for triangulation have been developed by theorists who describe lan-
guage use as a process of building mental models of the discourse entities 
evoked by verbal cues, including those deployed by literary authors (see, 
e.g., Clark 1996; Zwaan 1996). Recently, scholars of story have built on 
this and related work to characterize the mental models used to parse texts, 
discourses, and other kinds of representations that are narratively organized 
(see, e.g., Doležel 1998; Emmott 1997; Gerrig 1993; Herman 2002, 2009; 
Pavel 1986; Ryan 1991; Werth 1999).
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 Classical, structuralist narratologists failed to come to terms with the 
referential or world-creating properties of narrative, partly because of the 
exclusion of the referent in favor of signifier and signified in the Saussurean 
language theory that informed the structuralists’ approach. Yet mapping 
words onto worlds is arguably a fundamental—perhaps the fundamental—
requirement for narrative sense making. The question is how readers of print 
texts, interlocutors in face-to-face discourse, viewers of films, and interpret-
ers of other kinds of narratives use textual cues to build up representations 
of the worlds evoked by stories, or storyworlds.8 Approaches such as deictic 
shift theory (Duchan, Bruder, and Hewitt 1995), text world theory (Werth 
1999), and contextual frame theory (Emmott 1997) suggest how configur-
ing narrative worlds entails mapping discourse cues onto the what, where, 
and when dimensions of mentally projected narrative worlds. In the present 
section I draw on this work to explore the range of cognitive processes that 
support inferences about the modal status, inhabitants, and spatiotemporal 
profile of storyworlds like Blake’s.
 The storyworld of “A Poison Tree” features a relatively limited constel-
lation of persons, non-human entities, and states of affairs: the narrator, a 
friend, and a foe; a real or imagined conflict of some kind; an iteratively 
narrated passage of time which follows the conflict and during which the 
narrator experiences a range of emotions (notably, fear and sadness), and 
strategically adopts a variety of behaviors and dispositions (smiles but also 
wiles); a garden, tree, and apple intertextually linked to their counterparts in 
the story of the fall; and a final glimpse by the narrator of the foe lying out-
stretched and presumably dead beneath the tree. This stripped-down ontol-
ogy—together with the way Blake has populated it with situations, objects, 
and events imported from a religious master narrative about the irruption of 
sin in paradise and the resulting loss of innocence—contributes to the poem’s 
parable-like quality. As already noted, Gallagher (1977) disputes any narrow 
interpretation of “A Poison Tree” as a parable, in which poetic vehicle is 
wholly subordinated to thematic tenor. More broadly, however, interpreta-
tion of the poem activates inferencing strategies that Turner (1996) associates 
with fundamental mechanisms of human intelligence and subsumes under the 
heading of parabolic projection, or the projection of a source story onto a 
 8. Hence, as discussed in Herman (2002: 9–22), the notion storyworld is consonant with 
a range of other concepts proposed by cognitive psychologists, discourse analysts, psycholin-
guists, philosophers of language, and others concerned with how people make sense of texts or 
discourses. Like storyworld, these other notions—including deictic center, mental model, situ-
ation model, discourse model, contextual frame, and possible world—are designed to explain 
how interpreters rely on inferences triggered by textual cues to build up representations of the 
overall situation or world evoked but not necessarily explicitly described in the discourse.
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target story—as when the story of someone’s death from a protracted illness 
is framed as a narrative of struggle with a murderous agent. In this account, 
making sense of one story in terms of another (e.g., reading “A Poison Tree” 
vis-à-vis accounts of the fall) is a basic and general principle of mind that sup-
ports all forms of narrative worldmaking, rather than a processing strategy 
limited to a particular literary genre.
 In any case, a focus on narrative ways of worldmaking underscores the 
need to consider how the what dimension of a given storyworld interacts 
with the dimensions of where and when. Along these lines, deictic shift 
theory seeks to illuminate the cognitive reorientation required to take up 
imaginary residence in a narrative world like Blake’s. This theory holds that 
a “location within the world of the narrative serves as the center from which 
[sentences with deictic expressions such as here and now] are interpreted” 
(Segal 1995: 15), and that to access this location readers must shift “from the 
environmental situation in which the text is encountered, to a locus within a 
mental model representing the world of the discourse” (15). The theory also 
suggests that over longer, more sustained experiences of narrative worlds, 
interpreters may need to make successive adjustments in their position rela-
tive to the situations and events being recounted—as prompted by the blue-
print for world building included in the narrative’s verbal texture. To make 
sense of Blake’s poem, readers have to track these shifts in orienting vantage-
points in order to update their emergent models of the unfolding storyworld 
as a whole. For example, in the poem’s verbal track there is a shift from the 
speaker’s perspective on events, which dominates the account, to the foe’s 
vantage-point beginning with line 11, and then a shift back to the speaker’s in 
the final two lines. (Line 14 is a different case: it is not clear whose cognitive 
vantage-point orients the report about the state of this storyworld “when the 
night had veild the pole.”) Temporally speaking, Blake’s use of the past tense 
in lines 1–14 prompts the inference that the younger, experiencing I encoun-
tered the foe, nourished the poison tree, and so forth at some time earlier 
than the present moment of narration by the older, narrating I.
 Yet here Blake’s management of verb tenses complicates the world-build-
ing process. Having initially used the past tense to situate the narrated events 
in a time-frame earlier than the present moment of speaking, in line 15 the 
narrating I switches to the present tense. Not only does this tense shift rein-
force that the glimpse of the dead foe is an especially salient event;9 what is 
more, use of the present tense also creates a context in which aspects of the 
 9.  For perspectives on the role of tense shifts in narrative, see Johnstone (1987); Schiffrin 
(1981); and Wolfson (1982).
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current moment of telling can be elided with past occurrences. The morphol-
ogy of English verbs does not distinguish between the simple present and the 
historical present; rather, discourse context must be used to determine which 
functional interpretation of the tense marking is preferable. Blake’s narrative 
exploits this feature of the language—i.e., the way English present-tense verbs 
can both signify the here and now and presentify what is past—to construct 
the foe’s death less as a localized incident than as complex event-structure dis-
tributed across time(s) (cf. Herman 2007: 320–21). In other words, the narra-
tor’s shift to the present tense promotes polychrony (Herman 2002: 211–61), 
or the situation of events at multiple points in time, with the figurative, his-
torical-present reading of “see” locating the narrator’s perceptual act in the 
past and the literal interpretation of “see” anchoring that act in the current 
moment of narration—and potentially in all moments that have led up to and 
will extend beyond the present. True, the first part of line 15, with its mention 
of a particular morning, would seem to favor the historical-present reading of 
the tense shift. But the strategic placement of “see” in the poem’s final cou-
plet, and the possibility of interpreting “the morning” as a generic reference 
to any morning (Gallagher 1977), licenses an alternative reading of the narra-
tor’s perceptual act as co-occurrent with the act of narration.
 Blake’s representation of this same pregnant moment in the visual design 
contributes to the temporal unmooring of the foe’s demise. The represented 
scene visually presides over or dominates the entire time-span covered by the 
poem’s sixteen lines; the branches of the poison tree not only stretch over 
the full extent of the foe’s supine body but also encompass the whole of the 
text. And again, the placement of the image after the conclusion of the poem 
suggests that the effects of this death, rather than being encapsulated within 
the current speech event as a past moment recounted by the narrator, flows 
forward, ongoingly, into the future.10 In short, in concert with its tense pat-
terning, the visual design of the poem inhibits knowledge about the position 
of events along the timeline stretching from past to present to future—from 
the experiencing I to the narrating I and beyond. Attempts to parse the tem-
poral logic of the text generate an unresolvable question: exactly where along 
the narrative timeline can the narrator’s perception of—or affective response 
to—the death of the foe be situated?
 Emmott’s (1997) contextual frame theory provides other tools for char-
acterizing how Blake’s text sets into play narrative ways of worldmaking, 
 10. Here it is worth re-emphasizing how the verbal component of the text is intertwined 
with the branches of the tree that bore the poison apple as fruit. Thus, taken as a verbal-visual 
complex, the poem metaleptically suggests that the language used to recount these events is 
itself the fruit of the destructive discord rooted in the storyworld.
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and in doing so invites exploration of the interfaces of narrative, media, and 
mind. Emmott’s model is premised on the assumption that readers of narra-
tives like “A Poison Tree” use semiotic cues to bind characters into and out 
of particular contexts (that is, mentally modeled environments for being and 
doing), and that these contexts will be distributed spatially as well as tem-
porally over the course of a narrative. Once characters and other elements 
have been integrated into contextual frames, readers of print texts can use 
those frames to disambiguate pronouns that refer to different discourse enti-
ties at various points in the narration. Thus, the friend is bound out of what 
Emmott would call the primed contextual frame after line 2, whereas the foe 
is bound into the frame with an initial mention in line 3, and line 4 binds 
in the speaker’s wrath as well. The pronoun “it” in lines 5, 7, and 9 refers 
back to this entity, or rather psychological state, whereas the binding in of 
the apple in line 10 allows readers to parse the same pronoun (“it”) differ-
ently when it occurs in lines 11 and 12. From this perspective, more generally, 
narrative worldmaking can be analyzed as a process of mentally configuring 
contexts, as well as scanning for specific textual cues that prompt readers to 
engage in the binding, priming, recalling, switching, and other processing 
operations that involve such contexts.
 But how does the poem’s inclusion of a visual track impinge on the con-
struction of contextual frames? In a way that complements the effects of 
Blake’s strategic shift to the present tense for a verb of perception in line 15, 
the poem’s multimodal design raises questions about the scope and applica-
tion of contextual frames even as it triggers their use. The tense shift prompts 
readers to situate the act of seeing in multiple frames, each with a different 
“timestamp.” In this manner, the poem promotes what might be termed cog-
nitive flexibility, suggesting how some modes of worldmaking require oscillat-
ing between multiple frames to trace through the consequences of particularly 
salient events—to understand how those events have shaped the whole his-
tory of a world. Conversely, the image of the dead foe primes, in the visual 
channel, only one of the several contextual frames activated over the course 
the verbal text’s unfolding. In this manner, the poem promotes what can be 
called cognitive economy, inducing readers to select one frame as the point of 
reference for interpreting a sequence of events that spans multiple places and 
times. Here the terminal event in the sequence provides, in the visual track, 
the primary frame of reference. The poem would have cued a very different 
way of worldmaking if the initial event in the sequence—viz., the narrator’s 
failure to engage openly and directly with the person who thereby became 
his foe—had been represented visually. Equally important is how these con-
trasting and complementary methods of framing are set into play at one and 
150  Part II: Chapter 5
the same time, thanks to the interaction between the text’s verbal and visual 
channels.
 Finally, in evoking a storyworld, the degree to which a narrative fore-
grounds a more or less marked (and thus noteworthy or tellable) disruption 
of the canonical or expected order of events is one of the factors that accounts 
for how readily the text or discourse can be interpreted as a narrative in the 
first place. Once a world has been evoked and interpreters have relocated to 
it, orienting themselves to its canonical order or “givens,” the procedures spe-
cific to narrative worldmaking require that the world be one in which those 
givens are called into question, jeopardized by events that are more or less 
radically noncanonical, more or less antithetic to the normal order of things 
(Bruner 1990; Herman 2009: 133–36). Thus, in the storyworld associated 
with “A Poison Tree,” the dissipation of anger through discourse is not tel-
lably transgressive; hence the encounter with the friend receives only a bare 
report in lines 1–2. By contrast, the failure to address the cause of a dispute, 
and its resultant flowering into full-blown, destructive hatred, is reportably 
at odds with the world-order encapsulated in the first two lines. Hence 87.5 
percent of the verbal portion of the text (lines 3–16) is devoted to an account 
of the narrator’s experiences with the person who became his foe. For its 
part, the entirety of the poem’s visual design is given over to representing (the 
effects of) world-disrupting events, not the canonical order against which 
those events stand out—in the manner of a foreground against a background.
 Yet the different degrees of disruptiveness that the same sort of event 
might have in various contexts suggests the impossibility of attempting to 
fix in advance what makes something tellable, what constitutes a narratable 
disruption in the order of a world. Literary narratives can be viewed as a 
resource for exploring such threshold conditions for narrativity, and for gen-
erating counterfactual contexts in which situations and events become tel-
lable in ways they might not otherwise. To put the same point in other terms, 
texts like Blake’s suggest how narrative is both a product of and a resource 
for the (re)modeling of worlds.
stagiNg disCourse PraCtiCes iN storYworlds
In other studies, I have explored literary authors’ representations of discourse 
practices—their figuring of “scenes of talk” (Herman 2006) in which char-
acters engage in communicative acts, including acts of storytelling. In this 
section, shifting to a different set of tools for triangulating stories, media, and 
the mind, I examine Blake’s multimodal staging of discourse practices in “A 
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Poison Tree.” Literary narratives like Blake’s bear importantly on folk theo-
ries of discourse in general; they also reflect—and help shape—understand-
ings of discourse about emotions in particular. Further, the poem reflexively 
models, through its visual as well as verbal design, how the production and 
understanding of discourse requires interlocutors to position themselves with 
respect to one another as well as discourse referents.
“A Poison Tree” and Folk Theories of Discourse
In contrast with the texts used in my previous work, such as the final inter-
change between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay before the “Time Passes” section 
of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (Herman 2006), or the complex, 
sometimes disingenuous interaction between the male character and Jig in 
Hemingway’s “Hills Like White Elephants” (Herman 2010b), Blake’s poem 
evokes in its first stanza a quite minimal scene of talk—or rather of talk with-
held, which is what allows the speaker’s wrath to grow and thereby nourish 
the bright poison apple. But even so, the poem sketches a folk theory of dis-
course as a means to understanding, and for that matter as a remedy against 
the discord and strife that define a fallen world. Specifically, in a way that 
anticipates Nietzsche’s 1887 diagnosis of the causes and consequences of res-
sentiment (Nietzsche 1968) Blake’s text interlinks the emotion of anger, the 
absence of talk, and the having of enemies; more precisely it characterizes the 
having of an enemy in terms of the inability to dissipate anger through open 
discourse. The poem’s reflexive representation of discourse thus suggests the 
potentially destructive consequences, for self as well as other, of not using 
talk to assemble jointly a world-picture that encompasses multiple perspec-
tives on events. At issue is the process whereby I come to imagine the world 
from another’s vantage-point, and reciprocally cue the other to imagine the 
world from my own situation. The storyline involving the narrator and his 
enemy traces through what happens when there is no attempt to exchange 
and negotiate accounts of situations and events around which conflicting 
interpretations have grown up.
 The poem also raises broader questions about ways in which folk theories 
of discourse can be encapsulated in literary narratives like Blake’s. How does 
a given text reflexively model the processes by which discourses are produced 
and interpreted, as when a narrative uses an embedded storytelling scenario 
to comment on the nature and possibilities of narrative in general (Prince 
1992)? How does the text situate acts of discourse production in the story-
world relative to other forms of activity, e.g., nonverbal behaviors, acts of 
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perception not accompanied by talk, and so on? And in narratives exploiting 
more than one semiotic channel, how is the information about scenes of talk 
distributed between the various channels or tracks—and with what effect? In 
“A Poison Tree,” for example, the visual channel represents the effects of the 
withheld talk, but information about the act of withholding is found only in 
the verbal text. What would have been the consequence for readers’ engage-
ment with the text—or, to revert to the terms of the previous section, for the 
world-building process—if this relationship had been inverted in the poem’s 
overall design?
Emotion Discourse and Emotionology
Recent accounts of emotion talk throw further light on Blake’s staging in 
words and images of discourse practices—and of the cognitive processes 
that both support and are supported by such practices. For his part, Stearns 
(1995) contends that there is a basic tension between naturalist and construc-
tionist approaches. Naturalists (cf. Ekman 1982) argue for the existence of 
innate, biologically grounded emotions that are more or less uniform across 
cultures and subcultures. By contrast, constructionists argue that emotions 
are culturally specific—that “context and function determine emotional life 
and that these vary” (Stearns 1995: 41). Griffiths (1997: 137–69) accuses 
constructionists of engaging in straw-person argumentation with a version of 
naturalism that no practicing researcher would actually endorse. Putting that 
objection aside, however, work by Adolphs (2005) suggests how the natural-
ist and constructionist positions can be reconciled if emotions are viewed as 
(1) shaped by evolutionary processes and implemented in the brain, but also 
(2) situated in a complex network of stimuli, behavior, and other cognitive 
states. Because of (2), the shared stock of emotional responses is mediated 
by culturally specific learning processes. In turn, to explore the contribution 
of cultural contexts to humans’ emotional life, analysts can study “[e]motion 
discourse [as] an integral feature of talk about events, mental states, mind 
and body, personal dispositions, and social relations” (Edwards 1997: 170). 
This approach gave rise to the concept of “emotionology,” which was pro-
posed by Stearns and Stearns (1985) as a way of referring to the collective 
emotional standards of a culture as opposed to the experience of emotion 
itself (cf. Harré and Gillett 1994: 144–61; Edwards 1997: 170–201). The 
term functions in parallel with recent usages of “ontology” to designate a 
model of the entities, together with their properties and relations that exist 
within a particular domain. Emotionologies are systems of emotion terms 
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and concepts deployed by participants in discourse to ascribe emotions to 
themselves as well as their cohorts.
 On the one hand, the visual design of “A Poison Tree” both draws on and 
contributes to a broader cultural system for understanding emotions. The 
relatively large size of the image of the dead foe and the encirclement of the 
text by the branches of the poison tree suggest a dominant emotionological 
motif: namely, the ease with which anger grows to all-consuming and thus 
poisonous proportions. Further, the branches extending upward along the 
right margin of the poem, before curling over the top of the text and then 
back down the left margin, are stick-like, bare of leaves, perhaps even dead. 
Not only does anger or wrath, when left unexpressed (and thus unaddressed), 
come to overshadow the worlds in which we act and interact; what is more, 
its only fruits are a bleak, unhospitable environment, with no possibility for 
renewal or regeneration.
 On the other hand, the verbal design of Blake’s poem also features a richly 
emotionological profile. Of its 101 words, a substantial percentage is drawn 
from the lexicon of emotion: “angry,” “wrath,” “fears,” “tears,” “glad.” 
The poem thereby mirrors the way, in everyday discourse more generally, 
people draw on emotion terms to make sense of their own and one another’s 
minds as minds. What is more, the poem recounts actions that are, in the cul-
tural, generic, and situational contexts in which Blake’s discourse is embed-
ded, pragmatically rather than lexically linked with the emotions it figures. It 
suggests a complex network of cognitive and behavioral connections among 
unresolved (or unexpressed) anger or resentment, fear, sadness or depression, 
and schadenfreude, or the taking of satisfaction in another’s suffering. This 
same underlying network of concepts—in other words, the emotionology 
in which the poem is embedded and to which it contributes in turn—allows 
readers to reconstitute unstated causal links among emotional states, such as 
the way unexpressed anger can foster a sociointeractional environment that 
breeds other life-destroying emotions. Thus, when the narrator reports that 
“my foe beheld it [the apple] shine, / And he knew that it was mine” (line 
11–12), the use of the possessive pronoun in a position of emphasis at the end 
of line 12, together with the “mine”/”shine” rhyme, suggests that envy may 
have been one of the foe’s motivating impulses for stealing into the narrator’s 
garden at night—presumably, to obtain the “apple bright” (line 10). By con-
trast, when the narrator openly expresses his anger at the person who thereby 
becomes his friend in lines 1–2, the possibility for envy is dissipated along 
with the narrator’s own ill will.
 In short, literary narratives such as Blake’s do not just recruit from 
emotionologies but also contribute to their formation and reconfiguration. 
154  Part II: Chapter 5
Arguably, Blake’s poem seeks to make an emotionological intervention, by 
using words and images to underscore the importance of uncoupling the emo-
tion of anger from the secretive, deceitful pursuit of recompense for anger-
causing grievances and to suggest that anger or wrath, if brought out into the 
open and addressed explicitly, need not eventuate in life-negating practices.
Positioning
Theories of positioning afford another strategy for investigating the reflexive 
modeling of discourse practices (and their after-effects) in multimodal nar-
ratives like Blake’s. In Harré and van Langenhove’s account (1999: 1–31), 
speech acts are used to assign positions to social actors. Positions, in this 
account, are places along scales or continua that correspond to polarities of 
character such as “strong versus weak,” “flashy versus understated,” etc. 
Over time, self- and other-positioning speech productions help build over-
arching storylines in light of which people make sense of their own and oth-
ers’ doings. Reciprocally, those overarching narratives provide the means 
for linking position-assignments with utterances, as when a snide or affirm-
ing remark about someone does its work thanks to the way it shores up (or 
undercuts) a larger story about that person.
 In “A Poison Tree,” positioning is a relevant parameter for analysis on 
at least two levels: the level of the characters, and the level of the reader’s 
engagement with the text, given the narrative techniques used in the poem.11 
At the first level, the text suggests how the positioning of self and other as 
foes translates into a particular strategy for relating to someone viewed as an 
enemy. Thus, the narrator’s use of the designation of “foe” arises not during 
his interaction with that other person but at a distance, during his subse-
quent taking stock of the encounter—the narrational act corresponding to 
the poem itself being one method for taking stock ex post facto. By contrast, 
although the poem does not mandate this interpretation,12 one possible read-
ing of the opening lines is that the narrator’s positioning of self and other 
as friends translates into an “I-you” mode of encounter, with the narrator 
directly informing his friend about his wrathful feelings. And conversely, the 
continuing possibility of encounters of that kind is ensured by open acts of 
 11. See, e.g., Bamberg (1997) and Herman (2009: 55–63) for a fuller discussion of levels 
of positioning.
 12. As Peter Rabinowitz pointed out in his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
essay, “the poem never says that [the narrator] told his wrath to his friend; he might have told 
it to someone else and have been relieved of the burden [in that way].”
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telling. The poem thereby suggests how positioning practices both afford and 
result from certain protocols regulating communicative encounters, which in 
turn derive from ways of conceptualizing social space. Positioning someone 
as an enemy at once requires and entails eliminating any genuine mutuality 
of encounter—as well as any world-model that includes such mutuality as a 
possible development.
 At a second level, Blake’s words and images position readers vis-à-vis (the 
narrator’s account of) events in the storyworld. Here again both the shift to 
the present-tense verb “see” in line 15, and the image capturing the contents 
of the perceptual act corresponding to this verb, play a key role. Up until line 
15, actions and events are focalized through the older, narrating I; the nar-
rator thus positions himself and readers at a remove from these past occur-
rences. But on the historical-present interpretation of “see,” the shift to the 
present tense can be viewed as a shift to internal focalization: the text regis-
ters how things looked to the narrator at the moment he first saw the dead foe 
outstretched beneath the tree. The poem’s positioning logic likewise changes, 
bringing both teller and reader into a less mediated relation to the event of 
the foe’s death, whose impact at that past moment is strikingly reinforced by 
the image. Meanwhile, the eternal-present reading of “see” positions readers 
in yet another way, and leads to a different construal of word-image relations 
in the text. In this second reading the impact of the foe’s death lives on into 
the present, and is directly encountered by the narrating I rather than filtered 
retrospectively through the remembered perceptions of the experiencing I. 
In comparison with the historical-present interpretation of “see,” further, 
the event of the foe’s death is presented in an even less mediated fashion; the 
image now suggests that the ongoing perception of the dead foe dominates 
and predetermines the narrator’s act of telling, even before it begins.
 Blake thus combines verbal and visual designs to prompt reflection on 
narrative itself as a method of positioning self and other with respect to 
reported events—events whose varying degrees of accessibility to memory, 
cognition, and emotion can be signaled (or created) via shifts in storytelling 
style.
Narrative aNd CoNsCiousNess
I come now to the third and final strategy for triangulating research on nar-
rative, media, and mind to be discussed in this essay: namely, the strategy of 
examining the nexus of narrative and consciousness. In one manifestation, 
this triangulation strategy focuses on how stories represent the felt, conscious 
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awareness of narrators as well as characters; in another manifestation, the 
focus is on the extent to which narrative might afford scaffolding for con-
scious experience itself.
 On both the historical-present and the eternal-present readings of “see” in 
line 15, a key feature of the poem is the way it accentuates both verbally and 
visually the impact of the sight of the outstretched dead foe on the narrator’s 
consciousness. Blake’s emphasis on lived quality of this perceptual act sup-
ports a hypothesis about the nature of narrative itself: namely, that a distin-
guishing feature of narrative worldmaking is the way it highlights the pressure 
of events on real or imagined consciousnesses affected by storyworlds-in-flux 
(cf. Fludernik 1996). To put the same point otherwise, narrative is centrally 
concerned with qualia, a term used by philosophers of mind to refer to the 
sense of “what it is like” for someone or something to have a particular expe-
rience (Levin 1999; Levine 1983; Nagel 1974). Cutting across differences of 
genre, communicative context, and storytelling media is a common focus on 
the what-it’s-like dimension of consciousness; stories more or less explicitly 
foreground how one or more human or human-like minds is affected by what 
is going on in narrated worlds (Herman 2009: 137–60). But if it is part of the 
nature of narrative to focus on the impact of events on experiencing minds, 
the converse question also suggests itself: does narrative afford scaffolding 
for consciousness experience? Are there grounds for making the strong claim 
that narrative not only represents what it is like for experiencing minds to live 
through events in storyworlds, but furthermore constitutes a basis for hav-
ing—for knowing—a mind at all, whether it is one’s own or another’s?
 Relating qualia to the notion of the intrinsically first-person nature of con-
scious awareness, Searle (1997) for his part argues that consciousness cannot 
be observed, since consciousness itself resides in the structure of observing. 
As Searle puts it, there is “no way for us to picture subjectivity as part of 
our worldview because, so to speak, the subjectivity in question is the pictur-
ing” (98). Consciousness, in this account, is equivalent to the qualia associ-
ated with observing or experiencing the world from a particular, irreducibly 
subjective or first-person vantage point. But the isomorphism between the 
structure of narrative and the structure of consciousness may indicate a 
way beyond the paradox identified by Searle. Narratives, thanks to the way 
they are anchored in a particular vantage point on the storyworlds that they 
evoke, and thanks to their essentially durative or temporally extended pro-
file, do not merely convey semantic content but furthermore encode in their 
very structure a way of experiencing the world. Thus, even granting Searle’s 
point that we cannot picture our own or another’s subjectivity because it 
is built into the process of picturing the world, it can still be argued that 
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engaging with a narrative enables interpreters to experience the subjectivity 
that it manifests (cf. Zahavi 2007). On this reading, Blake’s tense shift in line 
15 does not just provide information about but moreover enacts the tempo-
rally unlocatable impact of the foe’s death on the narrator, or rather its mul-
tiple locations along the (the narrator’s experience of the) timeline connecting 
past and present. What is more, multimodal narratives like Blake’s afford 
especially rich possibilities for representing what it is like to experience events 
in storyworlds. For example, aspects of the narrator’s subjective experience, 
or the what-it’s-like dimension of his encounter with the dead foe, are encap-
sulated in the perspective structure of the image: the onlooker is situated near 
the head of the body (hence the comparatively small size of the legs and feet), 
and appears to be looking at the body not from a full standing position, but 
almost as if he is crouching down—or perhaps has been brought to his knees 
by the sight of the outstretched foe. To put the same point another way, it 
would be inconsistent with the perspective structure of the image to suggest 
that the narrator-observer experienced the sight of the dead foe from high 
above, say in the uppermost branches of the poison tree, or from a situation 
closer to the feet than the head of the body. And the narrator’s conscious 
experiences are re-experienced by readers who use the perspective structure 
of the image as scaffolding for knowing what it was like (or, given the fictivity 
of this scenario, what it would be like) to encounter this body in this specific 
way in this particular storyworld.
 In sum, unlike other modes of representation such as deductive argu-
ments, stress equations, or the periodic table of the elements, narrative is 
uniquely suited to capturing what the world is like from the situated perspec-
tive of an experiencing mind. More than just representing minds, stories emu-
late through their temporal and perspectival configuration the what-it’s-like 
dimension of conscious awareness itself. And if narrative in general provides 
a discourse environment optimally suited for the world-picturing process, 
another broad project of triangulation would involve studying how specific 
modes and media of storytelling can be used to emulate the structure of con-
scious experience.13
 13. Although it cuts against the grain of aspects of Hamburger’s (1993 [1957]) account, 
and in particular her claim that the worlds created through first-person versus third-person 
narration have a different ontological status, from another perspective the line of argument 
being sketched here can be viewed as an extension of Hamburger’s model. Not only fictional 
narrative but narrative more generally, the argument suggests, can be used to evoke or emu-
late the experiencing consciousness of another (cf. Fludernik 2007: 265–66). Meanwhile, for 
a wide-ranging discussion of types of empathy facilitated by such narrative emulations of 
consciousness (among other techniques used in novels), see Keen (2007).
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PostsCriPt
New Challenges for Postclassical Narratology
In this essay, I have used Blake’s multimodal text to argue that cognitive nar-
ratology can be productively characterized as a triangulation project, that 
is, a framework for inquiry that explores the interfaces among narrative, 
media, and the mind. In making this argument, I have implicitly suggested 
the advantages of weaving together two strands of postclassical narratology 
that have for the most part been pursued separately up to now, namely, trans-
medial narratology (Herman 2004; Ryan 2004; Wolf 2003) and cognitive 
narratology.
 Unlike classical, structuralist narratology, transmedial narratology dis-
putes the notion that the fabula or story level of a narrative remains wholly 
invariant across shifts of medium. However, it also assumes that stories do 
have “gists” that can be remediated more or less fully and recognizably—
depending in part on the semiotic properties of the source and target media.14 
Transmedial narratology is thus premised on the assumption that, although 
narrative practices in different media share common features insofar as they 
are all instances of the narrative text type, stories are nonetheless inflected by 
the constraints and affordances associated with a given medium. Meanwhile, 
theorists developing cognitive approaches to narrative have worked to enrich 
the original base of structuralist concepts with ideas about human intelli-
gence either ignored by or inaccessible to earlier story analysts, thereby build-
ing new foundations for the study of cognitive processes vis-à-vis various 
dimensions of narrative structure. And here the cognitive and transmedial 
approaches overlap. As already suggested, the target of cognitive-narratologi-
cal research is the nexus of narrative and mind not just in print texts but also 
 14. For example, cinematic adapations of print texts reveal the story-configuring, and 
not just story-transmitting, properties of the media at issue. Thus, if voice-over narration is 
used to remediate in a film extended passages of free indirect discourse or thought report in 
the print-text source, the particular voice chosen to deliver the narration can affect film view-
ers’ assessments of the situations and events being represented. In John Huston’s 1987 film 
adaptation of James Joyce’s “The Dead,” the use in the final scene of a voice-over by Donal 
McCann, the actor who plays Gabriel Conroy, cues the inference that the images of a snowy 
Ireland are subworlds glimpsed by Gabriel’s mind’s eye. By contrast, in the opening sequence 
of Todd Field’s 2006 film Little Children, an adaptation of the novel by Tom Perrotta, the 
third-person narration is recast in the form of a voice-over delivered by Will Lyman, whose 
deep, authoritative voice American viewers will associate with the news magazine Frontline, 
produced by the Public Broadcasting Service. In this case the particular voice chosen provides a 
kind of hyper-authentication of the events being shown on screen—and creates an incongruity 
that Fields exploits to comic effect. Examples of this sort suggest how narrative remediation 
can impinge on judgments about the modality status of events being recounted and hence on 
the configuration of storyworlds. 
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in face-to-face interaction, cinema, radio news broadcasts, computer-medi-
ated virtual environments, and other storytelling media. In turn, “mind-rele-
vance” can be studied vis-à-vis the multiple factors associated with the design 
and interpretation of narratives across media, including the story-producing 
activities of writers, the processes by means of which interpreters make sense 
of storyworlds evoked by multimodal as well as monomodal narrative arti-
facts, and the cognitive states and dispositions of characters in those vari-
ously configured storyworlds. In addition, the mind-narrative nexus can be 
studied along two other dimensions, insofar as stories function not only as 
a target of interpretation but also as a means for making sense of experience 
in their own right. The integrative framework outlined here thus underscores 
the pertinence of new questions for postclassical narratology: what sense-
making possibilities do multimodal storytelling practices afford that are not 
afforded by monomodal or single-channel narrative practices, and vice versa? 
Do multimodal narratives that exploit different semiotic channels (e.g., words 
and images vs. utterances and gestures) draw on, and support, different ways 
of navigating the world (cf. Herman 2010a)? And what investigative probes 
might be developed to explore these sorts of issues?
 To extrapolate: if postclassical narratology in a first phase involves incor-
porating ideas that fall outside the domain of structuralist theory, in order 
to reassess the possibilities as well as the limitations of classical models, 
new challenges emerge in a second phase. What is now required is to bring 
into closer dialogue the full variety of postclassical approaches—feminist, 
transmedial, cognitive, corpus-narratological, and other. By juxtaposing the 
descriptions of narrative phenomena (narration, perspective, character, etc.) 
made possible by these approaches, testing for overlap among the descrip-
tions, and then exploring the degree to which the descriptions’ non-overlap-
ping aspects might complement one another, theorists can begin to engage in 
a more coordinated effort to accomplish what remains the overarching goal 
of narrative inquiry: coming to a better understanding of what stories are and 
how they work.15
 15. A different version of portions of this essay will be published as “Stories, Media, and 
the Mind: Narrative Worldmaking through Word and Image,” in a special issue of the Chinese 
journal Foreign Literature Studies. Coedited by Shang Biwu and James Phelan, the issue is 
devoted to “Postclassical Narratology: Western Approaches.” I am grateful to Jan Alber, Shang 
Biwu, Monika Fludernik, Jim Phelan, Peter Rabinowitz, Les Tannenbaum, Jim Zeigler, and 
Lars Franssen for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of the analysis presented here. I 
am also grateful for the Arts and Humanities Seed Grant from Ohio State University and the 
fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies that have supported this research.
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Cinematic narration figures prominently in the work of several narratolo-
gists. Basically, three schools of thought exist. The first, represented by David 
Bordwell, argues that film has narration but no narrator (1985: 61). Accord-
ing to Bordwell, cinematic narration is created by the viewer, who uses cogni-
tive schemata to transform the film’s visual images and sounds into a series 
of perceptible configurations, which he or she then interprets as a story.1 In 
contrast to Bordwell’s approach, the second school, represented by Seymour 
Chatman, argues that films are narrated by a cinematic narrator. Chatman 
defines this narrator in terms of “the organizational and sending agency” 
(1990: 127) behind the film. In his view, films “are always presented—mostly 
and often exclusively shown, but sometimes partially told—by a narrator 
or narrators.” The overall agent that does the showing is “the ‘cinematic 
narrator’” (133–34).2 The third school, represented by theoreticians such 
 1. See also Bordwell (1989), Fleishman (1992: 13; 19), Bordwell and Thompson (2003: 
86–87), and Grodal (2005: 169).
 2. Other terms for the same concept are “image-maker” (Kozloff 1988: 44), “grand 
Imagier” (Gaudreault 1999: 107; 2000: 56), “narrateur filmique” (Burgoyne 1991: 272), “ex-
ternal narrator” (Stam et al. 1992: 103), “perceptual enabler” (Levinson 1996a: 252), “film 
narrator” (Lothe 2000: 30), and “implied narrator” (Laass 2008: 22). Diehl argues that he is 
“a firm defender of the conceptual claim that any narrative of necessity requires a narrator” 
and puts the matter as follows: “Regardless of the medium in which a narrative is presented, 
I claim that we are prescribed to imagine a fictional narrator for a narrative work N if and 
only if we are prescribed to imagine de re of the text of N that it occurs within the world of 
the fiction generated by N” (2009: 23, 15).
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as George Wilson (1986: 135), Michaela Bach (1999: 245–46), and Berys 
Gaut (2004: 248) argues that it is the implied filmmaker who mediates the 
film as a whole, guides us through it, and directs our attention to impor-
tant issues. Similarly, Katherine Thomson-Jones argues that “the narrator 
guide is sometimes just the filmmaker as manifest in the film” (2007: 82), 
while Manfred Jahn de-anthropomorphizes the source of the discourse and 
speaks of a “filmic composition device (FCD),” which he defines as “the theo-
retical agency behind a film’s organization and arrangement.” According to 
Jahn, the FCD “need not be associated with any concrete person or character, 
particularly neither the director nor a filmic narrator” (Jahn 2003: F4.1.2–
F4.1.3).
 Up until now, the discussion has been dominated by analyses that focus 
on the conceptual foundations of film narration, rather than on how con-
cepts of cinematic narration might be developed in ways that are produc-
tive for the business of interpreting films. For instance, some theoreticians 
try to verify their claims concerning the cinematic narrator on the basis of 
the so-called A Priori Argument (“narration without narrator does not exist 
because the former is conceptually dependent on the other”)3 or the so-called 
Argument for Means of Access (“only the fictional persona of the narrator 
can give us access to the fictional world of a narrative”),4 while others—such 
as Currie (1995: 266), Gaut (2004: 235–37), and Thomson-Jones (2007: 
82–89)—attempt to refute these arguments on logical grounds.5 Although 
these attempts to develop a “philosophy of the movies” (Gaut 2004: 230) 
constitute a valuable and important contribution to the understanding of 
movies, my focus is elsewhere. The most pressing question for me is whether 
the concept of a cinematic narrator helps us come up with better readings or 
interpretations of movies.
 To address this practical, interpretive issue, I begin by exploring the way 
viewers rely on folk psychology6 to make sense of films. In doing so, I will try 
to both synthesize and transcend the three approaches mentioned above. Sec-
ond, I want to reconsider analytical tools such as the implied filmmaker and 
 3. Chatman argues that both “a communication with no communicator” and “a creation 
with no creator” (1990: 127) are impossible, and hence, cinematic narratives need to have a 
narrator.
 4. For Levinson, “the presenter in a film [ . . . ] gives perceptual access to the story’s sights 
and sounds; the presenter in a film is thus, in part, a sort of perceptual enabler. Such perceptual 
enabling is what we must implicitly posit to explain how it is we are, even imaginarily, perceiv-
ing what we are perceiving of the story [ . . . ]”(1996: 252).
 5. Also, theoreticians exist who try to refute the prior refutations of others. See, for 
example, Diehl (2009: 16, 19).
 6. The term “folk psychology” denotes “our standard, everyday, unthinking, ‘common-
sense’ assumptions about how our minds and the minds of others work” (Palmer 2004: 244).
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the cinematic narrator from the perspective of their usefulness for actual film 
analysis and cinematic criticism. Third, I develop a new model of cinematic 
narration and I show that this model may serve as a frame of reading that 
helps us to make strange and incomprehensible experimental films such as 
David Lynch’s Lost Highway (1997) more readable.
HYPotHetiCal iNteNtioNalisM aNd 
tHe readiNg oF FilMs
In our everyday interaction, we try to understand others by attributing men-
tal states and dispositions to them. Alan Palmer argues that “consciousness 
allows us to adapt intelligently to our environment” (2004: 89). Similarly, 
Lisa Zunshine points out that we continuously engage in processes of mind-
reading and try “to explain people’s behavior in terms of their thoughts, 
beliefs, and desires” (2006: 6). If we did not speculate about or try to inter-
pret the intentions of our fellow human beings, most, if not all, types of inter-
action (such as human communication) would become impossible.
 Numerous critics have argued that the way in which we try to make sense 
of other people is similar to the way in which we attempt to make sense 
of fictional narratives (Palmer 2004, Zunshine 2006, and Herman 2007). I 
would like to propose that when viewing a film, most viewers try to find out 
what the film means or “is trying to say.”7 Indeed, Daniel O. Nathan argues 
that “interpretation is in general and essentially a matter of asking ‘why,’ of 
seeking an explanation of whatever it is that we have before us” (1992: 196).
 Films are directed by individuals such as Alfred Hitchcock, Stanley 
Kubrick, Fritz Lang, or David Lynch, and they are typically very influential 
with regard to the end product that we as viewers get to see. However, it is 
of course ultimately impossible to determine the filmmaker’s intentions. To 
begin with, in film analysis it does not even make sense to speak of a single 
author or filmmaker. While writing a novel is typically something done by 
an individual, a film is usually so expensive and technically so complicated 
that it can only be realized through a complex production process in which 
many professionals work together: the author of the script, the producer, the 
director, the editor, actors and actresses, photographers, sound directors, etc. 
(Lothe 2000: 31).8 For these reasons, it is impossible for us to know whether 
 7. This is obviously not true of films that were designed for “pure” entertainment such 
as action movies or porn films.
 8. At the same time, it is worth noting that the producer and the director typically exer-
cise more power over the final product than all the others.
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our interpretations reveal the intentions of this multitude of professionals 
who produced the film. Arguably, however, it would be equally impossible if 
there were only one professional such as the director.9
 Some critics speak of an “implied author” (Booth 2002) or an “implied 
filmmaker” (Gaut 2004: 248) rather than the real filmmaker. However, I 
would also like to avoid these terms because they suggest that certain critics 
are able to transcend the mere forming of hypotheses about a narrative’s pur-
pose or “point,” and that they are somehow right about the intentions that 
a narrative evokes. For example, according to Wayne C. Booth, the implied 
author is the real author’s “second self,” and as such satisfies “the reader’s 
need to know where, in the world of values, he stands, that is, to know where 
the author wants him to stand” (1983: 73). Booth believes that analyses 
along the lines of the concept of the implied author enable us “to come as 
close as possible to sitting in the author’s chair and making this text, becom-
ing able to remake it, employing the author’s ‘reason-of-art’” (1982: 21).
 Since we can never be sure that we have formed correct hypotheses about 
the implied author or filmmaker’s intentions, I want to follow instead David 
Herman’s slightly more modest proposal to move beyond the “compartmen-
talized intentionality” of the implied author or filmmaker—that is, beyond 
an approach that is grounded in a view of intentions as inner, mental objects 
(cf. Hutto 2000)—and toward “an approach of narrative understanding 
that more fully and more openly grounds stories in intentional systems, that 
acknowledges the extent to which the process of interpretation hinges on 
making defeasible (= possibly wrong) inferences about communicative inten-
tions” (2008: 244). This proposal closely correlates with the idea that inten-
tions are not located in one particular and/or fixed area (such as the real 
or implied filmmaker). Rather, they are distributed across the inventers and 
interpreters of narratives, narrative designs, and the communicative context 
in which narratives are produced and interpreted (Herman 2006).
 More specifically, I propose to look at the way in which we make sense 
of films from the perspective of hypothetical intentionalism, a cognitive 
approach in which “a narrative’s meaning is established by hypothesizing 
intentions authors might have had, given the context of creation, rather than 
relying on, or trying to seek out, the author’s subjective intentions” (Gibbs 
2005: 248; my italics; see also Kindt and Müller 2006: 170–76). More to the 
point, I use what Daniel C. Dennett calls “the intentional stance” (1996: 27) 
and Alan Palmer’s “continuing-consciousness frame” (2004: 175) to shed 
 9. On the intentional fallacy in literary studies, see Wimsatt and Beardsley (2001) and 
Barthes (2002).
Alber, “Hypothetical Intentionalism”  167
new light on cinematic narration. My basic assumption is that we all attri-
bute intentions and motivations to films in order to find out what they might 
mean. Dennett defines the intentional stance as “the strategy of interpreting 
the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as 
if it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consid-
eration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’” (1996: 27). Similarly, according to Alan 
Palmer, “the working hypothesis that visibly coherent behavior is caused by a 
directing consciousness in the actual world is used by extension in the appli-
cation of the continuing-consciousness frame to the storyworld” (2004: 178).
 When we view a film, we treat it as “a rational agent who governed its 
‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’” (Den-
nett 1996: 27). We do not merely engage in processes of mind-reading to 
understand the minds of the characters; rather, we also apply the continuing-
consciousness frame to the film as a whole and construct some kind of mind 
or consciousness behind the film. In a second step, we then form hypoth-
eses about this mind’s intentions or what one might call the film’s potential 
“point.” However, since we can never be sure that we have interpreted a film 
correctly, it does not make sense to ascribe our hypotheses about the inten-
tions and motivations behind the film to the real or implied filmmaker.
 Jerrold Levinson, one of the major supporters of hypothetical intention-
alism, in reconsidering Booth’s concept of the implied author, argues that 
“instead of speaking of beliefs and attitudes that would be reasonably attrib-
uted to the actual author on the basis of the work contextually grasped, we 
can speak of the beliefs or attitudes that just straightforwardly belong to the 
implied author—he or she is being a construction tailor-made to bear them” 
(Levinson 1996b: 229). While Booth thinks that the concept of the implied 
author ultimately enables us to “employ [ . . . ] the author’s ‘reason-of-art’” 
(1982: 21), Levinson redefines the implied author as a more or less fictional 
construct created in the reader’s mind on the basis of signals or cues in the 
narrative text. Since, as Tom Kindt and Hans-Harald Müller point out, the 
term “implied author” has been used so differently in the past, one might 
want to dispense with the implied author: “it would hardly be sensible to 
continue using the old name to refer to the new, refined concept” (2006: 
176).10
 Hence, with regard to the medium film, I propose to ascribe our hypoth-
eses about the intentions underlying a movie to what I would like to call the 
“hypothetical filmmaker,” a term which denotes the single entity to which 
 10. To put this slightly differently, the term “implied author” has by now acquired so 
much baggage that it makes sense to use new terminology.
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the viewer ascribes conscious or unconscious motivations that actuated the 
professionals who were responsible for the making of the film in question.11 
In this model, the intentions and motivations that played a role in the produc-
tion of a film are distributed across the film’s inventers, the film’s interpret-
ers, and the film’s narrative designs (which viewers use as the basis of their 
hypotheses).
tHe CiNeMatiC Narrator reCoNsidered
Let us for a second assume that films are narrated by a cinematic narrator in 
Chatman’s sense (1990: 127). Would it, then, somehow be possible to discern 
the presence of this narrator or to get a sense of how the film narrator medi-
ates a film as a whole? At first glance, one might feel that in film, no deictic 
or expressive markers exist that would warrant the existence of a film narra-
tor. In particular, in films that follow the classical paradigm of transparency 
(such as Fritz Lang’s You Only Live Once [1937]) and avoid intertitles, non-
diegetic inserts, non-diegetic music,12 and so forth, nothing really suggests the 
presence of a cinematic narrator; indeed, we have a sense of the immediacy 
of presentation: the film seems to merely show a fictional world without any 
narratorial inflection or commentary. Hence, one may feel that it is unnec-
essary to introduce a narrator for film and that what we are observing in 
theorists needing such a persona is an illicit transfer of real-world frames of 
storytelling onto the (much more complex) communicational process of cine-
matic narration. In films using non-diegetic music or sound effects, intertitles, 
captions, non-diegetic inserts, voice-over- or character-narrators, however, 
some sort of mediacy does indeed make itself felt. This is also true of such 
filmic peculiarities as slow-motion sequences or speed-ups, garish colors, sur-
prising cuts, and wipes.
 If we posit the existence of a cinematic narrator, it is clear that this “over-
all agent that does the showing” (Chatman 1990: 134) has to be both extradi-
egetic and heterodiegetic. Furthermore, the film narrator is typically covert 
and only occasionally slightly more overt, though never as overt as the first-
person or authorial narrator of a novel. Hence, David A. Black (2001: 301) 
argues that the cinematic narrator differs from the prototypical narrators 
 11. Similarly, Nathan argues that “given the weaknesses of ordinary intentionalism, appeal 
to a hypothetical author is the only adequate response” (1992: 200) to the demands of literary 
interpretation.
 12. Non-diegetic inserts and sound effects are not part of the fictional world and cannot 
be seen or heard by the characters in the film.
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of novels or short stories. Indeed, the film narrator is typically covert like the 
narrative medium in reflector-mode narratives (such as Virginia Woolf’s novel 
Mrs. Dalloway [1925]) or third-person narratives of external focalization 
(such as Ernest Hemingway’s short story “The Killers” [1927]).
 According to Seymour Chatman, it is of utmost importance to discrimi-
nate between “the inventor” of a film (what he calls the implied filmmaker) 
on the one hand, and its “presenter” (what he calls the cinematic narrator) 
on the other (1990: 133). However, from the perspective of actual film criti-
cism, this distinction does not really matter because the functions of these 
two entities or constructs clearly converge. Interestingly, the functions that 
critics ascribe to the cinematic narrator are virtually identical with the func-
tions that others attribute to what they call the implied filmmaker: both are 
rather neutral or covert shower or arranger functions.13
 Since everything for which the cinematic narrator is said to be responsible 
(the mediating, presenting, showing, arranging, or organizing of the film) 
can in fact be attributed to what I call the hypothetical filmmaker, we can do 
away with the concept of the film narrator.14 From the perspective of hypo-
thetical intentionalism, the only really important thing is that we formulate 
hypotheses about the intentions and motivations that played a role in the 
production of the film. I would therefore like to redefine cinematic narration 
as the interaction between the film’s inventers, its viewers, and the film’s nar-
rative designs. As I see it, cinematic narration correlates with the idea that the 
viewer uses Dennett’s intentional stance and Palmer’s continuing-conscious-
ness frame to speculate about the film’s intentions. And I want to argue that 
he or she formulates these hypotheses on the basis of the narrative designs 
used in the film.
 13. For instance, Seymour Chatman uses the term “cinematic narrator” to denote “the 
organizational and sending agency” (1990: 127) behind the film; Jerrold Levinson speaks of a 
“perceptual enabler” who “gives perceptual access to the story’s sights and sounds” (1996a: 
252); Jakob Lothe defines the “film narrator” as “the superordinate ‘instance’ that presents all 
the means of communication that film has at its disposal” (2000: 30); and Kozloff speaks of an 
“image-maker” who is responsible for “all the selecting, organizing, shading, and even passive 
recording processes that go into the creation of a narrative sequence of images and sounds” 
(1988: 44). Similarly, Booth defines the “implied author” of films as “a creative voice uniting 
all the choices” (2002: 125); Manfred Jahn (2003: F4.1) speaks of a “filmic composition device 
(FCD)” which denotes “the theoretical agency behind a film’s organization and arrangement”; 
and Gaut simply argues that “the implied filmmaker” mediates the film as a whole (2004: 248).
 14. Similarly, Richard Walsh suggests eradicating extra- and heterodiegetic narrators in 
narrative fiction: “Extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrators (that is, ‘impersonal’ and ‘authorial’ 
narrators), who cannot be represented without thereby being rendered homodiegetic or intradi-
egetic, are in no way distinguishable from authors.” He therefore concludes that “the narrator 
is always either a character who narrates, or the author” (2007: 84; 78).
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tHe HYPotHetiCal FilMMaker as 
tHe FilM’s HigHest autHoritY
The concept of the hypothetical filmmaker (seen as the “agent” projected by 
the viewer) offers us an organizational hierarchy that helps us describe the 
functioning of film narratives. From the perspective of hypothetical inten-
tionalism, it makes sense to attribute the totality of a film’s stimuli (including 
non-diegetic music or sound, garish colors, non-diegetic inserts, surprising 
cuts, as well as paratextual elements, i.e. intertitles, captions, and the film’s 
opening and final credits) to some kind of agency and to then ponder their 
potential “point.” Some viewers will (not without reason) maintain that such 
choices ultimately issue from the director of the film. However, since we can 
never be entirely sure of the director’s true intentions (and since his or her 
intentions are not the only ones that play a role), I suggest attributing these 
choices and the motivations behind them to the hypothetical filmmaker or, in 
a different manner of speaking, simply to the film as a whole. From my per-
spective, the only important thing here is that we speculate about the poten-
tial purpose of the movie, scene, or shot under discussion; it does not matter 
whether we attribute these choices to the filmmaker or to the film as a whole. 
Let me present a couple of examples that illustrate how viewers typically 
impute intentions to cinematic stimuli.
 For instance, by continuously juxtaposing Alex’s (Malcolm McDowell) 
violent outbursts with (non-diegetic) Beethoven music, the film A Clockwork 
Orange (1971) proposes a connection between violence and art. Indeed, Sob-
chack argues that in the film, “art and violence spring from the same source; 
they are both expressions of the individual, egotistic, vital, and non-institu-
tionalized man” (1981: 98). Furthermore, the garish red screen during the 
opening credits may be a visual hint at the extreme emotions (related to sex 
and violence) that are at work in A Clockwork Orange. Similarly, the film 
Fury (1936) presents us with a surprising cut from gossiping housewives to a 
(non-diegetic) shot of clucking hens, and thus urges us to look for similarities 
between these two entities. More specifically, we are invited to (metaphori-
cally) see the women as hens (Bordwell and Thompson 2003: 336). Likewise, 
the film 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) suddenly cuts from a bone employed 
by a primitive ape-man and then thrown up in the air to a spacecraft of the 
future. This juxtaposition may suggest that the same primitive motives and 
instincts that drove the ape-man to construct a weapon out of a bone also 
drive us to manufacture space-age hardware (Whittock 1990: 51–52).15
 15. Both cuts urge us to see one entity as a different one and thus involve cinematic meta-
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 For their part, the films Metropolis (1926) and The Bourne Identity 
(2002) use intertitles or captions to inform the audience about the story’s 
temporal and spatial whereabouts. In this context, it is worth noting that the 
choices concerning the color and the typographical presentation of the letters 
do not only convey narrative information but additionally set a particular 
tone.16 For example, The Bourne Identity, a film about a non-conformist CIA 
agent called Jason Bourne (Matt Damon), who suffers from amnesia after 
the CIA has tried to kill him, presents us with white captions that look as if 
they could have come from a report written on a computer. The film thus sug-
gests objectivity and aloofness—a tone that highlights the cool and merciless 
way in which the CIA tries to eradicate Bourne, and simultaneously contrasts 
sharply with the strong emotional attachment we develop for the major pro-
tagonist as he desperately tries to find out who he is.
 Furthermore, films may occasionally supply voice-over narrators who 
comment on what we see on the screen or character-narrators who tell stories 
to other characters. For instance, the film A Clockwork Orange confronts 
us with a homodiegetic voice-over narrator (Alex) who comments on the 
action on the screen, while the movie The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) 
uses a character-narrator (Francis) who tells another inmate how he ended 
up in the lunatic asylum. Since the images continue on the screen regardless 
of whether such verbal narrators speak (and also regardless of whether non-
diegetic sounds, captions, or intertitles are present), the theoretical construct 
of the hypothetical filmmaker has to be seen as the film’s highest authority: 
all information is a consequence of its mediation, choice, organization, and 
arrangement. In other words, voice-over narrators, character-narrators, non-
diegetic sounds, and intertitles are all components of the hypothetical film-
maker’s options; they are some of the various devices that can be used in film.
 Films sometimes also present us with unreliable character-narrators, and 
the concept of the hypothetical filmmaker helps us explain and conceptualize 
cinematic unreliability. In cases of unreliable narration in film, it is always the 
case that the film as a whole (or, in a different manner of speaking, the hypo-
thetical filmmaker) draws our attention to and simultaneously counteracts a 
character-narrator’s norms, values, tastes, judgments, or moral sense (Prince 
1987: 101), and sometimes even the character-narrator’s “actual and overt 
misinterpretation or distortion of story facts” (Chatman 1990: 225, n. 21). 
phor. For more on film metaphors, see Whittock (1990) and Alber (forthcoming). Generally 
speaking, I would attribute cinematic metaphors to choices made by the hypothetical film-
maker.
 16. Also, Metropolis is a silent film and therefore required intertitles above and beyond 
“intent.”
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Thus, it makes sense to discriminate between cinematic forms of normative 
unreliability on the one hand, and cinematic forms of factual unreliability on 
the other (see also Laass 2008: 30–32). In both cases, we are invited to see 
that the character-narrator’s norms differ significantly from the norms of the 
film, and our hypotheses about intentions and motivations obviously play a 
crucial role.
 A well-known example of cinematic unreliability is Hitchcock’s Stage 
Fright (1950). In this film, Jonathan Cooper (Richard Todd) tells Eve Gill 
(Jane Wyman) that he and Charlotte Inwood (Marlene Dietrich) are secret 
lovers and that he is wanted by the police for killing Charlotte’s husband. 
Jonathan (or “Johnny”) also tells Eve that Charlotte committed the crime. 
According to his story, he only helped her to get rid of her blood-stained dress 
but was seen leaving the scene. The camera enacts Jonathan’s story, which 
Eve and we as viewers assume to be true. “Only retrospectively, after Johnny 
admits to Eve his criminal tendency and a previous murder, do we realize that 
the camera has conspired with Johnny to deceive us, that Johnny’s flashback 
was a lie” (Chatman 1990: 131).
 Another example of cinematic unreliability can be found in the film The 
Usual Suspects (1995), in which Roger “Verbal” Kint (Kevin Spacey), appar-
ently a disabled low-profile criminal, tries to get immunity for his involve-
ment in a drug deal by testifying to US Customs Special Agent Dave Kujan 
(Chazz Palminteri). As in Stage Fright, the camera enacts Kint’s story, which 
Kujan and we as viewers assume to be true. However, as we learn at the end 
of the film, Kint only made up this story in order to mislead Kujan about his 
true identity. That is to say, the images we saw only conformed to Kint’s fab-
ricated story but not to what actually happened.17 Toward the end of the film, 
Kint receives his immunity and leaves the investigation room, while Kujan 
realizes that important details and names from Kint’s story are actually words 
appearing on objects in the room, and that Kint is actually Keyser Söze, the 
criminal mastermind Kujan had been looking for.
 I agree with Volker Ferenz’s argument that all unreliable narration in film 
emerges from an unreliable character-narrator (like Jonathan Cooper in Stage 
Fright or Kint in The Usual Suspects).
 17. One might argue that in such cases, a film narrator translates the narration visually to 
the audience and that this cinematic narrator is unreliable. However, I would argue that since 
what we see is identical with what we hear, most viewers attribute both the spoken words and 
the resulting images to the character-narrator. From my perspective, there is no need for the 
concept of the film narrator in these cases either. The character-narrator is unreliable and this 
is clearly what we are supposed to realize.
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In film, only in the case of [ . . . ] the character-narrator who “takes over,” 
and thus appears to be the driving seat of, the narration, [ . . . ] do we deal 
with narrators whom we treat like “real persons” and “new acquaintances” 
and whom we can hold “responsible” for being unreliable about the facts 
of the fictional world. Only then do we have a clearly identifiable fictional 
scapegoat with sufficient “authority” over the narrative as a whole whom 
we can blame for textual contradictions and referential difficulties. (Ferenz 
2005: 135)18
At first glance, one might feel that a film like A Beautiful Mind (2001) also 
presents us with a form of unreliable narration because it uses a lying cam-
era as well (Helbig 2005, Lahde 2006, Laass 2008: 28). However, upon 
closer inspection we realize that in this case, the camera presents us with the 
deranged perception of John Forbes Nash (Russell Crowe), a mathematical 
genius, who begins to endure delusional and paranoid episodes, and Nash 
does not relate his life through a narrative; rather, he is a focalizer who simply 
misperceives the world. For example, at one point in the film, Nash begins to 
work for a secret Defense Department facility in the Pentagon, and it takes us 
quite some time to realize that he has never done so and that we have shared 
Nash’s deranged perception all along. Toward the end of the film, we learn 
that the people from the Defense Department (such as William Parcher [Ed 
Harris]) do not exist outside Nash’s mind (even though we see him interact-
ing and dealing with them). According to Ferenz, focalizers like Nash cannot 
be unreliable: they “cannot be held accountable for distorting the fictional 
world simply because they do not narrate it” (2005: 140). Nash cannot mis-
represent the world of A Beautiful Mind because he does not even try to nar-
rate or represent it; rather, he inhabits it.19
 18. Greta Olson argues along the same lines, when she claims that “the less personalized 
the narrative voice is, [ . . . ] the more inappropriate it is to infer unreliability” (2003: 106, 
n14). To put this slightly differently, the more personalized the narrative voice is, the more 
appropriate it is to infer unreliability.
 19.  Similarly, it would also be odd to speak of the unreliability of Septimus Warren-Smith 
in Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway (1925). Septimus is a reflector-character who suffers 
from schizophrenia following World War I. For instance, he frequently sees Evans, his com-
manding officer during the war, who is dead: “There was his hand; there the dead. White things 
were assembling behind the railings opposite. But he dared not look. Evans was behind the 
railings!” (2000: 21). Since Septimus misperceives the world but does not try to convince us of 
his deranged worldview, it does not really make sense to speak of unreliability here. Eva Laass 
mentions a number of films such as The Sixth Sense (1999), Memento (2000), Donnie Darko 
(2001), A Beautiful Mind (2001), and Mulholland Drive (2001), which, in her view, “encour-
age the attribution of unreliable narration [ . . . ] in spite of their non-personalised narrative 
mediation” (2008: 28). She sees these cases as forms of unreliable narration because for her, 
they are presented by the cinematic narrator (whom she rechristens as “the implied narrator” 
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 Inferences about intention also come into play in connection with other 
forms of focalization. Generally speaking, films can use images that are inter-
nally focalized (such as point-of-view shots or memory sequences) or images 
that are externally focalized. In the latter case (which is far more common 
in film), the perspective “corresponds to that place where a hypothetical 
observer of the scene, present at the scene, would have to stand in order to 
give us the space as pictured” (Branigan 1984: 6). Numerous recent films 
confront us with images that seem to be externally focalized but then turn out 
to represent a character’s worldview or misperception. For instance, Christine 
Edzard’s two-part film adaptation of Charles Dickens’s novel Little Dorrit 
(1855–57) (Nobody’s Fault and Little Dorrit’s Story [1987]) presents us with 
sequences in which the images of Amy Dorrit (Sarah Pickering) and Arthur 
Clennam (Derek Jacobi) are shaped by their respective worldviews. Nobody’s 
Fault confronts us with the worldview of Arthur, while Little Dorrit’s Story 
focuses on Amy’s worldview. For instance, the room at the Marshalsea debt-
ors’ prison in Little Dorrit’s Story is bigger and brighter than the room we 
see in Nobody’s Fault. According to March, “the walls of the set have been 
bodily moved out by several feet; the set has been repainted, redressed in 
slightly brighter colors; potted plants blossom [ . . . ]; Dorrit’s bare chair 
grows a cover, and his dressing gown sprouts tendrils of embroidery” (1993: 
255). These two perspectives on the prison and William Dorrit (Alec Gui-
ness) reflect Arthur’s and Amy’s perception. While Arthur has a pessimistic 
worldview and feels oppressed in the room, Amy has become accustomed 
to the prison and has a more optimistic worldview. The “point” of this tech-
nique is presumably to suggest that both Amy and Arthur live in their own 
worlds, and that it is difficult (or impossible) for one to understand the other 
(Alber 2007: 48). Since no narrator misleads us in this case, and since the 
filmic images here clearly relate to focalization, i.e. a character’s worldview, 
rather than narration, I think that such scenarios cannot be described as cin-
ematic forms of unreliable narration. I would like to argue that they are bet-
ter understood as forms of internal focalization.20
 To summarize: it makes sense to attribute a film’s various stimuli to 
an agent like the hypothetical filmmaker because their presence follows a 
[ibid.: 22]). Since I have done away with this concept, I would suggest categorizing all of these 
cases as forms of internal focalization: in each case the images we see are dominated by the 
distorted worldview of one of the characters, and they are focalizers who do not represent (or 
even try to represent) what we see.
 20. Most of the alleged examples of cinematic unreliability discussed by Jörg Helbig also 
involve internal focalization, i.e., reflector-characters (or focalizers) that perceive but do not 
narrate (2005: 134–36; 140). The only exception is Fight Club (1999), where we can attribute 
unreliability to Jack (Edward Norton), the film’s voice-over narrator (ibid.: 136–39).
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particular purpose. In other words, they are interpretive clues and we are 
invited to ponder their implications. The concept of the hypothetical film-
maker allows us to speculate about the “point” of the film’s various stimuli 
and its overall design without suggesting that we can definitely know the real 
or implied filmmaker’s intentions. It is also worth noting that we assume that 
the hypothetical filmmaker follows the Gricean Cooperative Principle. That is 
to say, we approach the filmic data on the assumption of encountering a well-
informed composition guided by the Gricean maxims of quality, quantity, 
relevance, and manner (1989: 22–40). Indeed, Marie-Louise Pratt has shown 
that no matter how odd the textual structure of a narrative is, we will always 
try to read it as a purposeful and meaningful communicative act by utilizing 
the Gricean Cooperative Principle (Pratt 1977: 170–71). And, as I will show 
in what follows, we can use this (very basic) assumption to make filmic oddi-
ties more readable.
tHe HYPotHetiCal FilMMaker 
as a FraMe oF readiNg: the strange Case of Lost Highway
In this section, I show that the concept of the hypothetical filmmaker may 
serve as a frame of interpretation that helps us to make strange and incom-
prehensible experimental films such as David Lynch’s Lost Highway (1997) 
more readable. Lost Highway is a particularly strange and disconcerting film 
because it is full of unnatural, i.e., physically and logically impossible, sce-
narios or events (Alber 2009a: 80, 2009b). In this film, some of the characters 
are inexplicably transformed into other characters. Also, characters exist who 
can be at two different locations at the same time.21 In the words of Mur-
ray Smith, “appearance and reality are dislocated; motivations are obscure, 
cognitive dissonance disturbs the very foundations of narrative coherence; 
temporal and causal sequences become paradoxical” (2003: 159). As I show 
in what follows, the application of Alan Palmer’s continuing-consciousness 
frame to the characters but also to the film as a whole helps us to (at least 
partly) explain this odd narrative.
 Lost Highway opens with a sequence in which we see Fred Madison 
(Bill Pullman) in his house. Somebody rings the bell and, through the inter-
com, delivers the (apparently meaningless) message that “Dick Laurent is 
dead.” The film then introduces us to the tense atmosphere in the marriage 
 21. Inexplicable transformations of characters are physically impossible, while violations 
of the principle of non-contradiction are logically impossible (see also Doležel 1998: 165).
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between Fred, who works as a saxophone player, and his wife, Renée (Patri-
cia Arquette). Among other things, she does not want to go to his concert 
at the Luna Lounge. After the concert, he tries to call her but she does not 
answer the phone (either because she does not want to or because she is not 
there). In another scene, they have sex but he is obviously unable to satisfy 
her. Fred’s and Renée’s body language and their conversations (which are full 
of long and awkward pauses) also give us a clear sense of their alienation. 
“Renée’s desire is a source of unbearable agony for Fred, precisely because 
he has no idea what she wants, let alone how to give it to her” (McGowan 
2000: 54). The film underlines this feeling of discomfort by using a minimal-
ist décor, low-key illumination,22 and non-diegetic lugubrious string sounds. 
At one point, we witness a flashback in which Fred remembers that Renée 
left another concert by Fred together with a character called Andy (Michael 
Massee). When Fred then asks her how she got to know Andy, she remains 
extremely vague and tells him that Andy has offered her an unspecified “job.” 
Fred suspects Renée of having an affair, and he becomes so jealous that he 
eventually kills her.
 In his prison cell, Fred is mysteriously transformed into the car mechanic 
Pete Dayton (Balthazar Getty) who has an affair with Alice Wakefield. Inter-
estingly, Alice is played by Patricia Arquette, the actress who also plays 
Renée. One way of explaining Fred’s transformation and the existence of 
Pete’s parallel universe would be to argue that Fred re-experiences the tragedy 
of his marriage with Renée from a different perspective, and in his fantasy 
assumes the identity of Pete, who is in many senses diametrically opposed to 
him: Fred is a melancholy and lonely musician who does not seem to have 
any friends. Pete, on the other hand, is a promiscuous car mechanic (and 
also a small-time criminal) who has numerous buddies. Also, Pete goes out 
with Sheila (Natasha Gregson Wagner) and at the same time, he begins an 
affair with Alice who seems to be the fantasy version of Renée since both are 
played by the same actress, Patricia Arquette. In the second part of the film, 
Fred tries to achieve something he did not achieve in the first part, namely to 
gain power and control over (or solve the mystery of) Renée (who is “reincar-
nated” as Alice).
 The hypothetical filmmaker presents us with various clues that corrobo-
rate my hypothesis that the second part of the film enacts Fred’s fantasies. 
First of all, before the transformation, we see an opening curtain which con-
veys the idea that we are about to witness something staged, theatrical, or 
 22. “Low-key” illumination primarily correlates with a lack of lighting and is frequently 
used in horror films to create suspense (see Bordwell/Thompson 2003: 196).
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invented. Second, it is worth noting that the curtain opens to a shot of an 
exploding hut in the desert that runs backward: we see the exploding hut 
turning into a complete one. By using this backward-running shot, the film 
seems to tell us that we will learn how the hut came to explode, i.e., how the 
marriage between Fred and Renée came to be so unworkable that Fred finally 
killed his wife. Third, although the film contrasts the worlds of Fred and 
Pete through the use of lighting, colors, depth,23 and music,24 it remains very 
clear to us that the two worlds are related; the film establishes a connection 
between these worlds by having Patricia Arquette play both Renée and Alice, 
and by having Pete and Alice often speak the same dialogs as Fred and Renée. 
Fourth, when Fred realizes that, even in his role as Pete, he cannot under-
stand, “have,” or control Renée/Alice, the fantasy world begins to crumble 
and we return to the primary level of the film, i.e. Fred’s world.25 We can 
make sense of the film by applying Alan Palmer’s continuing-consciousness 
frame to the characters Fred/Pete and Renée/Alice (Pete and Alice are fantasy 
versions of Fred and Renée created in Fred’s mind), and we can also assume a 
continuing consciousness (the frame of the hypothetical filmmaker) that tries 
to communicate a meaningful message behind the film as a whole.
 At this point, one may wonder about the differences between the con-
cept of the implied filmmaker and the concept of the hypothetical filmmaker. 
I think the advantage of my concept is an ethical or moral one, namely a 
higher degree of honesty, modesty, and cautiousness. In contrast to Booth, I 
do not know for sure whether my reading correlates with the place “where 
the author wants [me] to stand” (1983: 73) and I do not know whether I have 
approximated the position of the authorial audience. I would like to suggest 
my reading as a hypothesis or speculation, and (as in everyday interaction) I 
want to allow for the possibility that I might be wrong. Nevertheless, I wish 
 23. “The first part (reality deprived of fantasy) is ‘depthless,’ dark, almost surreal, strange-
ly abstract, colorless, lacking substantial density, and as enigmatic as a Magritte painting, with 
the actors acting almost as in a Beckett or Ionesco play, moving around as alienated automata. 
Paradoxically, it is in the second part, the staged fantasy, that we get a much stronger and fuller 
‘sense of reality,’ of depth of sounds and smells, of people moving around in a ‘real world’” 
(Žižek 2000: 21).
 24. According to Smith, “the first half is dominated by a mixture of ‘dark ambient’ or 
‘illbient’ atmospheres, and ‘industrial’ music—recalling the soundtracks of Eraserhead and 
The Elephant Man. The second half shifts the emphasis to, on the one hand, a kind of lite jazz 
(best exemplified by Antonio Carlos Jobim’s bossa nova composition ‘Insensatez’), and on the 
other hand those gaudy cousins, ‘black’ metal, ‘death’ metal, and shock rock (in the form of 
tracks by Rammstein and Marilyn Manson)” (2003: 160).
 25. Since a seemingly supernatural event (Fred’s transformation into Pete) gets explained 
as a dream or fantasy, Lost Highway bears certain structural similarities to what Todorov calls 
“the uncanny” (1973: 41).
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to stress that the process of interpretation closely correlates with speculations 
about intentions.
 I would now like to speculate about the potential purpose or “point” 
of the parallel universe that Lost Highway projects. First of all, it is worth 
noting that in Fred’s fantasy world, Fred’s alter ego Pete has an affair with 
Alice. Alice, some kind of femme fatale, is the girlfriend of Mr. Eddy (Robert 
Loggia), a pornographer, and she also plays roles in his porn films. At one 
point, Alice tells Pete that Andy offered her a “job,” which consisted of tak-
ing her clothes off in front of Mr. Eddy while one of his gangsters put a gun 
to her head. Pete asks her why she did not decline and speculates that she 
actually “liked it.” Since we witnessed exactly the same dialog between Fred 
and Renée earlier on, the film here informs us that in its primary world, it 
was actually Fred’s wife Renée who accepted Andy’s job offer. Indeed, toward 
the end of the film, when we return to Fred’s world, we learn that Renée had 
an affair with the pornographer Dick Laurent, the equivalent of Mr. Eddy in 
Fred’s world (also played by Robert Loggia), and starred in his porn films. 
More specifically, we see Renée having sex with Dick Laurent in a room at 
the so-called Lost Highway hotel. Once Renée has left the hotel, Fred over-
powers Dick Laurent, throws him into the boot of his car, and then shoots 
him in the desert. This scene is followed by a sequence in which Fred rings the 
bell of his own house to speak the sentence “Dick Laurent is dead” into the 
intercom. That is to say, at the beginning of the film, Fred must have (at least 
unconsciously) known that “Dick Laurent is dead” because he had already 
killed him. I think that one can explain this logically impossibly scenario (in 
which Fred tells himself through the intercom that “Dick Laurent is dead”) as 
the visualization of an unconscious process. In other words, the images tell us 
that Fred knows that he killed Dick Laurent but represses this knowledge so 
that he is no longer consciously aware of it.
 As Fred begins to realize that, even in his role as Pete, he cannot “have” 
or control Renée/Alice,26 the fantasy world gradually dissolves. All the char-
acters disappear or are retransformed. At first, Pete’s girlfriend Sheila disap-
pears, and she is followed by Pete’s parents. Later on, when Pete and Alice 
have sexual intercourse in the desert, he tells her, “I want you, I want you,” 
to which she coldly responds, “You’ll never have me.” It is notably at this 
 26. As I have shown in Alber (forthcoming), Pete’s obsession with Alice borders on self-
destruction. At one point, she tells him that she will not be able to see him. Pete is full of 
despair, and the film cuts from a close-up of Pete’s face to a shot of moths inside a ceiling light, 
where they die in their attempt to fly into a light bulb. This juxtaposition involves cinematic 
metaphor and allows us to see Alice as the light and Pete as a moth in so far as he destroys 
himself in his desperate attempts to reach or possess her.
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point that Pete turns into Fred again. Fred’s second attempt to gain control 
over Renée did not work either, and as a consequence Pete is retransformed 
into Fred. Alice, on the other hand, walks into the hut and disappears like 
all the other characters. Lost Highway thus seems to argue that Fred should 
learn to let go and to accept things as they are because he will not be able to 
control Renée anyway. One potential message of the film might be that our 
desperate attempts to control others by understanding every aspect of them 
will not work out, and that we should thus refrain from trying to do so.
 There are two final aspects of this film that I would like to discuss in the 
context of my attempt to develop an interpretation of the film using the idea 
of hypothetical intentionalism, namely the identity of the spooky and devil-
like “Mystery Man” (Robert Blake) and the videotapes that Fred and Renée 
find on the stairs to their house. Both seem to be closely related to the prob-
lems that exist between Fred and Renée. To begin with, it is worth noting that 
the pasty-faced Mystery Man enters the world of the film through Renée, or, 
more specifically, through Fred’s vision of Renée. We first see this old man 
when Fred wakes up during the night, looks at his wife but instead of her face 
sees the face of the Mystery Man.27
 Later on, Fred talks to the Mystery Man at Andy’s party. The Mys-
tery Man tells Fred that he is in Fred’s house, and offers to call him there. 
Strangely enough, the Mystery Man, who stands before Fred, answers the 
phone in Fred’s house. When Fred asks him how this is possible, the old man 
replies, “You invited me. It is not my custom to go where I am not wanted.” 
The Mystery Man thus seems to embody Fred’s desire to be at two places at 
the same time to be able to gain absolute control over Renée (for instance, 
when he phones her after the concert and she does not answer the phone). In 
what follows, the movie (or the hypothetical filmmaker) establishes a close 
link between Fred and the Mystery Man. For example, both can be at two 
different locations at the same time: the Mystery Man can simultaneously 
stand before Fred at Andy’s party and answer the phone in Fred’s house. 
Similarly, at the end of the film, we see Fred telling himself through the inter-
com that “Dick Laurent is dead.” Also, the Mystery Man notably helps Fred 
to kill Dick Laurent. One way of explaining the existence of the Mystery 
Man would thus be to argue that he exists in Fred’s mind and constitutes 
some kind of materialization or embodiment of Fred’s desire to understand 
and control the split within Renée, i.e., her hidden desires and drives. In other 
 27. This superimposition involves cinematic metaphor and invites us to see Renée as the 
Mystery Man with the consequence that the beautiful woman becomes threatening, scary, and 
ugly. And, indeed, Renée is in a sense quite threatening for Fred: he cannot have a “normal” 
relationship with her because of her mysterious desires (Alber, forthcoming).
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words, we can explain the Mystery Man by attributing his existence to Fred’s 
unconsciousness. Anne Jerslev, on the other hand, reads the Mystery Man 
as “a personified, perverse visual principle” (2004: 161). This reading also 
makes sense if one extends this principle to all the men in the film. Interest-
ingly, both Fred/Pete and Mr. Eddy/Dick Laurent follow the desire to master 
the riddle of femininity through voyeuristic surveillance but ultimately fail.
 In the first part of the film, Fred and Renée find three different videotapes 
on the steps to their house. The first one depicts the exterior of their house; 
the second one presents a strange shot in which somebody walks into their 
bedroom and films them as they sleep; the third one shows Fred next to the 
mutilated corpse of his wife. These videotapes are disconcerting because we 
never learn where they come from. The most obvious answer is the Mystery 
Man, who, however, only exists in Fred’s mind. I would therefore like to 
argue that, like the Mystery Man, the videotapes are actually materializations 
of the problems that exist between Fred and Renée. And it is worth noting 
that their problems have got to do with both videotapes and the idea of sur-
veillance. Renée plays roles in Dick Laurent’s porn films, and this is arguably 
a severe problem for Fred.28 Fred, on the other hand, would like to observe 
every move that his wife makes in order to gain complete control over her.
 In other words, the film Lost Highway depicts psychological processes 
and problems as existing in the outside world where they can be filmed. 
Many shots in this film seem to convey the idea that internal processes can 
have very drastic consequences in the outside world, and that we should pay 
attention to them. Also, by confronting us with entities such as the Mystery 
Man and the videotapes, both of which cut across the distinction between 
“internal” and ”external,” the hypothetical filmmaker illustrates that it can 
be difficult to clearly separate illusion and reality. And this is particularly 
true of extreme emotional states like jealousy. One might argue that the film 
is ultimately about Fred’s feelings of jealousy and his desperate attempts to 
come to terms with them (through a fantasy of omniscience). The Mystery 
Man and the videotapes highlight that in extreme emotional states like jeal-
ousy, reality and illusion often become indistinguishable. As a matter of fact, 
the film puts us into a position that is similar to that of a jealous person: we 
frequently do not know what to believe or which images to trust. And this 
is another effect that I would like to attribute to the hypothetical filmmaker. 
The ultimate message of the film might be that like Fred, we should not fol-
low the human urge to create significance; we should rather learn to let go. 
 28. Colin Odell and Michelle Le Blanc also argue that the connection between these tapes 
and Pete’s world is “via video” (2007: 99).
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But it is worth noting that if we had not tried to impute intentions, we would 
not have arrived at this conclusion.
CoNClusioN
In this paper, I have looked at the process of cinematic narration from the per-
spective of hypothetical intentionalism. More specifically, I have redefined the 
process of cinematic narration as a complex process that involves the film’s 
inventers, the viewer, and the narrative designs used in the film. I argue that 
viewers try to make sense of films by applying Dennett’s intentional stance or 
Palmer’s continuing-consciousness frame to characters but also to films as a 
whole. This redefinition of cinematic narration has the following advantages. 
First, it does justice to the folk-psychological reasoning viewers typically use 
to make sense of films. Second, we can avoid the odd suggestion that we can 
determine the real or implied filmmaker’s intentions and motivations; in con-
trast to the implied author or filmmaker (Booth 1982: 21; Phelan 2005: 45), 
the hypothetical filmmaker is an emergent product of the interaction between 
narrative designs and processes of production and interpretation. Third, the 
concept of the hypothetical filmmaker can be used to replace the cinematic 
narrator, and it offers us a hierarchy that makes it possible for us to describe 
the complex functioning of cinematic narrative (including the phenomenon of 
cinematic unreliability). Fourth, the hypothetical filmmaker helps us to make 
experimental films such as David Lynch’s Lost Highway more readable. This 
particular film might argue that it makes no sense to try to control others, 
and that we should learn to let go. I would like to hypothesize that these ideas 
played a role in the production of the film, and attribute them to what I call 
the hypothetical filmmaker.29
 29. I wish to thank Johannes Fehrle, Monika Fludernik, Per Krogh Hansen, David Her-
man, Tilmann Köppe, Jim Phelan, Peter Rabinowitz, and the anonymous reader of the manu-
script for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
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Literary critics have long acknowledged that form is (a kind of) content 
and, as such, socially meaningful. Even scholars whose focus is hermeneu-
tic rather than poetic cannot wholly escape attending to the formal ele-
ments that shape—and arguably are—the text. It would seem, then, that 
narratologists and interpreters of narrative would acknowledge consider-
able common ground. Yet the relationship between narratology and studies 
of the novel—to take one example—still remains something of a standoff, 
and nowhere more vividly than on the turf of history. As Monika Fludernik 
observes, narratologists have demonstrated “comparatively little interest on 
a theoretical level in the history of narrative forms and functions” (2003: 
331). Conversely, scholars invested in the history of the novel tend to evince 
little more than passing interest in the novel’s changing formal practices. As 
Marjorie Levinson observes, the “historical turn” in literary studies, with 
its emphasis on texts as “documents” rather than “monuments” (to bor-
row René Wellek’s famous terms), has been accompanied by a rather widely 
acknowledged “eclipse” of form (Levinson 2007: 559, 566). Thus it would 
seem that, as Brian McHale willfully overstates it, “historicism represses nar-
ratology, just as [ . . . ] narratology represses history” (2005: 65). It is safe to 
speculate that typically, though of course not universally, the more histori-
cized a narrative project, the less likely it is to be narratological, and that the 
more narratological a project, the less likely it is to be historical.
 And yet some of the most important contributions to narrative stud-
ies are rich amalgams of poetics and history. I think of Erich Auerbach’s 
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inimitable Mimesis, which offers a history of techniques by which narrative 
has changed under the pressure of imitative representation. Or Ian Watt’s 
groundbreaking Rise of the Novel, which provides a brilliant delineation 
of “formal realism” as “the sum of literary techniques [ . . . ] whereby the 
novel embodies [a] circumstantial view of life” by providing “such details 
of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, [and] the particu-
lars of the times and places of their actions” (Watt 1957: 31–32). Or the 
concept of homology between the formal structures of literary texts and 
the economic conditions of society that we owe to such theorists as Georg 
Lukács and Lucien Goldmann. And I think of course of Bakhtin, whose 
explorations of the “dialogic imagination” are at once historicized and for-
malized, and of Fredric Jameson, whose Political Unconscious: Narrative as 
a Socially Symbolic Act (1981) arguably relies almost as much on Greimas 
as on Marx.
 Ansgar Nünning would seem to be right, then, in predicting that “the 
more narratological literary and cultural history becomes and the more his-
torically and culturally oriented narratology becomes, the better for both” 
(2000: 345). One recent model of just such a serious narratological inquiry 
that is also a serious literary history is Hilary Dannenberg’s Coincidence and 
Counterfactuality: Plotting Time and Space in Narrative Fiction (2008). My 
essay offers a more modest contribution to that aim by studying narrative 
form as sexual content in the context of lesbian—or what I prefer to call sap-
phic—literary history.1 I am of course far from the first to marry the study 
of lesbian representation with the study of narrative form: Marilyn Farwell’s 
Heterosexual Plots & Lesbian Narratives (1996) asks what counts as “les-
bian narrative” and explores lesbian subjectivity as it is constituted in a range 
of modern and postmodern incursions against a heterosexual masterplot; 
Judith Roof’s Come As You Are: Sexuality & Narrative (1996) investigates 
the reciprocal relationship of narrative and sexuality in twentieth-century 
Western discourse to ask what textual locations homosexualities can occupy; 
and a fruitful “Sexuality and Narrative” issue of Modern Fiction Studies 
(1995) likewise explored this imbrication. But these several works discuss 
twentieth-century texts almost exclusively and, like most studies of sapphic 
representations in the novel (Lisa Moore’s Dangerous Intimacies [1997] and 
George Haggerty’s Unnatural Affections [1999] for eighteenth-century Eng-
lish texts, and Sharon Marcus’s Between Women [2007] for Victorian narra-
 1. Terms such as “lesbian” and “sapphic” are equally problematic for exploring a histori-
cal sweep. I prefer “sapphic” in part for its emergence in the eighteenth century, the period that 
will constitute the central focus of this essay, and in part simply for its Verfremdungseffekt: it 
reminds us that sexuality, like narrative, is historically contingent.
188  Part II: Chapter 7
tives), focus primarily on plot and character. My own much briefer work on 
“Queering Narratology” (1996) does attempt to sharpen awareness of the 
significant place gender and sexuality might occupy in narration itself, but 
like these other studies, it remains essentially a project of synchrony.2
 My purpose here, in contrast, is both diachronic and formalist: to sketch 
the ways in which a particular cultural topos—in this case, female same-sex 
desire—may be linked with historically variable narrative practices. By look-
ing at the changing ways in which the sapphic operates narratively, I hope to 
suggest that we have something to learn about the history of sexuality from 
studying narrative form; conversely, by looking at the ways in which narra-
tive—and in particular narration—operates sapphically, I hope to suggest 
that we have something to learn about narrative tout court from its sapphic 
inscriptions. And in tracing the rudiments of an arc from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth century of one such structure, I will suggest that the intersections 
of narrative history with the history of sexuality make the case for both a 
more consciously historicized narratology and a more consciously narrato-
logical history of sexuality.3
 More specifically, I will explore a form of narrative intersubjectivity that 
I call the “sapphic dialogic,” in which erotic content is filtered through a 
(usually intradiegetic) female pairing of narrator and narratee. Attending to 
narration rather than only to narrated events allows me to argue that female 
same-sex desire underwrites both early pornography and, in more muted 
and unexpected ways, the courtship novel of the eighteenth century. Such 
a claim might well seem counterintuitive, for as many scholars have persua-
sively argued, the “rise” of the novel is swept up in the constitution of sexual 
difference and the consolidation of a heterosexual subject. And if, as Nancy 
Armstrong has famously argued, the “modern individual is first and foremost 
a woman” (1987: 4), certainly that woman—Pamela, Elizabeth Bennet, Jane 
Eyre—is defined by her place in a social order that is heterosexual as well as 
class-stratified. But reading narrative form as sexual content brings a more 
complex textual story—both in and of the novel—to light. Put differently, 
I am suggesting that what Michael McKeon has called the “secret history 
of domesticity” carries the deeper secret of domesticity’s dependence on the 
structural deployment of female same-sex desire.
 2. A somewhat lengthier version of this essay appears in Lanser (1998).
 3. Lisa Moore’s Dangerous Intimacies: Toward a Sapphic History of the British Novel 
(1997) nods to the potential for the sapphic to inflect the “rise” of the novel but does not take 
up this challenge more than in passing and not through an analysis of narrative form.
Lanser, “Sapphic Dialogics”  189
PorNograPHY aNd saPPHiC ForM
Mikhail Bakhtin has famously argued that “the speaking person and his [sic] 
discourse” (1981: 332) constitute the novel’s primary distinctiveness, and it is 
a commonplace that homodiegetic voice “rose” with the novel itself. It is also 
a commonplace that female voice characterizes many an eighteenth-century 
novel. But the prehistory of the novel’s homodiegetic practices turns out to be 
quite differently gendered. If we can trace the genesis of a work like Robinson 
Crusoe to such seventeenth-century genres as the spiritual autobiography and 
the traveler’s tale, it is worth noting that these forms relied almost exclusively 
on male voices.4 One of the few places where early modern literature does 
deploy female homodiegesis is in the formal dialogue, a genre that experi-
enced a dramatic resurgence in early modernity. While the preponderance of 
Renaissance dialogues remained true to the Platonic tradition of male inter-
locutors, female voices were put to two primary purposes, both of which 
entail transgressions of “woman’s place”: protofeminist discourses about 
the status of women and erotic conversations about sexuality. Both practices 
can trace their roots to Lucian’s Dialogues of the Courtesans of the second 
century c.e., to my knowledge the only classical instance that relies almost 
exclusively on the voices of women. Indeed, it is fair to say that the genres 
both of the querelle des femmes and of early modern pornography were born 
in female voice. Christine de Pisan’s Cité des dames (1405), which launched 
the querelle, relies entirely on the voices of “Christine” and her allegorical 
but explicitly female guides to the utopian women’s “city” to make its case 
for women’s contributions to history. Later instances of the querelle are more 
prone to relying on male voices, although Moderata Fonte’s Il merito delle 
donne (1600) breaks new ground by creating conversations among seven 
women friends who undertake a scathing critique of patriarchy, marriage, 
and men’s treatment of women.
 It is in the more clearly narrative of these two genres, however, that we 
find the most direct antecedent of female voice in the novel. In the final 
dialogue of Pietro Aretino’s Ragionamenti (1534), arguably Europe’s first 
post-classical pornographic fiction and one structured entirely as a series of 
conversations between women, a midwife/procuress describes to a wetnurse 
an illicit encounter that she has arranged between a married lady and her 
lover. But in an act of dialogic imagination, the midwife adds a sapphic nar-
rative layer to this heterosexual story by telling another woman what the 
 4. As Felicity Nussbaum argues in The Autobiographical Subject, women also produced 
spiritual autobiographies, but these were available only privately. Among others, Nussbaum 
mentions works by Elizabeth Bury, Mary Mollineux, Alice Thornton, and Elizabeth West.
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sight of a third woman—the adulterous wife who is undressing for her male 
lover—does to her. Re-presenting the view from her hiding place, and in effect 
occupying a focalizing position that aligns her with the man as he examines 
his paramour “carefully, in every nook and cranny,” the midwife rhapsodizes:
I saw her strip herself stark naked [ . . . ] for he examined her carefully 
[ . . . ]. My God, her neck! And her breasts, Nurse, those two tits would 
have corrupted virgins and made martyrs unfrock themselves. I lost my wits 
when I saw that lovely body with its navel like a jewel at its center, and I 
lost myself in the beauty of that particular thing, thanks to which men do so 
many crazy deeds [ . . . ]. The front parts of her body drove me wild, but the 
wonder and marvel which really drove me wild were due to her shoulders, 
her loins, and her other charms. I swear to you [ . . . ] that as I looked at her, 
I put my hand on my you-know-what and rubbed it just the way a man does 
when he hasn’t place to put it. (Aretino 2005: 341–42)5
In this moment, a heterosexual story produces, in effect, a second and quite 
sapphic narrative. And this stimulation of one woman’s desire when watch-
ing another is multiplied yet again when the midwife’s interlocutor, the nurse, 
is herself stimulated by listening to the midwife: “I feel, as you tell me all this, 
that sweet delight which you feel when dreaming that your lover is doing it to 
you and then awake just as you come” (Aretino 2005: 342). The arousal of 
women by women that happens on the level of narration thus depends on a 
heterosexual story, while the heterosexual story depends on the sapphic struc-
ture of its narration. The effect is dialogic not only in the formal but in the 
Bakhtinian sense: the heterosexual story becomes heteroglossic; it is capable 
of being turned into a homoerotic text, and the renowned “male gaze” is ren-
dered simultaneously female.
 It is fair to say that formally speaking, early modern pornography was 
born in this woman-to-woman narrative structure, and that what I call “sap-
phic dialogic” thus warrants recognition both in the history of sexuality and 
the history of narrative. I do not, of course, mean that actual lesbians by 
 5. For reference to this scene I am indebted to Denise A. Walen (2000). Aretino’s Italian 
original reads as follows: “la vidi spogliare ignuda [ . . . ] perchè egli la contemplò in ogni parte 
[ . . . ]. Un collo Iddio! Un petto balia! E due poccie da far corrompere i vergini, et da sfratare 
i martiri; io mi smarrii nel vedere il corpo con la sua gioia per elico in mezzo, e mi perdei ne la 
vaghezza di quella cosa, bontà de la quale si fanno tante pazie, tante nimicizie, tante spese, e 
tante parole; ma le coscie, le gambe, i piedi, le mani, e le braccia lodino per me chi sa lodarle. 
E non solo le parti dinanzi; lo stupore che mi cavò fuor del sentimento, uscì da le spalle, da 
le reni, e da l’altre sue galanterie. Io ti giuro per lo mio mobile, e lo do a sacco, al fuoco, e ai 
ladri, e ai birri, se non mi posi nel vederlo la mano a la cotale, menandomela non altrimenti 
che si menino i cotali da chi non ha dove intignergli” (Aretino 1979: 275).
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whatever name had anything to do with the construction of Aretino’s dia-
logues, which are doubtless written for the titillation of men and which also 
use transgressive women to expose a range of social and intellectual hypoc-
risies. But it is not insignificant that pornography takes this turn, for I will 
argue that the dialogic structuring of a heterosexual story through female 
same-sex narration becomes a significant practice not only overtly in seven-
teenth-century erotica, but covertly in eighteenth-century courtship narra-
tives. Aretino’s sapphic structure is thus a foundational practice in the history 
of European narrative as it edges toward the genre recognizable as the novel. 
We can readily see the more overtly erotic and the more conventionally chaste 
(and historically sequential) versions of this dynamic in two of the most pop-
ular erotic fictions of the 1680s, and again, if more chastely, in such novels 
by women writers as Eliza Haywood’s The Masqueraders; or, Fatal Curios-
ity (1724), Marie-Jeanne Riccoboni’s Lettres de Milady Juliette Catesby à 
Milady Henriette Campley, son amie (1759), Frances Sheridan’s Memoirs 
of Miss Sidney Bidulph (1761), and Eliza Fenwick’s Secresy, or The Ruin on 
the Rock (1796), and perhaps most tortuously in the two most famous nov-
els of the eighteenth century, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1747–48) and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1762). That we can 
also mark a relative endpoint to this practice of sapphic narration is equally 
significant.
 While the stories that Aretino’s midwife tells the nurse are not dependent 
on—but only back-inflected by—their sapphic narration, two erotic fictions 
of the 1680s, Nicolas Chorier’s L’Académie des dames ou la Philosophie dans 
le boudoir du Grand Siècle (c. 1680) and Jean Barrin’s Vénus dans le cloître, 
ou, La religieuse en chemise: entretiens curieux (1683), and several other 
texts to a lesser degree take sapphic narration beyond the imbrication of 
two temporalities to a “here-and-now” dynamic in which sapphic dialogue 
not only revises but constitutes the plot.6 That these texts are invested in the 
formal realism and especially the “chronotope” that characterizes modern 
fiction aligns what are otherwise loosely-plotted erotic encounters with the 
novel that will “rise” in their wake. L’Académie des dames consists of seven 
dialogues between the newly betrothed Octavie and her more experienced, 
 6. Texts with erotic content that use female-female narration during the same period 
include the anonymous L’école des filles, ou la philosophie des dames, printed multiple times 
from 1655 on and set forth in an English version as The School of Venus (1680); Ferrante 
Pallavicino’s La Retorica delle Puttane (1642 and 1671); the anonymous English contribution 
based upon Pallavicino, The Whores Rhetorick: Calculated to the Meridian of London; and 
conformed to the Rules of Art (1683); and, in a somewhat different vein, Bernard Mandeville’s 
The Virgin Unmask’d: or, Female Dialogues Betwixt an Elderly Maiden Lady and her Niece 
(1724).
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married cousin Tullie, who has come to teach her the sexual ways of the 
world. Vénus dans le cloître uses a similar structure to enact five dialogues 
between the innocent Soeur Agnes and the sexually experienced Soeur Angé-
lique. Both works circulated widely throughout Europe in their original lan-
guages and in translation; both discuss, describe and enact sex acts in the 
context of philosophically wide-ranging conversations; both texts deploy nar-
rative strategies that keep same-sex intimacy in motion throughout the text, 
even when heterosexual acts are being recounted or enacted; and both also 
resist closure by promising further sapphic encounters or by insisting that 
they live on in memory.
 These narratives take sapphic structure beyond Aretino’s retrospective 
and voyeuristic form; here the interlocutors are also the actors, and the tex-
tual events become inseparable from their narration. The narrator-characters 
effectively perform sex acts through speech acts: they discuss sex, report sex, 
and enact sex, mostly between one another and sometimes with men in one 
another’s presence, in a discourse that joins narration and action in a single 
chronotope. This is no external view such as the one through the peephole 
that allows Aretino’s midwife to participate in a man’s seduction of a woman; 
here both narrators and readers are located in effect within the sexual events. 
The merging of Erzählzeit (narrating time) and erzählte Zeit (narrated time), 
marked both by the “ahs” and “ohs” of sexual pleasure and by ellipses that 
signal ecstasy beyond language, sustains a sense that the represented acts are 
proceeding at something like the pace in which they would actually occur, cre-
ating a stimulating synchrony that makes sex available to readers as an expe-
rience and makes time “in effect, palpable and visible” (Bakhtin 1981: 250) 
in a way that the novel will come to depend on. Even heterosexual encoun-
ters are filtered through sapphic narration, effectively “queering” these fic-
tions’ ostensibly phallocentric plots. In effect, all sex becomes sapphic sex, 
and heteroerotic pleasure—for both characters and readers—is dependent on 
the sapphic word and gaze. Without denying that these fictions are man-made 
fantasies produced primarily for men’s pleasure, they nonetheless constitute a 
formal innovation in the gendering—and sexing—of narrative voice.
saPPHiC doMestiCitY
the eroticism of Confidence
Libertine fictions continue to proliferate, of course, in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Diderot’s La Religieuse (circulated in manuscript in 1760 but not pub-
lished until 1796) is easily read as an implicit revision of Vénus dans le cloître 
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(though with a single female narrator addressing a male narratee) and Sade’s 
Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795) as an explicit revision of L’Académie 
des dames (though with male as well as female dialogic voices). It is espe-
cially worth noting that England’s best-known indigenous libertine novel, 
John Cleland’s Fanny Hill or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1749), is 
structured as a sexual confidence between women: each volume begins with a 
salutation to an anonymous “Madam” whose “desires” Fanny considers “as 
indispensable orders” to provide the “stark naked truth” (39) even though 
she wishes her narratee would be “cloyed and tired” with the “repetition of 
near the same images, the same figures, the same expressions” in recounting 
the “joys, ardours, transports, ecstasies” in a narrative of which “the practice 
of pleasure [ . . . ] professedly composes the whole basis” (129). Clearly, this 
“practice of pleasure” constitutes on the level of narration the very relation-
ship between narrator and narratee.
 In terms of manifest content, these libertine fictions are rather distant 
from the domestic novels that dominate the eighteenth century. Yet Bakhtin 
reminds us that the novel is in a sense pornographic at its core: it is essentially 
the practice of prurience, “of snooping about, of overhearing ‘how others 
live’” (1981: 123). If, as the novel gets domesticated, it foregoes its most 
overtly pornographic “snooping,” then it seems to me all the more signifi-
cant that the structure of narration underlying so many libertine writings 
also sustains a major strand of the domestic novel. For I will argue that the 
convention of sapphic interlocutors set in motion by libertine fiction finds a 
muted counterpart in one of the most common narrative devices of the court-
ship novel: the device of confidantes whose letters, journals, or conversa-
tions place two women in a structurally erotic relationship in which same-sex 
secrets become the narrative vehicle for cross-sex desires. The sexual history 
of narrative form thus argues for a line of continuity between the libertine 
dialogues and the more decorous novels of desire that appear to affirm and 
even to celebrate a firmly heterosexual trajectory. In this way, the sapphic is 
not simply propelled by the novel but propels it, holding an originary place in 
the new narrative order from which the novel springs.
 We find a cautionary version of this structure in Eliza Haywood’s The 
Masqueraders or, Fatal Curiosity (1724). In a fiction that I would situate mid-
way between the libertine and the domestic, the rake Dorimenus seduces a 
willing widow named Dalinda to the apparent bliss of both. Yet for Dalinda, 
sex requires the supplement of its telling:
Whatever Company she happen’d to be in, she always found some pretence 
to make [Dorimenus] the Theme of her Discourse, and even among those 
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who were the greatest Strangers to him, would invent some way to introduce 
his Name—But all this fell short of the Satisfaction she wanted:—Her Soul, 
full of his Charms, wild ’twixt Desire and Transport, could not contain the 
vast Excess.—She long’d to impart the mighty Bliss. (13)
Here Haywood in effect sets up the primacy of narration over story as a sex-
ual practice. When Dalinda “pour[s] out the overwhelming Transport” (7) to 
her friend Philecta, her own narration of her sexual encounters is not merely 
mentioned but transcribed, and it occupies far more textual space than the 
heterodiegetic narrator’s initial account of those acts. Moreover, the narra-
tion is explicitly represented as an erotic experience: while Dalinda “related 
to [Philecta] the particulars of her Happiness,” she
[ . . . ] felt in the delicious Representation, a Pleasure, perhaps, not much 
inferiour to that which the Reality afforded [ . . . ]. She no sooner parted 
from [Dorimenus’s] Embraces, than she flew to her fair Friend, gave her the 
whole History of what had pass’d between them—repeated every tender 
Word he spoke—not the least fond Endearment was forgot—describ’d his 
Looks—his melting Pressures—his Ardours!—his Impatiences!—his Exta-
sies!—his Languishments!—and endeavour’d to make her sensible how 
different he was from other Lovers!—how much beyond his Sex!—with 
what a God-like Sublimity of Passion he ador’d her!—and what was more 
prodigious than the rest, assur’d her, that each Enjoyment but encreased 
Desire. (14)
Here we have a sapphic supplement that turns the heterosexual event, struc-
turally speaking, into sex “between women,” so that the narrative becomes 
the story of the pleasure both of (hetero)sexual act and (homo)sexual dis-
course. But if Dalinda needs narration to supplement story, the supposedly 
dependable but, it turns out, envious confidante needs story to supplement 
narration: she uses what Dalinda has told her in order to lure Dorimenus to 
herself, her “fatal curiosity” thereby turning narration back into plot. Philec-
ta’s ruin is likewise doubly an effect of story and narration; after she becomes 
pregnant, it is less the pregnancy than Dalinda’s exposure of Philecta’s 
betrayal that ultimately destroys Philecta: “The Affair shall be no Secret—I 
will, at least, have the satisfaction of Revenge” (40). The tragic outcome of 
this particular structure of narration takes us far from the collusive eroticism 
of the libertine fictions I have discussed above; indeed, one could argue that 
Haywood’s representation serves as a cautionary tale locating female inter-
locutors as rivals for men rather than erotic partners. That the sapphic struc-
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ture is enclosed within a heterodiegetic narrative both fosters and symbolizes 
the unreliability of female confidence.
 More domesticated and subtler deployments of same-sex narrative con-
fidence structure two midcentury novels by women: Marie-Jeanne Ricco-
boni’s Lettres de Milady Juliette Catesby à Milady Henriette Campley, son 
amie (1759) and Francis Sheridan’s Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph (1761). 
Riccoboni’s epistolary novel is effectively a one-way correspondence from 
Juliette to her confidante Henriette, narrating Juliette’s flight from Lord Oss-
ery, to whom she had been secretly engaged but who had abandoned her to 
marry another. Ossery’s wife has died, and he is now pursuing Juliette in an 
effort to explain himself; it turns out that he did not love his wife but mar-
ried her as the honorable response to a peccadillo. After Juliette yields to her 
own desire and marries him, it is Ossery who writes the news to Henriette, 
appropriating Juliette’s pen and effectively silencing her to tell Henriette that 
there is no longer a “Lady Catesby,” but “if in place of this friend so dear 
to your heart you’ll accept a new one, then Lady Ossery is ready to receive 
your warm congratulations” (172–73; translation mine). Ossery is emphatic: 
Juliette is now “mine, forever mine. No more Lady Catesby; she’s my wife, 
my friend, my mistress” (173). But Juliette recovers her pen from Ossery to 
suggest that she is not simply “forever his”: the novel’s last avowal of love is 
for the confidante: “We await you impatiently here: no parties, no balls, with-
out my dear Henriette; I would say no pleasures, if the person who is follow-
ing my pen with his eyes were not already a little jealous of my tender amitié” 
(39).7 In the final narration, in contradistinction to the apparent plot, it is 
the husband who gets abandoned and the female friendship that gets the last 
word. Juliette Catesby thus participates in the extensive revisionist project 
which I have discussed elsewhere (Lanser 1998–99), that gives to friendship 
between women the primacy that classical and early modern writers from 
Aristotle to Montaigne accorded friendship between men.
 The same-sex intimacy sustained by narration more vividly overtakes the 
cross-sex intimacy that dominates the plot of Frances Sheridan’s Memoirs of 
Miss Sidney Bidulph. Constructed as journal written for Cecilia, for whose 
“embrace” Sidney “longs” and to whom, in conventional fashion, “she 
revealed all the secrets of her heart,” Sidney Bidulph is built upon blatant 
trade-offs in the object of desire. Just as Cecilia leaves to go abroad, Sidney’s 
brother returns from abroad with Faulkland, the man with whom Sidney will 
fall in love. One might argue that the unacknowledged task of this novel, 
 7. In a fuller analysis of this novel in Fictions of Authority (1992: Ch. 2), I discuss the 
ways in which Ossery’s own narration undermines itself even before Juliette regains the pen.
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like the task that Freud assigns to female development and the task that the 
story of Iphis and Ianthe assigns to the gods, is to turn a woman’s intimacy 
with another woman into a socially mandated union with a man. If so, how-
ever, Sidney Bidulph demonstrates not the ease but the difficulties of such a 
transformation, for Faulkland will become Sidney’s husband only after a first 
marriage that turns tumultuous and ends tragically and a series of tribula-
tions that thwart her happiness with Faulklaud both before and after their 
(legally questionable) union. The novel’s maidenly title, Memoirs of Miss Sid-
ney Bidulph, provides a telling counterpoint to Sidney’s marriages.
 It is thus also significant that Sidney Bidulph retains its sapphic narrative 
structure to the end. In a reversal of the opening drama, Cecilia returns from 
the continent just after Faulkland again leaves for it. Although newly married 
at last to the man she has loved for so many years, Sidney still writes to Ceci-
lia that she “shall not be sorry if I am detained from Mr. Faulkland till I have 
the happiness of first embracing you, as our separation may be afterwards of 
a long continuance” (455). As it turns out, the separation of long—indeed 
permanent—continuance will be from Faulkland, as it is Cecilia who narrates 
Faulkland’s death, having “immediately on [her] arrival in London [ . . . ] 
fl[own] to the dear friend of [her] heart” and “found the dear Sidney alone, in 
her bed-chamber [ . . . ] prepared to receive me” (459). It is as if Faulkland’s 
death enables a new kind of marriage effected through the novel’s structure 
and affirmed by the fact that after this bedroom scene Cecilia takes over as 
narrator and completes Sidney’s text. In yet another exchange of narration 
and story, then, heterosexual marriage is replaced by a same-sex narrative 
union on the level of form.
 If it is possible to read the narrative structure of Juliette Catesby or Sidney 
Bidulph as attenuated and sanitized sapphic dialogue, then arguably the novel 
of domesticated heterosexuality has its narrational roots in the intimacy of 
sexual knowledge shared between women. These examples render marriage 
far from the simple “tomb of friendship” (24) that the fictional Eliza Whar-
ton of Hannah Foster’s The Coquette proclaims it—or that the historical 
Elizabeth Carter avowed when she lamented that “people when they marry 
are dead and buried to all former attachments” (I, 56–57). Indeed, in Sidney 
Bidulph, it is heterosexuality itself that ends up “dead and buried.” Such is 
also the case with Eliza Fenwick’s Secresy (1796), which uses the structure 
of confidence to create a more openly erotic intimacy between Caroline, the 
text’s primary narrator, and Sibella, its primary character, within a convoluted 
plot of multiple desires: Sibella’s for the libertine Clement, the sensitive Arthur 
Murden’s for Sibella, Caroline’s for Murden. Through it all, the relation-
ship between Caroline and Sibella is manifestly eroticized through Caroline’s 
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overtly physical rhapsodies over Sibella and reciprocated in Sibella’s emo-
tional dependence on Caroline, in whose arms Sibella finally dies after bearing 
a stillborn child conceived with Clement.8 Narratively speaking, the sapphic 
is arguably the ultimate open secret in Secresy; the intimacy between Caroline 
and Sibella coexists uneasily enough with the triangulated plot for Caroline 
to report that others have noticed it. Fittingly, the novel’s last words conjoin 
the intimacy of narration with the intimacy of story, as Caroline grieves both 
Sibella and Murden: “I loved them both as I never loved man nor woman 
beside” (359).
 As novels like The Masqueraders and Secresy make clear, however, the 
distinction between (sapphic) narration and (heterosexual) story with which I 
have been working here does not entirely hold up. That is, the “events” that 
constitute the narration—i.e., the interactions between narrators and nar-
ratees that are in theory separable from the events of the story—are, in most 
of these instances, implicated in the turns of the plot. In a few cases—for 
example, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure and Juliette Catesby—the inti-
macy between women enacted through narration is little more than an over-
lay upon—rather than an altering factor in—a manifestly heterosexual story. 
But narration has a stronger connection to the plot of Sidney Bidulph and 
Secresy, and The Masqueraders, like L’Académie des dames and Vénus dans 
le cloître before it, is entirely dependent on the workings of same-sex confi-
dence. These variations suggest that the relationship between the dynamic of 
narration and the dynamic of plot in any given text is itself a variable worth 
further narratological scrutiny.
saPPHiC resurreCtioN aNd tHe tragiC turN
The trajectory in which sapphic narration ends up complicating a heterosex-
ual plot also characterizes, in ways too often overlooked, what are arguably 
the eighteenth-century’s two most important and popular domestic fictions, 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1747–48) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, 
ou la Nouvelle Héloïse (1762). Each of these epistolary novels structured 
through multiple intradiegetic voices features a female confidante (Anna 
Howe for Clarissa, Claire for Julie) who is herself resistant to marriage and 
professes an excess of love for the heroine. At the end of both novels, the 
confidante attempts to reclaim the heroine’s dead body for herself in a bed-
 8. I discuss this novel in passing, along with Clarissa and La Nouvelle Héloïse, in “Be-
feriending the Body” (1998).
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room scene with profound if differing implications for the novel’s inability to 
sustain a marriage plot. That the erotic relationships between Anna and Cla-
rissa and between Julie and Claire are under-attended by critics seems to me 
symptomatic of the ways in which scholars both of sexuality and of the novel 
have given short shrift to narrative form as textual content.
 Anna Howe’s pledges of love for Clarissa are threaded throughout Rich-
ardson’s long text: “I love thee as never woman loved another,” Anna pro-
fesses repeatedly. But Clarissa does not run off to, or off with, Anna nor does 
Anna come to Clarissa’s rescue (and the novel’s structure of letter-writing 
requires, of course, that the confidantes remain apart). In this way, Clarissa 
effectively renders the implications of Anna’s love insignificant on the level of 
story while requiring that love as a central feature of narration. Thus sepa-
rated from Clarissa for 1400 pages, Anna Howe turns up to make good on 
her loverly pledges only when Clarissa is a corpse. With heaving bosom, in 
what she herself calls a “wild frenzy,” Anna repeatedly kisses Clarissa’s lips, 
attempting “by her warm breath” to bring Clarissa back to life (1402–3). 
When Anna twice asks “is this all [ . . . ] of my Clarissa’s story!” (1402), she 
suggests that this is not all, that the female intimacy that has structured the 
narration cannot be killed off by the closure that Clarissa’s death implies.
 Julie’s cousin Claire is likewise set up early on as an intimate, in a desire 
that triangulates the relationships of Claire, Julie, and Julie’s lover Saint-
Preux and that culminates in Claire’s excess of grief when Julie contracts a 
fatal illness after rushing into cold waters to save her child. Rousseau makes 
the eroticism of the death scene even more explicit than does Richardson 
when Claire shares the dying Julie’s bed after exiling both the husband and 
the chambermaids. In a language that could be describing sex as readily as 
dying, unexplained “comings and goings” precede the “moans” that draw 
Julie’s husband, Monsieur de Wolmar, to the chamber, where he sees “the 
two friends motionless, locked in each other’s embrace; the one in a faint, and 
the other expiring.” Claire has to be dragged away and locked up to stop her 
from continuing to “thr[ow] herself upon [Julie’s] body, warm it with hers, 
endeavor to revive it, press it, cl[ing] to it in a sort of rage, call it loudly by a 
thousand passionate names” (602) and from literally going mad with grief.
 Both Anna and Claire attempt in the narration of their devastating loss 
to create a kind of sapphic after-plot: in the novel’s last letter, Claire insists 
that Julie lives on, that “her coffin does not contain all of her . . . it awaits the 
rest of its prey . . . it will not wait for long” (612; ellipses in original). And 
Anna Howe imagines that she and Clarissa may “meet and rejoice together 
where no villainous Lovelaces, no hard-harted relations, will ever shock our 
innocence, or ruffle our felicity” (1403). Thus two of the eighteenth-century’s 
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most widely read and now canonical novels embed a sapphic structure in 
which narration writes beyond the plot’s ostensible closure to turn death into 
a kind of same-sex marriage.
 With the exception of Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure and Juliette 
Catesby, in neither of which the confidante plays a substantive role in the nar-
rated events, all of the novels I have described as bearing a sapphic narrative 
structure end tragically. In this respect they differ both from the libertine fic-
tions of the seventeenth century, in which sapphic and heterosexual elements 
coexist quite cheerfully, and from a number of homoerotically-inflected eigh-
teenth-century novels with comic plots. Richardson’s Pamela and Sir Charles 
Grandison, Edgeworth’s Belinda, and Diderot’s La Religieuse, for example, 
all feature characters marked implicitly or explicitly as sapphic, and all of 
these novels require the forcible exclusion of the sapphic character through 
exile or alteration: Pamela’s leering Mrs. Jewkes turns innocuous; Grandi-
son’s mannish lover of women, Miss Barnevelt, is dropped from the narra-
tive; Belinda’s duelling feminist Mrs. Freke is symbolically castrated after she 
is caught in a “man-trap”; and the advances of the lesbian mother superior in 
La Religieuse become the last straw—implicitly worse than the cruel physical 
and psychological punishments of Suzanne’s previous abbess—that impels 
Suzanne’s narratee finally to intervene in order to get her out of the convent. 
None of these novels displays the sapphic structure of narration that I have 
discussed here; conversely, none of the eighteenth-century novels with sap-
phic narration, arguably excepting the Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, fea-
tures any character who is overtly marked, let alone mocked, as lesbian.9 The 
more covertly homoerotic courtship fictions that I have been discussing here 
seem less able to put their sapphic strains to rest. To be sure, the comic irony 
of Juliette Catesby’s final demurral has less operative force than the tragic 
irony of Anna Howe’s final reunion with Clarissa, and the difference between 
these endings may be related not only to major distinctions between comic 
and tragic fiction but to very different degrees of narrative agency: Henriette 
is but a silent receiver; Anna a major textual voice. Yet the divergent reso-
lutions of Juliette Catesby and Clarissa both locate the eighteenth-century 
domestic novel within an erotic nexus that is far from straightforward, and 
the fact that scholars so often pass over the sapphic potential of these endings 
 9. The character Phoebe in Cleland’s novel is marked by a queer pleasure in sexual en-
counters with women (as is the young Fanny herself before having heterosexual intercourse), 
but Fanny goes to some length to reassure her narratee that Phoebe “really” prefers male part-
ners even as she undermines that claim: “Not that she hated men or did not even prefer them 
to her own sex; but when she met with such occasions as this was, a satiety of enjoyments in 
the common road, perhaps to a secret bias, inclined her to make the most of pleasure wherever 
she could find it, without distinction of sexes” (1985: 49–50).
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may remind us of the shared investment in heteronormativity that character-
izes our own century and that we may be too stringently reading back into 
the eighteenth century. For the story of the heterosexual subject, which the 
eighteenth-century novel has seemed bent on consolidating, is also the story 
of the incompleteness or sometimes even the failure of that consolidation, an 
incompleteness arguably produced not only by blatant moves against queer 
subjects such as Miss Barnevelt but also by structures in which the narration 
of erotic pleasure and erotic danger is filtered through the intimacy between a 
female narrator and her female narratee.
Heterodiegesis aNd HeteroseXual PlottiNg
In linking the erotically muted courtship novel with the blatantly sapphic 
dialogues of early pornography, I am not claiming any direct lineage, though 
the possibility of influence cannot be wholly ruled out. Rather, I am suggest-
ing that the sapphic gets put in motion as an early modern problem that is 
intimately tied both to the project of the novel and to the broader cultural 
challenge of regulating the regimes of gender and sexuality to which the novel 
is indentured. That Clarissa, Julie, and Sibella must be killed off, Dalinda 
and Philecta done in and Sidney Bidulph widowed, sometimes in ways that 
give female confidantes an entry point into the plot, suggests that as the eigh-
teenth-century continues, the discursive project of regulating sexual subjectiv-
ity through the novel might be growing not simpler but more complex.
 No wonder, then, that the nineteenth-century novel expunges the dialogic 
structure of female confidence, as if heterosexual subjectivity requires a wall-
ing off of same-sex narration even more complete than of same-sex event. It 
may be no accident, for example, that the heterodiegetic narrator’s strongest 
affirmations of sisterly intimacy in Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility and 
Pride and Prejudice occur at the end of these novels, after the sisters are safely 
married off. More pointedly, it is worth remembering that Elinor Dashwood 
says almost nothing to Marianne of her feelings for Edward and that even the 
ebullient Marianne speaks only what and when she must about her relation-
ship with Willoughby. Elizabeth Bennet likewise holds back so much of her 
belated desire for Darcy that her ostensible confidante Jane is as surprised as 
Mr. and Mrs. Bennet when Elizabeth agrees to marry him. What in light of the 
novel’s history amounts to a wary withholding of female intimacy on the level 
of narration becomes all but completed in a novel like Jane Eyre, in which the 
confidante is an anonymous and voiceless reader and Jane’s beloved friend 
Helen Burns has been killed off (perhaps so that Jane herself may live, since 
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as Jane puts it, “I was no Helen Burns” [59]). While I would agree with Lisa 
Sternlieb that in Jane Eyre “the reader is repeatedly pitted against Rochester 
for Jane’s affections” and that “she woos her reader as Rochester has wooed 
her” (475), these qualities make the genderlessness of Jane’s “dear reader” all 
the more significant.10 It is only a step from Jane’s anonymous narratee to the 
“you” that is “merely dead paper” to which the narrator of Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman’s “The Yellow Wall-Paper” (1892) addresses her words, or for that 
matter to the narrative form of Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’ Diary (1996), 
whose narrator does not explicitly address even a paper narratee even though 
some kind of narratee is, of course, implied.
 These examples suggest that the arc of what I am calling the sapphic 
dialogic reaches its most explicit form in the seventeenth century, becomes 
sexually muted in the eighteenth, and all but disappears by the nineteenth 
century. I am not arguing, of course, that the sapphic itself disappears with it. 
Sharon Marcus is right to say that the Victorian novel does not negate bonds 
between women, though I would not quite agree that “almost every Victorian 
novel that ends in marriage has first supplied its heroine with an intimate 
female friend” (76). I read the coexistence of female friendship with the mar-
riage plot as a sign of the consolidation of heterosexuality, all the more as it 
is the shared desire for a specific man that sometimes most unites the women 
(Middlemarch, as Marcus shows us, is a case in point). I suggest, however, 
that because these female intimacies are rendered in extradiegetic and often 
also heterodiegetic narration, they are better able to remain instrumental 
rather than to offer resistance to the heterosexual marriage plot. By contrast, 
in both the libertine fictions and domestic novels I have been discussing, at 
least one of the female interlocutors is assigned or enacts a protofeminist cri-
tique of men and/or marriage. Anna, Claire, Juliette, Philecta, and Caroline 
all make clear their resistance to some domestic or patriarchal status quo.
 It is also worth recognizing that this textual pattern of same-sex dialog-
ics, while produced by male as well as female writers, is gendered female: 
the male-male homoerotic dialogue or structure of intersubjective confidence 
does not take root in the novel in the same way. One could argue, of course, 
that the dialogue form enacted between two or more male interlocutors lies 
firmly at the heart of the “Western tradition,” given its primacy as Plato’s 
great structuring technique and its subsequent use in myriad dialogues across 
literary history. And, as Robert Sturges points out, male-male dialogue struc-
tures several important discourses on male friendship, from Cicero’s to that 
 10. I discuss the narrative strategies of Jane Eyre more fully in Fictions of Authority (1992: 
176–93).
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of the twelfth-century cleric Aelred to the seventeenth-century pederastic dia-
logue of Rocco’s L’Alcibiade fanciullo a scola (1651), in which, says Sturges, 
the dialogue mode once again becomes “a form of seduction” as it was in 
Plato’s Lysis (138). The dialogic mode continues without much erotic con-
tent in Diderot’s philosophical fictions (Le Rêve d’Alembert, Le Neveu de 
Rameau), but it is otherwise a rare phenomenon among novels of the eigh-
teenth century. It is uncommon even in men’s works for a male narrator to 
address a male narratee to recount erotic desires or deeds, though one might 
consider the (ultimately competitive) ways in which Clarissa functions as a 
love object in the correspondence between Lovelace and Belford, and one 
must also, of course, recognize those rarer novels from Aphra Behn’s Love 
Letters Between a Nobleman and His Sister (1688) to Pierre Choderlos de 
Laclos’s Les Liaisons dangereuses (1784) in which sexual secrets are the stuff 
of male-female confidence.
 On the whole, then, it is not through intradiegetic narration that the 
novel engages male-male desire, with the slight exception of Goethe’s Die 
Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774), at least until Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
(1817), in which men (the creature, Victor) talk to men (Victor, Walton) and 
in which the first-level narrator Walton, while writing to his (silent) sister, 
speaks passionately of his desire for intimacy with a man. Those eighteenth-
century narratives in which men recount erotic experience are more likely to 
be directed to extradiegetic narratees who stand in for the public reader. Such 
a difference in gendered narrative patterns is plausible given the fact that men 
are culturally more authorized to speak to a “public” both in general and 
about the erotic in particular.
 This by no means signifies an absence of male homoeroticism in the 
eighteenth-century novel; such a claim would be patently false, as numer-
ous scholars have shown.11 Rather, I am claiming a more limited and less 
frequently erotic presence of male-male narrative interlocutors during the 
period in which the novel “rose.” In short, it is safe to say that the male-
male dialogic has a quite different trajectory from the sapphic structure that I 
have been discussing. This difference reminds us not only that the eighteenth-
century novel genders both the structures of desire and the mechanisms of its 
narration, but that, as I have argued elsewhere and often, narration itself has 
gendered properties.12
 In arguing for sapphic form as an underpinning of the eighteenth-century 
novel’s domestic agenda, I also hope to have shown that narrative form can 
 11. See, for example, MacFarlane and Haggerty.
 12. I make this argument in several essays, most recently in “Sexing the Narrative” (1995) 
and “Queering Narratology” (1996).
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function as novelistic content and that the novel’s history of sexuality thus 
needs to encompass a history of form. Nor should narration be considered 
the only element—though I believe it remains a central and underexplored 
one—in which form arguably embeds what manifest content seems to be 
overlooking or even contradicting. The ways in which several of the novels 
I have been discussing write “beyond the ending,” to take a phrase from 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis, suggests, for example, that the formal qualities of plot 
embodied in narrative order and narrative time might also be fruitful loca-
tions for a history of the novel and its sexualities. Years after Helen’s death, 
Jane Eyre has the word Resurgam—“I shall rise again”—engraved on her 
friend’s tomb. This textual detail gives the story of Jane and Helen a kind 
of afterlife metaphorically related to that accorded female intimacy through 
its reappearance after the resolution of the marriage plots in several of the 
novels I have been discussing. In this spirit, we might speculate that what nar-
rative content “killeth” may likewise find a Resurgam in narrative form. It is 
my hope that such prospects will challenge historicism no longer to repress 
but rather to welcome narratology, and narratology likewise to welcome his-
tory. Both fields have little to lose and much to gain from such a new dialogic 
relationship.
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Girard’s thesis of mimetic desire (also called “triangular” or “metaphysical” 
desire)1 has aroused much theoretical interest among literary scholars, who 
have expanded and expounded his theory, while at the same time criticiz-
ing its universal pretensions and its blurring of differences between different 
types of desire (e.g., male vs. female, heterosexual vs. homosexual).2 Literary 
interpretations that apply Girard’s ideas from his work Deceit, Desire, and 
the Novel (1965) to fictional narratives focus on the dynamics of mimetic 
desire and rivalry between two (or more) characters on the story level: the 
desiring subject, the mediator (or rival), and the desired object.
 In this essay, I wish to examine the relations between story and narra-
tion3 in connection with the triangular structure of desire and to demonstrate 
how mimetic rivalry can function between narrators and narratees. I claim 
that narration may affect mimetic desire in contradictory ways: on the one 
hand, narration may reinforce and perpetuate mimetic desire, both through 
 1. The terms “mimetic desire” and “triangular desire” are clearly equivalents, since the 
structure of mimetic desire—desiring subject-mediator-desired object—is triangular. The term 
“metaphysical desire” originates in Girard’s claim that “[a]s the role of the metaphysical grows 
greater in desire, that of the physical diminishes in importance. As the mediator grows nearer, 
passion becomes more intense and the object is emptied of its concrete value” (1965: 85).
 2. See, for instance, Dee (1999), Klarer (1991), Kofman (1980), Moi (1982), Morón 
Arroyo (1978), Sedgwick (1985).
 3. My distinction between “story” and “narration” is based on Rimmon-Kenan, made 
“in the spirit of Genette’s distinction between ‘histoire,’ ‘récit’ and ‘narration’ (1972: 71–6)” 
(2001: 3).
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the re-experiencing of past events and through the mimicry of the media-
tor while relating the story; on the other hand, narration may clash with 
mimetic desire. In this case, the relations between narrator and narratee rep-
resent a possible world in which mimetic desire no longer exists. I conclude 
with remarks on the possible contribution of Girard’s notion of metaphysi-
cal desire to narratology, specifically to the analysis of the interconnections 
between autodiegetic narrators, their narratees, and the main character(s) in 
their story.
 Two qualifications for the argument are required at this preliminary stage: 
first, since mimetic desire can obtain only between subjects or characters that 
are structured as subjects, it can operate on the level of narration only if both 
the narrator and the narratee are personalized. In other words, my line of 
reasoning is applicable only for narratives in which the narrator and the nar-
ratee are also characters in the story or, at the very least, have some human 
properties such as gender, social status, or a system of beliefs. Thus the type 
of narratee under consideration differs significantly from the theoretical con-
struct that Gerald Prince terms “a degree-zero narratee,” which has neither 
personality nor any particular experience of the world (1973: 181–82, 1985; 
see also Piwowarczyk 1976).
 Secondly, mimetic desire can exist on the level of narration insofar as there 
is a story at that level or mimetic desire motivates the narration and the nar-
rator’s appeal to a narratee (this point will be clarified in my interpretations 
of specific narratives). In such stories, there are significant similarities and 
contrasts between the theme of mimetic desire in the story and the narrator-
narratee relation (see Chatman 1978: 259). Hence in discussing narration, I 
do not refer to the minimal function of any narrator to recount events and 
situations, which Genette names “the properly narrative function” (1980: 
255). Instead, mimetic desire on the level of narration is closely related to 
another function of the narrator, which Genette calls “the function of com-
munication” (256) and which echoes Jakobson’s phatic and conative func-
tions (1960: 357). In the narratives that I shall discuss, “the absent presence 
of the receiver becomes the dominant (obsessive) element of the discourse” 
(Genette 1980: 256).
girard’s NotioN oF MiMetiC desire
Girard sharply distinguishes between his notion of mimetic desire and the 
notion of desire in the romantic literary tradition. The romantic conception 
presents desire as spontaneous, that is, as a direct, linear connection between 
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the desiring subject and the desired object (1965: 16–17, 29–39, 269). By 
contrast, according to Girard’s triadic model, the subject does not desire the 
object in and for itself, but the desire is mediated by another subject who 
possesses, or pursues, this object. This other subject, the mediator, is at the 
same time admired by the desiring subject as a model, in extreme cases even 
as a human God (61), and despised as an obstacle in achieving the object. 
The desiring subject fallaciously presents his4 own desire as both logically and 
chronologically original and the desire of the mediator as derivative, i.e., as 
emanating from the desiring subject’s desire.
 Girard believes that metaphysical desire is in principle insatiable: each 
time the desiring subject succeeds in achieving the desired object, he becomes 
disappointed and frustrated because he realizes that it is not really what he 
has coveted. The reason for this constant disappointment is that the sub-
ject cannot overcome his initial loss of self-respect and self-assurance caused 
by the painful recognition that he is not divine, namely, that he is not self- 
sufficient. In his attempt to compensate for this lack, the subject believes that 
he can achieve self-sufficiency if he is able to have the objects that his media-
tor possesses. The obsession of the desiring subject with obtaining objects 
turns him into a slave of his unrealizable desire.
 The most crucial distinction within the category of metaphysical desire is 
between external and internal mediation. External mediators are spiritually, 
socially, and intellectually distant from the subject who imitates them and 
desires the same objects to such an extent that they do not inhabit the same 
world and therefore cannot engage in rivalry. For instance, Amadís de Gaula 
is the external mediator of Don Quixote, since the real knight and his zeal-
ous follower inhabit separate worlds and are spiritually and socially distant 
from each other.5 By contrast, the desiring subject and his internal mediator 
in Dostoevsky’s novels inhabit the same world, are closely related spiritually 
and are often members of the same family.6 The great spiritual distance that 
 4. I avoid using “he or she” when referring to the desiring subject and his rival for two 
reasons. First, although Girard’s theory purports to be universal and valid for both sexes, the 
great majority of the examples of mimetic desire that he provides are novels written by male 
authors and featuring male rivals and a woman as the “desired object.” Second, the novels 
discussed in this essay comprise, even more so than those chosen by Girard, almost exclusively 
male characters. Yet unlike Girard and like most of his feminist critics, I do not assume that 
male and female desire necessarily fit into the same structure.
 5. Amadís de Gaula was, according to the four-volume narrative written by Garci Ro-
dríguez de Montalvo, the illegitimate child of King Perión of Gaul and Elisena of England and 
was raised by the knight Gandales. Unlike Amadís, Don Quixote, originally named Alonso 
Quixano, was a country gentleman who lived in an unnamed section of La Mancha with his 
niece and a housekeeper.
 6. For instance, Andrei Versilov and his illegitimate son Arkadi Dolgoruky (the narrator) 
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characterizes external mediation tallies with an emotional distance, hence 
external mediation does not produce rivalry. By contrast, internal media-
tion generates rivalry between the desiring subject and his mediator, which 
becomes more passionate and destructive as the distance between them is 
reduced (8–9, 85–88). Another significant difference between external and 
internal mediation is that the subject of the first type openly admits his desire, 
whereas the subject of the second type makes great attempts to conceal it, 
since he believes that if his mediator knows what his desire is, the mediator 
will prevent him from achieving it.
 Girard further claims that all great novels7 show the futility of mimetic 
desire by transcending the obsession from which it has sprung (Girard 1965: 
300). This final phase of moral recognition, which resembles anagnorisis in 
tragedies, provides novels with a sense of closure that liberates both the hero 
and his creator from the agony of delusions: “When he renounces the decep-
tive divinity of pride, the hero frees himself from slavery and finally grasps 
the truth about his unhappiness. There is no distinction between this renun-
ciation and the creative renunciation. It is a victory over metaphysical desire 
that transforms a romantic writer into a true novelist” (307).
 Narration as the perpetuation of triangular desire challenges Girard’s 
claim that every great novel ends with the surmounting of desire, that is, 
with the conversion of the desiring subject, who recognizes that his desire 
is destructive.8 Conversion is a historical convention that was prominent in 
nineteenth-century novels, which constitute the hard core of Girard’s analy-
sis; this convention was increasingly subverted by novels from the twentieth 
century. In the novels and novellas that will be analyzed in this essay—Günter 
Grass’s Cat and Mouse (Katz und Maus), Jean Genet’s The Thief’s Journal 
(Journal du voleur), and Albert Camus’ The Fall (La chute)—there is either 
no conversion at all or only a partial conversion (in the case of La chute, it is 
misleadingly presented as a complete conversion).
 The issue of conversion is only one manifestation of the way in which 
Girard’s choice to focus on a specific corpus of novels rather than another 
has affected his theoretical insights. Most of the novels that he discusses, 
written by Cervantes, Flaubert, Stendhal, Proust, and Dostoevsky, feature an 
external (extra-heterodiegetic) narrator who does not participate in the story 
in Dostoevsky’s A Raw Youth both fall in love with Katerina Nikolaevna Akhmatova, the 
widow of an army officer. It turns out that Arkadi’s love for Akhmatova is an imitation of his 
father’s, whom he at the same time venerates and detests.
 7. Girard has been justly criticized for confusing descriptive and normative categories 
(see Moi 1982: 23).
 8. Girard never defines the term “conversion,” but its religious undertones are clear (see 
1965: esp. 293–94).
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and is not personally involved in the events. This non-personalized narrator is 
detached from the mimetic desire that dominates fictional characters. Proust’s 
A la recherche du temps perdu is of course an exception, but even in this case, 
Girard does not distinguish between story and narration when discussing 
mimetic desire. In other words, he does not distinguish between the internal 
focalization of Marcel as character and the external, retrospective, and self-
reflexive focalization of Marcel as narrator. By contrast, I wish to concentrate 
on narratives in which the narrator is both the main character (or one of the 
two main characters) in the story and the “desiring subject.” These narratives 
foreground several ways in which narration can be associated with triangular 
desire.
 Not many novels answer the three criteria which govern my inquiry: hav-
ing a personalized narrator, a personalized narratee, and a story on the level 
of narration (or a relationship between a narrator and a narratee that directly 
addresses the issue of desire). The three fictional narratives that will be dis-
cussed in what follows were chosen because they dramatize the ambivalent 
relations between the narrator and the narratee—admiration and hostility, 
attraction and repulsion—which are inherent in mimetic desire. Each of these 
narratives manifests a specific type of mediation and desire on the level of 
narration, which is intricately connected to the level of the story.
 Although Girard’s Deceit, Desire, and the Novel is a well-known work, it 
has not received as much attention from literary scholars as have other theo-
ries of desire, in particular that of Jacques Lacan. Girard’s Catholicism, his 
partly unjustified reputation as a political reactionary, and what is perceived 
by some as the reductiveness of his theory—which is accused of boiling down 
all cultural and historical phenomena into one underlying structure—have 
stood in the way of a more precise examination of his ideas (see Golsan 1993: 
111–24). This essay is an opportunity to promote interest in Girard’s insights 
and their great explanatory power.
 I wish to emphasize at the outset the strengths of a Girardian analysis in 
comparison with an analysis based on Lacan’s theory of desire. According to 
Lacan, desire emerges from the primary splitting of the ego and the inevitable 
failure of the subject to return to a fictive originary state—signified by the 
Real—of undisturbed unity with the (m)other (see Fryer 2004: 92–94). Gen-
et’s narrative is especially amenable to this type of explanation owing to the 
salient motif of the absent mother (e.g. 21–22), which a Girardian reading 
does not account for, but the other two narratives can at the most generate 
speculations about the infantile source of lack and desire. Girard’s argument 
that desire necessarily fails because there is always another rival whose being 
cannot be completely appropriated proves more productive in these cases. 
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Moreover, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s interpretation of Girard (1985: esp. 
21–25), which emphasizes the concealed homosocial relations between the 
desiring subject and his rival in Girard’s structure of triangular desire, is par-
ticularly illuminating for narratives that highlight the ambivalent relations 
of admiration and hostility between male characters.9
cat and Mouse
The mimetic rivalry between Pilenz—the narrating character10—and Mahlke 
is the major theme of Günter Grass’s novella Cat and Mouse (1961). Pilenz 
belongs to a group of adolescents who mimic each other in an uncompli-
cated way. Their social interaction never develops into real competition or 
rivalry and helps to retain the unity of their small community. When Mahlke, 
Pilenz’s idiosyncratic schoolmate (on the story level) and his narratee on the 
level of narration, joins the group, his unique appearance and conduct at the 
same time attract and repel Pilenz. Mahlke seems to belong to the group in 
certain respects but transgresses its borders in others; this feels threatening 
to Pilenz, because it signifies instability and undermines his ostensibly secure 
world.11 Pilenz admires Mahlke for his apparent self-sufficiency as well as 
 9. A thorough examination of the points of convergence and divergence between the 
Lacanian and the Girardian conceptions of desire is far beyond the scope of this essay. This 
territory has been covered in part by Meloni (2002). Nonetheless, I wish to raise some ideas 
about this issue. Lacan’s theoretical assumptions are based on Freud’s, whereas Girard, though 
influenced by Freud, is critical of psychoanalysis. However, both Lacan and Girard have ana-
lyzed desire as insatiable, marking a lack in being that can never be filled. Accordingly, each 
of them concludes that the subject will never achieve complete satisfaction (Braunstein [2003]; 
Ragland-Sullivan [1995]). Lacan’s model of desire, like Girard’s, is based on intersubjectivity, 
that is, on a triadic structure (Meloni [2002]; Grigg [1991: 110]). Yet Girard takes a negative 
view of metaphysical desire and argues that it should be surmounted, whereas for Lacan desire 
is a necessary condition for the creation of the imaginary and the symbolic registers, hence 
also for the generation of representation and meaning and for the structuration of the subject 
(Sullivan [1995]).
 10. In using the term “narrating character,” I presuppose that there is at least a minimal 
psychological continuity between the autodiegetic narrator as narrator and as character, even 
if this continuity is replete with ruptures, splits, and fissures. Although classical narratologists 
such as Genette and Rimmon-Kenan supposed that their distinctions and classifications are 
devoid of psychological assumptions, it seems that they too presuppose such continuity in the 
very terms “homodiegetic” and “autodiegetic” narrators (see Genette [1980: 245]; Rimmon-
Kenan [2001: 96–97]).
 11. For a more detailed study of narratives featuring an individual whose idiosyncrasy and 
refusal to conform subverts the norms of the group, see Marcus (2008). However, whereas the 
essay in question focuses on the discursive aspects of such narratives, Mahlke challenges Pilenz 
and his friends by his behavior and his disproportioned body rather than by an exceptional 
discourse.
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for his charisma, resoluteness, and unconventional behavior (Grass 1961: 
24–26).12
 Although Mahlke participates in certain communal activities, he remains 
an outsider whose inability or unwillingness to conform seems to challenge 
the norms of the group, its solidarity, and cohesiveness. For example, he does 
not take part in the communal sexual intercourse with Tulla, Pilenz’s cousin, 
when the other boys vie with one another in order to prove their masculin-
ity to themselves and to the other members of the group. It transpires that 
this abstinence is caused neither by Mahlke’s impotence nor by his putative 
homosexuality, but stems from his self-assured virility that does not require 
proof (32–35).
 Mahlke’s extraordinary spiritual qualities are supplemented by his excep-
tional physical traits, above all his huge Adam’s apple and his enormous 
penis, whose size presumably—so the text implies—corresponds to its fertility 
(33–34). The homosexual undertones of Pilenz’s description of Mahlke turn 
him into an implicit source of libidinal desire that is rejected and denied.13 As 
a typical case of mimetic rivalry, this admiration is mingled with hostility,14 
which is demonstrated not only in Pilenz’s responsibility for Mahlke’s prob-
able death, but in other deeds as well. For instance, there is the repeated 
symbolic erasing of Mahlke’s name and image: first, Pilenz erases the gro-
tesque image of Mahlke-as-Christ, which was drawn on the blackboard by 
a classmate (38), and some years later, Pilenz with an ax destroys the words 
“Stabat Mater dolorosa” that Mahlke engraved on a board of the latrine of 
the Nazi Labor Service camp, thereby erasing Mahlke’s name as well (109). 
Another deed that presumably manifests Pilenz’s hostility towards Mahlke is 
the story of the cat and the mouse that is incessantly repeated throughout the 
novella in a number of variations and gives it its title: the cat is a real cat (but 
also, symbolically, the predator that chases Mahlke), whereas the “mouse” 
is Mahlke’s exceptionally huge Adam’s apple (and symbolically, Mahlke as 
prey). The most significant question of the plot, which remains undecided, is 
whether Pilenz alone enticed the cat to jump on the “mouse” when Mahlke 
 12. All references to specific pages in this essay refer to the original edition, unless other-
wise indicated.
 13. Girard believes that homosexuality is derived from heterosexuality: “Proustian ho-
mosexuality, for example, can be defined as a gradual transferring of erotic value which in 
‘normal’ Don Juanism remains attached to the object itself” (1965: 47). See also Golsan (1993: 
26); Moi (1982: esp. 28–30); Sedgwick (1989: 16–17, 21–25). Although Pilenz denies being 
sexually attracted to Mahlke, his fascination with Mahlke’s genitalia certainly suggests that 
his adoration is not purely spiritual.
 14. Ryan (1977) claims that Pilenz’s ambivalent relationship with Mahlke is politically 
significant, as implied by the narrating character: Pilenz collaborates with the Nazi regime, 
whereas Mahlke shows signs of resistance (but also of resignation).
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was lying asleep on the grass, whether one of his friends did this, or whether 
the cat jumped on the “mouse” of its own free will.
 Pilenz’s use of “wir” (“we”) when narrating the story excludes Mahlke 
from the group to which Pilenz belongs, thereby increasing the distance 
between them while at the same time portraying Mahlke as a manifestation 
of das Unheimliche (the uncanny), whose idiosyncrasies prevent him from 
becoming an integral part of any human community.15 This exclusion is one 
way in which the narrating character conceals his metaphysical desire not 
only from others, but also from himself, in order to pacify his conscience 
and deny his guilt (see Girard 1965: 10, 153–61). In other words, the use of 
the first-person plural is a camouflage which Pilenz uses to create the impres-
sion that his interest in Mahlke did not exceed the interest of his friends and 
that he was not solely responsible for Mahlke’s end—an impression which 
is incompatible with the details of his story. Mahlke’s mimetic rivalry with 
Pilenz illustrates Girard’s claim about “the inverse relationship between the 
strength of desire and the importance of the object” (86): metaphysical desire 
which focuses on the mediator increases at the expense of the significance of 
the physical object that he possesses. Girard argues that the final stage in this 
evolution is the complete disappearance of the object. In Cat and Mouse, the 
objects of the mediator play a significant role, but they constantly replace 
one another, thereby revealing that none of them has a noteworthy intrinsic 
value.16 The pompoms, the screwdriver, the military medal are all treated by 
Pilenz as sanctified objects not because of their essential properties, but sim-
ply because they are associated with the mediator:
Wenn Mahlke gesagt hätte: “Mach das und das!,” ich hätte das und noch 
mehr gemacht. Mahlke sagte aber nichts . . . und als er die Puscheln als 
 15. The idiosyncrasy of Mahlke’s character and Pilenz’s responsibility for his probable 
death make Grass’s novella relevant to a later major book by Girard, Violence and the Sa-
cred (1977). In this work, Girard describes sacrificial violence as the remedy for unrestrained 
violence and total chaos in civil society: instead of fighting among themselves, mimetic rivals 
channel their hostility to an exceptionally vulnerable individual (or group), an outcast in their 
community. The sacrificial process can succeed only if the violence is in fact (or is at least 
presented as) unanimous, that is, if the whole community participates in the persecution, or at 
least accepts it passively (see also Golsan [1993: 29–84]). Like any scapegoat, Mahlke bears 
victimary signs which differentiate him from the rest of his community. However, unlike the 
typical sacrificial process described by Girard, Pilenz has exclusive responsibility for Mahlke’s 
death and attempts either to repudiate his responsibility or to lay the blame on his classmates 
while at the same time confessing the deed.
 16. Hilliard (2001: 425–30) contends that the objects used by Mahlke could be arranged 
in accordance with Roman Jakobson’s definition of the poetic function as the projection of the 
principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination.
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Mode einführte, war ich der erste, der die Mode mitmachte und Puscheln am 
Hals trug. Trug auch eine Zeitlang, aber nur zu Hause, einen Schraubenzie-
her am Schnürsenkel. . . . Und hätte Mahlke nach der Rede des U-Boot-Kom-
mandanten zu mir gesagt: “Pilenz, klau ihm das Ding mit dem Drussel!,” ich 
hätte das Ding mit dem schwarzweißroten Band vom Haken gelangt und für 
Dich aufgehoben. (1963: 81)
If Mahlke had said: “Do this and that,” I would have done this and that and 
then some. But Mahlke said nothing. . . . When he introduced the pompom 
vogue, I was the first to take it up and wear pompoms on my neck. For a 
while, though only at home, I even wore a screwdriver on a shoelace . . . and 
if after the submarine captain’s speech Mahlke had said to me: “Pilenz. Go 
swipe that business on the ribbon,” I would have taken medal and ribbon off 
the hook and kept it for you. (1964: 74)
There is more than one way for the desiring subject to possess the desired 
object. When he wishes to conceal his desire from his rival and from oth-
ers (perhaps also from himself), or when he is too much of a coward to face 
his rival directly and not shrewd enough to manipulate him, he may com-
promise the achievement of his desire by continually observing the desired 
object, which becomes sanctified in his view, regardless of its intrinsic value. 
This is a compromise, because while the object is not completely under his 
control, it nonetheless feeds his desire and gives him the illusion of gain-
ing full control at some point in the future. Pilenz’s desire for Mahlke is a 
case in point. Although he mimics Mahlke’s behavior, Pilenz (perhaps uncon-
sciously) knows that wearing a screwdriver on his neck is too transparent an 
impersonation. His solution is to fix his gaze on the screwdriver, possessing it 
merely with his eyes, and to wear it on his neck only when he is at home and 
nobody sees him. Similarly, Pilenz asks Mahlke if he (Pilenz) could touch the 
medal that the latter has stolen from a former pupil who had won it during 
the war (82), but when later Mahlke wins such a medal as a mark of distinc-
tion for his feats and asks Pilenz to keep it while he stays in his hiding place 
in the minesweeper, Pilenz refuses to take the desired object (136). His refusal 
demonstrates his wish to conceal his desire from himself and from others 
(he would not like to be viewed as someone who overtly mimics Mahlke) 
and indicates the transfer of his desire from the object to the rival/mediator 
(Pilenz does not deem the medal so important).
 According to Girard, in the most intense and violent cases of internal 
mediation “the object is only a means of reaching the mediator. The desire 
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is aimed at the mediator’s being” (1965: 53).17 The desiring subject deludes 
himself that if he succeeds in absorbing the being of the mediator, he will con-
sequently become self-sufficient. Since these attempts are doomed to failure, 
the desiring subject must seek another solution to his feeling of existential 
worthlessness. One radical solution is to murder the mediator (or to cause 
his death indirectly). The desiring subject believes that if his rival—now the 
obstacle that thwarts his desire—no longer exists, he will be able to restore 
his self-assurance and self-fulfillment (85). The subject’s mistake is that he 
ascribes the cause of, and the responsibility for, his feelings of inferiority to 
the other rather than to himself. An inverse solution is committing suicide, 
thus renouncing desire once and for all: “Desiring one’s own nothingness is 
desiring oneself at the weakest point of his humanity, desiring to be mortal, 
desiring to be dead” (275). As the most extreme manifestations of the exis-
tential states of sadism and masochism (176–92, 287–92), the desperate acts 
of murder and suicide are “dialectical reverses” that arise from the same psy-
chological source (184).
 In Katz und Maus, murder—or at least causing the mediator’s death—
happens on the level of the story (Pilenz persuades Mahlke to hide in a 
sunken barge and deceptively steals the can opener from him, thus leaving 
him inside the barge without any food), while committing suicide is symboli-
cally enacted on the level of the narration. Indeed, a compulsion of repetition 
that prevents the teller from continuing with his life is an exemplary mani-
festation of the death principle.18 Paradoxically, this masochistic longing for 
 17. Girard distinguishes between two forms of internal mediation: “exogamic,” or ex-
trafamilial, and “endogamic,” or intrafamilial (1961: 42). In exogamic internal mediation, 
metaphysical desire dominates the relations of subjects who inhabit the same world and are 
relatively close to each other spiritually and socially, but it does not penetrate the most intimate 
circle of the family. By contrast, in endogamic internal mediation, metaphysical desire takes 
over the relations between members of the same family and is hence more emotionally intense 
and more prone to becoming dangerously violent. Cat and Mouse demonstrates that endo-
gamic metaphysical desire is not in all cases the more violent of the two. Familial relations are 
almost absent from Grass’s novella: Pilenz lives with his family, but he is completely absorbed 
by his relations with his classmates; his parents do not interest him at all, and the death of his 
brother at war is briefly mentioned as an event that had no emotional effect on him at the time 
(122, 137). I suggest replacing Girard’s categories of “exogamic” versus “endogamic” media-
tion with softer categories that avoid dichotomies and can give a better account for cultural 
differences, such as the significance of family relations for the desiring subject.
 18. See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1961), esp. 30–32, and also Rimmon-
Kenan (1987: 177–78). Rimmon-Kenan interprets Pilenz’s narration not as suicide, but as 
killing Mahlke yet again. Both interpretations (mine and Rimmon-Kenan’s) presuppose that 
Pilenz is indeed responsible for killing, or at least attempting to kill, Mahlke. This assump-
tion is challenged by Hilliard, who claims that Pilenz as narrator attempts “to give himself an 
importance that he did not in fact have, as a character at the time” by confessing crimes that 
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one’s own (symbolic) death is achieved through the narration by the amplifi-
cation of metaphysical desire and the accentuation of the prominent role of 
the mediator as an obstacle. The deceased Mahlke thwarts Pilenz’s desire as 
he persists in haunting Pilenz after his death: guilt best preserves metaphysical 
desire and does not allow the perpetrator of the crime to forget his rival. This 
persistence of desire is also signaled by Pilenz’s appeal to Mahlke in his role 
of narratee in at least 23 paragraphs and sentences, especially at the begin-
ning and the end of some chapters (e.g., the beginning of chapter two and 
the end of chapter three). This strategy draws attention to Mahlke’s role as 
mediator of Pilenz’s metaphysical desire. The narrating character knows well 
that Mahlke cannot respond to his call, yet he insists on attempting to com-
municate with Mahlke as if the latter could reappear through the power of 
words. These hopeless attempts merely perpetuate Pilenz’s confession of his 
guilt and prevent him from achieving contrition and atoning for his sin.
 Pilenz feels compelled to tell the story in order to repudiate his guilt (7, 
84), but the repetitive scene of the cat and the mouse and the lack of closure 
at the end of the narrative19 attest to the failure of this attempt. Furthermore, 
the narrating character intends to tell only Mahlke’s story (21, 99), but as the 
narrative unfolds, it becomes clear that this story is inseparable from Pilenz’s, 
that is, that the life and death of his rival and of himself have become inter-
mingled. Pilenz feels that Mahlke dominates his emotions and dictates his 
actions to such an extent that it is no longer clear who writes the story (98). 
Not only did the mediator’s death fail to restore the subject’s self-assurance; 
the atrocious deed has made this goal forever unachievable.
 Thus narration can reinforce and perpetuate mimetic desire through re-
experiencing and re-enacting. However, narration can also be mimetic desire, 
in the sense that it is motivated by the will to mimic the mediator and his 
desires. The conception of narration as mimetic desire contributes to Girard’s 
argument against the romantic idea of spontaneous, unmediated desire: the 
desire to tell one’s own story is—or can be—mediated, not only by exter-
nal mediators from whom the desiring subject is socially and spiritually dis-
tanced, but also by internal mediators, indeed the same ones who inhabit the 
story-world.
he has not really committed (2001: 432).
 19. In her analysis of the normative and functional aspects of the mediation gap between 
the author and reader in literary communication, Yacobi (1987) distinguishes between the 
perspectives of the narrator and reader on the lack of closure in Cat and Mouse. From Pilenz’s 
perspective, “the uncertainty that surrounds the end is existential and in keeping with the open-
ness and chaos of reality”; by contrast, the reader, who considers the text as a fictional creation 
of Grass, views this lack of closure as “one option out of many, chosen for a purpose of his 
own, and fictionally motivated (realized, justified, camouflaged) by reference to the narrator’s 
‘constraints of reality’” (362).
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 Grass’s novella obliquely and intricately displays triangular desire as the 
motivation for narration through an analogy between swimming and nar-
rating.20 After Mahlke learns to swim and to dive, these activities become his 
favorite habits. On one occasion, Pilenz swims after Mahlke in a manner that 
is presented not only as aimed at reaching a goal, but also—and more signifi-
cantly—as mimicking his rival. These events are intertwined with the act of 
the narration, which is of course posterior to them, and the two acts—swim-
ming and narration—are portrayed as analogous:
Während ich schwamm und während ich schreibe, versuchte und versuche 
ich an Tulla Pokriefke zu denken, denn ich wollte und will nicht immer an 
Mahlke denken. Deswegen schwamm ich in Rückenlage, deswegen schreibe 
ich: Schwamm in Rückenlage . . . war aber, als ich die zweite Sandbank 
hinter mir hatte, weggewischt, kein Punkt Splitter Loch mehr . . . [Ich] 
schwamm Mahlke entgegen, schreibe in Deine Richtung: Ich schwamm in 
Brustlage und beeilte mich nicht. (1963: 79)
As I swam and as I write, I tried and I try to think of Tulla Pokriefke, for 
I didn’t and still don’t want to think of Mahlke. That’s why I swam back 
stroke . . . but when I had the second sandbank behind me, she was gone, 
thorn and dimple had passed the vanishing point . . . [I was] swimming 
toward Mahlke, and it is toward you that I write: I swam breast stroke and 
I didn’t hurry. (1964: 72)
This paragraph not only metaleptically blends past and present, story and 
narration, but also indirectly applies mimetic desire to narration: if Pilenz 
mimics Mahlke by swimming after him, and if swimming is like narrating, 
then it makes sense that narrating is another form of mimicry. Once again, 
not only does Mahlke come back to life in Pilenz’s memory: Pilenz writes 
through Mahlke, in the sense that their story lives have become irrevocably 
enmeshed.
 I wish to end this section with a short discussion of two paragraphs from 
the novel that highlight the connection between the appeal to the mediator 
 20. Frye (1993) draws an interesting analogy between Pilenz’s narration and the functions 
of Mahlke’s body, particularly his digestive system. For the analogies between the process of 
narration and the events of the story, see also Hilliard (2001) and Rimmon-Kenan (1987). My 
use of “motivation” in interpretations of fictional narratives should be distinguished from its 
use by Russian Formalists as a literary device that could be given a compositional, a realistic, 
or an artistic raison d’être. My own employment of the term is based on its use in psychology 
and the philosophy of psychology as the reason and the initiation for a particular behavior as 
well as the direction, intensity and persistence of such behavior (see, e.g., Mook [1996: 4]).
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(i.e., Mahlke) as narratee and the perpetuation of mimetic desire. The first 
paragraph relates directly to the analogy between swimming and narrating:
Ich schwimme langsam in Brustlage, sehe weg, zu, vorbei . . . sehe, bevor 
meine Hände den Rost fassen, Dich, seit gut fünfzehn Jahren: Dich! 
Schwimme, fasse den Rost, sehe Dich: der Große Mahlke hockt unbewegt 
im Schatten, die Schallplatte im Keller hängt und ist in immer dieselbe Stelle 
verliebt, leiert aus, Möwen streichen ab; und Du hast den Artikel mit dem 
Band am Hals. (1963: 82)
I swim slowly, breast stroke, look away, look beyond . . . and before my 
hands grip the rust, I see you, as I’ve been seeing you for a good fifteen years: 
You! I swim, I grip the rust, I see You: the Great Mahlke sits impassive in the 
shadow, the phonograph record in the cellar catches, in love with a certain 
passage which it repeats till its breath fails; the gulls fly off; and there you are 
with the ribbon and it on your neck. (1964: 74)
The text blurs the difference between seeing as a physical act that presup-
poses the presence of the seen object (in this case, Mahlke’s body swimming) 
and “seeing” metaphorically, that is, the re-presentation of the once seen 
object in imagination. Pilenz’s external gaze during the actual swimming 
turns inwards, as his memory evokes the moments in which he mimicked the 
movements of his rival; his direct appeal to Mahlke as narratee accords with 
this blurring of differences between past and present, presence and absence, 
since the desiring subject (i.e., Pilenz) considers these differences insignificant 
as long as his desire persists. Just like Mahlke, Pilenz repeats the same record; 
unlike Mahlke, however, his repetition does not bring him any happiness.
 The second paragraph displays the repetition compulsion of the narrating 
character in a completely different context:
Laß uns noch einmal zu dritt und immer wieder das Sakrament feiern: Du 
kniest, ich stehe hinter trockener Haut. Dein Schweiß erweitert Poren. Auf 
belegter Zunge lädt Hochwürden die Hostie ab. Eben noch reimten wir uns 
alle drei auf dasselbe Wort, da läßt ein Mechanismus Deine Zunge einfahren. 
(1963: 126)
Let us all three celebrate the sacrament, once more and forever: You kneel, I 
stand behind dry skin. Sweat distends your pores. The reverend father depos-
its the host on your coated tongue. All three of us have just ended on the same 
syllable, whereupon a mechanism pulls your tongue back in. (1964: 114)
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The quoted lines describe Mahlke, Pilenz, and Father Guzevsky during com-
munion; Pilenz addresses Mahlke and asks him to re-experience this Christian 
ceremony. Narration in general, and the direct appeal to Mahlke as narratee 
in particular, serve here once more to revive the dead. A peculiar analogy 
is created between transubstantiation, that is, the change of the substance 
of bread into Christ’s body occurring during communion, and the “necro-
mancy” of Mahlke by means of Pilenz’s story. Pilenz will never let his adored 
rival go.
tHe tHief’s JournaL
Unlike the symmetrical relations between admiration and hostility towards 
the mediator in Grass’s novel, Genet’s autobiographical narrative The Thief’s 
Journal (1949) represents the relations between these two aspects of mimetic 
desire as asymmetrical: the autodiegetic narrator’s adoration of the media-
tors—male criminals, outcasts, thieves, and beggars whose body and spirit 
he desires—outstrips his antagonistic emotions towards them: Genet main-
tains that he has never felt any hate for his lovers (284).21 His hostility and 
contempt, but also his feeling of inferiority and his wish to compensate for 
the life he could not have had—or have chosen to avoid—are directed at his 
anonymous readers, whom he chooses to address as the narratees of his story 
and whose anonymity serves well his goal to project on them his radical, 
although confused, criticism of the mainstream society of his period.
 Genet adores the penises of his lovers like a pious Catholic adores the 
relic of a saint. The penis both embodies and symbolizes everything that he 
covets: masculinity, power, prowess, domination, and self-sufficiency (e.g., 
24, 144). The greater the obstacle the lover poses to Genet, the more Genet 
comes to worship and is attracted to this lover. The lovers’ self-admiration, 
indifference to other people’s agony and pain, and ostentatious desire for 
their own body mark them as tough personalities who will not easily give 
other people access to their body and soul. Armand, Genet’s most admired 
lover, demonstrates these qualities and is therefore idolized (194). His narcis-
sistic desire for his own body is contagious, and his adoration by other men 
attracts Genet and poses a challenge to him (see Girard [1965: 96–99]).
 Contrasting with these expressions of adoration, and at the same time 
inseparable from them, are Genet’s manifestations of rivalry with his media-
 21. Morón Arroyo justly criticizes Girard for having “a reductionist conception of the ob-
ject of desire” (1978: 84) and proposes that mimetic desire may promote cooperation between 
subjects who desire the same object.
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tors: treason and envy. Treason, like Girard’s “murderous hostility,” expresses 
the wish of the desiring subject to dispose of the mediator, thereby proving to 
him, and most of all to oneself, one’s self-sufficiency. The narrating character 
contends that the willingness to act cruelly towards one’s beloved, to violate 
his trust, and to break the bonds of love is the most lofty and beautiful act of 
eroticism (89–90, 181, 257–58). Envy is described by the narrating character 
as a form of eroticism that may lead to the worst treason—murder. Genet 
plans to murder both Stilitano and Robert, when the friendship between the 
two men, whom he loves, distances him from them (151–52).
 Like many characters (and subjects) whose conduct is motivated by pow-
erful metaphysical desire, Genet holds a romantic view that conceives of the 
self as separate from the world and attributes the source of all his desires to 
himself (see Girard 1965: 11). Although Genet is aware that his search for a 
Nietzschean moral solitude and self-assured pride is mediated by his models 
of masculinity, he believes that he can dispose of those models once he has 
attained his goal. However, moral solitude does not actually break the ties 
of eroticism; defying the beloved simultaneously reassures and reinforces his 
influence as a model. The following lines demonstrate this blind spot and 
draw an ironic light on the ideal of self-sufficiency:
C’est peut-être leur solitude morale—à quoi j’aspire—qui me fait admirer les 
traîtres et les aimer. Ce goût de la solitude étant le signe de mon orgueil, et 
l’orgueil la manifestation de ma force, son usage, et la preuve de cette force. 
Car j’aurai brisé les liens les plus solides du monde: les liens de l’amour. Et 
quel amour ne me faut-il pas où je puiserai assez de vigueur pour le détruire! 
(1949: 48)
It is perhaps their moral solitude—to which I aspire—that makes me admire 
traitors and love them—this taste for solitude being the sign of my pride, and 
pride the manifestation of my strength, the employment and proof of this 
strength. For I shall have broken the stoutest of bonds, the bonds of love. 
And I so need love from which to draw vigor enough to destroy it! (1967: 36)
 Genet’s autobiography is replete with paragraphs that seem to indicate 
that his worldview has been molded by the mimicry of and identification 
with his fellow thieves to such an extent that he completely rejects the values 
of normative society. Genet constantly associates morally negative concepts, 
such as evil (le mal), cruelty (la cruauté), and treason (la trahison) with mor-
ally positive concepts, such as moral perfection (la perfection morale), as 
well as with aesthetic and religious terms (especially poetry and sainthood). 
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The shocking conceit with which the narrative opens, in which Genet points 
out the close similarity between the fragility and the delicacy of flowers and 
the brutal insensitivity of convicts, acutely represents his goal to undermine 
moral and aesthetic dichotomies and to dissent from hegemonic values.22
 Yet Genet also expresses his inability or unwillingness to detach himself 
entirely from the norms that he despises. He avoids committing a murder 
because he understands that murderers are unable to detach themselves from 
the murdered, whose specter forever haunts them. Thus Genet admits that an 
unreserved detachment from the prevalent moral norms—the replacement of 
the worship of God with the worship of Satan—is an unattainable fantasy 
(113, 224–25).
 A similar oscillation can be detected in the inconsistency of the narrating 
character concerning his motivation for narration. From some paragraphs, 
one may conclude that he does not desire to communicate with the reader, 
since he claims that only in solitude can erotic love and devotion be sustained, 
and his narrative is this erotic song of solitude (106–7, 116). In Genet’s dic-
tum “Ce livre ‘Journal du Voleur’: poursuite de l’Impossible Nullité” (1949: 
100) (“This book, The Thief’s Journal, pursuit of the Impossible Nothing-
ness,” 1967: 77), I interpret impossible nothingness as poetic self-sufficiency. 
The journal attempts to achieve this nothingness (i.e., complete detachment 
from the ordinary world) by comprehending and justifying this regulative 
ideal, but it can be achieved only by an act of communication, which inher-
ently thwarts the goal whose attainment it was intended to promote.
 However, in another paragraph Genet says he wishes to use his past tribu-
lations in order to teach the reader who he is at the time of the narration (75). 
In a more ambiguous passage, he claims that he would like to use his narra-
tive for virtuous purposes (“à des fins de vertus,” 65). This virtuous purpose 
is perhaps self-perfection, but it can also be a didactic aim of educating his 
readers to become better people by contributing to their understanding of 
society’s outcasts, whom they rarely have the opportunity to know person-
ally.
 Genet’s ambivalence concerning the norms of hegemonic society and 
the purpose of his narration is reflected in his address to his narratee—“the 
reader.” Genet’s portrayal of his readers is far from Prince’s “degree-zero 
narratee”: they do not have specific physical traits, but they certainly share 
a particular mentality in representing a conservative bourgeois, a thought-
less adherent to the conventional system of values. Needless to say, the 
 22. For Genet’s imperative “to establish a contingent relationship between flowers and 
criminals” and to enforce his belief “in the dialectical reconciliation of opposites,” see Reed 
(2005: 79–84).
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actual reader may have nothing in common with “the reader,” with Genet’s 
anonymous narratee, and may repudiate the worldview attributed to him or 
her. Most addresses to the narratee throughout this narrative highlight the 
unbridgeable distance between the narrating character’s moral values and 
emotional world on the one hand, and those of the narratee on the other. The 
criminal must be endowed with fervent creativity, courage, and determina-
tion in order to surmount the difficulties of being divorced from the norma-
tive world; it is implied that the narratee lacks all of these precious qualities: 
“Niant les vertus de votre monde, les criminels désespérément acceptent 
d’organiser un univers interdit. Ils acceptent d’y vivre. L’air y est nauséa-
bond: ils savent le respirer. Mais—les criminels sont loin de vous—comme 
dans l’amour ils s’écartent et m’écartent du monde et de ses lois” (1949: 10). 
“Repudiating the virtues of your world, criminals hopelessly agree to orga-
nize a forbidden universe. They agree to live in it. The air there is nauseating: 
they can breathe it. But—criminals are remote from you—as in love, they 
turn away and turn me away from the world and its laws” (1967: 5). In his 
separate world, the criminal reminds the narratee of the suffering and the 
pain that the latter marginalizes and ignores (57–58).
 By contrast, in other paragraphs the narrating character conveys his wish 
to be accepted and even revered by the conformist narratee, from whom he 
seems to be unable to detach himself (285). The act of narration itself (in 
all written narratives) reveals, and is motivated by, the wish to communi-
cate with the narratee. A precondition for such communication is a minimal 
degree of comprehension, since the articulation of disputes and disagreements 
is meaningless unless it can be at least partly understood by the other party. 
In order to win the narratee’s recognition, the narrator is willing to com-
bine conventional forms of beauty (i.e., rhetorical devices of narration) with 
unconventional forms, which risk being incomprehensible or unacceptable 
(108). However, understanding cannot be achieved unless the horizons of the 
reader-narratee fuse with those of the narrating character: “ . . . j’utiliserai 
les mots non afin qu’ils dépeignent mieux un événement ou son héros mais 
qu’ils vous instruisent sur moi-même. Pour me comprendre une complicité 
du lecteur sera nécessaire. Toutefois je l’avertirai dès que me fera mon lyrisme 
perdre pied” (1949: 17). “I shall not make use of words the better to depict 
an event or its hero, but so that they may tell you something about myself. 
In order to understand me, the reader’s complicity will be necessary. Never-
theless, I shall warn him whenever my lyricism makes me lose my footing” 
(1967: 11).
 The act of communication between a narrating character and a reader-
narratee both reinforces and weakens Genet’s triangular desire. On the one 
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hand, the act of narration reproduces this desire by making him re-experi-
ence and reinterpret his passionate stories of love and rivalry, admiration 
and hostility; moreover, as previously noted, Genet often identifies the beauty 
of poetic creation with the world of treason, evil, and repudiation of moral 
norms. His narration praises the alternative world of counter-norms; it justi-
fies and intensifies triangular desire by providing eroticism with a suitable 
poetic form. On the other hand, the narratee’s world, which lacks the vehe-
ment contradictory emotions that characterize the world of evil and crime, 
puts an end to triangular desire.
 The contradictory addresses of the narrating character to the narratee 
could therefore indicate his ambivalence about the possibility that desire 
might be annihilated. The imagined secure and serene world of the narratee 
can offer Genet salvation from extreme emotion, suffering, and pain, but at 
the same time, this world is dreary and devoid of the challenges and excite-
ments that only a world based on mimetic desire can supply.23
 I have already stressed that internal mimetic desire is characterized by the 
craving of the desiring subject to eliminate the distance between himself and 
the mediator by becoming the other or by subordinating the subject’s will 
to his mediator’s or vice versa. Conversely, in addressing the reader, Genet 
does not attempt to dissolve the reader’s otherness. The distance between him 
and his narratee remains. Accordingly, Genet constantly employs the second-
person—“votre monde,” “vos moeurs” (“your world,” “your morals”)24—
rather than the first-person plural.
 Like Pilenz in Grass’s novella, the narrating character in Genet’s narrative 
(who identifies himself as the author)25 derives his motivation for narration 
from mimetic desire. In the paragraph quoted below, he blurs the difference 
between writing a story (or being engaged in any other type of creative activ-
ity) and living (or experiencing) it: an author who writes about evil should 
experience it as a necessary part of his creation by mimicking the desires and 
 23. Reed (2005: 107–8) points out a similar ambivalence concerning Genet’s relationship 
with Lucien, one of his lovers in non-fictional reality and one of the characters in The Thief’s 
Journal.
 24. Genet’s address to the reader can be interpreted as directed either to a single reader 
or to readers in general. Both interpretations underscore the spiritual distance between the 
narrating character and his reader(s), the first by the formality of the address (“vous” versus 
“tu”), and the second by contrasting the individualist, outcast narrator with the conformist, 
homogeneous community of readers.
 25. Although the narrating character of The Thief’s Journal is named after the author, 
Genet’s work does not accord unproblematically with Philippe Lejeune’s “autobiographical 
pact” (see Lejeune (1989)), since Genet constantly reminds the reader that his creation is 
fictional and that it is therefore futile to separate the true from the false in his narrative. See 
Spear (1996) and Ubersfeld (1996).
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the crimes of his heroes. Hence the criminals are his mediators not only in 
“the real world,” but also in his creative activity. The story cannot be told 
unless it is an authentic dramatization of a (mediated) eroticized life:
Créer n’est pas un jeu quelque pas frivole. Le créateur s’est engagé dans une 
aventure effrayante qui est d’assumer soi-même jusqu’au bout les périls ris-
qués par ses créatures. On ne peut supposer une création n’ayant l’amour à 
l’origine. Comment mettre en face de soi aussi fort que soi, ce qu’on devra 
mépriser ou haïr. . . . “Prendre le poids du péché du monde” signifie très 
exactement: éprouver en puissance et en effets tous les péchés; avoir souscrit 
au mal. Tout créateur doit ainsi endosser—le mot serait faible—faire sien au 
point de le savoir être sa substance, circuler dans ses artères—le mal donné 
par lui, que librement choisissent les héros. (1949: 220–21)
Creating is not a somewhat frivolous game. The creator has committed 
himself to the fearful adventure of taking upon himself, to the very end, the 
perils risked by his creatures. We cannot suppose a creation that does not 
spring from love. How can a man place before himself something strong as 
himself which he will have to scorn or hate? . . . “Taking upon himself the 
sins of the world” means exactly this: experiencing potentially and in their 
effects all sins; it means having subscribed to evil. Every creator must thus 
shoulder—the expression seems feeble—must make his own, to the point of 
knowing it to be his substance, circulating in his arteries, the evil given by 
him, which his heroes choose freely. (1967: 172–73)
Metaphysical desire, according to Genet’s “credo,” is a productive force, 
since it constitutes all types of valuable creation (religious as well as poetic), 
therefore it should be endorsed and encouraged rather than renounced.
tHe faLL
Metaphysical desire is not as explicitly present in Albert Camus’ The Fall 
(1956) as it is in the other two narratives that I have analyzed. It is not clear 
whether the narrating character who introduces himself under the pseud-
onym Jean-Baptiste Clamence and his anonymous addressee are mimetic 
rivals. Yet the story is centered on the loss of existential self-sufficiency, which 
Girard points out as the source of mimetic desire, and on the futile search for 
others who may compensate the unstable self for this loss. It is not in vain 
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that Girard briefly refers to Camus’ novella in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel 
as an “admirable and liberating work,” which suggests that “a whole new 
career was probably opening up before him [Camus]” (1965: 271–72).
 In a later essay, “Camus’ Stranger Retried” (1978), Girard argues that 
Camus’ The Fall “goes higher and deeper” (33) than his previous novel 
L’Etran ger (The Stranger) and demonstrates Camus’ transition from the pre-
liminary romantic phase of his career, characterized by bad faith, to a mature 
phase, in which he espouses a more complex worldview. In Girard’s words, 
“[t]he confession of Clamence does not lead to a new ‘interpretation’ of 
L’Etranger but to an act of transcendence; the perspective of this first novel is 
rejected” (21). Surprisingly, in this essay Girard does not interpret The Fall in 
relation to his theory of mimetic desire.
 The central event of the narrative (both in importance and in its loca-
tion in the text) is the fall of an unknown woman into the Seine. Clamence 
avoids jumping into the water to save the woman and does not even inform 
anybody of this incident (81–83). At the time of the fall, Clamence believes 
he has already arrived at the peak of his achievement, a perfect man both 
intellectually and morally: “je me trouvais un peu surhomme” (36). After 
some years of repression and denial, he re-experiences this fall as a traumatic 
event. From this point onward, his irreversible fall begins. His deceitful self-
image collapses like a pack of cards. He reckons that his only rescue from 
a complete mental breakdown is to share his guilt with the rest of human-
ity. To achieve this end, he repeatedly tells his story to people previously 
unknown to him, and in the course of his narration he manipulates them into 
a position in which they will be compelled to admit that they are Clamence’s 
accomplices.
 At the outset, it seems that the narrator wishes to establish close contact 
with his interlocutor thanks to the latter’s particularly interesting, sympa-
thetic, or otherwise appealing character. However, this first impression turns 
out to be an affectation, a ruse intended to draw the narratee’s attention. 
Clamence clarifies that his privileged interest in the narratee is temporary and 
that it stems not from any of the latter’s unique qualities, but from the narra-
tive situation. He views the narratee as a kind of object that is interchange-
able with any other narratee who has similar traits (160–65). At the end of 
the account Clamence will proceed to court another narratee, whereas this 
one is to become another member, unimportant in himself, of humanity.
 The narratees whom the narrating character addresses function as his 
mediators: in his attempt to restore his previous image, the narrator pre-
tends at first to be as self-assured as he assumes his interlocutor to be, in 
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order finally to demonstrate that belief in one’s own perfection is spurious. 
Clamence’s infinite repetition of his narration to replaceable addressees is 
the most extreme case of the process that Girard describes as the breaking 
up of the unity of the mediator into multiplicity (1965: 91). The closer the 
internal mediator is to the subject in his social status and intellectual faculties, 
the briefer is his reign. Hence the mediator loses any enduring significance 
conferred to him in particular: “Beginning with Proust, the mediator may be 
literally anyone at all and he may pop up anywhere” (92).
 In Clamence’s narration, both the mediator and the desire are almost 
devoid of any concrete content. The mediator is an abstract and reticent 
double, or a mirror image, of the desiring subject, who desires, not any 
material object that his mediator possesses, but rather his spirit—his pride, 
self-confidence, and self-respect. Therefore mimetic rivalry in Camus’ work 
lacks dramatic passion and overt violence. In other words, it does not pro-
duce the intense ambiguity of high admiration and murderous hostility typi-
cal of metaphysical desire. Instead, aggression appears in the narrative in the 
much more palatable form of rhetorical devices, such as the formulation of 
highly provocative and disputable statements as rhetorical questions (e.g. 
80, 140). The suspicion and hostility of the narrating character towards 
his narratee is expressed by his hardly perceptible transformations from the 
first-person singular (je) to the first-person plural (nous). To be sure, the aim 
of this rhetorical ruse is not to display fraternity, but to render his personal 
life-story—above all his guilt and his chastisement—inseparable from the 
life-story of the narratee (e.g. 54–55, 90–91, 134–35).26 Yet although the 
“desiring subject” Clamence craves to dominate his “mediator,” he is well 
aware that the narrative situation renders him entirely dependent on the 
willingness of the narratee to listen to him and to follow him wherever he 
goes.
 Unlike Grass’s novella, Camus’ represents a compulsive and insatiable 
impulse to dispose of the mediator once he has been efficiently used, even 
more so than in Genet’s narrative. Yet both Cat and Mouse and The Fall per-
petuate mimetic desire and represent a structure of infinite mediation, which 
promises only further agony and guilt in a recurring act of narration and 
deprives the desiring subject of any prospects for a calmer and more stable 
future.27
 26. For a thorough treatment of the narrator’s rhetorical devices, see Brochier (1979), 
Marcus (2006), and Quillard (1991).
 27. Infinite repetitious mimetic desire in Camus’ narrative, like in Grass’s, represents a 
form of suicide, namely, a cessation of lived experience. See also Solomon (2006: 200).
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iNtra- aNd eXtra-subJeCtive Narratees as 
Mediators oF MiMetiC desire
Rimmon-Kenan defines the narratee as “the agent which is at the very 
least implicitly addressed by the narrator. (A narratee of this kind is always 
implied, even when the narrator becomes his own narratee)” (2001: 90). I 
wish to extend Rimmon-Kenan’s contention and claim that a personalized, 
autodiegetic, and self-conscious narrator is prone to address him- or her-
self, at least implicitly, in the narrative. This type of narratee—whom I name 
intra-subjective narratee—tends to be the past self of the narrator, that is, 
the narrator as he used to be as a character during the time of the narrated 
events. The split between oneself as narrator and oneself as character and 
narratee is implied by autodiegetic self-conscious narration, since writing or 
telling a story about oneself creates a temporal and logical gap between the 
narrating self and the experiencing self and presupposes a narratee (see Mar-
cus [2006: 87, note 15]).
 The second type of narratee in these narratives is the extra-subjective 
narratee,28 discussed elaborately in this essay, whose identity is (or at least 
seems to be) separate from the narrator’s (e.g., Mahlke in Katz und Maus 
and the silent narratee in Camus’ La Chute). The extra-subjective narratee 
in these narratives may be, to a lesser or greater degree, a projection of the 
intra-subjective narratee, that is, of the image of the (past) self of the narra-
tor. Hence the labels “intra-subjective” and “extra-subjective” are employed 
with regards to the narrator, as the addressor on the level of narration. In the 
three narratives discussed in this essay, the intra-subjective narratee is never 
directly addressed, but only implicitly, first and foremost through the rela-
tions of similarity and contrast between the extra-subjective narratee and the 
narrator-as-character.
 The concept of the intra-subjective narratee is extremely relevant for 
Girard’s conception of metaphysical desire. As previously noted, Girard 
emphasizes that the greater the similarity between the subject and his media-
tor, the more severe the rivalry between them. Along this line of argument, it 
seems plausible to claim that the greatest rivalry takes place between oneself 
and oneself-as-another, i.e., between the autodiegetic narrator and his past 
self as a character.
 For instance, Pilenz’s greatest rival is perhaps not Mahlke, but his past 
self, which is closely similar to his self-as-narrator, yet not identical with it. 
 28. I thank Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan for suggesting the terms “intra-subjective” and 
“extra-subjective” narratees.
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The narrating character, which is “the subject” in the external level of mim-
etic desire, splits into two in the internal level: he remains in the position of 
“the desiring subject” as narrator (in his present self), whereas as character 
(in his past self) he takes the position of “the mediator” or “the rival”: Pilenz-
as-narrator continues to desire everything that belongs to Mahlke and by 
doing this, he imitates the desire of himself as character; this desire is inher-
ently insatiable, since Mahlke most probably no longer exists.
 Pilenz as character is or becomes Mahlke, in the sense that his life is grad-
ually reduced to the observation of Mahlke’s life and the mimicry of his acts, 
and this prevents him from becoming an autonomous subject. At the same 
time, Pilenz is not Mahlke, in the sense that his imitation cannot be but par-
tial and inauthentic. Hence there are both similarities and differences between 
Mahlke as the external narratee of the narrative and Pilenz-as-character, its 
intra-subjective narratee. Pilenz’s wish in the story to annihilate Mahlke 
(falsely believing that he will become self-sufficient as soon as Mahlke dis-
appears) becomes, on the level of narration, a wish to annihilate himself as 
character: for what is the aspiration to dispose of his guilt through writing his 
story (84) if not an impossible wish to detach his present self from his past? 
Pilenz’s story is indeed “von Mahlke oder von Mahlke und mir, aber immer 
im Hinblick auf Mahlke,” (21) (“about Mahlke, or Mahlke and me, but 
always with the emphasis on Mahlke,” 1964: 21), since Pilenz actually lacks 
a separate self. Pilenz as narrator imitates the desire of his past self to possess 
Mahlke, but he can satisfy this desire only through the endless repetitions of 
his story.
 The analogy between the extra-subjective narratee and the intra-subjec-
tive narratee as two types of rivals/mediators on the level of narration is even 
more emphatic and explicit in the case of La Chute. Clamence’s narcissism 
may make the readers wonder whether the narratee exists as a real character 
or only as a projection of the narrator, “in which case the supposed dialogue 
collapses into a ceaseless self-engendering monologue” (Ellison 2007: 183). 
Certain characteristics of the narratee differentiate him from the narrator 
and make it difficult to psychologically identify the narratee with the narra-
tor. Especially prominent is the silent refusal of the narratee to confess to the 
narrator, despite the latter’s efforts to manipulate the narratee to do so (51, 
70–71, 159). In this way the role-playing persists throughout the novella: the 
narrator narrates (and occasionally verifies the narratee’s attention), and the 
narratee’s reactions are mentioned by the narrator as part of their dialogue: 
he sometimes interrogates, responds, smiles, or protests, but never tells his 
own story. In this respect, the narratee can be identified not with Clamence 
as narrator but with Clamence’s former self as character. Like the narratee, 
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Clamence as character is a Parisian, apparently self-assured, educated male 
lawyer; like the narratee, Clamence as character is incapable of self-reflection 
and does not feel the need to narrate his story, probably because both of 
them deem themselves complete, immaculate, and self-sufficient. Thus, unlike 
Mahlke, who cannot be identified with Pilenz-as-character, there is no way 
to differentiate Clamence’s narratee from his past self. Clamence as narrator 
envies and despises both for their self-assured existence, which turns out to 
be spurious and instable.
 By contrast, Genet’s extra-subjective narratee (the reader), characterized 
as bourgeois and unadventurous, seems to have nothing in common with the 
nonconforming, impertinent intra-subjective narratee—Genet as character. 
The extra-subjective narratee suggests the possibility of eradicating meta-
physical desire, whereas the intra-subjective narratee—in his fervent desire 
for the penis of his lovers—revives this desire. Genet’s unwillingness to con-
form as narrator is demonstrated in his conscious efforts to efface himself as 
character and recreate himself constantly from his current position as narra-
tor (75–76, 126), hence to possess and control his most intimate rival—his 
past self. Paradoxically, in his retrospective writing he cannot avoid the con-
struction of an image of his past while destroying this image time after time.
 Unlike the romantic conception of desire resisted by Girard, my model 
does not suppose a whole, unified, and coherent subject of desire, but rather 
splits this subject into two: the self is at the same time the self-as-another. 
Hence one can also be one’s own rival, and both types of rivals (the intra-
subjective and the extra-subjective narratees) can reflect each other and differ 
from one another to a lesser or greater degree.
CoNClusioN
girard’s Notion of Mimetic desire and Narratology
Girard’s Deceit, Desire, and the Novel is not a work of structural narratol-
ogy, but an attempt to identify and define a thematic construction shared by 
all (great) novels, which differentiates them from the romantic way of think-
ing. Girard is often accused by his critics of reducing the narrative text to 
its extralinguistic references, because he insists that the language of the text 
signifies (but also distorts and conceals) human relationships in the actual 
world.29 Nevertheless, the classical narratological distinction between story 
and narration, or more precisely, the implications of this distinction for the 
 29. See Golsan (1993: 111).
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narrative transaction, contribute to the qualification and elaboration of 
Girard’s thesis.
 The relations between the narrator and the narratee in Günter Grass’s 
novella Cat and Mouse both reflect and amplify the relations of mimetic 
desire between the two as characters in the story. As opposed to the straight 
analogy between metaphysical desire on the levels of story and narration in 
Grass’s novella, the relations between the narrator and the narratees in Gen-
et’s autobiographical novel The Thief’s Journal represent a possible world 
in which mimetic desire no longer exists. Hence Genet’s narrative is more 
amenable than Grass’s to the Girardian conception of conversion as a resolu-
tion of mimetic desire, although the possibility of conversion is negated as 
soon as it is suggested. Like Cat and Mouse and unlike The Thief’s Journal, 
Albert Camus’ The Fall demonstrates the perpetuation of mimetic desire by 
the endless repetition of the act of narration. While in the two other narra-
tives mimetic desire only motivates the narration and the narrator’s appeal to 
a narratee, without a story on that level, The Fall presents a story on the level 
of narration, which is woven into the story of the past life of the narrator.
 Girard’s argument that heroes of novels experience a conversion towards 
the end of the plot (as do the authors of those novels; see Golsan [1993: 
111]) is influenced by his worldview, according to which one can pave the 
way to a balanced and stable integration of the self and the other only by 
resigning metaphysical desire: “To triumph over self-centeredness is to get 
away from oneself and make contact with others but in another sense it also 
implies a greater intimacy with oneself and a withdrawal from others” (298). 
However, this argument also stems from his inattentiveness to the act of com-
munication within narratives between the narrator and the narratee, which 
in some cases reproduces and augments triangular desire. Modernist autodi-
egetic narration is particularly prone to exhibiting this type of enduring self-
centeredness.
 Not only does narratology illuminate and challenge Girard’s thesis of 
metaphysical desire; conversely Girard’s thesis—when it is extended to the 
level of narration—can contribute to narratology by helping to demonstrate 
some patterns of relations between the narrator and the narratee and by elu-
cidating possible connections between story and narration.
 In Story and Situation (1984: esp. 50–69), Ross Chambers argues that the 
relations of power and authority between the narrator and the narratee are 
motivated by the narrator’s wish to control the conveyance of information on 
the one hand, and by the narratee’s willingness to offer attention in exchange 
for information on the other hand. The essay highlights these relations in 
a different manner: if metaphysical desire is the basis of this relation, then 
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narratorial authority is motivated by the anxiety that the loss of the narratee 
will cause unbearable pain to the narrator, whose mediator and rival will no 
longer provide him with the (fragile) existential security that he needs. The 
narrator’s concealment, duplicity, and deception, emphasized in Chambers’s 
argument as means of seducing the narratee and reinforcing the authority of 
the narrator, are intensified in the analyzed narratives, in which they function 
as a feature of internal mimetic desire.
 Mimetic desire in autodiegetic narratives that have two (or more) types of 
narratees offers a complex network of possible analogies between the partici-
pants in the act of communication on the level of the narration (i.e., narrators 
and narratees) and the participants on the level of the story (i.e., charac-
ters, particularly narrators-as-characters). One should, however, beware of a 
reductive conclusion: not every narrative of this kind presents metaphysical 
desire between the narrator and the narratee. Although there are certain types 
of correlations between the structure of a narrative and its themes, such cor-
relations are never necessary connections.30
 30. I would like to thank Jan Alber, Monika Fludernik, and Jonathan Stavsky for their 
comments on earlier versions of this essay, and Moshe Ron for his preliminary comments on 
the subject.
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Social science disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, educa-
tion, and so on have long had an interest in narrative as a human cognitive 
and discursive device for sense-making and for ordering one’s life experi-
ences. The underlying assumption is that narratives are “social products 
produced by people within the context of specific social, historical and cul-
tural locations. They are related to the experience that people have of their 
lives, but they are not transparent carriers of that experience. Rather, they 
are interpretive devices, through which people represent themselves, both to 
themselves and to others” (Lawler 2002: 242; emphasis in original). These 
disciplines have consequently developed their own specific methodological 
tools for analyzing narrative, which can be broadly separated into thematic 
analysis, structural analysis, dialogic/performance analysis and visual anal-
ysis (Riessman 2008). Even though thematic analysis is only one of four 
possibilities according to Riessman’s outline, it is my impression that much 
narrative research in the social sciences is still limited to an investigation into 
what is told, while the how (that is, the process of constructing and convey-
ing what is told) is discussed in fairly general terms. Despite their focus on 
narrative, many social scientists seem to be largely unaware of (and per-
haps not interested in?) what (literary) narratology has to offer. The question 
arises to what extent “classical” narratological concepts that have hitherto 
been mainly applied to literary narratives can also be successfully exported 
to other disciplines which have an interest in narrative. Fludernik (1996) 
contends in her book on “natural narratology” that narratology can learn 
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from oral narratives and discourse analysis: “It will be argued that oral nar-
ratives (more precisely: narratives of spontaneous conversational storytelling) 
cognitively correlate with perceptual parameters of human experience and 
that these parameters remain in force even in more sophisticated written nar-
ratives, although the textual make-up of these stories changes drastically over 
time” (12). Conversely, one could ask whether studies of oral narratives may 
likewise benefit from the discussions conducted in narratology.
 I seek to answer this question by exploring ways of combining sociolin-
guistic narrative analysis with narratological terms and concepts. My aim 
is to demonstrate that narratology can, if suitably adapted to social science 
requirements, add further insights into the particularly “narrative” features 
of oral narratives. First I provide an outline of various narrative approaches 
in the social sciences, drawing upon Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber’s 
(1998) distinction between holistic-content, holistic-form, categorical-content 
and categorical-form modes of reading narrative. This outline suggests that 
narrative research can vary significantly in its theoretical depth and meth-
odological rigor, ranging from detailed turn-by-turn linguistic analyses (e.g. 
in discursive psychology) to more thematic or topic-oriented approaches. I 
then analyze two oral narratives from the Database of Personal Experience of 
Health and Illness (DIPEx, now: healthtalkonline.org) with a view to identi-
fying possible points of convergence between narratology and social science 
brands of narrative research. More specifically, I borrow narratological terms 
such as experiencing/narrating I, focalization or slant and filter, and double 
deixis in you-narratives for my analysis, and I contend that frequently evoked 
concepts in the social science literature such as social positioning, identity 
(Giddens 1991), and the marking of in-group and out-group relations (Tajfel 
1974) can be further illuminated if reconsidered through a narratological lens.
Narrative aNd soCial sCieNCe researCH MetHods
an overview
Research methods in the social sciences can be located along a continuum 
ranging from “quantitative” to “qualitative” approaches. Quantitative 
research methods are normally applied if one’s aim is to deal with a large 
amount of data, and if the main interest lies in measuring these data, com-
paring figures and percentages, and calculating the relations between vari-
ables. The question one asks is “How many?” rather than “In what way?” or 
“Why?” The instruments for this type of research are standardized so that, 
ideally, every test subject is given the same input and tests are repeatable. 
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The aim is to reach valid and reliable results. Typical methods include large-
scale surveys and statistical measurements. By contrast, qualitative methods 
are used when questions of motivation, attitudes, or opinions are concerned. 
With qualitative methods, one can generate data on people’s interactions 
and their relationships and functional positions in social organizations, insti-
tutions and systems, or, more generally, one can obtain data on cognitive, 
affective and behavioral aspects of people in given social contexts, e.g. their 
beliefs, attitudes, feelings, opinions and real vs. reported, planned or remem-
bered actions. Today, multi-method approaches, which combine both quanti-
tative and qualitative methodologies such as surveys and interviews, are very 
common in social science research and, more specifically, in health research 
(McDonald and Daly 1992; McKie 1996).
 Narrative research is one of a number of methods in the qualitative meth-
ods camp. One key tool is narrative interviewing. In narrative interviews 
open-ended questions are used to elicit stories from the interviewee. This type 
of interview is common, for example, in life history research. Narrative inter-
views can have a topical focus, i.e. they concentrate on specific events and on 
what happened when and why, but more often they are cultural interviews in 
the sense that they try to unravel norms, values and beliefs of a certain group 
or society (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 9–10). While the narrative interview is a 
method to elicit answers from respondents, the data thus generated can be 
analyzed from different vantage points, as explained below.
 Oral narratives pose a series of questions in terms of possible analytical 
approaches but these questions can be summarized, by and large, in the fol-
lowing questions identified by Riessman (1993: 25):
1. How is talk transformed into a written text and how are narrative seg-
ments determined?
2. What aspects of the narrative constitute the basis for interpretation?
3. Who determines what the narrative means and are alternative readings 
possible?
Question one touches upon issues surrounding the transcription of interview 
material and the selection of narrative data. The second part of this ques-
tion borders on considerations of form: what, in structural terms, constitutes 
a narrative? Narrativity plays a central role here. Questions two and three 
refer to the interpretation process: what is of interest in a narrative, i.e. what 
in particular does a researcher wish to investigate? And, finally, what is the 
analyst’s role and to what extent does his or her interpretive focus influence 
research findings?
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 Even though this matrix was devised for life history research, the catego-
ries of content vs. form on the one hand and categorical vs. holistic on the 
other are applicable to any type of narrative analysis. The holistic-content 
approach, as its name suggests, looks at the content of a life story in its 
entirety. Even if only parts of the narrative are focused upon, e.g. the begin-
ning or the ending, they are always interpreted holistically with regard to 
the entire narrative. The reconstruction of a life story can also involve using 
archival data and visual material. In the holistic-form approach, broad struc-
tural categories come under closer scrutiny. Thus one can look at genre allo-
cations of life stories: for instance, does a story develop as a tragedy or as a 
comedy, or can one analyze in more detail how the plot develops throughout 
the life course? Are there turning points, for example, or a climax? On the 
holistic-form side, social science research has brought forth sociolinguistic 
narrative analysis in the Labovian tradition, which delineates the overall 
shape of oral narratives in terms of Labov’s diamond diagram with abstract, 
orientation, turning point, complicating action, and coda (Labov and 
Waletzky 1967; Labov 1982). Another key concept is “evaluation,” which 
explains why a narrative is told in the first place, for example because the 
related events are particularly exciting, important, dangerous, funny or, more 
generally, worth telling. Structurally, evaluation is marked through deviance 
from the overall “narrative syntax.” This can be seen, for example, in a shift 
of tenses, modality, etc.
 Since sociolinguistic narrative analysis also attends to features of narrative 
syntax one can also place it within the categorical-form area. The categorical-
form mode focuses on a more detailed linguistic analysis of narratives, com-
ments, utterances, etc. Analysts might look at metaphors used by the speaker 
or at the distribution of active/passive constructions, and the like. One 
type of research that is clearly located in the categorical-form axiom is the 
 The answers to these questions depend largely on the conceptual frame 
one works in and are therefore also influenced by the specific discipline within 
which a researcher undertakes narrative analysis. However, it is possible to 
sketch a general outline of the types of narrative analysis currently available 
to scholars. Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber (1998: 12–14) propose the 
following model for the classification and organization of the narrative analy-
sis of life stories, which is based on four cornerstones:
HOLISTIC-CONTENT HOLISTIC-FORM
CATEgORICAL-CONTENT CATEgORICAL-FORM
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conversation-analytic approach practiced in discursive psychology, for exam-
ple, where data are carefully transcribed including phonetic detail and pro-
sodic features such as intonation patterns and pauses. These data are then 
analyzed on a turn-by-turn basis in order to trace the locally determined 
unfolding of the conversation. Discursive strategies and markers, such as 
backchannels, repairs, hedges, boosters, interruptions, tag questions, etc., 
come under closer scrutiny in this line of research. The categorical-content 
approach, by contrast, is equated with what is otherwise known as “content 
analysis,” i.e. the extraction, classification and collection of separate utter-
ances under the heading of predefined categories (Grbich 1999). Categories 
can be fairly broad or narrow, depending on one’s research angle and detail 
of analysis. Data are coded for larger thematic features. The analysis can 
range from quasi-statistical forms where the frequency and length of discus-
sion of recurring themes is measured, to more qualitative accounts marked by 
careful reading and the contextualization of data.
 As Rentz (1999) demonstrates in her survey of case studies conducted 
in the area of professional communication, social science studies themselves 
often take a narrative form by presenting either the research activities or the 
explored phenomena, or both, as stories. Case studies frequently make use 
of narrative methods since narrative “is particularly critical to the making 
of experiential knowledge” (Rentz 1999: 54). Thus case studies invite the 
interpretations of readers and allow them to read the data against their own 
“folk knowledge” and life experiences. However, pieces of narrative research 
can vary significantly in their theoretical depth and methodological rigor, as 
we saw. I must add the caveat here that I consider it perfectly legitimate that 
researchers resort to different types of narrative analysis, depending on the 
data at hand and on the purpose and aim of the research. To adopt an argu-
ment used by social science researchers, the research questions ultimately 
determine the methods one uses (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2008; 
May 2001; Silverman and Marvasti 2008). Further aspects to bear in mind 
in this context are disciplinary traditions as well as the audience the research 
is targeted at. For example, it may be counterproductive to present a detailed 
conversation-analytical account of doctor-patient interaction to medical prac-
titioners as they may be uncomfortable with the linguistic terminology and 
may therefore not consider the analysis helpful for their own practical pur-
poses. However, I think that discussions of narrative materials could some-
times benefit from closer linguistic and especially narratological analyses.
 Over the last few decades narratology, by definition the prime discipline 
of narrative analysis, has branched out into a wide array of “post-classical” 
narratologies (Heinen and Sommer 2009; Herman 1999a; Nünning and Nün-
Mildorf, “Narratology and the Social Sciences”  239
ning 2002) that have borrowed concepts from psychology, sociology, anthro-
pology, history, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, discourse linguistics, 
and other fields. In the past, attempts have also been made to build bridges 
between narratology and social science disciplines. Herman’s (1999b) concept 
of “socionarratology,” for example, takes into account narrative features, 
contextual factors, and the cognitive dimension in narrative production. Tan-
nen (1989, 1997) demonstrates that spoken discourse is by no means less lin-
guistically complex than literary discourse and that in fact oral narratives can 
display more effective strategies for creating involvement. Some scholars have 
also attempted to apply narratological concepts to non-literary narratives. 
For example, a recent collection of essays looks at the roles and functions of 
narrative in real-life contexts such as journalism, medicine, natural sciences, 
psychology, law, religion, economics, politics, and so on (Klein and Martínez 
2009).1 Potter (1996), a discursive psychologist, dedicates a section of his 
book on the discursive construction of reality to focalization in conversa-
tional narratives (163–65), arguing that focalization assigns to the listener the 
role of perceiver and endows the speaker with the authority of a “witness” 
(see also Atkinson 1990). Potter concludes his excursion into narratology by 
saying that “a more systematic study of the kinds of focalization that occur in 
everyday talk and news interview talk could be particularly revealing” (173). 
Another feature that is generally considered to be mainly “literary” is free 
indirect discourse. However, scholars like Polanyi (1984), Fludernik (1993), 
and Tommola (2003) have pointed out that certain forms of free indirect 
discourse can also occur in spoken language. Despite such efforts to encour-
age interdisciplinary approaches, however, a more consistent and systematic 
exploration of potential areas of cross-fertilization between narratology and 
other narrative approaches is still missing in the field. It is time to begin to 
close the gap. Before I move on to my analyses, let me provide some informa-
tion concerning the narratives presented in this essay.
data
The two narratives were selected from the Database of Personal Experience 
of Health and Illness (DIPEx), which has changed its name to healthtalkon-
line.org and can be accessed online. DIPEx is a registered charity, whose aim 
 1. One point in this volume I criticize is the fact that, even though it addresses narratives 
in real life (“Wirklichkeitserzählungen”), none of the contributions attends to spontaneous 
conversational storytelling, which, to my mind, can be considered the most typical kind of 
storytelling in comparison to the ones presented in the book.
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is to make people’s experiences with over one hundred common illnesses 
available to other patients but also to function as a teaching resource for 
health care professionals. The database contains excerpts from interviews 
conducted with patients as well as general information about a wide range of 
conditions. The first website was launched as a pilot site in 2001, and DIPEx 
has been expanding its online information base ever since. The team behind 
DIPEx consists of medical practitioners and social scientists working in the 
area of health and illness. The data for the website are generated in in-depth 
interviews conducted with patients in their homes or in other locations if they 
prefer not to be interviewed at home. All interviews are fully transcribed and 
coded for general themes and topics. Prior to publication on the website, the 
respondents read the transcripts and decide whether they wish some of the 
material to be excluded from publication. Copyright is then passed on to the 
DIPEx team.
 While I was not able to access complete transcripts of the interviews 
because of financial limitations, I was kindly permitted to use the materi-
als that are available on the actual DIPEx website. A few words are there-
fore in order concerning the narratives I use. First of all, the narratives are 
presented out of context in that only parts of the interview in which they 
emerged are available online. Second, the narratives have already been pre-
selected according to the thematic criteria applied by the DIPEx research 
team. In other words, a certain bias may have been introduced by arrang-
ing the narrative materials in specific ways, and since I am not part of the 
research team I may be less aware of such a bias. Third, the materials on the 
website are tidied up in the sense that transcripts have been made more read-
able for a larger readership. Hence, one does not find a close phonetic tran-
scription of the interviews. However, a minimum of description of the oral 
nature of these data is maintained in the notation of pauses and breaks in 
speech, for example. Unlike with other transcripts, the transformation from 
the oral to the written medium was not an issue for my analysis, since the 
DIPEx website also makes recordings of the presented excerpts available. In 
other words, prosodic features and other phonetic particularities can be and 
were double checked. My use of line breaks in the narratives follows Labov 
and Waletzky’s (1967) typology of narrative clauses. I have not added tran-
scription conventions other than the ones already used by the DIPEx team to 
ensure readability. Furthermore, I would like to add that, for my purposes, a 
holistic rather than a turn-by-turn presentation of the narratives is perfectly 
sufficient. While a conversation-analytic approach would require a more fully 
elaborated transcript with both speakers’ (that is, the respondent’s and inter-
viewer’s) turns, the sociolinguistic narrative approach coupled with narrato-
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logical considerations does not necessarily require such detail. The narratives 
selected must be considered case studies, and I do not claim general appli-
cability or validity for the results I present. The purpose of this paper is to 
open vistas to what, in my view, is a promising new line of research along the 
boundaries of narratology and the social sciences.
FaMilY stories aNd PersoNal ideNtitY
In an earlier article on focalization and double deixis in oral narratives (Mil-
dorf 2006), I concentrate especially on the formation of professional identity 
in contrast to personal identity in the narrative discourse of general practitio-
ners. However, society contains a great variety of groups one can belong to. 
Besides professional groups, friends and family also play a significant role in 
our lives and determine our identity. Sarangi (2006) maintains that “[f]amily 
is conceptualized as a social institution that mediates the individual and the 
social, with identifiable structures, functions, and hierarchies” (403). Family 
structures in turn are largely based on narratives, as Langellier and Peter-
son (2004) argue, and these narratives establish members’ in-group and out-
group status and thus define who belongs to a family and who does not: 
“What we commonly call ‘the family’ is not a single, naturally occurring 
phenomenon but variations in small group cultures produced in embodied, 
situated, and material performances such as family storytelling. Family sto-
rytelling is a multileveled strategic discourse carried out in diverse situations 
by multiple participants who order personal and group identities as family” 
(113). A problem arises when personal stories potentially threaten family 
unity because of a discrepancy between feelings of loyalty on the one hand 
and misgivings about other members of the group on the other. Let us have a 
closer look at the following interview narrative related by a 52-year-old man 
suffering from epilepsy. The narrative recounts his second seizure and the 
reaction of his family.
Narrative 1
1. When the second time it came round,
2. when I had the second fit which wasn’t very long afterwards,
3. and they decided that “yeah you’ve got epilepsy,”
4. my grandmother, my grandparents, my grandmother particularly was 
really distraught, sobbing.
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5. And basically my parents were supportive
6. but um, they kept the,
7. it’s like they kept the lid on things.
8. Um, yeah they didn’t want,
9. there was a degree of shame if you like,
10. not, I don’t mean that unkindly on them,
11. I think they meant well
12. and they were very supportive to me.
13. But they didn’t want to go round saying “Excuse me but my son’s an 
epileptic,”
14. and they would much rather I suppose naturally talk about success 
rather than what was certainly perceived as a failure.
This narrative can be divided into two larger parts: the actual narrative rang-
ing from lines 1 to 7, and a lengthy evaluation from line 8 onwards, which 
resumes and elaborates the key point of the narrative, namely that the family 
were not willing to discuss the narrator’s illness openly (“they kept the lid 
on things,” line 7). The narrative begins by anchoring the story world tem-
porally in lines 1 and 2: “When the second time it came round, when I had 
the second fit which wasn’t very long afterwards.” While the first line gives 
a rather vague image of the incident because of the replacement of “the fit” 
with the third-person pronoun “it” and the somewhat unusual verb phrase 
“came round,” the second line specifies what happened by explicitly men-
tioning “the fit” and by tying the incident back to the narrator’s first seizure 
alluded to in the relative clause “which wasn’t very long afterwards.” The 
following narrative clause in line 3, which entails the complicating action of 
the story, depicts a crucial point in the illness narrative: the labeling of the ill-
ness as “epilepsy.” Labeling plays an important role in medical consultations 
since giving a label to a physical condition turns this condition into a definite 
disease or problem and thus establishes it as a fact (Maynard 1988).
 What is also noteworthy here is the use of direct speech or what Tannen 
(1989) calls “constructed dialogue,” i.e. a seemingly verbatim rendition of a 
speech situation which, however, cannot be taken to be an accurate reflec-
tion of the original speech situation but is rather a version (re)constructed 
in the current conversational context: “‘yeah, you’ve got epilepsy?’” As in 
literary narrative, direct speech is used to enliven a scene and to create in the 
listener a sense of vicinity to the characters in the scene. In this particular 
example, the use of direct speech gives additional weight to the labeling of 
the narrator’s disease, which is also reinforced by the affirmative interjec-
tion “yeah.” The revelation of the diagnosis is dramatized and the charac-
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ters in this “drama” come to life, as it were. More importantly, however, 
the direct speech here also assumes a distancing function that works in two 
ways. On the one hand, the narrator as experiencing self distances himself 
from the doctors who passed the diagnosis by making them stand out as 
distinct characters or actors in his illness narrative (“they decided that . . .”). 
On the other hand, the narrator also distances himself from his ill persona 
and refuses identification with the label of “epilepsy” by reconstructing the 
diagnosis in direct speech and by thus presenting himself as second-person 
“you” rather than “I.” The address form implies that the label was imposed 
on the experiencing self from the outside and has not been fully incorpo-
rated yet (compare with “and they decided that I had epilepsy” or even “and 
they decided that I’ve got epilepsy”). A similar strategy is used in line 13, 
where the identification, and hence acknowledgment, of the illness through 
labeling is again presented in direct speech: “‘Excuse me but my son’s an 
epileptic.’” This time, however, labeling the disease is precisely what does 
not happen, what the narrator’s family “didn’t want to go round saying.” 
The constructed speech in this context thus has an almost sarcastic quality, 
especially since it contains the apologetic phrase “excuse me” and the generic 
category “an epileptic.”
 Criticism of the family’s attitude towards the narrator’s problem is the 
central topic of the narrative, and the family’s behavior constitutes large parts 
of the plot. What is interesting, however, is the fact that the narrator repeat-
edly tries to tone down his criticism and that he uses a number of linguis-
tic strategies in order not to come across as someone who is unjustifiably 
disappointed with his family. To use Tannen’s (2006) term, the narrative is 
“rekeyed” in the sense that the overall tenor changes. In line 4 the narrator 
depicts the distress felt by his grandparents and especially his grandmother 
(see the self-correction from “my grandparents” to “my grandmother”) and 
emphasizes this through the adverb “really” as well as the additional action 
verb “sobbing.” The continuous form of the verb implies that this expression 
of the grandmother’s distress must have been lengthy and ongoing. Line 5 
focuses on the parents and describes them as “supportive.” The adverb “basi-
cally,” however, already anticipates some contrasting action, which is then 
introduced through the coordinator “but” in the following line: “but um, 
they kept the, it’s like they kept the lid on things” (lines 6–7). The container 
metaphor evoked in the expression “they kept the lid on things” suggests 
that the parents regarded the narrator’s illness as something that must be 
contained or suppressed. More precisely, the metaphor expresses what the 
narrator as experiencing self thought his parents did and felt. The hesitation 
marker “um” used at this point (lines 6 and 8), the speech cut-off in line 6, 
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and the use of the modifier “it’s like” in line 7 after “they kept the” before 
the phrase “they kept the lid on things” is completed—these all indicate a 
high level of self-monitoring and point towards the interaction work the nar-
rator is doing as the narrating self, i.e. from his present-day perspective. In 
Jahn’s (1996, 1999) terminology we could say that the narrator occupies 
focus-1, i.e. he offers the “lens” through which the story world is perceived. 
In his model of vision, Jahn distinguishes between two types of focus which 
he then applies to the concept of focalization: focus-1 is “the burning point 
of an eye’s lens, usually located in a person’s head,” while focus-2 is “the 
area of attention which the eye focuses on to obtain maximum sharpness” 
(Jahn 1999: 88). In the narrative at hand, the speaker can be said to occupy 
focus-1 in the sense explained above, as well as focus-2 since he focuses on 
himself in relationship to his parents in his narrative. What I wish to suggest 
here is that even in oral storytelling one ought not to presuppose a simple 
co-referentiality between the storyteller and the person expressed in the first-
person pronoun “I.” Instead, it can be useful to differentiate between various 
narrative personae and functional roles a narrator may assume.
 Rather than presenting the behavior of his parents straightaway as an 
absolute fact, the narrator reformulates it in terms of his own retrospective 
perception or focalizer position (“it’s like”) and thus mitigates the potentially 
critical stance conveyed in the metaphoric phrase. This mitigating strategy is 
repeated in another clause cut off in line 8 (“Um, yeah they didn’t want”), 
which is then resumed in line 13 (“But they didn’t want to go round say-
ing . . .”) with a range of excuses and justifications of the parents’ behavior 
placed in between (lines 11–12: “I think they meant well and they were very 
supportive”). Furthermore, hedges are employed to deflect the impression of 
the narrator as unduly critical: “I don’t mean that unkindly on them” (line 
10); “a degree of shame” (line 9). The conditional clause “if you like” (line 9) 
indirectly negotiates the word choice of the noun “shame” and has the addi-
tional phatic function of establishing rapport between storyteller and listener 
(in the sense of “I am lacking a better word at this point but you know what 
I mean”).
 Chatman’s (1986) distinction between filter and slant can also be useful 
for the analysis of this narrative. While the events at the time of the diagnosis 
and the family’s reaction are “filtered through” the narrator’s eyes both on 
the level of the experiencing and the narrating self, the critical judgment that 
is implicitly passed can be reframed as the “slant” the narrator takes on the 
events in retrospect. This slant, however, becomes more ambivalent through 
the excusatory tone introduced because of the interview situation. When talk-
ing to the interviewer the narrator feels obliged to maintain face as the under-
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standing son of the family despite his probable disappointment about the 
reaction of his parents. The division of the narrator’s position into slant and 
filter can be further observed in the final line of the narrative, in which the 
narrator speculates on reasons why his parents did not want to discuss his 
illness openly: “and they would much rather I suppose naturally talk about 
success rather than what was certainly perceived as a failure” (line 14). The 
most striking aspect here is the free indirect discourse (FID) in “they would 
much rather . . . talk about success,” which blends the narrator’s voice with 
the alleged thoughts/motives of his parents. One might object here that the 
clause is in fact an example of direct discourse, which is immediately depen-
dent on the inquit formula “I suppose.” I would reject such a reading because 
of the parenthetical insertion of “I suppose,” which marks the putative verb 
phrase phonetically and thus lifts it out of the surrounding syntactical con-
struction, no longer warranting its function as a real inquit formula. Typical 
features of FID in this example include the omission of the reporting clause 
(“they thought” or “they said” or “they felt”), the change from first-person 
to third-person pronoun use (“we would rather” to ” “they would rather”), 
tense backshift of the modal verb “would,” and the use of features of spoken 
language such as the combination of the quantifier “much” with the adverb 
“rather” (see also Leech and Short 1981: 325ff.). Since the verb is a modal 
verb, the backshift is not evident from the linguistic form alone as modals 
typically do not change when they are in past tense. However, the context 
with past tense in the preceding and following clause strongly suggests that 
the modal must also be set in the past here. It is important to bear in mind 
that the narrative does not represent what the parents actually said or thought 
but what their son assumes they may have said or thought. In other words, 
the clause containing FID is used to convey hypothetical thought or speech.
 FID is said to be limited to literary narrative because it enables the narra-
tor to access the minds of characters in the story world, a phenomenon that 
is supposed to be impossible in real life. In this narrative we see that even 
conversational storytellers can make use of FID if they present the thoughts, 
feelings, or motives of other people. That this form of access to other people’s 
minds is unusual and hence needs to be explained or justified in oral narra-
tives (while it is a perfectly legitimate form in literary narrative), can be seen 
in the insertion of the above-mentioned verb phrase “I suppose,” which iden-
tifies the speaker’s statement as his conjecture rather than an observable and 
verifiable fact. The parents’ reasoning, which could easily come under attack 
if understood as a sign of lack of courage and acceptance of the son’s pre-
dicament, is thus again mitigated and presented in a defensive manner. This 
verbal defense of the parents culminates in the passive construction used at 
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the end of the narrative: “what was certainly perceived as a failure” (line 14). 
The adverb “certainly” again frames the presented feelings in terms of what 
the narrator “believes to be true” rather than what “is true” (what Leech 
[1987: 107–110] calls “theoretical meaning”). More importantly, however, 
the “experiencers” or “originators” of these feelings are completely blotted 
out. In other words, the perception of the narrator’s illness as “failure” is 
not explicitly attributed to anyone. One could interpret the relative clause 
as referring to the perception of others (“what other people perceived as a 
failure”), in which case the parents’ behavior would imply shame and lack of 
courage. One could also read the clause as indicating the parents’ own per-
ception (“what they perceived as a failure”), which would even magnify their 
sense of shame. Both interpretations are problematic in the context of family 
storytelling as they suggest criticism of one’s parents and thus pose a potential 
threat to family unity.
 Tajfel (1978) demonstrates that denigration of members of the out-group 
is necessary for the definition and demarcation of one’s in-group. If family 
members are criticized, they are indirectly placed on a par with out-group 
members and the boundaries between groups become blurred. For this rea-
son, criticism needs to be toned down by means of a defensive slant on the 
narrative expressed in numerous linguistic and narrative strategies. Chat-
man’s distinction between filter and slant proves useful as it helps explain a 
discrepancy in this oral narrative: while the slant the narrator offers on the 
story world is defensive of the narrator’s parents and ostensibly presents them 
in a positive light, the narrator’s function as filter grants the listener an insight 
into the minds of the parents, which implicitly conveys a sense of disappoint-
ment and criticism. On a more global narrative level, the switch between the 
experiencing self and narrating self positions, which entails a switch from the 
filter to the slant function of the narrator, mark a shift in the narrator’s posi-
tioning. He moves from the position of son who confirms his membership in 
the family group to the position of ill person who feels excluded and stigma-
tized by people who do not inhabit the same domain of illness (in the sense of 
Donald’s [1998: 23] “wellness-illness divide”).
illNess, ideNtitY, aNd deiCtiC traNsFers
Let us now turn to another narratological concept that can be used for the 
study of oral narratives, double deixis (Herman 1994). The following narra-
tive is a personal narrative of a 60-year old woman suffering from depression 
who recounts the way in which she managed to go back to a “normal” life 
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by taking on a secretarial post. The narrative is particularly interesting for its 
use of double deixis. Herman (1994) lists five possible functions of second-
person pronoun “you”: generalized you, fictional reference, fictionalized (= 
horizontal) address, apostrophic (= vertical) address, and doubly deictic you. 
One can speak of double deixis when the relationship between the morpho-
syntactic form of you and its textual functions is not entirely clear-cut and 
when you assumes more than one of the above-mentioned first four functions 
at the same time.
Narrative 2
1. One day she (my social worker) knocked on the door
2. and said, “We’re going to start a MIND group, a sort of MIND group, 
would you be interested in joining us?”
3. So I got into that
4. and because of my secretarial skills I was immediately taken on as a 
secretary of the working group.
5. And, and that’s how it went.
6. And again because you’re . . . becoming friendly with the professionals 
as it were, [pause]
7. and [pause] at a point where you, you were starting to give something 
back, starting to help other people.
8. And that made me realize how important it was to help other people.
9. And I think that gives you an uplift doesn’t it.
10. And that’s really what happened,
11. that’s, that’s how I got back into normality.
The narrative begins with a kind of mini-dramatization including constructed 
dialogue in line 2 and the metonymic image “knocked on the door” (line 1), 
which can be understood literally as the social worker knocking on the nar-
rator’s door and also figuratively as an image for the social worker’s request. 
The complicating action from line 3 to 7 relates how the narrator became 
a secretary of the working group. This part of the plot then culminates in 
the resolution of the narrative (lines 8–11), the main point of which is the 
narrator’s recognition of how important the job was for her well-being. In 
other words, the narrative describes a turning point in the narrator’s life. As 
Rimmon-Kenan (2002) argues, the turning point structure in illness narra-
tives “counteracts disruption” (18) and thus offers a sense of coherence to the 
ill person. However, this structure can also constitute a kind of “entrapment” 
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in the sense that it suppresses the experience of chaos and can thus lead to a 
meaningless recycling of a culturally expected narrative type.
 In narrative 2 the turning point in the narrator’s life is presented in posi-
tive terms and thus matches the cultural expectation of the “getting better” 
plot line. Interestingly enough, the narrator switches from first-person to 
second-person narrative when she describes which aspects of her new job 
brought about the change in her life: “And again because you’re . . . becom-
ing friendly with the professionals as it were, [pause] and [pause] at a point 
where you, you were starting to give something back, starting to help other 
people” (lines 6–7). While the first instance of you still bears marks of gener-
alized you since it is accompanied by the present tense (present progressive), 
the second you clearly indicates a replacement of the first-person pronoun 
with you which, however, still refers to the narrator as experiencing self. It 
is the narrator herself who started to help other people. The use of you-nar-
rative creates a peculiar sense of self-distancing, as though the narrator were 
looking at herself from the outside of the narrated story world. One could 
also interpret the you-narrative in more positive terms as an inclusive move 
that enables the sick person to enter a dialogue with herself. At the same 
time, since the narrative was related in an interview, one can assume that 
there is also a residue of the vertical address function of “you” left. Put dif-
ferently, the “you” can also be read as including the interviewer and thus it 
assumes the dialogic function of creating involvement by suggesting that, had 
the interviewer been in a similar situation, she may also have had a similar 
experience. The vertical address element is only minimal, however, since the 
recounted story is very specific and a distinct part of the narrator’s life. In line 
9, generalized you becomes more dominant again: “and I think that gives 
you an uplift doesn’t it.” While it was the narrator in particular who felt an 
uplift because of her changed situation, anyone in such a context may experi-
ence the same feeling. The simple present, which generalizes the statement, 
and the tag question, which has the phatic function of securing the listener’s 
agreement with the statement made, support this interpretation. Only in line 
8 does the narrator return to the first-person pronoun when she relates the 
point of her realizing what was important in her life, which also happens to 
be the turning point in her illness narrative.
 What possible functions does the you-narrative in this particular story 
have? The fact that the narrative at this point is also marked by pauses 
points towards the narrator’s thinking about how her job affected her life 
and thinking about how to frame this process in the interview. In a way, 
the narrator mentally (and then verbally) resumes her life, and the distance 
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between the experiencing self in the past and the narrating self in the pres-
ent is captured in the distancing you. As I said, it is almost as if the narra-
tor entered a dialogue with herself at this point, thereby also supporting 
the memory work she is accomplishing in the interview. At the same time, 
you clearly lacks a sense of full identification if compared to I. One could 
therefore argue that the use of you-narrative here enacts the process of de-
centering or the narrator’s shift of focus from herself as the ill person to oth-
ers who also needed help. This reading is corroborated by another comment 
the narrator makes later in the interview: “And I do think that the idea that 
it was benefiting somebody else as well, that it wasn’t just ‘self.’ Which is 
a good thing because you do turn in on yourself. And it made one sort of 
stop being focused on just oneself.” This statement is highly interesting as 
it contains a deictic shift not only to second-person you but also to generic 
one, and moves the whole experience even further away from the narrator. It 
foregrounds the almost universal and indeed generic aspect of such turning 
point structures in illness narratives.
 This example shows how deictic transfers in narratives can help elicit 
the dynamics of identity formation. In this narrative a move away from self-
awareness typically expressed through the first-person pronoun “I” (Giddens 
1991: 53) correlates with the narrator-protagonist’s removal of focus from 
her sick persona to others on the intradiegetic level. This de-focusing is con-
structed as a beneficial process and as the prerequisite for change. The nar-
rator’s affirmative resolution, where she talks about “uplift” (line 9), “that’s 
what really happened” (line 10), and “that’s how I got back into normality” 
(line 11), underlines the positive tenor of the narrative. On the extradiegetic 
level the you-narrative places the listener in the peculiar position of someone 
who overhears the dialogue of the narrator with herself and at the same time 
in the position of an addressee who is invited to feel included in the narrated 
events. What we observe here is the kind of narrative work that forms the 
basis of our self-identities: “A person with a reasonably stable sense of self-
identity has a feeling of biographical continuity which she is able to grasp 
reflexively and, to a greater or lesser degree, communicate to other people” 
(Giddens 1991: 54). Illness disrupts continuity but the turning point struc-
ture remedies this disruption by providing a new sense of continuity that 
centers on a “before” and “after.” Ironically, then, the narrative strategy of 
deictic transfer that normally destabilizes a sense of narrative identity is used 
here to accomplish and to convey an even greater sense of identity lost and 
found. This stands in contrast to the first narrative in which the narrative 
strategies of focalization and FID compete with and subtly undermine some 
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of the narrative’s more explicit messages, which ultimately conveys a sense of 
ambivalence.
CoNClusioN
As we can see from these examples, further layers of complexity can be 
revealed in seemingly simple oral narratives by means of narratological anal-
ysis. While discourse linguistics has already made a significant contribution 
to a more systematic investigation of oral narratives, I argue that narratology 
can help elicit the particularly narrative features of oral narratives, which may 
lead to more finely-grained distinctions. Let us briefly reconsider the concepts 
I set out to investigate: identity, social positioning, in-group and out-group 
relations. Research on identity no longer assumes identity to be a mono-
lithic conglomerate of essential features but rather a dynamic concept that 
is constantly and contextually (re)negotiated among interactants (de Fina, 
Schiffrin and Bamberg 2006).2 If identities are partially negotiated through 
narratives, the question arises in what ways narratives can offer scope for 
identity formation. Social positioning as one facet of identity formation is 
a case in point. Hollway (1984), for example, states that “discourses make 
available positions for subjects to take up. These positions are in relation 
to other people” (236). Yet how do subjects “take up” positions? In narra-
tive, positions can be made available through the characters that people the 
story world and also through the position of the narrator vis-à-vis the story 
world. One of the fallacies of narrative research in the social sciences to date, 
I would argue, is to assume that the storyteller equals the narrator and, if he 
or she is telling a personal story in the first person, also equals the charac-
ter presented in the story. As my discussion has shown, narrators in and of 
oral stories can assume more complex positions, which can be captured if 
one adopts narratological terms such as experiencing and narrating self or 
slant and filter. Likewise, identities and group relations emerge in a process in 
which storytellers set themselves off from, identify with or in some other way 
relate to themselves as characters and to other characters in their storyworlds. 
Georgakopoulou (2005) demonstrates in her research on young Greek female 
adolescents’ talk how, for example, stylization, i.e. the enactment of other 
people’s (in this case, men’s) voices in narratives, contributes to the constitu-
tion of her informants’ “own gendered selves” (180). While the use of other 
characters’ speech has been widely studied in discourse linguistics, the notion 
 2. Compare the contribution of Löschnigg in this volume.
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that other people’s “voices” may stand in for covert presentations of third-
person consciousness has not featured prominently in the literature, one rea-
son certainly being that this narrative phenomenon is not deemed possible in 
oral narratives.3 And yet, such subtle phenomena do occur. The only problem 
is that very fine-tuned narratological sensors are required to discover them.
 A lot more work needs to be done. First of all it would be desirable to 
analyze a large sample of oral narratives from a wide range of contexts to see 
if any common patterns emerge. For example, can certain narrative strate-
gies be correlated with socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, social 
status, or professional group? To what extent can narrative strategies such 
as focalization, double deixis, or FID be linked to more general conversa-
tional strategies employed to establish rapport, to convince or persuade, to 
signal convergence or divergence, and so on? What these questions certainly 
demonstrate, however, is that scholars from various disciplines interested in 
narrative ought to collaborate more closely in order to arrive at more holis-
tic approaches. After all, “the exploratory and experimental options of nar-
rative are inextricably fused with our fleeting reality itself,” as Brockmeier 
and Harré (2001) contend, and for this reason “one motive—perhaps even 
a leitmotif—of the study of narrative realities should be to investigate this 
opening-up quality of the discursive mind and to uncover the multifaceted 
forms of cultural discourse in which it takes place” (56).
 3. It is nonetheless true that pragmatics is one linguistic area that has traditionally also 
considered the attribution of speaker meaning. More recent work that is particularly of interest 
here is relevance theory as put forward by Sperber and Wilson (see Wilson 2000: 419ff. for an 
overview). See also Mildorf (2008).
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(0) iNtroduCtioN
In the theory of autobiography, theoretical developments in literary studies 
are clearly reflected. From an earlier mimetic understanding of the genre as 
the representation of an autonomous and homogeneous self the pendulum 
swung to the deconstructionist view, dominant in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. According to deconstructionist tenets, there can be no representa-
tion of self in language, but only an illusion of “self” generated by a purely 
textual subject. It was at this point that theorists like Michael Sprinker even 
went as far as to proclaim the “end of autobiography” (Sprinker 1980). Since 
the late 1980s, however, the pendulum seems to have come to a standstill at 
the center between the mimetic and deconstructionist extremes of amplitude, 
settled in a framework of constructivist (narrativist) theories of autobiogra-
phy. Paul John Eakin (1992), Jerome Bruner (1991; 2003), and others have 
emphasized the role of narrative in the formation and maintenance of a sense 
of identity. They foreground, on the one hand, the creative (as opposed to the 
mimetic) function of autobiography with regard to individual identity, while, 
on the other hand, reviving the concept of autobiographical reference. At the 
same time, the framing of human experience in the form of narrative(s) has 
become the focus of interest in a range of disciplines beyond those immedi-
ately concerned with life-writing, and narratology has branched out to inves-
tigate the role of narrative in a variety of different fields.
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A self is probably the most impressive work of art we ever produce, surely 
the most intricate. (Bruner 2003: 14)
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 In the following, I propose to show which models and categories of con-
temporary narratology may be relevant for a narratologically grounded dis-
cussion of autobiographical discourse. The aim of my essay is therefore not 
to add to the already vast body of narrative theory (including the theory of 
autobiography), but to bring to focus some recent theoretical developments 
which bear on autobiographical narrative(s). In particular, I shall point to 
the interfaces which exist between narrativist theories of autobiography and 
cognitive narratology and demonstrate how an analysis of autobiographical 
discourse may benefit from the synthesis of these disciplines. In my essay, I 
shall concentrate (1) on the discursive representation of the experiential in 
autobiography; (2) on narrativity and the self, i.e. the role of narrative in the 
formation of identity; (3) on the role of frames and scripts in the textual rep-
resentation of memory; and, finally (4) on the fictionality of autobiography.
 The question of the fictionality of autobiography requires some eluci-
dation because in both fields, postclassical narratology and the theory of 
autobiography, the role of the fictional in (autobiographical) narrative has 
recently been redefined. In autobiographical theory in particular, the distinc-
tion between fact and fiction no longer seems to be the overriding concern 
that it was until relatively recently. This relaxation of the borders between 
truth and fiction is due not so much to the undermining of “facticity” in 
life-writing caused by the general post-structuralist mistrust of “truth” and 
“authenticity.” Rather, the noted shift in perspective seems to correlate with 
an emphasis on narrativity as a vital factor in the construction of identity, i.e. 
a view that autobiography, in narrative terms, stages the drama of creating 
the autobiographer’s identity. In this drama, as I shall explain under (4), fic-
tion plays an important role. As regards postclassical narratology, narratolo-
gists like Monika Fludernik (1996) have suggested ways out of the fact/fiction 
divide by aligning narrativity with fictionality (cf. 4). Such a shift away from 
an emphasis on the referential clearly has its advantages, since it enables one 
to accommodate the variety of forms which has been characteristic of auto-
biographical writing especially since the second half of the twentieth century.1
(1) writiNg tHe eXPerieNtial
In all forms of autobiographical discourse, the narrative rendering of indi-
vidual experience and of a sense of identity is inextricably linked with basic 
 1. For the autobiographical in various media and cultural approaches to the autobio-
graphical, see the essays in Kadar et al. (2005).
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structural patterns. These emanate from what classical narratology has 
described as the dual aspect of the (fictional) autobiographer as experiencer 
and narrator. This duality has until now been investigated primarily with 
regard to plotlines and genres, to forms of focalization and to the problem of 
unreliable narration. I want to argue that, if one conceives of autobiography 
as a psychological activity which creates, rather than merely depicts, identity, 
retrospection and the double aspect of the self involve the construction not 
only of the experiencing, but also of the narrating self. These should therefore 
be viewed not in terms of the dichotomy sometimes suggested by structuralist 
accounts, but within larger frames of rendering the experiential.
 On the textual level of autobiography, the continuity between experience 
and narrative is manifested in what Genette has termed homodiegesis, i.e. the 
rootedness of the narrative voice in the world of the narrative. In the case of 
factual autobiography, this rootedness rests on actual embodiment, and the 
ensuing “materiality” provides a criterion which in principle distinguishes 
it from other (especially fictional) forms of writing (cf. Smith/Watson 2005). 
Classical narratology has investigated homodiegesis primarily with regard 
to fictional narratives. It distinguishes between two aspects of the narrative 
instance, as it were, the self as character and the self as narrator, variously 
referred to as the “narrated” or “experiencing” self, on the one hand, and the 
“narrating self” or “narrating I,” on the other. Valid as this distinction may 
be for the structural analysis of literary narratives, its application to autobi-
ography seems problematic as it is prone to introduce a dichotomy which 
detracts from the continuity of (remembered) experience as emphasized by 
narrative psychology and recent theories of life-writing. Such continuity even 
applies to narratives of conversion. These are a common type of autobiogra-
phy that seems to give absolute priority to the narrating self by establishing a 
superior standpoint in the present, namely that of a reformed wrongdoer who 
has gained an insight into some “higher” truth about himself. Yet even in 
conversion narratives a clear-cut division between narrator and experiencer 
cannot always be upheld, as emerges clearly, for instance, from the following 
passage in John Bunyan’s spiritual autobiography Grace Abounding to the 
Chief of Sinners (1666):
In these days, the thoughts of religion were very grievous to me; I could 
neither endure it my self, nor that any other should; so that, when I have 
seen some read in those books that concerned Christian piety, it would be as 
it were a prison to me. Then I said unto God, Depart from me, for I desire 
not the knowledge of thy ways, Job. 21.14, 15. I was now void of all good 
consideration; Heaven and Hell were both out of sight and minde; and as for 
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Saving and Damning, they were least in my thoughts. O Lord, thou knowest 
my life, and my ways were not hid from thee.
 Yet this I well remember, that though I could my self sin with the great-
est delight and ease, and also take pleasure in the vileness of my compan-
ions; yet even then, if I have at any time seen wicked things by those who 
professed goodness, it would make my spirit tremble. As once above all the 
rest, when I was in my height of vanity, yet hearing one to swear that was 
reckoned for a religious man, it had so great a stroke upon my spirit, that 
it made my heart to ake. (Bunyan 1962: 7; Bunyan’s emphasis in italics; my 
emphasis in bold)
Here the super-ordinate perspective of the present, reformed narrator at first 
appears to be the only vantage point which enables the creation of meaning. 
Yet the reverberations of actual experience are emphasized in the narrative, 
e.g. by underlining the vividness of memories and by the use of proximal 
deictics (“now”), while the insertion (and identification) of the biblical quota-
tions indicates an attempt at authenticating as well as re-living experience in 
the light of ulterior established authority. Rather than implying a dichotomy 
between “then” and “now,” therefore, the temporal levels of narrator and 
experiencer in this passage are really made to interact, the result being a con-
tinuity of experience.
 According to traditional views of the genre, the “I” in autobiography 
represents subject and object, viz. the past and present selves, and the privi-
leged position of the present narrator is confirmed exactly because the past 
self is different from the present self. The autobiographer thus recounts not 
only what has happened to him/her at an earlier time, but above all how he/
she has become himself/herself from the “other” which he/she was. The dif-
ference produced by autobiographical reflection is therefore twofold, com-
prising a difference in time as well as in identity. According to such views, 
the personal reference (“I”) is ambivalent, since the narrator was a differ-
ent person in the past from what he/she is now.2 As we have seen from the 
above-cited example, however, a continuity of experience and of a sense of 
self applies even when the discourse seems at first to confer upon the autobi-
ographer’s self a sense of “otherness.”
 I should emphasize here that I am concerned with the conception of a 
structural aspect of homodiegetic narration and with its theoretical implica-
tions. As conceived in the terms of classical (structuralist) narratology, these 
 2. Cf. Laura Marcus: “Autobiography imports alterity into the self by the act of objec-
tification which engenders it” (1994: 203).
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implications would in fact amount to a division between narrator and experi-
ence on epistemological and ontological grounds, whereas I would argue for 
re-conceiving this structural aspect in terms of a continuum and of “writing 
the experiential.” What I am not concerned with here is the extent to which 
autobiographies may explicitly reflect on differences between the writer’s 
“then” and “now” on a meta-textual level.
 Instead of emphasizing the duality of narrator and experiencer, it might 
be more appropriate to regard the autobiographical act as an experiential 
site, as a re-living of experience rather than as an attempt by a detached sub-
ject to interpret itself as object. This is because autobiography, as has been 
indicated at the beginning, may no longer be viewed in terms of a retrospec-
tive rendering of an already formed self, but should best be regarded as an act 
of identity-construction. Such identity-construction is decisively shaped by 
present motivations, desires and anxieties. Indeed, the actual writing of auto-
biography is a re-enactment of the (sub)conscious construction processes that 
have preceded it. The experiential in the sense of a psychological re-living 
and cognitive re-construction of experience is therefore really an element of 
the autobiographical act itself. Autobiographical narrative may therefore be 
conceived of in terms of the frames of experiencing and reflection provided 
by models of cognitive narratology.
 One such model has been proposed by Monika Fludernik in her ground-
breaking Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (1996). Fludernik’s categories are 
derived from her analysis of spontaneous oral narrative, which she regards 
as prototypical of the narrative rendering of specifically human (or at least 
anthropomorphic) experience. The “natural” form of such a rendering is the 
first-person: “[In the oral mode] [ . . . ] the experientiality of story-experience 
[ . . . ] is aligned primarily with the first-person frame” (315). The concept 
of experientiality is basic to Fludernik’s understanding of narrative. Roughly 
speaking, experientiality refers to an individualized rendering of experience 
as reflected in human consciousness. The continuity of experience and nar-
ration, which is also emphasized in recent theories of autobiography, is thus 
central to Fludernik’s narratological model. One of her aims in Towards a 
‘Natural’ Narratology is to radically revise conventional notions of narrativ-
ity. As opposed to traditional definitions of narrativity, which are based on 
plot, Fludernik rejects plot as a necessary component of narrativity. Instead 
she grounds narrativity in experientiality, emphasizing the presence of a 
“human (anthropomorphic) experiencer” as an indispensable precondition 
of experientiality (13). Human consciousness and its representation are of 
supreme importance in her model: “[Consciousness] both mediates narrativ-
ity and constitutes one of its signifiers” (374). Because of its emphasis on the 
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“consciousness factor,” Fludernik’s model appears to be more suitable to the 
description of autobiographical narrative; it is able to reflect to the focus on 
the inner life of the subject typical of most autobiographies better than are 
traditional, event-centered concepts of narrativity. It is not only this fore-
grounding of consciousness, however, that makes Fludernik’s model an ideal 
descriptor of autobiographies, but also the fact that autobiographies fre-
quently focus on the specificity of the represented experience, which, accord-
ing to Fludernik, is another criterion in defining narrativity (cf. 29).
 Fludernik regards narrativity as resulting from the reader’s integration of 
a text into the framework of real-life experience, a script that also includes 
frames of narrative mediation and of narrative genres (cf. also Fludernik 
2003). In particular, she distinguishes between five cognitive frames which 
“relate to basic perspectives on human experience and its narrative media-
tion” (2003: 246) and which therefore become functional in narrative dis-
course: action, telling, experiencing, viewing, and reflecting. In the case of 
autobiography, frames of telling, experiencing, and reflecting are of special 
importance, and the distinction made in classical (structuralist) narratol-
ogy between the narrating and experiencing selves of autodiegetic narrators 
can now very easily be re-formulated in these terms. I have shown elsewhere 
(Löschnigg 2006a: 84–86; 2006b) how an emphasis on either one or the 
other of these frames will determine the narrative profile of a text, and how 
fictional autobiographies (i.e. novels in the form of autobiography) in par-
ticular have tended to concentrate on rendering the experiential substance 
rather than the reflective process. In any case, a flexible model such as Flud-
ernik’s seems to be more adequate for a description of autobiographical nar-
rative than the division implied by the teller vs. experiencer model of classical 
narratology. Moreover, Fludernik’s experiential model of narrative connects 
with those approaches to autobiography which regard life-writing as the con-
struction of individual identity in the medium of narrative, since both high-
light the significance of individual experience and its reflective processing (or 
re-enactment) in the narrating consciousness.
(2) NarrativitY aNd tHe selF
Different concepts of narrative and narrativity notwithstanding, it is generally 
agreed that autobiography is a “narrative” genre. If one looks at the histori-
cal range of autobiographical texts, however, one perceives a remarkable dif-
ference between, for instance, St. Augustine’s narrative realism, on the one 
hand, and (post-)modernist texts such as Beckett’s, on the other. The latter 
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seem to reject narrative as a form reflecting an inherent order in life, and to 
suggest that the narrative form is really a liability from which the “I” has to 
free itself. Considering the protean nature of contemporary life-writing, and 
especially the tendency towards fragmentation and experiment in many twen-
tieth-century autobiographies, one may start to wonder, as Paul John Eakin 
does, whether “narrative as a structure of reference [is] to be understood as 
a period-specific phenomenon, an outmoded literary convention that is to be 
identified as a vestige of a nineteenth-century historicist model of the sub-
ject?” (Eakin 1988b: 34). While Eakin still maintains that narrative is essen-
tial to the genre, other theoreticians have questioned this view. For instance, 
James Olney regards “autobiography [not as] a definition of the writer’s self 
in the past, at the time of action, but in the present, at the time of writing” 
(1972: 44). Narrative, Olney seems to imply, is only of secondary importance, 
serving just as a vehicle for expressing the insights gained by the subject into 
his/her own existence.3 Both Eakin and Olney use a definition of narrative 
that is based on plot or event-structure.
 No doubt, some of the skepticism about the role of narrative in autobiog-
raphy may ultimately be attributed to a questioning of traditional assumptions 
about the mimetic functions of life-writing. As has already been stated, recent 
theoretical positions on autobiography hold that the “I” which emerges from 
autobiographical discourse is not the faithful rendering of an autonomous 
and homogeneous self, but rather a self which has been construed in the nar-
rative act. (In this respect, I find Olney’s term “definition” in the passage cited 
above somewhat problematic, too.) Autobiography is a poietic rather than a 
mimetic genre, which also includes an element of the imaginary in the emerg-
ing “portrait” of the subject. The narrative act, it needs to be emphasized, 
acquires a vital role in the construction of a sense of identity. Indeed, the view 
that the narrative rendering of lived experience engenders such a sense of 
identity seems to be supported by psychological studies, which indicate that 
dysnarrativia, i.e. the inability to construct or understand stories, seriously 
impairs a sense of selfhood (cf. Bruner 2003: 86).
 “Narrativized” understandings of identity focus on lived experience rather 
than on some quality which essentially “defines” a person, and on the capac-
ity of narrative to impose order and coherence on what is otherwise a jum-
ble of disconnected fragments of experiences and memories (see Mink 1978; 
Ricœur 1984–1988; Bruner 1991). The epistemological aspect of narrative, 
i.e. its functioning as a “cognitive instrument,” is emphasized in particular by 
 3. Some theorists, e.g. Michel Beaujour, have distinguished between “autobiography” 
and the “autoportrait,” the latter being characterized by its lack of a coherent narrative (1980: 
348).
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Bruner and Mink, while Ricœur leans towards an ontological understanding, 
according to which narrative discourse reflects a narrative order of experience 
as such. The assumption that our experience and memories are organized in 
the form of narratives, however, is common to all the theorists mentioned, 
and is inseparably linked in their thinking with the heuristic function of nar-
rative when it comes to creating a sense of identity. Peter Brooks, referring to 
Rousseau’s The Confessions, keeps insisting that narrative provides the only 
means by which the autobiographer has access to his/her identity:
The question of identity [ . . . ] can be thought only in narrative terms, in the 
effort to tell a whole life, to plot its meaning by going back over it to record 
its perpetual flight forward, its slippage from the fixity of definition, [ . . . ] 
the contradictions encountered in the attempt to understand and present the 
self in all its truth provide a powerful narrative machine. Any time one goes 
over a moment of the past the machine can be relied on to produce more 
narrative—not only differing stories of the past, but future scenarios and 
narratives of writing itself. (1984: 33)
The narrative construction of self, it must be pointed out, is a continuous 
process which is pragmatic in the sense that it meets the needs of the situation 
encountered. In the theory of autobiography, the recognition of the pragmatic 
function of autobiographical narrative has given rise to approaches which 
regard autobiography as a “mode of cognition and perception” (Nalbantian 
1994: 36) rather than as a literary genre. They see the writing of one’s life 
as the re-enactment of a process of creating, rather than finding, a sense of 
identity, “not merely as the passive, transparent record of an already com-
pleted self but rather as an integral and often decisive phase of the drama of 
self-definition” (Eakin 1988a: 226). Since this process unfolds along narrative 
lines, particular emphasis has been placed upon narrative’s capacity to cre-
ate order: “[N]arrative plays a central, structuring [!] role in the formation 
and maintenance of our sense of identity” (Eakin 1999: 123). By structuring 
contingent experience, narrative enables us to grasp identity as the telos of a 
coherent story: “We achieve our personal identities and self-concept through 
the use of the narrative configuration, and make our existence into a whole by 
understanding it as an expression of a single unfolding and developing story” 
(Polkinghorne 1988: 150). The contiguity of experience is thus structured 
by language (and especially by narratives) into a series of verbalized events; 
according to Bruner, selfhood is a “kind of meta-event that gives coherence 
and continuity to the scramble of experience” (Bruner 2003: 73). Even if 
the narrative construction of the self is “more constrained by memory than 
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fiction,” it is indeed “uneasily constrained” (Bruner 2003: 65), the process 
fusing memory and the imagination. Seen in this light, the referential “truth-
claim” of autobiography emerges as the result of a transferring of cognitive 
parameters onto an ontological plane.
 The advent of postclassical narratology has undoubtedly helped to 
strengthen those views in the theory of autobiography which have empha-
sized the importance of narrative and of “narrativity” for the genre. Focusing 
as it does on the “question of how the human mind picks up patterns and 
enriches them with schematic information (from expectations and memories) 
into meaningful units” (Bamberg 2005: 218), cognitive narratology in par-
ticular should prove fruitful for the study of autobiographical discourse, as I 
shall try to show in the following section of this essay.
(3) MeMorY, sCriPts, aNd sCHeMata
The “cognitive turn in narratology” (Ibsch 1990) has yielded valuable 
insights into the workings of narratives as a readily available tool-kit in the 
“domain of human interaction” (Bruner 2003: 4). Cognitive narratology has 
become an interdisciplinary project in itself, drawing from and combining 
disciplines such as cognitive psychology, frame theory, linguistics, and the 
study of artificial intelligence (cf. Herman 2003a; Hogan 2004). In particular, 
the specific conditions of memory and their importance for the constitution 
of identity have become one of the central fields of cognitive and especially 
of narrative psychology. Humans retell memories according to pre-conceived 
notions about their functioning and the way in which they reach into the 
past.4 In this process, as in the cognitive processing of immediate experience, 
narrative structures and schemata play a vital role: “[A]ll forms of memory 
are explicitly or implicitly based on retrospective narratives that seek to cross 
the unbridgeable gap between the time of narrating and the time of the events 
that will be narrated” (Müller-Funk 2003: 207). The significance of narra-
tive for the content as well as the relevance of our memories underlines once 
more the importance of narrative as a means of creating meaning or a sense 
of identity. In this connection, it should be emphasized that one needs to 
consider the remembered past as being just as “real” as the autobiographer’s 
present consciousness, since the contents of memory are determined by pres-
ent motivations, desires, and anxieties (and also by internalized social, ethi-
cal, and moral norms or “frames”).
 4. See Rubin (1986); Thompson et al. (1996); Schacter (1996).
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 In his classic psychological study Remembering: A Study in Experimental 
and Social Psychology, Frederick Bartlett describes the workings of memory 
as the organizing of past experience into anticipatory patterns for dealing 
with the present (cf. 1932: 201–14). In order to cope with present experience, 
memory thus references a considerable number of experiential repertories. It 
engenders dynamic “scripts” as well as static “schemata,” to use well-known 
terms from cognitive psychology.5 Narrative shows a particular affinity to 
these processes, since its specific temporal structure is ideally suited to con-
veying the interaction of past and present consciousness underlying Bartlett’s 
model of memory. The rendering of past events includes a consciousness, 
in the present, of their eventual outcome, which is why “[t]elling narratives 
is a certain way of reconciling emergent with prior knowledge” (Herman 
1997: 1048). This insight seems to be particularly valid for autobiographi-
cal narration, since retrospection always includes a consciousness of what 
was not known at the time of the events referred to. The temporal structure 
of life-writing is therefore really a threefold one, comprising the autobiogra-
pher’s past and present, and also that which is now the past, but what from 
an earlier point of view was the future,6 i.e. that which the autobiographer 
could not have known at the time: “If subjects come into being through their 
relationship with narratives, then narratives are formed in time; [ . . . ] but the 
form of narrative time [ . . . ] does not flow in only one direction” (Williams 
1995: 126).
 This may be illustrated by passages such as the following. My example is 
taken from the chapter in John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography (1873), in which 
he reviews his companionship with his future wife, Harriet Taylor, and the 
influence she was to prove on his life:
At the present period, however, this influence was only one among many 
which were helping to shape the character of my future development: and 
even after it became, I may truly say, the presiding principle of my mental 
progress, it did not alter the path, but only made me move forward more 
boldly and at the same time more cautiously in the same course. The only 
actual revolution which has ever taken place in my modes of thinking, was 
already complete. My new tendencies had to be confirmed in some respects, 
 5. Dennis Mercadal defines “script” as “[a] description of how a sequence of events 
is expected to unfold [ . . . ] Scripts represent a sequence of events that take place in a time 
sequence” (1990: 255). “Schema” is defined as “[a] term used in psychology literature which 
refers to memory patterns that humans use to interpret current experiences” (ibid. 254). The 
term is used more or less synonymously in cognitive psychology with “cognitive frames.”
 6. See Ricœur (1984, ch. I, 1) on Book 11 of St. Augustine’s Confessions.
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moderated in others: but the only substantial changes that were yet to come, 
related to politics [ . . . ]. (1969: 114–15)
As can be seen, the narrative moves backwards in time from a super-ordinate 
vantage-point in the autobiographer’s present to a “present period” in the 
past, continuing as a subtly graded alternation of anticipation and retrospec-
tion which oscillates between these two temporal levels. However, if autobio-
graphical discourse is frequently characterized by chronological complexity, 
narrative provides the organizational strategies which ensure that this com-
plexity can be dealt with by writers and readers. This is because narrative, 
as David Herman has shown, supports cognition by “enabl[ing] tellers and 
interpreters to establish spatiotemporal links between regions of experience 
and between objects contained in those regions” (2003: 169). It does so, first 
of all, through what Herman calls its “power [ . . . ] to chunk phenomenal 
reality into classifiable, knowable, and operable units” (174). Along the same 
lines, Charlotte Linde (1993) has emphasized that a life story is the result 
of segmenting operations which structure the continuity of experience into 
cognitively manageable blocks. Mill’s Autobiography, with its clear-cut divi-
sions between his childhood and youth subjected to a rationalist education, 
the sudden awakening to feeling, and his achievement of a balance between 
the two, which Mill claims to have accomplished in later life, may serve as a 
case in point.
 Narrative further helps cognition, as Herman (2003) reminds us, by estab-
lishing causal connections and by providing a framework which enables the 
specific to be integrated into the typical and actual occurrences into expecta-
tions. The latter function has also been stressed by Jerome Bruner, for whom 
“narrative in all its forms is a dialectic between what was expected and what 
came to pass” (Bruner 2003: 15), and for whom “the ‘suggestiveness’ of a 
story lies [ . . . ] in the emblematic nature of its particulars, its relevance to a 
more inclusive narrative type” (1991: 7). As becomes evident from the exam-
ple of Mill, much nineteenth-century autobiography is modeled on a Bildungs-
roman type of narrative, on the underlying belief that individual identity can 
be grasped in terms of organic development. Another such type, which has 
been of central importance in the history of autobiography, is the conver-
sion narrative, while narratives of estrangement and fragmentation seem to 
have become the dominant pattern in contemporary autobiography (with the 
exception, of course, of the plethora of celebrity lives). This means that auto-
biography has come to be dominated by self-referential and literary modes 
of writing, a process which has raised anew the debate about the fictionality 
of the genre. In the following, I want to show how recent developments in 
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narratology and in the theory of autobiography may shed new light on the 
referential and pragmatic aspects which have been in the center of that debate.
(4) tHe FiCtioNalitY oF autobiograPHY
Even before the post-structuralist demise of the autonomous subject, the 
reception of autobiography had been characterized by some complexity. 
On the one hand, readers expected autobiographers to provide “truthful” 
accounts of their lives, at least in the sense that the narrative was based on 
an effort to remember as accurately as possible what had happened. In other 
words: readers expected an account that was free from deliberate distortions 
and from too much self-fashioning. According to conventional understand-
ing, autobiography rendered an intimate portrait of a person who signaled, 
by the very act of writing his/her life story, that this life was worth the read-
er’s notice. Autobiographers such as Rousseau asserted the “honesty” of their 
narratives and the fact that they had consciously neither concealed nor added 
anything of importance. This frankness contributed much to the attraction 
autobiographies held for readers. On the other hand, such declarations of 
honesty could awaken a dormant skepticism on the reader’s part. After all, 
autobiographies were written not least with an intention of impressing the 
reader, and declarations of “honesty” might serve to distract, as likely as 
not, from some hidden motive. In the case of Rousseau, this becomes evident 
when one realizes what amazing self-centeredness is unwittingly revealed in 
his Confessions (1781–89). As Rousseau insists on the accuracy of his recol-
lections, he at the same time frankly admits to the gaps in his memory and 
indicates that some of these may actually have been filled by his imagina-
tion. For instance, this is how he writes about the happy times with Mme de 
Warens (“maman”) at Les Charmettes:
Nothing that happened to me during that delightful time, nothing that I did, 
said or thought all the while it lasted, has slipped from my memory. The 
period preceding it and following it recur to me at intervals; I recall them 
irregularly and confusedly; but I recall that time in its entirety, as if it existed 
still. My imagination, which in my youth always looked forward but now 
looks back, compensates me with these sweet memories for the hope I have 
lost forever. I no longer see anything in the future to attract me; only a return 
into the past can please me, and these vivid and precise returns into the peri-
ods of which I am speaking often give me moments of happiness in spite of 
my misfortunes. (1953: 215–16)
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The suspicions aroused by this passage that Rousseau may project an unduly 
idyllic version of Les Charmettes are confirmed by the sequel, where it 
becomes evident that this pastoral serves to relieve, by means of contrast, 
the writer’s present predicament, i.e. the conspiracy against him which he felt 
was brewing among those around him. As the result of several such passages, 
readers’ attitudes towards the Confessions will typically fluctuate between 
trust and skepticism,7 and this may well hold for autobiography in general. 
However, the genre’s central paradigm, for most of its history, has neverthe-
less been that of the authenticity of the life and the authority of the autobi-
ographer as the source of the narrative. Postmodern autobiography, on the 
other hand, relies on the tenets of post-structuralist theory which have elimi-
nated the category of authorial intention from textual analysis. On the side 
of readers, the blend of skepticism and trust which shaped the reception of a 
text such as the Confessions has given way to a general mistrust of autobiog-
raphy as a genre and to a rapprochement of “autobiography” and “fiction.”
 The question of fictionality, including the fictional element in autobiogra-
phy, has been discussed extensively, and it would transcend the spatial limits 
of this essay to recapitulate this discussion here (for some key contributions 
to this discussion, cf. note 8). Suffice it to say that a pragmatic definition is 
now widely accepted which regards fiction as a specific form of communica-
tion that is subject to aesthetic norms rather than those which govern non-fic-
tion texts, and by different contextual conventions, and which can therefore 
not be contested in the way non-fiction texts can. However, this understand-
ing of fictionality does not allow for a clear-cut distinction between “factual” 
and “fictional” autobiography, especially if one considers that it is really the 
representation of inner states which is at the core of the genre. Neither does 
it provide guidelines for distinguishing “genuine” from “fake” autobiogra-
phies, since “fiction” does not equal “lying.”8
 While classical narratology concentrated almost exclusively on the anal-
ysis of literary narratives, recent narratological approaches have begun to 
investigate, in a systematic manner, the non-fictional domain, too. It may 
well be assumed that this extension of narratology’s sphere of interest will 
benefit the study of autobiography, a genre which has increasingly come 
 7. It would thus be interesting to investigate the Confessions with a view to the dynam-
ics of the primacy and recency effects as explained by the cognitive sciences: readers tend to 
cling to their intial interpretations of a given text (in this case, an interpretation determined by 
Rousseau’s explicit declarations of honesty), until confronted with substantial textual evidence 
which contradicts this interpretation. It is at that point that the primacy effect will be overlaid 
by the recency effect, and textual data are integrated into a revised interpretive framework (cf. 
Zerweck 2002: 222–23).
 8. On this issue, see Henrik Skov Nielsen’s essay in the present volume.
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to be situated along the borderlines of the factual and the fictiona1.9 The 
many examples of contemporary autobiography which actually investigate 
these borderlines, and which through formal experiment attempt to render 
a sense of estrangement and fragmentation on the part of the writer, have 
clearly called for a different reception than did straightforwardly chrono-
logical accounts such as Mill’s. Theoretical approaches to autobiography 
should therefore focus on the text as a manifestation of the writer’s present 
concerns rather than on abstract notions of “authenticity.” Inconsistencies 
in life-stories should be analysed with a view to their function and signifi-
cance for the subject rather than as violations of the “truth.” In other words, 
one should distinguish perhaps not so much between “fiction” and “real-
ity” as between different kinds of “reality”: the lived and the narrated. This 
applies to a diachronic investigation of autobiography, too, in particular to 
an analysis of the correspondences between factual autobiography and the 
Bildungsroman. This relationship has been a complex one, since the novel 
has explored the domain of autobiography while at the same time fictional 
life-writing seems to have exerted a profound influence on its factual model. 
As Michael McKeon claimed, “authenticity began by being mimicked in the 
novel before being recuperated and interiorized by the autobiographers. The 
autobiographer could only become himself by imitating people who imagined 
what it was to be an autobiographer” (1987: 47). The question then is how 
genres such as the novel and autobiography combine to create traditions, 
or even world-pictures, and to negotiate frames of “self” and “other.” To 
answer this question, one may want to refer to a central tenet of cognitive 
narratology, namely the tendency towards “naturalization” on the part of 
readers, i.e. their integration of texts into real-life frames or familiar generic 
frames. In the case of autobiographical narratives, the generic frame is that of 
the life-story, and the reception of autobiographical writing will therefore be 
determined ultimately by those cultural factors which shape prevailing views 
on narrative and the transparency (or opacity) of language with regard to the 
rendering of a life as lived.
 Regarding autobiography neither as the mimetic depiction of a personal-
ity already formed, nor as a genre which conveys merely an illusion of the 
 9. The amphibious nature of autobiography was already highlighted by scholars such 
as Northrop Frye, for whom autobiography and the novel merged in a “series of insensible 
gradations” (1957: 307), and by Paul Ricœur, for whom autobiography is characterized by 
the encroisement of two primary modes of narrative, history and fiction (cf. Ricœur 1984–88). 
Similarly, Smith and Watson (2005) have pleaded for treating autobiography as a special case 
in that it presents a specific combination of factual and fictional narrative, while theorists 
such as e.g. Philippe Lejeune (1989) and Elizabeth Bruss (1976) have staunchly defended the 
distinction between autobiography and the novel.
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self, but as the textual manifestation of a continuous process of identity-con-
struction, suggests a way out of the impasse of “fact” versus “fiction.” This 
is the case because reception may then focus not on the ‘authenticity’ of the 
life as narrated, but on the presence of the autobiographer and on the narra-
tive construction, rather than re-construction, of the self.10 The structuring 
of contingent experience which is an essential part of this process has been 
variously referred to as relying on “fictions” (Eakin 1988a) and “metaphor” 
(Olney 1972). As employed by Olney, the term metaphor denotes “all the 
world views and world pictures, models and hypotheses, myths and cosmolo-
gies” which humans use in order to give structure to the reality of existence, 
including their understanding and representation of self. And more often 
than not, one should add, these metaphors come in the form of narratives. If 
metaphors, according to Olney, “are that by which the lonely subjective con-
sciousness gives order not only to itself but to as much of objective reality as 
it is capable of formalizing and controlling” (1972: 30), then it is narratives 
that constitute the basis which underlies this process.11 If the narrativizing 
of experience in autobiography is thus enmeshed in other narratives, the fic-
tional and the referential in autobiography no longer appear to be mutually 
exclusive. Underlining “the essential narrativity of human experience” (Eakin 
1992: 87), Eakin and others have argued for re-introducing “reference” into 
the theory of autobiography. Yet this referent of autobiographical discourse, 
the subject, after its deconstructionist demise is no longer a pre-existing self, 
as these critics have shown themselves, but human experience as such. Expe-
rience, that is, may be conceived in narrative categories, which makes the text 
of an autobiography appear as a duplicate narrative structure, i.e. a narrative 
re-configuration of what has already been encoded, in narrative terms, at a 
first level. Similarly, in narratology, Fludernik’s experientially-based model of 
narrative has aligned fictionality and narrativity, playing down the relevance 
of a distinction between fictional and non-fictional narratives. Fictionality is 
inherent in her definition of narrativity, since, as she claims, “the experience 
portrayed in narrative is typically non-historical (non-documentary, non-
argumentational)” (1996: 39).
 Emphasizing the narrativity of autobiography and the narrative construc-
tion of our sense of identity enables one to regard the fictional element in 
 10. In some ways, this has been anticipated by an understanding of autobiography which 
has emphasized consistency and the logics of development, regarding autobiographical “au-
thenticity” as the result of coherence and “inner truth” rather than some kind of “referential 
truth” (cf. e.g. Pascal 1960).
 11. The function of metaphor in Olney’s theory of autobiography is thus similar to that 
of the emplotment of contingent events in historiography, as outlined by Hayden White and 
others (see White 1973; Mink 1978).
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autobiography in a new light. Fictionality can now be seen as an integral 
element in the formation of identity. It does not need to be set in opposition 
to autobiographical “truth,” as was proposed by early studies of autobiog-
raphy, nor does it constitute the hallmark of all attempts at life-writing, as 
was claimed by the deconstructionists. Due to the selectivity of memory and 
the impact of psychological factors pertaining to the autobiographer’s pres-
ent, the “I” of an autobiography will always comprise a fictional element. 
Acknowledging this fictional element will free autobiography from the con-
straints of the confessional paradigm which has traditionally dominated the 
genre. The demands of telling the “truth” and of making this truth subject to 
verification contributed towards a reductive view of autobiography that relies 
on simplifying distinctions between the true” and the “false,” the “authentic” 
and the “invented.” In addition, since standards of authenticity are shaped 
by the cultural context, the confessional paradigm has tended to favor con-
cepts of “self” which are based on dominant male and middle class norms, 
while at the same time undermining the truth-claim of autobiographies by 
marginalized groups, including women. Small wonder, therefore, that recent 
autobiographical writing, especially by women or members of ethno-cultural 
minorities, has avoided these generic constraints by rejecting the “autobio-
graphical contract” which guarantees the non-fictional status of autobiogra-
phy (cf. Lejeune 1989). These autobiographies resort to innovative strategies 
such as the explicit inclusion of fictional elements in order to express the 
uneasy cultural position of their subjects.
(5) CoNClusioN
According to Michael Sheringham, different positions on autobiography have 
usually depended on “prevailing views of narrative”: “Any moves towards 
a rehabilitation of narrative’s mimetic, heuristic or pragmatic functions are 
likely to support comparable shifts in the way autobiography is regarded” 
(1993: 23). Proceeding upon the assumption of a privileged relationship 
between autobiographical narrative and the investigation of mental pro-
cesses, this article has tried to show which areas of analysis may profit from 
a synthesis of new developments in narratology, especially cognitive narratol-
ogy, and recent theories of autobiography. The benefits of such a combined 
approach for describing central aspects of autobiographical discourse con-
cern the rendering of experience, the importance of narrative in the creation 
of a sense of identity, and the significance of cognitive frames for the temporal 
structure of memory-based narration. As to the rendering of experience, I 
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have argued that a new frame-oriented model of narrative will provide crite-
ria for describing a life as (re-)lived upon a different and more flexible basis 
than that offered by the binary narrator-experiencer model of classical narra-
tology. It also allows one to emphasize the continuity of narration and experi-
ence. With regard to the importance of narrative, I have tried to show how 
“narrativity” is a determinant of autobiography, independent of the actual 
textual shape of an individual work. In the third section of my essay I pointed 
out how cognitive narratology can help us grasp hold of the genre’s temporal 
complexity. Discussing the structure of autobiography, I was able to identify 
two types of processes which come into play in memory-based narratives: 
processes of segmentation and processes of creating coherence. Finally, as I 
have tried to show in the last section of my essay, the question of fictionality 
in autobiography may now be approached in a more differentiated manner. 
If narratology cannot provide criteria to distinguish between “fact” and “fic-
tion” in autobiographical writing, provided such a distinction can be made at 
all, it can provide the theoretical basis for describing the fictional as an inte-
gral element of life-writing. After all, to quote Graham Swift’s novel Water-
land (Swift 1983: 53), man is “the story-telling animal” and the fictional 
element which is inherent in this definition applies first and foremost to our 
own life-stories, too.
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Natural authors, unnatural Narration1
iNtroduCtioN
Hardly anything is more familiar to literary scholars than fictional narrative. 
Yet this simple term contains a slight tension between the invention associ-
ated with fiction, from its root in the Latin fictio, and the knowing associated 
with narration and its root in the Latin gnarus. How can you invent what 
you know or know what you invent? In all standard models of narratol-
ogy, the answer to this question has been to split the tasks and distinguish 
between the narrator who knows and the author who invents, and this is the 
case particularly in the framework of Gérard Genette.2
 The present essay discusses whether this narratological model of the rela-
tionship between narrator and author has served to naturalize the under-
standing of fictional narratives and of fictionality in the sense that they are 
understood along the lines of everyday reports.3 In its attempt to understand 
 1. I wish to thank Stefan Iversen and Rolf Reitan for their considerable contributions to 
this essay. Stefan Iversen’s theses on the concept of experientiality and other topics, and Rolf 
Reitan’s work on Genette’s and Hamburger’s concepts of narrators and narratives have both 
served as rich sources of inspiration.
 2. See Walsh (2007: 72–74) and Genette (1980: 214).
 3. An important context for the present article is the work of a research group formed by 
Brian Richardson, Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Rolf Reitan, Maria Mäkela, myself, and several 
others on what we call “unnatural narratology” (see www.unnaturalnarratology.com). The 
work of the group includes Brian Richardson’s Unnatural Voices as well as five panels on un-
natural narratology at the ISSN conferences in 2008, 2009, and 2010. A joint article by Alber, 
	 11
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fiction as a form of communication from a narrator,4 narratology has rarely 
devoted much attention to the author. Although paratextually grounded 
approaches make important and necessary contributions to our understand-
ing of fiction, they face problems when encountering works that are framed 
by ambiguous paratexts. This essay raises the question of the relationship 
between author and text by addressing some of these difficulties. It asks what 
such paratexts imply for the narrator-author distinction which supposedly 
exists in fiction and is absent in nonfiction. The texts used in this essay range 
from fictional to nonfictional writing, though I will focus particularly on 
James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces (2003). The essay will discuss in detail 
what may be gained by giving more attention to the rhetorical resources of 
the actual author. As signaled by the title, the aim is to demonstrate that 
the real author has the ability to transcend communicational models and to 
employ techniques of fictionalization, regardless of whether the narrative is 
presented as fiction or not. It is argued that such techniques can more help-
fully be explained by distinguishing between fiction and fictionality as well as 
between narration and communication than by assuming the existence of a 
narrator distinct from the author.
 In classical structuralist narratology, the relationship between author and 
narrator was central for the distinction between fictional and nonfictional 
narratives. In fictional narratives there is a narrator who is not the same 
person as the author. In nonfictional narratives like autobiographies, on the 
other hand, there is no narrator other than the author.5 This distinction is 
conventional and indispensable. It explains, for instance, why we must not 
arrest Bret Easton Ellis, assuming he is identical with the first-person narrator 
of American Psycho (1991), who is a serial killer.
 However, the distinction between author and narrator is also problem-
Iversen, Nielsen, and Richardson, “Unnatural Narratives—Unnatural Narratology: Beyond 
Mimetic Models?” has just been published, and two anthologies on unnatural narratology 
are in progress. In the group we are concerned with radically anti-mimetic texts but also with 
unnatural features in conventionalized genres and forms like the realist novel. These features 
comprise narrative “omniscience,” paralepsis, and what James Phelan refers to as redundant 
telling. We also deal with storyworlds that contain physical or logical impossibilities (Alber 
2009). For my own part, I take a special interest in unnatural acts of narration by which I 
understand physically, logically, mnemonically, or psychologically impossible enunciations.
 4. Ann Banfield also argues that “there have been numerous attempts to submit narra-
tive to the communication paradigm by positing a narrator addressing a reader for every text” 
(1982: 10, 8–18).
 5. See Genette (1993: 68–84), Lejeune (1975: 16ff), and Cohn (1999: 30 and 59). Herna-
di probably puts it most concisely: “Fictional narratives demand, historical narratives preclude 
a distinction between the narrator and the implied author” (Hernadi, in Cohn 1999: 124).
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atic. First, it tends, at least implicitly, to place an absolute barrier between 
fictional and nonfictional narratives, that is, between narratives with, and 
narratives without, a narrator other than the author. Second, it encounters 
difficulties when facing a range of limit cases where the question of fiction 
remains difficult to decide. These problems notwithstanding, the distinction is 
fundamental to most classical as well as postclassical narratologies: in nonfic-
tional written narratives the communication is taken to proceed from author 
to reader, in fictional ones (also) from a narrator to a narratee.
 These ideas have led narratologists to consider literary fictions as acts of 
communication and “reports” by narrators, and have resulted in a prevailing 
lack of interest in the author (Walsh 2007: 69). It almost seems as if Barthes’s 
1967 statement about the birth of the reader (at the cost of the death of the 
author) also holds true for the birth of narratology, baptized two years later 
by Todorov. Near the beginning of his essay, Barthes writes:
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on real-
ity but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than 
that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection appears, the 
voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. 
(Barthes 2004: 125)
Accordingly, and perhaps even necessarily, when analyzing narrated facts in 
a novel, narratological analysis seems to have confirmed this disconnection 
between fictional text and real-world author.6 Postclassical narratology has 
considered narratives in the light of a wide range of different contexts. It has 
invoked the reader, the importance of historical periods, gender issues, ques-
tions of ethics, ideology, and, perhaps more than anything, the workings of 
the human mind. But only rarely has it considered the author to be a relevant 
topic for narratology. It is a telling fact that The Cambridge Companion to 
Narrative (Herman 2007) has no chapter on the author. Additionally, the 
word “author” does not even appear in its glossary. Even in the comprehen-
sive index, the entry “author” points the reader to “rhetorical approaches.” I 
will follow this advice and approach the problem of the author by consider-
ing the tradition of rhetoric in narratology. I will first turn to James Phelan 
and then to Richard Walsh.
 6. For a few concise and precise remarks about the role of the author in narratology, see 
Fludernik (2006: 23–25).
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rHetoriCal aPProaCHes
James Phelan has written a number of books on rhetoric and narration. In 
Living to Tell about It (2005), Phelan defines narrative as follows: “First, 
narrative itself can be fruitfully understood as a rhetorical act: somebody tell-
ing somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something 
happened” (Phelan 2005: 18).7 By implication: if nothing happened, or no 
one told it, there would be no narrative. A great strength of Phelan’s book is 
the way in which he simultaneously approaches the standard cases, the excep-
tions to the rule, and the potential problems they create for his theory. Large 
parts of his book are devoted to problematic cases, and to cases that seem 
to contradict his definition. In his introduction, Phelan mentions a series of 
text examples in which the narrator narrates either what the narratee already 
knows (“My Last Duchess” by Robert Browning and “Barbie-Q” by Sandra 
Cisneros), or what the narrator himself could not know (Angela’s Ashes by 
Frank McCourt and The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald, where some-
thing is narrated in great detail from an episode where the narrator himself 
was absent).8 Phelan also mentions texts in which the narrator seems not to 
know a fact although the reader must infer that he actually knows it since at 
the time of narration he has come to the end of his story (“My Old Man” by 
Ernest Hemingway, e.g., is not permeated by the disillusionment experienced 
by the narrator at the end).9 Phelan quotes several other examples, all of 
which seem to contradict his definition of narrative as a report from narrator 
to narratee.10 He provides a brilliant analysis of these narratives and explains 
many of the peculiarities mentioned by “the author’s need” (12) and the use 
of “disclosure functions”:
The motivation for redundant telling resides in the author’s need to commu-
nicate information to the audience, and so we might use the longer phrase 
redundant telling, necessary disclosure to describe it. [ . . . ] communication 
in character narration occurs along at least two tracks—the narrator-narra-
tee track, and the narrator-authorial audience track. Along the narrator-nar-
ratee track, the narrator acts as a reporter, interpreter and evaluator of the 
narrated for the narratee, and those actions are constrained by the narrative 
situation (a character narrator, for example, cannot enter the consciousness 
of another character); let us call these actions “narrator functions.” Along 
 7. For variations of the same definition, see Phelan (1996: 8) and Phelan (2007: 3).
 8. See also Phelan (1996: 106).
 9. See also Phelan (1996: 103).
 10. See also the excellent examples in Phelan (1996: chapter 5).
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the narrator-authorial audience track, the narrator unwittingly reports infor-
mation of all kinds to the authorial audience (the narrator does not know 
that an authorial audience exists); let us call this reporting “disclosure func-
tions.” (Phelan 2005: 12; my emphasis)
Phelan’s explanations show why the above-mentioned example texts should 
not be considered as “mistakes” by their authors (as in fact they seldom are 
by readers), and why—although probably unreliable in other respects—the 
texts appear in the mentioned passages to present the story in an authorita-
tive way even when it clashes with the knowledge of the narrator. A potential 
problem, however, to be discussed in the following, is that—while serving 
the author’s need—the words are still described as “reports” from “the nar-
rator.” If all narration is report and communication (I use the two words 
synonymously, as Phelan seems to do)—then there must be a reporter. This 
explains why the author has come to stand outside the focus of narratology. 
In fictional narratives, the author does not tell the reader that something hap-
pened; the author invents the events. So in order to be able to view fictional 
narratives as reports, we must take an interest in the narrator instead. How-
ever, as soon as it becomes evident that the narrator is not reporting (when, 
for instance, he cannot know what is being recounted), the need for the 
author returns. Phelan responds to this problem by saying that the (implied) 
author has the narrator narrate to audiences and for purposes the narrator 
is unaware of. The general logic—one which is not specific to Phelan but 
common to all narratological models that equate communication and narra-
tion—is that if it is not the author who is reporting, then the narrator is doing 
it. And, conversely, if it is not the narrator who is reporting, then it must be 
the author.
 In what follows, I will suggest that there is a simpler and less circular way 
of approaching the problem. My suggestion is that one does not have to con-
sider all forms of narration as report and communication. Many narratolo-
gists have described narration—fictional and nonfictional, conversational and 
literary—under the umbrella of a unified theory, most often one based on oral 
storytelling. I am skeptical of this attempt and my skepticism boils down to 
the assumption that there is a crucial difference between narration and com-
munication. Much, but not all, narration is communication. I will call that 
part of narration that is not communication “unnatural narration” because it 
deviates from the paradigm of natural, i.e., oral narratives.
 After these remarks on narration vs. communication, I will briefly place 
the question of fiction vs. fictionality in the context of the ongoing discus-
sion about fiction vs. nonfiction. At opposite corners of the debate, we find 
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a separatist position associated with Dorrit Cohn and (especially the early) 
Philippe Lejeune, and a panfictionalist position often associated with Hayden 
White and more broadly with postmodernism and deconstruction.11 The first 
position deals in tell-tale signposts of fictionality that will reveal to a reader 
whether a text is fiction or nonfiction. By contrast, I follow Walsh and Phelan 
(see below) and think of such signposts rather as techniques of fictionalization 
that can also be used in nonfictional texts. As opposed to the dominant belief 
of the second position that everything can be read as fiction and according to 
the same rules of interpretation, I believe that the reader is often guided in his 
or her interpretation by a number of features that invite different readings. 
Furthermore, I claim that readers do, in fact, react very differently depending 
on whether they think they are reading fiction or not. Phelan puts this idea as 
follows:
The one theoretical generalization I would offer is that there is no one-to-
one correspondence between any specific formal feature of a narrative and 
any effect, including the placement of a narrative along the fiction/nonfiction 
spectrum. [ . . . ] I do not believe [ . . . ] that we can make the distinction on 
the basis of techniques that are either sure markers of fiction or nonfiction 
or that appear exclusively in one. As soon as such techniques get identified, 
some narrative artists will use them for unanticipated effects. (Phelan 2005: 
68)
Similarly, in the fortieth anniversary edition of Scholes and Kellogg’s The 
Nature of Narrative, Phelan points out four “unresolved instabilities” in nar-
rative theory. The first one concerns the study of unnatural narrative and 
refers to Brian Richardson.12 The second concerns digital narratives and the 
fourth a paradigm shift to questions of space and time. Interestingly, the third 
unresolved instability is about the question of fiction vs. nonfiction:
In my rhetorical view, preserving the borders [between fiction and nonfic-
tion] has the major advantage of helping us account for the differences in the 
ways we respond to particular narratives, even as the debate calls attention 
to various kinds of border-crossing—of technique, of character, of place, and 
so on. (Phelan, Scholes and Kellogg 2006: 335)
 11. For a good, short survey of the position from its roots in Saussurian linguistics to 
theorists like Eagleton, Hillis Miller and Norris, see Ryan (1997: 173ff).
 12. In Unnatural Voices, Brian Richardson demonstrates through careful readings of an 
impressive range of narratives how postmodern (as well as many earlier) narratives prove 
resistant to mimetic approaches. This paper was partly inspired by Richardson’s arguments 
about misguided mimetic generalizations.
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To put it bluntly, the advantage is that the borderline works, the disadvantage 
is that it does not exist—a slightly paradoxical description, but one I would 
actually subscribe to myself.
 In The Rhetoric of Fictionality, Richard Walsh also addresses this prob-
lem and offers the following solution:
By speaking of the quality of fictionality, I am framing the argument at one 
remove from the generic distinction between fiction and nonfiction per se, 
but fictionality is certainly an attribute of all fictions in that sense since it is 
applicable to all narratives deemed fictional (as distinct from false). [ . . . ] Of 
course it is the case that most fictions do in fact exhibit characteristics indic-
ative of their fictional status [ . . . ] but these are neither necessary nor suf-
ficient conditions of fictionality. [ . . . ] Even within the terms of the familiar, 
modern fictional contract, though, fictionality has no determinate relation 
to features of the text itself. [ . . . ] Fictionality is the product of a narra-
tive’s frame of presentation, of the various possible elements of what Gérard 
Genette has described as the paratext (1997). [ . . . ] And the distinction is 
categorical [ . . . ] because the interpretative operations applicable to a narra-
tive text are globally transformed, one way or the other, by the extrinsic mat-
ter of the contextual frame within which it is received. (Walsh 2007: 44–45)
Taking his point of departure from a position close to Phelan’s, Walsh argues 
that fictionality cannot be determined by text-internal evidence, and I agree 
with this argument.13 However, while Walsh stresses the globally transform-
ing power of the frame, I would like to add that fictionality may also be 
local. In fact, in other places, especially in his introduction, Walsh seems to 
acknowledge this fact, since it must be the reason why fictionality as a rhe-
torical strategy is sometimes also apparent in nonfictional narratives:
Not that fictionality should be equated simply with “fiction,” as a category 
or genre of narrative: it is a communicative strategy, and as such it is appar-
ent on some scale within many nonfictional narratives, in forms ranging 
from something like an ironic aside, through various forms of conjecture 
or imaginative supplementation, to full-blown counterfactual narrative 
examples. (Walsh 2007: 7)
In the useful distinction between fiction and fictionality, the global and the 
local seem to me equally important. Frame and paratext may produce a form 
 13. See also Löschnigg (1999) and Fludernik (2001).
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of fictionality that invites certain interpretative operations towards the nar-
rative as a whole. Using any of a range of techniques of fictionality (includ-
ing omniscience, free indirect discourse, simultaneous narration, imaginative 
supplementation, and counterfactual narrative) will locally produce fiction-
ality that similarly invites certain interpretative operations at least towards 
parts of the narrative—without necessarily turning the whole narrative into 
a fictional text. I will argue this in detail below in the context of the case of 
James Frey.
 So far I have argued that there can be fictionality without fiction and nar-
ration without communication. Ann Banfield’s book Unspeakable Sentences 
(1982) has greatly influenced my thinking about fictional narratives. I will 
just briefly indicate a few differences between us regarding some points on 
which she and I seem to agree. We both reject the assumption of much com-
munication theory that every sentence has a speaker and every text a narra-
tor (Banfield 1982: 11). However, Banfield holds “represented speech and 
thought” (free indirect discourse) to be an “exclusively literary style” (68), a 
view few would agree with today. For Banfield, narration (in a narrow sense 
as a translation of Benveniste’s histoire and Hamburger’s fiktionales Erzählen 
[142]) has no addressee (171), and is globally made up of sentences of non-
communication (242). In contrast to her, I stress that non-communication 
does not only appear in narrative fiction and, conversely, that not all narra-
tive fiction is non-communicative.
 The following sections pursue some of the questions raised when paratex-
tual information makes it difficult to determine which interpretative opera-
tions a narrative invites.
deterMiNiNg FiCtioN
In “Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality,” Marie-Laure Ryan 
mentions a crisis regarding the distinction between fiction and nonfiction 
(1997: 165). She argues against the theory of panfictionality, understood in 
the sense of the fictionality of all discourse (177). Opposing views that regard 
fiction and nonfiction as indistinguishable, Ryan proposes that “[t]he pos-
sibility of hybridization does not necessarily mean that the two categories 
are inherently indeterminate: the many shades of gray on the spectrum from 
black to white do not turn black and white into the same color (165).” In 
describing features of fictional text, Ryan takes her point of departure in a 
view that is very similar to Phelan’s:
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According to a widely accepted model, which I endorse in its broad lines, 
fictional communication presupposes a layered situation, in which an author 
addresses a real or “authorial” audience through a narrator addressing an 
imaginary or narratorial audience. [ . . . ] It [fictional communication] makes 
no claim to external truth, but rather, guarantees its own truth. (167)14
Ryan then presents some dominant panfictionalist positions (175–79), and 
convincingly counters them with arguments like the following: “But even 
if one concedes the unavoidable artificiality of representation, the thesis of 
universal fictionality rests on a faulty syllogism: all fictions are artifices. All 
representations are artifices. Hence, all representations are fictions (180).”
 In place of panfictionality, Ryan offers a model and a taxonomy that draw 
different conclusions from the acknowledged lack of clear borderlines:
If we maintain the distinction, what, then, is the literary-theoretical sig-
nificance of the current destabilization of the borderline between fiction and 
nonfiction? I would suggest that the contribution of postmodern writing 
practice to the system of genres is not to have merged fiction and nonfiction 
into one category, but on the contrary to have introduced a third species in 
the taxonomy. The system now comprises: (1) Those texts that overtly say 
“I am true,” asking the reader to accept this claim as a criterion of validity. 
(Biographies, historiography, traditional journalism, scientific discourse.) (2) 
Those texts that send a mixed message: I am not true but I pretend that I am. 
(Prototypes: Madame Bovary, War and Peace, Jane Eyre, Buddenbrooks). 
(3) Texts that say “I am not true” through overt makers, and inhibit par-
ticipation in a textual world. ([ . . . ] The French Lieutenant’s Woman, The 
Unnamable etc.). (181)
While I am completely sympathetic to Ryan in her case against panfiction-
ality, I think that this triad tends to overemphasize the importance of or 
challenge posed by metafiction, or what Ryan here refers to as postmodern 
writing practice. To me, there is a clear distinction in the taxonomy between 
nonfiction (category 1) and fiction (whether metafictive or not [categories 2 
and 3]). Although I see Ryan’s point, I am skeptical about the description of 
the second category. In my opinion, the books mentioned can all be placed 
on either side of the border because they do not really send a mixed message. 
It is simply not possible for a text to send the message “I am not true but I 
 14. For an even more elaborate account of the truth value of fiction and possible worlds, 
see Ryan (1991: 13–47).
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pretend that I am,” insofar as true texts do not normally send the message 
that they are not true.15 Therefore, any text that sends the message that it is 
not true does not pretend to be true. For the same reason, no one would mis-
takenly take any of the examples mentioned in category 2 to belong to any of 
the genres mentioned in category 1.
 Based on Ryan’s refutation of panfictionalism and her article in general, I 
want to argue in the following that a more profound challenge to the distinc-
tion between fiction and nonfiction comes from texts that present themselves 
as neither fiction nor nonfiction (I will call these texts “underdetermined”) 
and from texts that present themselves—in some cases at different times, in 
others at the same time—as both fiction and nonfiction (and hence can be 
called “overdetermined”). This leads me to modify Ryan’s taxonomy into one 
of my own invention:
(1) Fictional texts (prototypes: Madame Bovary, War and Peace, The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, The Unnamable, etc.).
(2) Underdetermined texts (prototypes: Les Mots by Sartre, A Million Little 
Pieces by Frey, etc.). For other examples like Knut Hamsun’s Hunger, see 
Cohn (1999: 34).
(3) Overdetermined texts (prototypes: Fils, Lunar Park, etc.).
(4) Nonfictional texts (biographies, historiography, traditional journalism, 
scientific discourse)
In my view, the majority of written narratives can easily be characterized as 
either fictional or nonfictional because paratexts, styles, techniques, and so 
forth, all point in the same direction. A minority of sometimes highly interest-
ing and controversial texts, however, display ambiguous, deceptive, missing, 
or self-contradictory paratexts. This can happen in a multitude of ways, and 
it is not my intention here to make an inventory of these. Instead, I will sim-
plify the matter and differentiate between only two categories of problematic 
cases. The first category (“underdetermined”) contains texts with paratexts 
that send no clear message (A Million Little Pieces by James Frey will be 
the main example in this category). The second category (“overdetermined”) 
contains texts with paratexts that send mixed or mutually exclusive messages.
 It is tempting to insert a fifth category in the middle, to include fiction 
disguised as nonfiction and vice versa. This category would then include texts 
that are wholly or partly true, but present themselves as fiction, and texts 
that are wholly or partly fiction, but attest to the opposite, and possibly also 
 15. Ryan seems to acknowledge this herself when she writes a little earlier: “But novels 
rarely read like the nonfictional genres they are supposed to imitate” (169).
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pseudo-autobiography and pseudo-history. However, it would not be easy to 
come up with examples because all fiction makes some reference to the real 
world, and since non-accurate parts in nonfiction normally compromise their 
veracity instead of turning it into fiction (Walsh 2007: 45). In the following 
discussion of the famous controversy about James Frey, questions like these 
will also be raised. I do not think of the four categories as separate boxes, 
but rather as forming a continuum with many shades of gray, to reuse Ryan’s 
expression. Far from turning fiction into nonfiction or vice versa, texts in 
categories 2 and 3 are placed in a middle region, drawing on resources from 
both categories 1 and 4. Likewise, I think that any attempt to place absolute 
boundaries between the categories is doomed to failure. Even underdeter-
mined and overdetermined narratives are not always as different as could be 
expected. In fact, an underdetermined text may occasionally change its status 
to an overdetermined text if new paratextual information is added.16
 In the following, I will inquire into the question of what problematic 
paratexts do to the narrator-author distinction supposedly present in fiction 
and absent in nonfiction.
JaMes FreY’s a MiLLion LittLe Pieces 
as aN uNderdeterMiNed teXt17
To represent the possible cases of underdetermined and overdetermined texts, 
I have chosen A Million Little Pieces (2003) by James Frey and Lunar Park 
 16. Underdetermined texts can become overdetermined when text-external contradictory 
contracts are signed—for example, in interviews at different times or by the publisher. Scandals 
are more likely to occur in cases of underdetermination than overdetermination, especially 
when an underdetermined text is first read as nonfiction and then as fiction, like Frey’s, but also 
when a text about, say, incest, is first read as fiction, then as nonfiction. Some underdetermined 
texts will easily lend themselves to being read according to more than one contract established 
outside the text.
 17. I do not devote attention to Frey’s book and the discussions that followed it because 
the book is especially complex or transgressive or because it is a perfect example of an under-
determined work. My interest has to do with the fact that the case is very instructive; also, the 
book can be read as fiction, nonfiction, or both at the same time. The settlement in the case 
even puts an exact date on the change, January 26, 2006, when Frey admitted inaccuracies and 
Oprah Winfrey withdrew her support for the book. Only readers who had bought the book 
before that date were eligible for refunds. There is no denying that the book tried to pass as 
nonfiction—I will say more about that later—and that it could be called a hoax. At a purely 
paratextual level, however, the first editions of the book were designed and published in ways 
that allowed it to be read, first as nonfiction, then as fiction. And although it is very clear that 
the book cannot unambiguously be described as nonfiction, it is equally clear that it is not 
“pure” fiction. On a paratextual level, the book was underdetermined, and on a descriptive 
level it remains difficult to clearly determine it as belonging to one or the other category.
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(2005) by Bret Easton Ellis. The two works mirror each other: the former 
was published as nonfiction, but turned out to be a rather inaccurate repre-
sentation of the experiences of its author; the latter was published as fiction, 
but is in many (though definitely not all) respects accurate in its facts and 
information about the author. In Lunar Park, then, the real author seems to 
be too much a part of the story for it to be clearly fictional, and in A Million 
Little Pieces the real author seems not sufficiently to be a part of the story for 
it to be clearly nonfictional. Whereas Lunar Park did not provoke any con-
troversy, discussions of A Million Little Pieces were heated, to put it mildly. 
Since Frey’s book, as well as the discussions surrounding it, are illuminating 
for arguments about narrators and authors, I will first concentrate on Frey’s 
case. Lunar Park will be discussed by way of comparison.
 A Million Little Pieces is about a very heavy substance abuser and how 
he overcomes his addiction. In September 2005, it was promoted by Oprah 
Winfrey on her talk show and was her book of the month. It was also at the 
top of the New York Times nonfiction paperback bestseller list for many 
weeks. Then, in the beginning of 2006, it was “exposed” as fraud by the 
website The Smoking Gun, which renamed it “A Million Little Lies.” Frey 
appeared on several talk shows, including Larry King’s; at the end of this 
show Oprah Winfrey called in to reconfirm her support for him. Later on, 
he was a guest on Oprah’s show again, on which occasion she withdrew her 
support and accused him of betrayal. Many other readers also reacted to the 
exposure with outrage.18 A poll at abebooks.com revealed that a significant 
“67.3% [said they] felt betrayed by Frey, and that a memoir should not con-
tain fictional information”19 (emphasis in the original). Here are a few telling 
quotes:
I was under the impression this was a real life experience. I’ve read more 
than half of this book and don’t know if I want to even finish it now. I want 
to know what is real in this book.
A memoir should be accurate. What’s the point of reading a non-fiction 
book if it’s fiction? (ibid.)
These statements clearly suggest that the difference between fiction and non-
fiction matters to real readers. Most readers seem to have different rules and 
expectations for fictional narratives than they do for nonfictional narratives. 
 18. See Lanser (2005: 209) for similar famous incidents causing outrage.
 19. See http://www.abebooks.com/docs/Community/Featured/james-frey-poll.shtml.
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Hence, lawsuits were filed, and Frey’s publisher finally made the following 
offer:
NEW YORK (Reuters)—Random House is offering refunds to readers who 
bought James Frey’s drug and alcohol memoir “A Million Little Pieces” 
directly from the publisher, following accusations the author exaggerated his 
story.20
Navigating between fiction and truth, Reuters uses the word “exaggerated.” 
On the one hand, this lexeme only makes sense with reference to what really 
happened in Frey’s life. On the other hand, the word highlights the fact that 
this is not exactly the truth but an exaggerated version of it. As incidental 
as the usage of this word may seem, it is significant that The Smoking Gun 
investigates the case from the same basic assumption of reference with a dif-
ference. In every instance in which The Smoking Gun wants to prove that 
Frey deviates from reality in his representation of different incidents, it starts 
by showing how many details are true, in order to show that they are investi-
gating the right incident:
However, based on Frey’s own statements in a TSG interview, there can be 
little, if any, doubt that the incident described in the Granville police report 
is the same one fictionalized in Frey’s book.21
The controversy and the lawsuit surrounding A Million Little Pieces raises 
problems of central importance to our issue here, i.e., the question of the 
importance of deceptive or problematic paratextual information concerning 
the fiction/nonfiction distinction and the narrator/author distinction. At least 
two very basic questions can be asked: is A Million Little Pieces paratextually 
determined as either fiction or nonfiction? And if so, what does this determi-
nation entail, and by what rules is it governed? Turning to the first, seemingly 
easy, question, let me quote from the final settlement:
A. Factual and Procedural Background
This action arises out of the publication and marketing of the book A 
Million Little Pieces by James Frey (the “Book”). The Book, which was 
published by defendant Random House, Inc. in 2003, is based on Frey’s 
experiences during a stay at a drug rehabilitation center and his subsequent 
 20. See http://www.harrisonfordweb.com/forums/showthread.php?t=5388.
 21. See http://www.thesmokinggun.com/jamesfrey/0104061jamesfrey4.html.
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recovery from drug addiction. After its publication, the Book gained critical 
success, and in the Fall of 2005, it was chosen as a featured selection of the 
Oprah Winfrey Book Club. The back cover classified the Book as “memoir/
literature.”22
Whereas the later Anchor Books edition is tagged as claimed here, neither the 
first nor the following paperback edition used that label. It is doubtful that 
the book was “classified” at all when first published. The first edition bears 
no generic markers on the front cover. On the back cover it has no statements 
by the publisher or author, but instead two blurbs by Bret Easton Ellis and 
Pat Conroy. Ellis calls it “a heartbreaking memoir” but also mentions, curi-
ously, its “poetic honesty.” Conroy makes no generic reference, but instead 
compares it to a major work of fiction: “James Frey has written the War and 
Peace of addiction.” Although the design and front and back cover have all 
been changed for the paperback edition, this still carries no generic markers. 
The settlement goes on to refer to the lawsuits:
All of these lawsuits focus on (1) the author’s alleged embellishments in the 
Book; (2) the labeling of the Book as a “memoir”; and (3) various other 
ways in which the Book was advertised, publicized, and marketed.23
Point (3) seems to touch on something essential: although not exactly labeled 
as such, the book was distributed, advertised and sold in the guise of a mem-
oir. The paratext is not restricted to the book cover. James Frey sticks to a 
double defense strategy not completely unlike Freud’s kettle argument. He 
claims, first, that a memoir is not unambiguously nonfiction, and, second, 
that, even if regarded as nonfiction, it does not necessarily have to be entirely 
accurate. This is apparent from his comments on Larry King’s talk show. Frey 
comments on the ambiguous fictional status of memoirs as follows:
[ . . . ] the genre of memoir is one that’s very new and the boundaries of it 
had not been established yet. [ . . . ]
 Yes. Again, I don’t think it’s fair to classify this “Million Little Pieces” as 
fiction at all. It’s a memoir. A very small portion is in dispute. [ . . . ]
 I couldn’t have written it if I hadn’t been through a lot of the things I 
talk about. You know, it’s a memoir. [ . . . ] I don’t think it should be held up 
and scrutinized the way a perfect non-fiction document would be or a news-
paper article.24
 22. See http://www.amlpsettlement.com/pdfs/Final_Approval_of_Settlement.pdf.
 23. See http://www.amlpsettlement.com/pdfs/Final_Approval_of_Settlement.pdf.
 24. See http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/11/lk1.01.html.
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Frey argues that his book is neither completely fictional nor completely non-
fictional. His publisher, Nan Talese, backs him up on this point on Oprah 
Winfrey’s show:
A novel is something different than a memoir. And a memoir is different 
from an autobiography. A memoir is an author’s remembrance of a certain 
period in his life. Now, the responsibility, as far as I am concerned, is does 
it strike me as valid? Does it strike me as authentic? I mean, I’m sent things 
all the time and I think they’re not real. I don’t think they’re authentic. I 
don’t think they’re good. I don’t believe them. In this instance, I absolutely 
believed what I read.25
Nan Talese thus places memoirs in the overlap between fictional novels and 
nonfictional autobiographies. In his interview with King, Frey comments on 
the accuracy of a memoir if regarded as nonfiction as follows:
KING: But it is supposed to be factual events. The memoir is a form of biog-
raphy.
FREY:  Yes. Memoir is within the genre of non-fiction. I don’t think it’s nec-
essarily appropriate to say I’ve conned anyone. The book is 432 pages 
long. The total page count of disputed events is 18, which is less than 
five percent of the total book. You know, that falls comfortably within 
the realm of what’s appropriate for a memoir. [ . . . ]
KING:  But you will agree, if you went into a bookstore and it said memoirs, 
you would think non-fiction?
FREY:  Yes. I mean, it’s a classification of non-fiction. Some people think it’s 
creative non-fiction. It’s generally recognized that the writer of a memoir 
is retailing a subjective story. That it’s one person’s event. I mean, I still 
stand by the essential truths of the book.26
I am not the one to decide whether memoirs must be nonfictional or whether 
it is appropriate for certain forms of nonfiction to be slightly, somewhat, 
considerably, or even necessarily incorrect. What is clear is that A Million 
Little Pieces was read as nonfiction, and that many readers found its inaccu-
racies (regarding a train accident, a prison sentence, and several other central 
issues) highly disturbing. More interesting still is the fact that in the many 
discussions surrounding the controversy surprisingly little attention was given 
 25. See http://www.oprah.com/tows/slide/200601/20060126/slide_20060126_350_115.
jhtml.
 26. See http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/11/lk1.01.html.
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to the actual wordings in the book. It can be argued—and was argued—that 
the paratext of Frey’s book did not determine the fictional status of the nar-
rative. Irrespective of whether we think of the paratext as underdetermined 
or deceptive, the narrative techniques used by Frey are frequently fictionaliza-
tion techniques. Frey himself gives one obvious example:
[ . . . ] One of the things I think is interesting is there are 200 pages of recre-
ated conversations in the book, but people haven’t been questioning those 
because, in that area, it’s understood that it’s a memoir, it’s a recreation, it’s 
my subjective recreation of my own life.27
It is very easy to realize that the represented events differ from what actually 
happened: the book does nothing to disguise this. Despite the narrator’s sup-
posedly imperfect memory, the book is made up of page- and chapter-long 
dialogues and exact renderings of speech. Even more significantly, the whole 
book is narrated in the present tense. The present tense here is clearly not the 
historical present or simply an interior monologue, but rather corresponds to 
what Cohn calls the “fictional present” (1999: 106), a form Cohn limits to 
fictional narratives.
 In chapter 6 of The Distinction of Fiction, Cohn describes a “mounting 
trend in modernist first-person fiction to cast a distinctively narrative (not 
monologic) discourse in the present tense from first to last” (1999: 97). Cohn 
rejects both the historical present and the interior monologue as satisfactory 
explanations for the phenomenon, and takes as her main example a passage 
from Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), containing the words that 
form the title of her chapter 6, “I doze and wake.” Cohn comments on this as 
follows:
But the introspective instance that most strongly resists the interior mono-
logue reading is no doubt the one that reads: “I doze and wake, drifting 
from one formless dream to another.” Here semantic incongruence combines 
with the formal feature that most forcefully counteracts the impression of 
an unrolling mental quotation in this passage as a whole: the pace of its dis-
course is not consistently synchronized with the pace of the events it conveys 
[ . . . ]. (103)
A Million Little Pieces contains numerous passages that could not be said, 
written, or even thought while the depicted events happened. There are 
 27. See http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/11/lk1.01.html.
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descriptions in the present tense of being alone, sometimes overwhelmingly 
consumed by “the fury” (Frey 2003: 203 et passim). There are also passages 
that report how the narrator is falling asleep:
[ . . . ] I climb into bed [ . . . ] I haven’t slept in forty hours. I’m still smiling 
[ . . . ]. My hand drops. Still. Eyes close. Smiling. (169) [ . . . ]
 The two men on the couches next to me are both sound asleep. [ . . . ] I 
fade in and out. The TV is narcotic. In and out. In. Out. In. Out. (286)
It is obvious that everything Cohn said about “I doze and wake” and the 
use of the present tense in first-person fiction also applies here. Insofar as 
“out” describes a state of mind, of not being conscious, it cannot possibly be 
reported at the same time. The techniques used in the extract dissociate the 
words from the narrator’s account. The words of the narrative in A Million 
Little Pieces are unnatural, in the sense that they are not modeled on natu-
ral narrative, i.e., everyday conversational storytelling. The book uses many 
techniques of fictionalization, but, as Frey mentioned, readers did not realize 
them. This was probably due to the fact that the text only uses techniques 
that have already been conventionalized in first-person narration.
 Let us now contrast the case of Frey’s (underdetermined) A Million Little 
Pieces with that of Bret Easton Ellis’s (overdetermined) Lunar Park. After this 
comparison, I will consider the possible consequences of non-communicative 
narration.
bret eastoN ellis’s Lunar Park 
as aN overdeterMiNed teXt
Lunar Park is an example of autofiction in the sense of Serge Doubrovsky: 
it is a novel labeled as fiction whose protagonist has the same name as the 
author.28 Furthermore, there is no doubt that much of what is said about 
the first-person narrator, who is called Bret Easton Ellis, holds true for the 
author as well. The book begins with a description of Ellis’s career as a writer, 
blended with short analyses of his prose and the opening lines of his earlier 
 28. Coined by Doubrovsky (1977: back cover et passim), “autofiction” designates books 
specifically defined as novels, with the protagonist, author, and narrator sharing the same 
name. Later on, Genette (without even mentioning Doubrovsky) expands the term to denote 
any long or short fictional narrative in which the author and one of the characters have the 
same name (Genette 1993: 68–84). For more on metalepsis and fictionality see McHale (1987) 
and several articles in Pier and Schaeffer (2005).
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works, such as Less than Zero (1985) and The Rules of Attraction (1987). In 
the first chapter, Ellis also talks about his promotion tours, his relationship to 
his publisher, the scandal following American Psycho, his friendship with Jay 
McInerney, and so forth (2005: 3–40). All of this is well known to readers 
who have followed Ellis’s career and read his books.
 However, there are also numerous elements that are not in accordance 
with the biography of the real author. In the book, Ellis has spent years at 
Camden College (a college many fictional characters from earlier Ellis books 
went to), and he is married to one Jayne Dennis (a fictional character who 
nonetheless has her own website29). Moreover, the events gradually turn into 
a Hamlet-gone-Stephen King-plot. Among other things, we are confronted 
with a haunted house that changes its appearance, ghosts, a living bird doll, 
and unexplained disappearances. At one point, Ellis and his son Robby are 
almost swallowed by a monster (316). Also, the fictional character Patrick 
Bateman from American Psycho, who reappears in Ellis’s novel Glamorama, 
turns up in Lunar Park, too, and begins (maybe as a copycat-killer incarna-
tion) to copy the murders from American Psycho. And Terby, the bird doll, 
a rather uncanny and disturbing element, gradually turns into a murderous 
creature (376). Interestingly, spelled backward, the name of the doll contains 
a question that might be addressed to the book’s narrator and/or its author: 
“TERBY”—“YBRET”—“Why, Bret?” (344).
 Lunar Park blends reality and fiction in a rather fascinating way. Since the 
fictional parts are so obviously fictional, the novel is clearly not an example 
of embellished nonfiction. However, it is worth noting that it also contains 
true information about the author’s life. It therefore seems reductive to see 
the book as pure fiction. Overdetermined autofictions urge readers to read 
them as fictional and nonfictional at the same time.30
 29. See http://www.jaynedennis.com/home.html. Interestingly, the book has a website, too: 
http://www.randomhouse.com/kvpa/eastonellis/.
 30. See the remarks on Lanser below and my forthcoming article “What’s in a Name? 
Double Exposures in Lunar Park.” In the article, I argue that autofictions bear numerous 
structural resemblances to double exposures in the visual medium. The photographic technique 
of “double exposure” merges temporally or spatially distinct figures. Similarly, autofictions 
superimpose an image of the real author over an image of characters in a fictional world. In 
the textual form of double exposure, the reader’s knowledge about the author (from interviews, 
biographies, the media, and so on) contributes to his or her view of the author in the literary 
work and vice versa: exaggerations, fictional inventions, and narrative fantasies in the work 
contribute to rumors and imaginations about the author. In any autofiction, then, the reader 
sees the sum of two pictures or two narratives superimposed over each other and haunting 
each other. Because Lunar Park demands to be read as both fiction and nonfiction, the novel 
can be viewed as a form of double exposure: the (nonfictional) story about the author is su-
perimposed on the (fictional) story about the character. The effect is formally quite different 
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Natural autHors
In the contractual language of Lejeune’s Le pacte autobiographique, Lunar 
Park signs two mutually exclusive contracts. The two contracts give the 
reader two contradictory messages: (1) “you must read this with Interes-
selosigkeit in the Kantian sense” (or, alternatively, “you won’t be able to find 
out what actually happened”) and (2) “you cannot read this with Interesselo-
sigkeit” (or, alternatively, “you must try to find out what really happened”). 
Frey claimed to have signed neither of the two contracts, the contract for 
fictional narratives or the one for nonfictional narratives. To my mind, con-
tractual thinking urges readers to make a choice between regarding A Mil-
lion Little Pieces as narrated by a lying author, or, alternatively, regarding it 
as narrated by a reliable narrator. In an illuminating article on the ways in 
which we link texts and authors, Susan Lanser argues that readers do not 
always react as instructed by theory. Lanser begins by stating that “[a]s the 
history of literary reception has made dramatically evident, there is simply no 
way to resolve these questions [of fictionality and truthfulness] from the text 
itself” (Lanser 2005: 206). Her opening example is a piece by Ann Beattie 
in The New Yorker, which remains equivocally attached to its author. The 
reader will hesitate between attaching the “I” of the prose text to the author 
and attaching it to a narrator distinct from the author. Beattie’s text is exem-
plary of the way literary discourse works rather than an exception to it: “The 
‘I’ that characterizes literary discourse, in other words, is always potentially 
severed from and potentially tethered to the author’s ‘I’” (210–211). Lanser 
argues that readers make connections between the author and the “I” of a 
narrative—even if the “I” is a fictional character—and that these connections 
are much stronger than narrative theory has hitherto claimed. Lanser is inter-
ested in both ambiguously and clearly fictional narratives. She argues that 
“[ . . . ] readers routinely ‘vacillate’ and ‘oscillate’ and even double the speak-
ing voice against the logic of both structure and stricture” (207; emphasis in 
the original). Later on, she says the following about fiction: “yet readers may 
ignore the technical boundaries of fictional voice, in effect doubling the ‘I’ so 
that the narrator’s words sometimes belong to the author as well as to the 
narrating character and sometimes do not” (216). In both cases, Lanser uses 
the word “double/doubling” for the activity of the reader. In narratives des-
ignated as fiction this is something the reader tends to do—“against theory,” 
as it were.
from the reference to real historical events or places in fictional works where the principle of 
minimal departure applies.
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 When Walsh addresses the relationship between fictive and nonfictive dis-
course in The Rhetoric of Fictionality, he also connects it to questions about 
narrators and authors. Rather than drawing ontological boundary lines, 
Walsh draws on the relevance theory of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. He 
points out that this paradigm has a very useful feature:
[ . . . ] a pragmatic theory of fictionality does not require detachment of fic-
tive discourse from real-world context. [ . . . ] Fictionality is neither a bound-
ary between worlds, nor a frame dissociating the author from the discourse, 
but a contextual assumption by the reader [ . . . ]. (36)
Discussing the consequences of a pragmatic approach for the concept of the 
narrator, Walsh writes that “[ . . . ] the narrator [ . . . ] functions primarily to 
establish a representational frame within which the narrative discourse may 
be read as report rather than invention” (69). Following this insight, I would 
like to dissociate report and invention to highlight that invention is also a 
resource of fictionality available to the actual author. This strategy will typi-
cally (but not always) result in a work of fiction. This insight sheds new light 
on some of the questions that texts like A Million Little Pieces pose to narra-
tive theory. Due to its ambiguous generic affiliation, A Million Little Pieces 
can serve as a triple test case:
 (1) If it is read as fiction, it will come across as authoritative, because it 
looks like many other fictional first-person narratives, using simultaneous 
narration and other techniques of fictionalization. It does not break any con-
temporary norms, and it does not mark the “narrator” as unreliable accord-
ing to current conventions for fictional first-person narratives. It is also worth 
noting that readers are used to fictional first-person narratives that reliably 
recount information which exceeds what a real person can remember. How-
ever, in Frey’s case, the author does nothing to pretend that a narrator is 
speaking to someone. As a person in the narrative, “the narrator” makes 
referential statements in his interactions with other characters, but the text 
never suggests that the narrator is—during or after the events—narrating 
the narrative to an addressee. The narrative is obviously the creation of the 
author, rather than something the character says, thinks, or even knows. If we 
read this text as fiction, we assume that the author has created a world that 
we should trust. In this case, the act of communication takes place between 
the author and the reader.
 (2) On the other hand, if the narrative is read as nonfiction, we may ques-
tion the accuracy of the narrative, and perhaps even investigate the facts, as 
did The Smoking Gun. There is, then, no narrator other than the author him-
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self. We might argue that James Frey is the narrator in the sense of Lejeune’s 
formula: “narrator = author.” The author then clearly uses techniques of 
fictionalization to get his story across, but this need not change the readers’ 
view that what they are reading is essentially a true, an exaggerated or pos-
sibly even untrue story about the life of the author. In this case, the act of 
communication takes place between the author and the reader as well.
 (3) Whereas overdetermined narratives arguably urge readers to read 
them as both fictional and nonfictional, underdetermined narratives seem to 
invite different readings at different times. Notwithstanding, in Frey as well 
as in Ellis, a third reading with a double vision—as proposed by Lanser—is 
possible. In fact, any reading that sees the book as being purely referential 
or purely non-referential will miss something. A reading of Lunar Park as 
pure fiction will have to play down some of its most essential messages about 
addiction and how to overcome it, not to mention the many striking similari-
ties between character and author, including the name. Similarly, a reading 
of A Million Little Pieces that does not take into account its techniques of 
fictionalization and its (re)invention of dialogues and events will miss some 
of the premises that are actually visible in the narrative itself. If the reader 
assumes that there is an equivocal attachment between the textual “I” and 
the real author, then the narrative is read as true communication from author 
to reader about the author’s life (maybe telling important things about this 
life even as it occasionally deviates from biographical truth) as well as a form 
of fictional communication from author to reader about the life of a heavy 
substance abuser. The author shares the name and the first-person pronoun 
with this abuser, but not all of his experiences.
 It is important to note that the differences between the three reading 
strategies one could adopt towards A Million Little Pieces do not include 
differences as to whether a concept of a narrator is needed to describe the 
narrative. In each case, the communication is from author to reader. One 
could decide to read the narrative as fiction and a posteriori assume the 
existence of a narrator, but it is not possible to verify the existence of a nar-
rator by means of intratextual features and to then determine the status of 
the narrative as fiction. Whether we read the book as fiction or not, and 
whether we assume the existence of a narrator or not, we cannot find realis-
tic explanations for the passages describing things of which the character is 
unaware. Nor will we be able to explain the conversations and renderings of 
dialogues that no narrator, character, or author could possibly remember. In 
short: deciding pro or contra fiction or pro or contra narrator will not really 
prove helpful in explaining the techniques and style used in the bulk of the 
book.
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I have argued that underdetermined and overdetermined narratives pose a 
problem to any theory that acknowledges distinctions between fiction and 
nonfiction but grounds the decision in paratextual information. I also pointed 
to the potential problems in explaining the narration of something a nar-
rator could not know or need not tell. Third, I tried to demonstrate that 
the concepts of author and narrator have been used to mutually explain an 
absence of communication in the other and therefore to avoid the problem of 
narration without communication. The lesson from A Million Little Pieces is 
threefold: first, the narrative is openly fictionalized; second, this fact does not 
automatically turn the book into pure fiction; and, third, the fictionalization 
cannot helpfully be explained by assuming the existence of a narrator other 
than the author. In fact, any rhetorical approach that takes narration to be 
report will—among other problems—encounter a major difficulty in A Mil-
lion Little Pieces. The narrative cannot be communication from the author, 
since he is not now experiencing what is narrated; nor can it be communica-
tion from a narrator, since he is not now narrating what is experienced. I will 
conclude by suggesting that there is a way of approaching these problems 
that is more helpful than trying to decide the text’s fictional status, or assum-
ing a narrator between the author and the narrative. This suggestion is simply 
that not all narration is report and communication.
 As a beginning, let us note that relevance theory, as put forward by Walsh, 
is compatible with Lanser’s idea of double vision and equivocal attachment. 
Some narratives will prompt assumptions of fictionality and nonfiction alike. 
Such a narrative was designed—whether intentionally or not—by the author. 
Let us then reconsider Phelan’s suggestion that narrative “can be fruitfully 
understood as a rhetorical act: somebody telling somebody else on some 
occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened” (2005: 18). It 
is reasonable to argue that a negation of any segment on the right side of 
the equation may not lead to a negation of narrative, but more precisely to 
a negation of communication. In my opinion, Phelan’s formula is accurate—
necessary as well as sufficient—as a definition of (conscious human) commu-
nication, but it is not a definition of narrative. What he really defines is not 
narrative, but conscious human communication. I want to argue instead that 
non-communication is a resource of fictionality available to the real author. 
Frey, like any other author, can opt for or against any technique of fictional-
ity—one of these being non-communicational narration.
 If we maintain the difference between fiction and fictionality, we find that 
invention and non-communication can be described as resources of fictional-
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ity, even though they do not belong exclusively to fiction. As argued above, 
fictionality is also a local quality of a narrative. Not all nonfiction refrains 
from techniques of fictionality, and not all fiction employs such techniques. 
This being said, it seems to me that to describe non-communication (in the 
very inclusive form of all sorts of narration that transcend Phelan’s formula 
of somebody telling somebody else that something happened) as a resource of 
fictionality available to the author is an economical way of describing a very 
distinctive feature in much fiction.
 Let me return briefly to the example of falling asleep: “I fade in and out. 
The TV is narcotic. In and out. In. Out. In. Out” (Frey 2003: 286). Irrespec-
tive of the global status of the narrative as fiction, this is not communica-
tion.31 The reasons include the fact that there is no one to tell, and no one 
with a conscious mind able to do the telling. In fictionalized narrative neither 
of the two parties necessary for communication (sender and receiver) needs to 
be present. It can be argued that some form of communication may also exist 
between, say, neurons or bacteria, and obviously between animals, without 
it necessarily entailing a “purpose” or a report “that something happened.” 
However, I have never encountered a definition of communication that did 
not include two parties in the form of a sender and a receiver. To what extent 
they need a shared cognitive environment, a channel, a message, a purpose, 
and so forth is beside the point I am making here: if nothing happened or no 
one recounted it, or if it is not told to anyone, there could still be narration 
but not communication.32
 While the narrative in texts of this nature can globally be considered a 
form of communication from author to reader, this global narrative may 
include local non-communication rather than a report from an unwitting nar-
rator. It may, for example, include narration that is unnatural, in the simple 
sense that it transcends the norms of everyday conversation and communica-
tion, and in the sense that it is without sender or receiver, without narrator 
or narratee. While much attention has been given to oral language as a pro-
totype for literary and written narrative (Fludernik 1996), it should be noted 
that written narrative lends itself more easily to non-communication, for the 
simple reason that it is more detachable from the enunciator of an utterance 
in time and space than is spoken language. Communicational models face 
 31. The comical qualities of this passage when read aloud reveal that this is a curious form 
of narration. The words form, quite literally “unspeakable sentences.”
 32. In this respect my proposal is very similar to Monika Fludernik’s suggestions in To-
wards a ‘Natural’ Narratology, where she defines narrativity as centering on experientiality 
(1996: 26) and as always implying the consciousness of a protagonist (30). For Fludernik “no 
teller is necessary” (26) for narrativity.
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difficulties with regard to some narratives. By understanding all narratives 
(fictional and nonfictional, fictionalized and nonfictionalized alike) along the 
lines of a communication model, we run the risk of modeling the subject 
after the model, instead of vice versa (Richardson 2006: 139ff.).
 The concept of the narrator can be a helpful tool for the interpretation of 
a text. Many narratives firmly attach words, thoughts, and opinions to nar-
rators which are quite different from their authors. It therefore makes sense 
to talk about narrators. It is perfectly possible to refer to James Frey as the 
narrator of A Million Little Pieces, and to Bret Easton Ellis as the narrator of 
Lunar Park. However, this does not solve questions raised by the non-report 
of the author in fictionalized narratives. Since narrators as “agents” do not 
invent, they cannot help to explain passages that are—inside fiction itself—
obviously invented and not reported. Putting all parts of a fiction “in the 
mouth” of a narrator brings with it a double problem in fictionalized nar-
ratives since it tends to deprive them of their distinctive fictionality without 
really explaining what the positing of a narrator was meant to explain: the 
absence of report in the author’s narrative.
 Having said that the author uses unnatural narration as part of the global 
communication of the narrative to the reader, the question is with what 
terms to best describe that type of narration. What is the relation between 
authorial communication and unnatural narration? Turning back to Phel-
an’s account of disclosure functions and narrator functions one could say 
that in unnatural narration, the disclosure functions proceed not along the 
narrator-authorial audience track but the author-authorial audience track as 
the author, in the interest of disclosure, violates the limits of narratorial com-
munication. Compared to the description quoted above with the two tracks 
consisting of the narrator-narratee track and the narrator-authorial audience 
track, this seems to me a welcome addition. I much prefer the description 
that the author violates the limits of narratorial communication over the 
description that the narrator unwittingly reports information since I believe 
that there is no report at the local level and at the level of the character-
narrator. In this respect, then, Phelan’s model and my own model converge. 
And this convergence reinforces the idea that the author and not the narrator 
is necessary to explain the specific phenomena discussed.
 The global communication from author to reader exists in any written 
narrative whether natural or unnatural, mimetic or non-mimetic, fictional 
or nonfictional. This description hardly captures the specificity of the men-
tioned passage in the “fictional present” and the consequences of using tech-
niques of fictionality and unnatural narration. To do this, I believe, we have 
to disentangle the words from a narrator. The author violates the limits of 
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narratorial communication, but also of real-world discourse. It is a moment 
of fictional invention (whether the narrative is globally a fiction or not), not 
a moment of report by the character-narrator. Attributing the words to the 
author is correct but only in the sense that he is producing a fictionalized pas-
sage in a way that is not reducible to naturally recurring oral discourse.
 The real author may or may not choose to construct the narrative in such 
a way that a narrator addresses a narratee. And having chosen to construct 
a narrator, the author may or may not limit the narration to telling what this 
narrator would be likely to know. The unnatural features of non-communi-
cation (no one telling anyone on any occasion and for any reason about any 
events) are neither necessary nor sufficient features ontologically or generi-
cally in fiction, but they are features of fictionality.
 My proposal has the advantage of acknowledging the ability of authors 
to employ such features of their choosing, as well as their ability to transcend 
normal communication and the rules governing conversation or storytelling 
from narrator to narratee. This ability to go beyond communicational mod-
els is paradoxically, yet completely logically, possessed by no narrator under-
stood within the framework of the very same communicational model.33
 It seems important to acknowledge that the explanatory power of com-
municational models is great, but limited in relation to the sum of all narra-
tives. Some narratives are natural, others are not. If we analyze all narratives 
according to the same model, we oversimplify matters. It would seem that an 
important task for narrative theory is to develop models that account for the 
specific properties of storyworlds, of experientiality, and of representations 
and narratives that resist description and understanding based on linguistic 
understandings of natural, oral communication.
 As I have shown, narration cannot always be understood according to 
the rules of communicational discourse. Furthermore, this fact ties narra-
tion more closely to its flesh-and-blood author. Far from being deprived of 
responsibility, this author is responsible for all his/her choices, including the 
possible choice of techniques of fictionalization and of non-communicative 
passages or whole narratives. To realize the full potential of authors, we 
should “employ” rather than “imply” them.
 33. In this article I have limited myself to claiming that there are features of fictionality 
that the concept of the narrator will obscure rather than explain. In a broader context there 
is no denying that I also agree with Walsh on his more general point that “[ . . . ] the narrator 
is always either a character who narrates, or the author” (Walsh 2007: 78).
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mise en reflet/mise en série, 68−69, 75, 
77−78
Mittelbarkeit (Stanzel), 111−12, 116. See 
also mediacy
mode (Stanzel), 106; teller mode, 45, 
115, 117, 260; reflector mode, 
45−46, 106, 114−19, 117n7, 118n8, 
128, 169
Modernism, 107, 230, 260
modes of reading narrative, 235, 237
montage, 123
mood (Genette), 37
multiperspectivism, 94n2
narratee, 7, 10, 18−19, 188, 193, 197, 
199, 199n9, 200−202, 206−7, 
210−11, 216, 218−19, 221−23, 
225−31, 277−78, 297−99; extradi-
egetic, 202; extra-subjective, 
227−29; intra-subjective, 227−29; 
personalized, 210
narrating character, 49, 53, 211, 
211n10, 212n14, 213, 216, 218, 
220−26, 223n24, 223n25, 228, 293
narrating I (vs. experiencing I), 19, 
147−48, 155, 235, 257. See also 
narrating self
narrating self (vs. experiencing self), 
227, 244, 246, 249−50, 257. See 
also narrating I
narration, 194, 202, 206, 207, 210, 218, 
229−31; act of, 222, 230; as mimetic 
desire, 216−17; authorial (Stanzel), 
10n12, 44, 115−16, 119, 121, 123, 
128, 168; autodiegetic (Genette), 
38, 230; cinematic, 163−81; covert 
(Chatman) (vs. overt), 114−16, 126, 
128, 168−69, 251; dynamic of, 
197; extradiegetic (Genette), 39−41, 
39n3, 40n5, 46, 48, 55, 68, 78, 
114, 123; etymological root of, 275; 
first−person (Stanzel), 38, 44−45, 
53, 108, 115−16, 128, 156, 291; 
homodiegetic (Genette) (vs. hetero-
diegetic), 41, 46, 48, 55, 118n8, 
189, 258; heterodiegetic (Genette) 
(vs. homodiegetic), 38−41, 48, 55, 
84, 194−95, 201; intradiegetic (Gen-
ette), 38−39, 46, 48, 55, 78, 188, 
197, 202; motivation for, 217, 221, 
223; of historical fiction, 40; overt 
(Chatman) (vs. covert), 46, 115−16, 
126, 128, 168; simultaneous (Cohn), 
282, 294 (see also fictional present 
and present-tense narration); third-
person, 38, 157n13, 158n14; unreli-
able, 120, 257; unreliable in film, 
171−74
narration (Genette), 206, 206n3
narrative: as report, 279; as sense-
making device, 234; conversational, 
13, 239; embedded, 49, 102; first-
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person, 44, 113, 115, 117n7, 118n8, 
128, 294; history of, 190; ‘natural’ 
(oral), 239n1, 279; reflector-mode, 
114–16, 117n7, 128, 169; rhetorical 
definition of, 278, 296; second-per-
son, 19, 248; syntax, 237; third-per-
son, 169; unnatural, 14, 14n15, 17, 
175, 275n3, 279−80, 291, 297−99
narrative clauses (Labov and Waletzky), 
240
narrative discourse (vs. story), 7, 13−14, 
16−19, 36−40, 47−49, 53, 71, 85, 
88, 105−11, 111n4, 114−19, 122, 
124, 126−29, 139−40, 146, 148, 
151−53, 157−58, 164, 192, 241, 
260, 262, 294; different definitions 
of, 105. See also syuzhet/sujet
narrative interviewing, 236
narrative levels, 35, 37−39, 41−46, 59, 
71, 77−78, 85, 105−7, 111, 114; 
extradiegetic level (Genette), 39, 46, 
68, 168, 249; intradiegetic/diegetic 
level (Genette), 39, 67−68, 78, 249; 
metadiegetic level (Genette), 38; 
hypodiegetic level (Bal), 64, 66−68, 
71−73, 78
narrative mediation, 105−6, 112−13, 
115−18, 120, 122−30, 260; exter-
nal/internal, 208−9, 214−16; action 
(Fludernik), 126; experiencing (Flud-
ernik), 126; reflecting (Fludernik), 
126; telling (Fludernik), 126; view-
ing (Fludernik), 126
narrative report, 105
narrative representation, 9, 15−16, 
35−37, 48, 55, 124
narrative situation (Stanzel), 106, 113, 
116, 128, 225−26 (see also typo-
logical circle); authorial, 44, 117n7, 
128; figural, 44−45, 115−17, 117n7, 
121; first-person, 44, 117n7, 118n8
narrative structure: same-sex; woman-
to-woman, 190
narrative transmission, 17, 35−41, 
44−45, 48, 51, 55, 107, 110−11, 
113−14, 119, 125−26, 128
narrative turn, 3
narrativity, 9, 16, 19, 60, 114, 150, 
236, 256, 259−60, 263, 269, 271, 
297n32; different definitions of, 105
narrativization (Fludernik), 269
narratologies: postclassical, 6−8, 11, 23, 
277
narratology, 2n2; classical (structuralist), 
1−4, 5−6, 6n7, 11, 58, 146, 267, 
271, 276−77; cognitive, 9n9, 11−12, 
14, 22n19, 139, 158, 263, 270; 
deconstructive, 3, 58; diachronic, 13 
(see also historical); feminist, 7; his-
torical, 6, 186 (see also diachronic); 
‘natural,’ 58, 234−35; neoclassi-
cal (Wolf), 79; postclassical, 1−6, 
11−12, 14, 16, 21−23, 58, 158−59, 
238, 256, 263, 277; second phase 
of, 4−5, 15−23, 158−59; postco-
lonial, 8; postmodernist, 14−15; 
queer, 7, 18; rhetorical, 9−11, 
35−56, 278−82; socionarratology, 
239; transmedial, 8−9, 17, 19, 158; 
unnatural, 14−15, 17, 275n3, 280
narrator, 105−7, 112−16, 118, 122−23, 
124−26, 128, 143−44, 151, 153−54, 
156−57, 202, 207, 210, 225, 
227−31, 244−50, 257−58, 275, 276, 
279, 294, 298−99; autodiegetic, 
207, 211n10, 219, 227, 230−31, 
260; cinematic, 9, 17, 107, 115, 
118, 128, 163−65, 168−69, 169n13, 
172n17, 173n19, 181; covert vs. 
overt (Chatman), 116, 126, 128, 
168; dramatic (Jahn), 9; engag-
ing (Warhol), 7; external (extra-
heterodiegetic), 209−10; first-person 
(Stanzel), 108, 276, 291; heterodi-
egetic (Genette) (vs. homodiegetic), 
10n12, 41, 84, 38−39, 168, 169n14, 
194, 200, 209; homodiegetic (Gen-
ette) (vs. heterodiegetic), 10n12, 
38−41, 46, 55, 118n8, 169n14, 
189, 211n10, 258; homodiegetic 
personalized, 210; omniscient, 38, 
108, 117n7; personalized (Stanzel), 
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210; voice-over, 9, 121, 126, 128, 
158n14, 168, 171, 174n20
narratorial persona, 114
naturalization (Culler/Fludernik), 268, 
275
no-mediation thesis (Walsh), 17, 
123−24, 130
no-narrator theory (Banfield), 114, 123, 
126−27. See also non-communica-
tion
non-communication, 282, 296−97, 299. 
See also no-narrator theory
non-diegetic inserts, 168, 168n12, 170
non-diegetic music and sound, 168, 
168n12, 170, 176
non-natural, 61
novel, 209−10, 229; courtship, 188, 
193, 200; dialogue, 115; domestic 
193, 199, 201; epistolary, 195, 197; 
Gothic, 44n6, 49, 73; history of, 
203; Modernist, 107; realist, 276n3; 
postmodernist, 14; Victorian, 
187−88, 201
omniscience, 45, 180, 276n3, 282
oral narratives, 19, 235−37, 239, 241, 
245−46, 250−51, 259, 279. See also 
oral storytelling
oral storytelling (see also oral narra-
tives), 244, 279
overdetermined texts (Nielsen), 284, 
291−92, 295−96
painting, 9, 21, 63, 67, 73−75, 78−79, 
126, 145
panfictionalism, 284
paratexts, 61−62, 66−67, 75; in film, 
170; in written texts, 276, 281−82, 
284−85, 287−88, 290, 296
parole (vs. langue) (Saussure), 6
person (Stanzel), 35, 37−41, 44−45
perspective (Stanzel), 106, 113; limited, 
45; external, 45
phoneme/phone dichotomy, 109
picture frame, 61−62, 75
plot, 7, 65, 84, 100, 104, 105n1, 106−8, 
110−11, 111n4, 119, 122−27, 129, 
188, 191−92, 194−201, 203, 212, 
230, 237, 243, 247−48, 257, 259, 
261, 292; dynamic of, 197
point of view, 106, 117n7, 118−19, 121, 
129
point-of-view (POV) shot, 51, 174
polychrony, 148
polyphony, 54
porn film, 165n7
pornography, 188, 190−93, 200
positioning, 19, 154−55; social, 235, 
250
possible-worlds theory, 2, 12, 59
postcolonialism, 11, 59, 78−79
postmodernism, 79, 123, 280
postmodernity, 21
pragmatics, 6, 12−13, 251n3
present-tense narration (Cohn), 38, 40. 
See also fictional present and simul-
taneous narration
prolepsis, 62. See also foreshadowing
protagonist, 18, 51, 106, 116, 121, 171, 
249, 291. See also character
psychoanalysis, 3−4, 18, 21, 211n9
psychonarration, 85, 122. See also 
thought report
qualia, 17, 156. See also what it’s like
queer, 3−4, 7−8, 11, 18, 21, 188, 192, 
199n9, 200
rapport, 244, 251
reader: implied, 10; real, 286
reader-response theory, 18, 78
realism, 187, 191, 260
récit (Genette), 115, 206n3
recursiveness, 36, 42, 44, 55
relevance theory, 251n3, 294, 296
remediation, 111, 144, 158n14
remedialization, 110−11, 125−28
repetition compulsion (Freud), 218, 230
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ressentiment, 151
rhetorical model, 10, 35−36, 40n5, 46
rival (Girard), 206, 208, 213−19, 
223−29. See also mediator
Russian formalism, 2n2, 4, 106
sapphic, 197−98, 200−201; dialogic, 18, 
188, 190, 201; dialogue, 191, 196, 
200; form, 189, 202; literary history, 
187; narration/narrative, 189−92, 
197; narrative layer, 189; (narrative) 
structure, 191−92, 196, 199, 202. 
See also lesbianism
schemata (cognitive), 11, 20, 61, 163, 
263−64, 264n5. See also frame
screen universe (Souriau), 39
script (cognitive), 11, 11n13, 19, 20, 
256, 264, 264n5
self vs. other, 268
setting, 63, 65, 70, 108, 110, 123
sexuality: history of, 188, 190, 203
shot-reverse shot, 120, 122
showing (vs. telling), 62−63, 65, 69, 
74−75, 116, 163, 169. See also 
mimesis
signifying (Gates), 8
slant (vs. filter) (Chatman), 107, 235, 
244−46, 250
social science research methods: qualita-
tive, 235; quantitative, 235
social sciences, 234−35, 238−39, 241, 
250
sociolinguistic narrative analysis, 235, 
237
soliloquy, 121−22
speech act, 154, 192; indirect, 40n5; 
theory, 3, 12, 109
stack, 42−43
story/discourse dichotomy, 13−14, 
16−19, 106−7, 109, 119, 127
story (vs. narrative discourse), 7−9, 18, 
36−38, 43, 49, 62−64, 66, 69−73, 
83, 85, 87, 102, 105−15, 118−19, 
121, 123−25, 127−29, 146−47, 151, 
154, 158, 163, 171−72, 187−91, 
194, 196−97, 200, 206−7, 206n3, 
209−13, 215−17, 219, 223−31, 262, 
265−66, 278−79, 286, 295. See also 
fabula, histoire, and Geschichte
story (vs. plot) (Forster), 106−7
storyworld (Herman), 39−41, 85, 87, 
98, 119, 130, 138n1, 139, 146−47, 
146n8, 148n10, 149, 150−51, 
155−57, 158n14, 159, 216, 242, 
244−46, 248, 250, 276n3, 299. See 
also diégèse and diegetic universe
syuzhet/sujet (vs. fabula), 106, 110, 124. 
See also narrative discourse
telling (vs. showing), 36−37, 62, 65, 69, 
75, 113, 115−118, 193, 126−28, 
130, 148, 155. See also diegesis
tense (Genette), 107, 115
text world theory, 146
theory of mind, 97−99
thought, 83, 90, 98; intermental 
(Palmer), 16, 83−86, 88−102, 104; 
intramental (Palmer), 16, 83−84, 
91−97, 99−103
thought report, 85, 89, 158n14. See also 
psychonarration
temporality 123, 191
transmediality, 9, 60, 67, 75
typological circle (Stanzel), 45. See also 
narrative situations
uncanny (das Unheimliche) (Freud), 213, 
292
uncanny (Todorov), 177n25
underreading (vs. overreading), 143; 
underdetermined texts (Nielsen), 
284−91, 295−96
unnatural, 14−15, 175, 291, 297; his-
torical development of, 14n15
unnatural narration, 296−99
unreliability, 13−14, 173n18, 173n19, 
195; cinematic, 120, 171−74, 181
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vocalization, 37
voice (Genette), 13−16, 21, 35−37, 
41, 44, 47−56, 107, 115, 118−19, 
128−30, 189, 192−93, 197, 199, 
257; as idiom, 36, 44, 44n6, 48−56; 
as instance, 36−37, 48−49, 52−56; 
as interpellation, 36, 52−56
we-narration, 8, 213, 226
what it’s like, 140, 156−57. See also 
qualia
wipe, 168
you-narrative, 235, 248−49
zoom, 52n11, 120, 122
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